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1. The playful citizen: An introduction
René Glas, Sybille Lammes, Michiel de Lange, Joost Raessens, 
and Imar de Vries
With the emergence of digital and mobile technologies, our conceptions 
and hopes of what citizen participation entails have changed profoundly. 
It seems as though interactive, networked, and cheap technologies have 
greatly democratized how literacies, knowledge, and power structures are 
generated and perceived in everyday life and that they have increased—and 
have further potential to increase—the degree of civic engagement. From 
playing, modifying, and designing games and interactive documentaries, and 
using playful tools and games for the production of alternative knowledges, 
to becoming protest-cartographers or pollution measurers, citizens appear 
to engage with, alter, and probe media technologies to a far greater extent 
than ever before. At the same time, we should be critical of what exactly 
these apparently enabling technologies do, and question what the drawbacks 
and the possibilities of digital media are for civic engagement.
In this edited volume, we provide an overview of the potentials and 
limitations of citizen engagement in the digital age through a selection of 
contributions from various academic f ields. These contributions discuss the 
many digital media technologies and developments that grew to prominence 
in the second decade of this century. From the Occupy Wall Street movement 
to the development of citizen science games, from new forms of participatory 
documentary f ilm-making to the rise and exploits of Reddit users, unifying 
all these topics is a sustained focus on what we consider to be ludic, or playful, 
engagement. It is through this view, we argue, that forms of partaking such 
as DIY, journalism, research, activism, art, or politics are to be understood. 
We would like to share a particularly striking example here, found in the 2010 
exhibition Space Invaders, organized by the National Gallery of Australia. 
Referring to the eponymous 1978 arcade video game, this playful exhibition 
celebrated the energy of graff iti culture and its street-based creativity 
(Babington 2010). Street artist MEEK’s contribution Begging For Change 
shows a homeless man holding a sign that reads “Keep your coins, I want 
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change.” This work’s explicit word play exhibits powerful social comments 
about the inadequacy of non-binding charity and compassion, and about 
the need for structural change (see Mouffe 2013, 64). From this particular 
instance of playful social commentary, we f ind we can extrapolate many 
other clues as to how forms of public participation in the early twenty-f irst 
century can be understood. Play, we posit, is an important theoretical 
principle for comprehending new manifestations of civic engagement.
With this book, we therefore want to further our interdisciplinary 
understanding of how media and citizenship can converge in contempo-
rary culture through the lens of play. In an era in which play has left the 
traditional playground and has pervaded domains traditionally perceived 
as non-playful, we need to get a better analytical purchase on how this shift 
has changed our approaches to citizenship as well as to media. The ongoing 
ludif ication of culture (Raessens 2014) and ludif ication of identity and self 
(Frissen et al. 2015) prompts us to rethink what citizenship is and how it 
can be understood, enacted, analyzed, and conceptualized in relation to 
media and play. If we have become more playful as citizens, in what ways 
and through which media is this manifested in our daily lives? Which 
media practices can we discern as evidencing and letting us understand the 
reciprocal relationship between ludif ication and citizenship? And should 
these practices be viewed as new ways to enhance and change the agency 
of citizens, or rather as facilitating and maintaining dominant hegemonies 
or assemblages of power (e.g. Lammes and Perkins 2016)? We set out to give 
a pluralistic answer to such questions by bringing together scholars from 
different f ields. They discuss a plethora of themes and topics, from game 
design to politics, pertaining to playful citizenship in the digital age.
The multifaceted framework we offer in this book builds on a corpus of 
academic literature that has previously drawn attention to the phenomenon 
of the ludif ication of culture and how culture can be understood through 
a playful lens (Fuchs 2012;1 Fuchs et al. 2014; Walz and Deterding 2015). 
It is important here to address the question whether the ludif ication of 
culture refers to, or is meant to be interpreted as, an ontological or an 
epistemological claim. The claim is ontological if it refers to a “new phase 
of history characterized so much by play that we can deem it a play world” 
(Combs 2000, 20). Or, as Eric Zimmerman declares in his Manifesto, if the 
claim is that we are living in a “Ludic Century” (2015).
In this book, we do focus on this ontological aspect of ludif ication of 
culture and society; however, our claim is also of an epistemological nature. 
1 All references to online sources were current as of 5 November 2018.
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We argue that the concepts of play and the ludification of culture are crucial 
for understanding what we call the “ludic turn in media theory” (Raessens 
2014, 109), and should be used as heuristic tools to shed new light on con-
temporary notions of citizenship, as lenses that make it possible to see new 
objects and phenomena in a different light and study them in a particular 
way. Both concepts enable us, as theorists, to identify poignant aspects of 
today’s media culture—and to construct a specif ic conceptual perspective 
on this culture. Zimmerman’s claim that we are living in a ludic century is 
both too broad and too narrow: it is too broad because it seems to suggest 
that we should have the whole twenty-f irst century as our research locus, 
and it is too narrow because the kind of research Zimmerman advocates 
is restricted to a game studies perspective. Our approach is rather more 
f inely drawn: we argue that we should become more specif ic by studying 
particular cultural, scientif ic, and political f ields and practices, and by 
doing so take into account broader developments that we wish to label as 
the ‘ludic’ or ‘playful’ turn taking place in these domains.
In tandem with academics noting a ludif ication of culture, especially in 
the social sciences, scholars have become increasingly interested in how 
digital and analog media can be used to engage citizens with their environ-
ments. From local citizen science projects (Nold 2009; Gabrys et al. 2016) 
to experimental, creative, and embodied projects (Calvillo 2012; Last 2012; 
McCormack 2013), these studies shed light on how media technologies can 
stimulate citizen participation through their performative, experimental, 
and creative affordances. While such studies at times implicitly relate 
citizenship to the ludic, we argue that creativity, experimentation, open-
endedness, and playful citizenship should be examined more directly as well.
This book is indebted to a rich array of studies that directly or indirectly 
examine the relation between citizenship, media technologies, and play. 
However, we want to take a step further in how we tie such perspectives 
together. What has not been thoroughly examined so far is how these three 
can be approached as a triadic relationship. Although studies about citizen 
science games, for example, may draw attention to the relation between 
science and games, they often underplay what citizenship is about. To 
be clear, it is often impossible to give equal attention to all three aspects 
and their reciprocal relations in individual studies, but it is precisely for 
this reason that an ordering, clustering, and contextualization of cases 
and analyses is needed to truly understand this triadic relation between 
citizenship, media, and play from a critical perspective.
We are convinced that such an ordering should go beyond disciplinary 
boundaries if we really want to start to understand citizenship, media, and 
12 R. GLAS, S. LAMMES, M. DE LANGE, J. RAESSENS, AND I . DE VRIES 
play from a multilayered perspective. The collected texts offer the reader 
a pluralistic perspective: we invited scholars and collected insights from 
diverse f ields such as (new) media studies, politics, science and technology 
studies, critical geography, design studies, game studies, play studies, com-
munication studies, and urban studies. This book should speak to anyone 
interested in how citizenship, media, and play are unfolding in the digital 
age and how we can develop a multifaceted and situated perspective to 
understand their relations and connections in productive ways. By bringing 
together a plethora of historical and more recent cases, and by including 
authors hailing from different fields to examine such phenomena, we present 
a book that critically investigates manifestations of citizenship, media, and 
play in contemporary digital culture.
Citizenship, media, and play
Our point of departure is the changing notion of what citizenship entails 
in our contemporary digital media culture. As Joyce Neys and Jeroen Jansz 
argue in their chapter in this volume, the importance of contributing to 
and interacting with democracy’s formal institutions is increasingly com-
plemented by citizens who express their political and civic engagement in 
different, playful ways. Analyzing the notions of play and playful media 
should subsequently enable us to better conceptualize our idea of ‘playful 
citizenship’.
Yet, as discussed before, this book aims to respond to the academic status 
quo in which the triadic relationship may have been under-theorized, but 
where dual relations have been conceptualized to a far greater extent. As 
will be discussed below, the relationship between certain pairs within 
our triad of citizenship-media-play has already been fairly well studied, 
namely in the case of media and citizenship, and of playful media. Our 
line of argumentation is as follows. First, the relationship between media 
and citizenship stands in a long theoretical, predominantly sociological 
tradition, including the more interdisciplinary f ield of communication 
studies. Therefore, discussions overwhelmingly emphasize citizenship as 
shaped by information and communication media (mass media and more 
recently social media). Recently, more attention has been paid to other 
technologies, practices, and approaches. This includes gaming, urban mobile 
media use, sensing technologies, dataf ication, media practices other than 
mostly rational and deliberative communication practices, and an emphasis 
on the imaginative, creative, and affective as important dimensions for 
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understanding civic media. Second, we observe that media and associated 
media cultures have become more playful. Many authors point to this 
ludification of digital technologies, and the culture of playfulness this fosters 
and taps into. Accordingly, we also need to redefine citizenship as playful 
and make clear what this notion of playful citizenship means within the 
domains of culture, science, and politics.
New media and changing civic engagement
Civic participation can be described as the extended involvement of 
individuals in a collective political decision-making process (Gordon and 
Mihailidis 2016; Koc-Michalska, Lilleker and Vedel 2016; Skoric et al. 2016). 
Broadly speaking, we can discern a rights-based model of citizenship, a 
duty-based sense of citizenship, and a contemporary kind of actualizing 
citizenship (cf. Hartley 2010). Each of these models highlights a different 
type of civic agency and mode of participation. And, as Kligler-Vilenchik 
notes, each citizenship model come with its own way of understanding 
media in relation to citizenship (Kligler-Vilenchik 2017, 1890).
First, in the rights-based view of citizenship, instruments for civic par-
ticipation include voting, campaigning, demonstrating, contacting elected 
representatives, joining political organizations, access to the judicial system, 
and so on. This emphasis on institutions underpins an understanding of 
citizenship in terms of what Margaret Somers calls “the right to have rights” 
(2008, xiv). This citizenship model highlights the power dynamics between 
state, market, and civil society. Governments are often the legal owners 
of issues and the ultimate decision-makers. Communication tends to be 
managed by authorities. Citizens have varying degrees of rights to obtain 
information and limited opportunity to voice their opinions using media. 
With the rise of mass media, a plethora of institutions and (global) corpora-
tions have increasingly started to lobby for their interests and likewise have 
become political agents that use various media strategically.
Second, in what Bennett, Wells, and Freelon (after Schudson 1998) refer 
to as ‘dutiful citizenship,’ individuals participate in civic life by joining or 
forming organized groups, by becoming more informed via the news, and 
by engaging in public life based on a sense of personal or collective duty 
(2011, 838). This model of citizenship understands civic participation as being 
driven by a sense of responsibility, or out of obedience to public authorities 
(Ibid., 839). Thus, citizenship is a form of socialization.
Third, digital media technologies are frequently understood as a driving 
force of civic participation. This would necessitate a reconceptualization of 
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citizenship. In the context of studies of young people’s use of online media, 
Bennett, Wells, and Freelon identify the rise of what they call ‘actualizing 
citizenship,’ in order to draw attention to the ways in which self-expression, 
emotional involvement, and intrinsic motivation are key elements in peer 
networks sustained via social media. Elsewhere, Bennett and Segerberg 
argue that we need to rephrase ‘collective action,’ based on high levels 
of organizational resources and the formation of collective identities, as 
‘connective action,’ which is based on personalized content sharing across 
media networks (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). Other authors have similarly 
focused on civic involvement through various media as a way to highlight 
everyday practices of the political rather than formalized institutional 
politics. With digital media technologies, ‘networked publics’ can engage 
with shared issues and material objects of concern (Latour 2005; Marres 
2007, 2012; Varnelis 2008). Technologies empower people to monitor is-
sues collectively and act upon them. Schudson calls this kind of active 
civic engagement ‘monitorial citizenship’ (Schudson 1998, 311-312). In this 
changing landscape of mediated citizenship, citizens increasingly feel a 
sense of collective ownership of complex (urban) issues (De Lange and De 
Waal 2013). At the same time, John Hartley observes the emergence of a 
‘silly citizenship’ (Hartley 2010), in which comedy, satire, viral videos, and 
other manifestations of playful media revolve around attracting people’s 
attention in the mediated political landscape. Hartley observes: “It is as 
much dramatic and performative as it is deliberative. The play’s the thing, 
as DIY-citizens, many of them children, perform their own identities and 
relations” (Ibid., 241).
Civic engagement thus is increasingly understood in this third sense, by 
focusing on personal experiences and affectively charged social networks. 
Some have argued that digital media afford more casual practices of engage-
ment. Critics highlight how media divert attention away from real issues 
and trick people into pseudo-participation, bordering on ‘make-believe’ 
involvement, with ‘slacktivism’ and ‘clicktivism’ (e.g. Morozov 2011; Tufekci 
2017). While these authors take a very critical perspective, Alex Gekker, 
in his contribution to this volume, takes into account the limitations and 
opportunities of this development. He reworks Jesper Juul’s notion of ‘casual 
games’ (Juul 2009) and calls this new type of participation ‘casual politicking’.
Most theories on media and citizenship focus on communication aspects 
and, by extension, community dynamics. In communication studies and 
sociology, a key debate in the discussion about media and civic engagement 
concerns reinforcement theory versus mobilization theory. The reinforce-
ment thesis holds that media cater for more of the same and thus help to 
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establish more f irmly what someone already believes. This is frequently 
labeled using terms like balkanization, f ilter bubble, capsularization, or 
parochialism. Mobilization theory, by contrast, argues that media expose 
people to new ideas and different perspectives, and therefore allow people 
to become better acquainted with ideas and standpoints beyond their 
known world. In terms of social capital, the reinforcement thesis emphasizes 
the tendency of media to strengthen ‘bonding capital’ and ‘strong ties,’ 
while the mobilization thesis underlines the potential of media to foster 
‘bridging capital’ and ‘weak ties’ (Skoric et al. 2016). Mercedes Bunz, in her 
contribution, uses this tension to highlight how digital media can both 
facilitate increased participation and, at the same time, contribute to an 
additional splintering of publics.
Further specifying the relationship between new media and citizen-
ship, we can identify three groups of questions, dealing with information, 
communication, and action. First, an information-based understanding of 
citizenship looks at what constitutes ‘the well-informed citizen.’ The ‘good 
citizen’ is a well-informed citizen. What happens to citizenship when digital 
media technologies and platforms become prominent as new sources of 
information? For example, in their chapter, Jessica Breen, Shannon Dosema-
gen, Don Blair, and Liz Barry address the question of what constitutes new 
types of citizen-generated information and knowledge, and how this is 
conveyed. Second, a communication-based view approaches citizenship 
in terms of social identities. The good citizen is a community member, 
local or imagined. What happens to this communal type of citizenship 
with the rise of digital media technologies and practices? Digital media 
shape how we connect to and feel part of groups, communities, and publics. 
New forms of distribution and the digital self that have emerged in the 
digital age complicate our senses of belonging and identity. Again, play is an 
important element for understanding this shift in social identity. Jennifer 
Gabrys, for instance, analyzes community-led citizen sensing projects in 
her contribution as a new form of environmental citizenship. Third, a focus 
on action highlights how citizenship emerges by doing things collectively, 
often with a common purpose. The good citizen is a creative entrepreneur. 
How do digital media technologies afford new modes of action? For instance, 
in his chapter, Douglas Rushkoff analyzes these issues by focusing on the 
Occupy movement, while William Uricchio focuses on how people actively 
engage with interactive documentaries.
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Play and playful media
In this introduction and throughout this book, we develop a framework for 
approaching citizenship in the digital age through play, with play as both 
a heuristic tool for understanding citizenship (a way of looking), and a set 
of civic practices (a way of doing). A key strength of the notion of playful 
citizenship is that it opens up a productive space to start reconceptual-
izing citizenship in a post-identitarian age, venturing beyond sedimented 
categories of group aff iliations. Play offers a new set of terms to recast 
today’s practices around citizenship in more dynamic and processual terms: 
as experimental, as rehearsal, as continual competition, as joking and mis-
chievous, as engaging and participatory, as a type of meta-communication, 
and so on.
An important step in our argument is that media themselves have playful 
qualities that warrant a reconceptualization of citizenship. Although play 
has always been a constituent element of many cultural practices (Huizinga 
1955), since the 1960s, a tendency can be discerned in which daily cultural 
practices have become far more imbued with play. This cultural shift has 
further accelerated with the emergence of a myriad of digital technologies, 
which impels us to think of the modern digital age in terms of a playful 
media culture (Frissen et al. 2015) where play has become increasingly 
connected with daily activities. This is, for example, evident in our changing 
attitudes to work, travel, politics, or the economy. But let us f irst unpack 
the notion of play.
Most people would associate the activity of play with games, but to engage 
with the notion of play in a broader socio-cultural perspective we start from 
a more general definition. A very basic definition is given by Salen and Zim-
merman, who consider play as “free movement within a more rigid structure” 
(2004, 304). While some chapters in this volume do discuss play in relation 
to games, in other chapters play is understood in this very general form: 
as seeking the ‘play’ in an established mechanism or structure, which can 
be a media technology, but also politics, art, or scientif ic research. In both 
a game-related definition and a more general one, play can be considered 
a problem-solving force. As Salen and Zimmerman point out, “when play 
occurs, it can overflow and overwhelm the more rigid structure in which 
it is taking place, generating emergent, unpredictable results,” potentially 
even leading to transformative play where “the force of play is so powerful 
that it can change the structure itself” (Ibid., 305). The notion of play having 
transformative power has by now been pushed far beyond games—think 
of notions of ‘critical play’ (Flanagan 2009) and ‘carnivalesque play’ (Sicart 
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2014), or of popular game designers like Jane McGonigal foreseeing “games 
that augment our most essential human capabilities—to be happy, resilient, 
creative—and empower us to change the world in meaningful ways” (2011, 
14). Such lines of reasoning have since become very much in vogue as the 
simultaneous ludif ication and digitization of culture has given rise to new 
connections between citizenship and participatory media technologies 
that are shaping our culture.
The connection between media technologies and play is, of course, not 
new. Scholars within and well beyond the f ield of game studies have already 
established the link between various media and play (Stephenson 1967; Fiske 
1987; Silverstone 1999; Kerr, Kücklich, and Brereton 2006; Raessens 2006; 
Simons 2007; Buckland 2009; Sicart 2014; Frissen et al. 2015), but very few 
of these studies focus on the sociocultural implications of this playfulness 
in media, let alone on citizenship.
We should be cautious, though, not to overstate the potential of play 
and, consequently, games and other playful media. In their critical political 
analysis of the digital gaming phenomenon, Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig 
de Peuter remind us that we should not consider play as necessarily or 
inherently empowering or democratizing (2009). For them, games are also 
the exemplary media of ‘Empire,’ Hardt and Negri’s concept for describing 
postmodern global capitalism (2000). Similarly critical views have also 
already been expressed about phenomena like gamification (e.g. Bogost 2011a, 
2011b; Fuchs et al. 2014; Walz and Deterding 2015). The question remains 
in what ways we have become empowered and where the limitations of 
our participatory powers lie. Games can motivate citizens to engage in 
citizen science and make players become ecological citizens by encouraging 
support, sympathy, and action for a variety of scientif ic and ecological 
issues. Cheap embeddable sensors, portable wireless communications, 
and computation technologies, paired with crowd-sourcing, networking, 
and co-creation principles from online culture, may all leverage citizens’ 
involvement in gathering, visualizing, disseminating, and producing data, 
information, and forms of knowledge and culture. Even though they may 
inspire citizens to become involved and thus help overcome asymmetries 
between where power is produced and where it is ‘lived’ (see Latour 2003), 
we still need to examine further where exactly their strength lies as well 
as the limitations of the affordances such media technologies really offer 
to change the way we perceive and engage in active citizenship (see also 
the chapters by Anne-Marie Schleiner and Ingrid Hoofd in this volume).
Another gap we aim to f ill is giving attention to some of the sociocultural 
implications of an increasingly playful media landscape. Lievrouw and 
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Livingstone (2002) propose that we think of media as composed of three 
elements: technical devices, social practices, and institutional arrangements. 
This provides a useful framework to zoom in on the playful qualities of 
media technologies. At the level of devices, we can see that Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have playful affordances (see also 
the chapter by Joost Raessens in this volume). In addition, we observe that 
new technologies are often approached and understood in playful ways, 
opening up room for playful exploration and experimentation. At the level 
of practices, we similarly see a plethora of playful or lusory attitudes (Suits 
1978) and uses of ICTs that can be extended to reflections about playful 
citizenship. Think about the origins of computing culture in the playful 
hacking practices of MIT students, and hardware hackers of the West Coast 
(see also the chapter by Stefan Werning in this volume). Thirdly, at the 
level of institutional arrangements and protocols, we contend that play is a 
productive heuristic for focusing on more structural aspects of media and 
citizenship. On the one hand, play provides a rich arsenal of strategies to 
deal with today’s complexity, uncertainty, risk, and network society. We see 
this in new arrangements for innovation and creativity: experimentation, 
(urban) living labs, self-learning networks, social movements, with room 
for improvisation and failure (see also the chapters by Eric Gordon and 
Stephen Walter, and by Mark Deuze and Lindsay Ems in this volume). On 
the other hand, play highlights the fact of being played: under the moniker 
of participatory media, people are being nudged into compliance, as a 
neoliberal ploy to extract free labor veiled as creative play done of your own 
free will (see also the chapter by Sonia Fizek and Anne Dippel in this volume).
Playful citizenship
So far in this introductory chapter, we have discussed the dual relationships 
between media and citizenship on the one hand, and media and play on 
the other. We now want to focus on the link between play and citizenship. 
One of the f irst scholars who paid attention to this relationship was the 
Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, who, in his Homo ludens (1955), put forward 
the notion of play as generative and constituting the ‘origin’ of human 
civilization. He concludes his long treatise on play with the argument that 
“civilization is, in its earliest phases, played. It does not come from play like 
a babe detaching itself from the womb: it arises in and as play, and never 
leaves it” (1955, 173, emphasis in original). It is important to point out here 
that Huizinga was critical about the interwar period, when he saw the play 
element in culture turn into barbaric “puerilism” (Ibid., 205). To tie this into 
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our argument with some poetic license, he was also aware that play could 
spoil the potential for civic engagement. He nonetheless pointed out that:
[R]eal civilization cannot exist in the absence of a certain play-element, 
for civilization presupposes limitation and mastery of the self, the ability 
not to confuse its own tendencies with the ultimate and highest goal, but 
to understand that it is enclosed within certain bounds freely accepted. 
Civilization will, in a sense, always be played according to certain rules, 
and true civilization will always demand fair play. (Ibid., 201)
Building upon Huizinga’s ethical reflections, we contend that play is an 
indispensable ingredient for building a civic society and citizenship. Yet, 
we are also critical of how Huizinga, motivated by the troubled interwar 
period, relates ‘good’ civilization to sticking to the rules of play. Instead, we 
also see potential in not playing by the rules, in bending rules, or changing 
rules. For Huizinga, cheating and being a spoilsport “shatters civilization” 
(Huizinga 1955, 201). However, there have since been many instances that 
demonstrate that transgressive forms of play can also present and produce 
new forms of civil resistance, or even ludic anarchy, the latter powerfully 
demonstrated by the Situationist movement in the late 1950s and 1960s. Such 
playful practices, in which citizens as players, political activists, artists, or 
provocateurs creatively engage with bending, shattering, or ignoring rules, 
can result in highly productive ways for citizens to engage with and give 
shape to their civic society.
The unruly dimension of play and citizenship is addressed by René Glas 
and Sybille Lammes in this volume when they discuss ludo-epistemology 
and meaningful citizen participation in processes of knowledge production. 
It is also touched upon by Ben Schouten, Erik van der Spek, Daniël Harmsen, 
and Ellis Bartholomeus, as well as by Stephanie de Smale, in their analyses of 
non-expert forms of knowledge production. Furthermore, in the contribution 
by Michiel de Lange attention is drawn to the destabilizing, yet productive 
potential of play when speaking about creative engagement with urban 
issues, while Sam Hind points to creative aspects of protest as a disruptive 
human and non-human practice.
We want to show the situatedness of playful citizenship and how specif ic 
cases either destabilize, or consolidate notions of citizenship and society 
through creative and playful approaches. As such, we see play as a manifold 
phenomenon and are critical, yet open to how it can change, stabilize, and 
undermine our classical notions of citizenship. We want to offer readers a 
kaleidoscopic view of the ludic potential of playful citizenship.
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Structure of the book
Now that we have established the notion of playful citizenship, we want to 
present it as a productive label for bundling and identifying common threads 
in a variety of empirical phenomena as interrelated, from citizen science to 
political activism, from online gaming to urban planning. To give structure 
to the breadth of contributions, we have divided this book into three parts, 
each pertaining to the notion of play: ludo-literacies, ludo-epistemologies, 
and ludo-politics. These three parts, discussed below, form a new way of 
ordering the emerging technologies and developments of the past decade 
that relate to the notion of playful citizenship. The three parts of the book do 
not delineate strict borders; inevitably there is quite some overlap in themes 
and topics. The chapters in each part nonetheless point toward a specif ic 
relational context in which we can situate and understand contemporary 
playful citizenship.
Ludo-literacies
As indicated earlier, play is permeating our daily lives more than ever. It is 
not just the omnipresence of games in many people’s media diet, but the 
ludif ication of culture in general that should be addressed to understand 
this properly. And, as Matthias Fuchs argues, “societies with high lusory 
attitude will turn anything into games or into toys,” which results in media 
technologies with increasingly ludic interfaces, thus advancing the process of 
ludif ication ever further (Fuchs 2012). This makes it all the more important 
to be able to understand the nature of contemporary games and play as part 
of critical media literacy.
According to Zagal, games literacy entails having the ability to play 
games, the ability to understand meanings with respect to games, and the 
ability to make games (2010, 23). Whereas the ability to play is functional, the 
ability to understand games is critical. Zagal defines understanding games 
as “the ability to explain, discuss, describe, frame, situate, interpret, and/or 
position games” in the context of human culture, other games, technological 
platforms and their ontological components (Ibid., 24). The third ability of 
games literacy moves from critical to creative, as understanding turns into 
the more active role of designing one’s own preconditions for play.
For Zimmerman, this design-oriented take on literacy is key for what 
he calls gaming literacy, a new set of cognitive, creative, and social skills 
that point to “a new paradigm for what it will mean to become literate 
in the coming century” (2009, 25). Zimmerman thinks the mischievous 
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meaning connoted by the term ‘gaming’ (rather than by ‘games’) is deliber-
ate: “Gaming a system, means f inding hidden shortcuts and cheats, and 
bending and modifying rules in order to move through the system more 
eff iciently—perhaps to misbehave, but perhaps to change that system for 
the better” (Ibid.). Here, we see notions of games literacy that, through their 
critical and creative dimensions, align with more critical takes on media 
literacy that focus on active citizenship. As Kellner and Share point out:
Critical media literacy involves cultivating skills in analyzing media 
codes and conventions, abilities to criticize stereotypes, dominant values, 
and ideologies, and competencies to interpret the multiple meanings 
and messages generated by media texts. Media literacy helps people to 
use media intelligently, to discriminate and evaluate media content, to 
critically dissect media forms, to investigate media effects and uses, and 
to construct alternative media. (2005, 372)
They too stress the importance of being able not only to understand media, 
but also to intervene through participatory, creative media practices.
In the chapters in Part I: Ludo-literacies, we take these three different 
aspects of games-related literacies as our point of departure. Joyce Neys 
and Jeroen Jansz show that playing political games can contribute to an 
increase in political participation and political engagement. Next, Stefan 
Werning and William Uricchio analyze how designing, modifying, and 
producing games and interactive documentaries can be considered to be 
forms of creative, cultural, and political expression, as a means of developing 
the player’s critical understanding of the medium. Finally, Joost Raessens, 
Anne-Marie Schleiner, and Ingrid Hoofd claim that making sense of games 
requires an understanding of the social, cultural, and political context in 
which these games are made and played.
Ludo-epistemologies
In the second part of this book, we look at the connections between play, 
media, and citizenship from the perspective of knowledge production. Using 
the term ‘ludo-epistemology,’ we have grouped together authors who use 
different perspectives on whether play and epistemology can form produc-
tive relations and how this is done. Under the header of ludo-epistemology, 
we see strategies that move away from a top-down conception of knowledge 
production, instead incorporating citizens’ daily practices into the equation. 
Inspired by Feyerabend’s term ‘anarcho-epistemology,’ which he introduced 
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to prompt a radical transformation in how knowledge is understood and 
made—scientists are citizens too—we argue for a shift to focus on play in 
order to achieve this. Similar to Feyerabend’s (1978, 1987, 1993) anarchic and 
somewhat ‘messy’ (see Law 2004), yet possibly less radical approach, play 
also has strong potential for overcoming asymmetrical relations between 
traditional bastions of knowledge production (e.g. the laboratory) and how 
techno-science is used in daily life by citizens (Latour 2003). However, it 
puts more emphasis on the creative, imaginative, subversive, and inquisitive 
qualities that can be part of knowledge production. This is exactly what 
lies at the core of this part of the book: it is through play that epistemology 
becomes more participatory.
We agree with Sutton-Smith (2001) that play is always ambiguous and 
can be attributed contradictory or paradoxical meanings. In relation to 
knowledge production, ambiguity affects not only play, but also a preconcep-
tion regarding the distinction between science and citizenship. According 
to this view, citizens are considered lay people while scientists are experts. 
Such thinking, we argue, prevents us from developing more innovative 
strategies (in design, method, or thinking) for meaningful connections 
between citizenship and science that truly use the potential of the playful 
citizen as an actor in techno-scientif ic knowledge production. At the same 
time, the contributions to this part of the book show that we need to keep 
a close eye on critical questions about when and how modes of play, like 
tinkering, tweaking, reshaping, and even cheating, become tools that subvert 
or even clash with knowledge production in terms of usefulness and the 
ethics of participation and civic action.
Part II: Ludo-epistemologies aims to give answers to these questions from 
two key perspectives. The f irst three chapters of this section zoom in on 
citizen science projects as they are enacted in daily live. From Jessica Breen, 
Shannon Dosemagen, Don Blair, and Liz Barry describing the hands-on 
tactics advocated by the Public Lab for mapping pollution, to the sensing 
projects examined and compared by media and science and technology 
studies scholar Jennifer Gabrys, and the biohacking project discussed by 
game and media scholar Stephanie de Smale, these chapters offer the reader 
a taste of ways in which play can be used in everyday life to turn citizens into 
experts and give them a creative voice in producing ‘artefacts’ that can have 
a direct impact on their livelihood and well-being. The last three chapters in 
this section also form a triad, this time centering on the potential and pitfalls 
of citizen science games. René Glas and Sybille Lammes combine science 
and technology studies (STS) and game studies perspectives to arrive at 
recommendations on how to change the aforementioned asymmetries, while 
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Ben Schouten, Erik van der Spek, Daniël Harmsen, and Ellis Bartholomeus 
approach this from a design perspective. Lastly, Sonia Fizek and Anne 
Dippel are perhaps less optimistic when they warn how the labor involved 
in citizen science games can also be used to enforce neoliberal ideologies.
Ludo-politics
The third part of this book collects contributions discussing how ludic 
engagement with digital media technologies offers new opportunities to 
‘act politically.’ These chapters suggest several tensions in the relationship 
between playful media and political agency. While acknowledging that these 
tensions cannot be completely resolved, the authors investigate where and 
how those tensions occur, and what perspectives help in understanding the 
limitations and opportunities in dealing with them.
The f irst tension frames playful media between strengthening individual 
and collective agency, and co-optation. Playful media can help to build 
networked publics around shared issues of concern, but can also consolidate 
existing institutional structures and corporate interests. Cloaked as fun 
and play, they foster pseudo-participation or ‘tokenism’ (Arnstein 1969), 
confining agency to what Müller (2009) terms ‘formatted spaces of participa-
tion.’ Some argue that discourses about participatory media as disruptive 
change agents in effect serve as simulacra for true political action. In an 
age of political consensus—which Chantal Mouffe (2005) has called ‘post-
politics’—the logic of participatory media platforms sustains the neoliberal 
consensus, and a ‘Californian ideology’ of individual responsibility and 
entrepreneurialism. A closely related second tension revolves around the 
question of whether social media platforms help to strengthen or erode 
collective action and public values. A growing number of authors—e.g. 
Trebor Scholz (2016); Van Dijck, Poell and De Waal (2018)—are critical of 
what is called the ‘sharing economy.’ Play then acts as a thin veneer for an 
underlying political economy of relentless extraction of free or low-paid 
labor and value. Recent publications (e.g. Rathenau Institute 2017) underline 
the possible harm this increasing reliance on participatory platforms could 
do to historically nurtured public values and democratic institutions. A 
third tension is whether playful media help to unify the public realm or 
further accentuate social differences. As discussed above, some people 
are ludo-literate and make productive use of media technologies, whereas 
others may not be able to. Hence civic rights are not the same for all. Playful 
media thus may contribute to social sorting by fragmenting the public into 
what we could call participation readiness levels.
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Throughout Part III: Ludo-politics, authors explore how playful media, 
ludic strategies, and tactics are employed in civic contexts to deal with 
these tensions. Mercedes Bunz sets the scene by arguing that new and 
playful forms of political participation do not necessarily allow revolution-
ary change and may not even provide suff icient friction and debate for 
real changes to occur. The four chapters that follow aim to show that 
there are productive frictions that can be generated in playful citizen 
activities, by staging carnivalesque interventions that use Twitter as a 
means for organizing and disrupting activities (Sam Hind), by incorporat-
ing play-like ‘meaningful ineff iciencies’ in all kinds of everyday societal 
processes and systems (Eric Gordon and Stephen Walter), by approaching 
political gatherings from a player/hacker’s point of view, rewriting general 
assembly rules and prototyping new ones (Douglas Rushkoff), or by mov-
ing away from eff iciency-driven plans for building ‘smart cities’ to more 
serendipity-embracing projects including the participation of people in 
creating ‘playful cities’ (Michiel de Lange). The last two chapters in the 
book advocate a cautionary stance in analyzing and praising playful uses 
of new media technologies to create f issures in power. Playful citizenship 
is not guaranteed to deliver on its promises when it is driven by a means-
over-end attitude (Mark Deuze and Lindsay Ems), or when the political 
arena itself becomes a game in which people predominantly casually 
participate (Alex Gekker).
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 Introduction to Part I
René Glas, Sybille Lammes, Michiel de Lange, Joost Raessens, 
and Imar de Vries
In the f irst part of this book, we present a collection of chapters on the 
relationship between the design of games and other playful media on the 
one hand, and the politics of citizenship and participation on the other. 
More specif ically, all the chapters relate to notions of ‘ludo-literacy’ as 
discussed in the Introduction. In what follows, various elements of games 
and play-related literacy—being able to play, critically understand, and 
create games—come into view, showing that without such literacy, citizens 
lack the critical skills to understand how game and playful design operates. 
These elements also allow game and playful media developers to enrich their 
work, creating more interesting, participatory experiences. Such skills, as 
will become clear, can be employed for political gains and needs, but also 
for acts of resistance. Moreover, having a critical understanding of games 
will allow us to think about the limitations of civic game design.
One key question asked when discussing games with political themes or 
goals is in what ways they facilitate civic engagement and political engage-
ment. In the f irst chapter of Part I, entitled Engagement in play, engage-
ment in politics: Playing political video games, media and communication 
scholars Joyce Neys and Jeroen Jansz ask this very question. What makes 
this work especially interesting as a starting point for this collection is their 
exploration of contemporary notions of citizenship and how these notions 
relate to modern (Western) democracies. They look at what constitutes a 
‘good citizen’ in our contemporary mediatized culture and how political 
games arouse civic engagement and political participation in their players. 
Discussing both theory and empirical f indings, Neys and Jansz highlight the 
persuasive potential of games, but they also call for further investigations 
of these effects.
New media and games scholar Stefan Werning is also interested in the 
relationship between citizenship and engaging with games, but he ap-
proaches this subject from the perspective of design rather than play. His 
chapter, Analytical game design: Game-making as a cultural technique in a 
gamified society, highlights an aspect of ludo-literacy—game design—that 
is key to understanding how games and playful media operate. According to 
Werning, being an independent citizen requires a basic knowledge of how 
software and programming operates due to our society’s heavily reliance 
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on digital media. Game-making, he argues, should be seen as a cultural 
technique. By engaging with ‘analytical’ game design experiments, the 
process of game creation allows citizens to understand and give shape to 
their surroundings, moving beyond enhanced ludo-literacy toward active 
civic engagement.
Moving away from games, media scholar William Uricchio focuses on 
interactive documentaries as a playful format in his chapter entitled Re-
thinking the social documentary. In this chapter, he stresses the potential 
of this new documentary f ilm format for increasing the participation of 
viewers in the creation of documentary productions. He shows that through 
playful participation, viewers can collaborate and co-create with makers, 
influencing the f inal product. It allows viewers to pick and reorder content 
that they f ind relevant for their own personal engagement with a certain 
topic. This creates individual experiences and is a move away from hav-
ing a strong authorial voice. For social impact documentaries, he points 
out, being able to trace and collect such individual experiences could also 
provide further insight into how civic engagement through contemporary 
media actually works. Uricchio’s chapter presents a strong case for the civic 
potential of allowing viewers to play with the documentary f ilm format, 
foregrounding the interactive documentary as a potent challenger for its 
traditional linear and author-driven counterpart.
In contrast to the previous chapter, new media and game scholar Joost 
Raessens focuses on a close reading of one particular example of a political 
game, the ecology-themed online production of Collapsus – Energy Risk 
Conspiracy. In his chapter, entitled Collapsus, or how to make players become 
ecological citizens, he aims to tackle the psychological climate paradox, 
namely the observation that the more climate facts people hear, the less likely 
they are to take action. The question is whether climate communication 
can be channeled through a game in such a way that it actually manages 
to change citizens’ thinking and behavior regarding climate change issues.
The contributions by Neys and Jansz, and Werning provide more general 
overviews of the potential of playing and making politically charged games, 
while Uricchio and Raessens focus on the potential of a new playful genre 
and a specific production respectively. The f inal two chapters in this section 
of the book take a more critical stance on the often alleged or implied 
emancipatory or empowering potential of such productions. In her chapter 
The broken toy tactic: Clockwork worlds and activist games, media artist 
and theorist Anne-Marie Schleiner takes the procedurality of games as 
her focal point. She examines what she refers to as the ‘toyness’ of activist 
simulation games, a ludic abstraction of the real world that can negate a 
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game’s potential critical impact. It reminds us that we should not take the 
persuasive capacity of procedural rhetoric as a given: the clockwork logic 
of a game can be so enchanting to the player that he or she can lose track 
of its argument. To confront players with the inner workings of a game, and 
consequently its inner argument, might require such toys to be broken by 
disruptive game design or deviant player strategies.
Finally, new media theorist Ingrid Hoofd tackles the civic potential of 
digital play head-on in a chapter entitled Video games and the engaged 
citizen: On the ambiguity of digital play. With a critical reading of a key piece 
of empirical research on the civic potential of games, she unpacks the overly 
positivist undertones of such research. By situating political games in a 
larger framework where digital play meets global neoliberal capitalism, she 
points out that games that might look empowering or emancipatory actually 
make such notions part of the pre-shaped and predicated mechanical logic 
of games. Taking cues from Baudrillard, who discusses the seductive nature 
of games that try to divert energy away from efforts to actually change a 
system, Hoofd considers playing games as engaging with the highest-order 
demands of cybernetic capitalism. This, she argues, applies to most civic 
games as well. Like Schleiner, though, she recognizes ways for resistance 
and subversion through playful self-reflexivity and hacking practices.
2. Engagement in play, engagement in 
politics : Playing political video games
Joyce Neys and Jeroen Jansz
Abstract
It is a widely shared value in Western democracies that citizens should 
engage with political and social issues. This engagement is not necessarily 
confined to party politics, but includes other aspects of citizenship as well, 
from commitment to a local cause to supporting the global campaign of an 
NGO. Video games are arguably an excellent platform for encouraging and 
developing such engagement. Playing may facilitate civic engagement by 
allowing players to practice and experience different civic competencies 
in the safe environment of the game. This chapter discusses the results of 
research in this up-and-coming f ield and critically assesses those results 
in light of the opportunities this form of play might offer citizens when 
negotiating contemporary forms of citizenship.
Keywords: Civic engagement, citizenship, media, play, serious games, 
persuasive gaming
This chapter explores whether playing political video games can facilitate 
civic engagement and, if so, how it encourages political participation. Over 
the last several decades, there has been an increasing academic focus 
on the diverse properties, characteristics, effects, and consequences of 
games and gaming. The research spans across a wide variety of topics that 
range from addiction and other negative effects of excessive gaming, to 
a focus on simulation from a design and educational perspective, to the 
beneficial effects of games in relation to health issues (e.g. revalidation and 
exergames). These topics have been scrutinized from different perspectives. 
Games have been analyzed from an economic perspective (focusing on the 
multimillion-dollar game industry), a psychological perspective (addressing 
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a wide range of motivational questions), an educational perspective (where 
games are studied in the context of formal and informal learning), and 
a cultural perspective (where games are studied as cultural artifacts of 
play) (Raessens and Goldstein 2005; Ritterfeld, Cody, and Vorderer 2009). 
In other words, the f ield of game studies is maturing and is thus providing 
additional knowledge that contributes to a better understanding of the 
relationship between gaming and culture. We see, slowly but surely, the 
f ield moving away from the bad versus good debate and starting to ask 
the bigger questions: how and in what settings can games best be used to 
what end?
The immense global popularity of playing video games is one important 
instance of what Raessens has called “the ludification of culture” (2006, 2014). 
However, ludif ication is by no means confined to playing (entertainment) 
games as playfulness increasingly penetrates different cultural domains 
(Frissen et al. 2015, 9). For example, leisure time (fun shopping), work 
(presenting repetitive tasks in a playful manner), and school (edugames). 
In this chapter, we will focus on the political domain. We aim to investigate 
whether and, if so, how citizens might become engaged in politics by play-
ing (political) video games. We will discuss both games that purposively 
communicate a political message, as well as games with more indirect 
political implications.
The chapter starts by exploring contemporary notions of citizenship and 
what that entails in today’s (Western) democracies. Related to the shifting 
conceptualization of citizenship, or what it means to be a good citizen, 
the changing media landscape is briefly discussed, after which we zoom 
in on games. We then move to discuss the wider notion of play in relation 
to engagement and how there are indications slowly starting to emerge 
that games are an excellent tool to engage (young) people, also in more 
political matters, even though it also becomes clear that ‘true’ engagement, 
or extended and substantial change in political interest/engagement, is 
always the product of the dynamic between playing such a game (the game 
as f irst contact and instigator) and the player’s discussion about the (contents 
of the) game with his/her peers. We argue that this might be explained 
by political socialization theory (see also Lin et al. 2010; Bourgonjon and 
Soetaert 2013), which leads to the conceptualization of games as one form 
of socializing agent.
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The good citizen is an active citizen: Citizenship in the 
twenty-first century
It is a widely shared value in Western democracies that citizens should 
engage with political and social issues. This is deemed necessary in order 
to maintain a healthy functioning democracy, since democracies thrive 
when citizens are active agents and participate in public debate inform-
ing themselves about issues relevant to them in particular and society in 
general. It is often argued that this informational prerequisite is required in 
order for citizens to make well-informed decisions in more formal electoral 
processes and to be able to fully participate in society (Ekman and Amnå 
2012). This full participation entails, among other things, voting in local and 
national elections, being able to identify that a neighbor might need help, 
and knowing where to go when there is a problem in one’s community. In 
other words, it is expected that citizens know their rights and responsibilities 
and that they are able to act upon those when necessary. Therefore, being a 
‘good citizen’ relates to the functioning of political and electoral processes 
(e.g. making an informed decision when voting) also on a societal level (e.g. 
being concerned with civic issues both on local and national level).
In other words, in order for a democracy to flourish it heavily depends on 
the civic virtues and the engagement of its citizens (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995; Honohan 2002; Schols 2015). This civic engagement of the active 
citizenry can roughly be described as all actions that any individual citizen 
undertakes to change something for the better that affects not just him- or 
herself, but also the broader community he or she is part of. These actions 
can, for example, be described as, but are not limited to, volunteering to help 
out other people in need, taking part in a demonstration for equal rights or 
signing a petition to help free a fellow citizen from wrongful imprisonment. 
Citizens speaking up and being concerned with their communities and 
social surroundings benef its democracy overall. The formal institutes of 
power, like for example the government, are thus made accountable and, as 
such, are forced to listen to the people, which, in turn, guarantees quality 
of government and a healthy and thriving democracy.
What this means in practical terms has been, in particular in the last de-
cades, reason for heated debates, both in- and outside of academia (Dahlgren 
2006, 2009). For most Western democracies, active citizenship used to be 
described via participation in more formal institutions or volunteer work, 
but also membership in a political party. This tendency is also reflected 
in academic research that has measured the degree of good and active 
citizenship using the aforementioned characteristics. For over a decade, for 
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example, the authoritative International Social Survey Program (ISSP) has 
used four categories of citizenship to assess what good citizenship should 
entail according to respondents: Participation (e.g. importance of voting 
and being active in politics); autonomy (e.g. being able to form one’s own 
opinion); social order (e.g. obeying the law); and solidarity (e.g. supporting 
people who are worse off) (see also Dalton 2008). These surveys are used 
worldwide, both nationally (e.g. the General Social Survey in the United 
States) and internationally (e.g. the European Social Survey).
However, these questions mainly address the normative conceptualiza-
tions of the ‘good citizen’ according to citizens themselves. It describes, in 
other words, what a ‘good citizen’ should be doing and not what citizens 
actually do. And while there is a predictable discrepancy between citizens’ 
civic values and their actual behavior, expressions of these values were seen 
to be rather stable. Up until about the start of the twenty-f irst century, in 
most Western democracies civic values relating to social order were valued 
to be more important to good citizenship than any others (Dalton 2008). 
This duty-based citizenship expresses itself in the acts citizens perform in 
relation to society (as the community of citizens). Among these social acts, 
political party membership was relatively high, as was union membership, 
as well as the self-evident duty to vote in elections.
Increasingly, however, there have been signs that citizens seem to be 
participating less, at least in these formal institutions (Kerr et al. 2009). A 
research study by Hoskins, Villalba, and Saisana (2012) shows that younger 
generations particularly lack the civic competences needed to be(come) 
successful active citizens and that these competences have been in decline 
over the past several decades among European youth. These results are in 
line with previous research that signals a steady decline in civic engagement 
in general and political participation in particular over the course of the last 
half century (e.g. Craig 1996; Levine and Lopez 2002; Lopez and Donovan 
2002; Wattenberg 2002). Most known in this respect is perhaps Robert 
Putnam’s work Bowling alone, in which he argues that “declining electoral 
participation is merely the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement 
from community life” (2000, 35), but he is surely not alone in this analysis 
(e.g. Kaase and Newton 1995; Norris 2002).
However, with the increase in main stream internet access in most 
Western democracies around the turn of the century, quite a few opposite 
readings of the state of democracy started to emerge. Rather than seeing a 
decline in engagement and participation, some scholars started to recognize 
a fundamental change in the way citizens engage and actively participate. 
In particular, online participatory practices were celebrated (e.g. Jenkins 
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2006; Jenkins and Carpentier 2013; Thorson et al. 2013; Kligler-Vilenchik and 
Shresthova 2014; Jenkins, Ito, and boyd 2016). It has been acknowledged that 
patterns of engagement and participation that are visible offline can also 
be seen online (e.g. Smith 2013; Gainous and Wagner 2014), so enthusiasts 
remain confident in their argument that democracy is thriving. They point 
out that young people increasingly show high levels of participation and 
engagement, but that they show this in different ways than before (e.g. Stolle 
and Hooghe 2005; Rainie et al. 2012; Schols 2015).
These different ways of participating and engaging with political and civic 
matters were for a long time not regarded as political practices. This might 
be one way to understand the contrasting readings of the state of democracy 
as outlined above. More recently, however, these different approaches 
are beginning to be reflected at the conceptual level with changes in the 
measurement of political participation and civic engagement. Joakim Ekman 
and Erik Amnå (2012), for example, propose a new typology for participa-
tion and engagement that makes a clear distinction between manifest (i.e. 
political participation including formal political behavior) and latent (i.e. 
civic engagement and social involvement) forms of participation. The idea 
of latent forms of participation is especially crucial in understanding these 
newer forms of political behavior.
A more fundamental explanation of the aforementioned contradictory 
results might be to take generational differences into account regarding 
the very notion of what citizenship entails. In other words, what it means 
for citizens to be a ‘good citizen’ changes and has been changing over 
the last several decades. This is best reflected in a shift in people’s views 
concerning the importance of the different civic values discussed earlier. 
Rather than emphasizing the importance of contributing to and interacting 
with democracy’s formal institutions (reflected in party memberships, for 
example, which translates into a dutiful form of citizenship), it has become 
increasingly important, especially but not only for younger generations to 
express their political and civic engagement in different ways (Bennett 2008; 
Bennett, Wells, and Freelon 2011). Dalton (2008) refers to this as the difference 
between dutiful and engaged citizenship, also referred to as allegiant and 
assertive citizens (Dalton and Welzel 2014). Interestingly, this is also reflected 
in a change in the importance of civic values. So-called allegiant citizens 
value social order more (e.g. obeying the law), while assertive citizens place 
more importance on autonomy (e.g. being able to form your own opinion in 
your own way) and solidarity (e.g. supporting those who are worse off) as 
markers of good citizenship (Hoskins, Villalba, and Saisana 2012).
ENGAGEMENT IN PLAy, ENGAGEMENT IN PoLITICS 41
Additionally, Chouliaraki (2010) argues that citizenship should be con-
ceptualized as expressing oneself in public. This seems increasingly relevant 
with more opportunities to express oneself and engage online. Self-mediation 
in this sense might be at the core of engagement and participation and lead 
to new forms of playful citizenship. She states that:
This mediated participation of ordinary people in public culture is being 
hailed as blurring traditional boundaries between media producers and 
consumers, and leading to new forms of playful citizenship, critical dis-
course and cosmopolitan solidarity. Drawing on a view of self-mediation 
as a new terrain of democratisation that is, however, embedded within the 
regulative regimes of the market or the state, [we should] critically explore 
the dynamics of mediated participation as an ambivalent discourse that 
is shifting the sensibilities and practices of citizenship. (Chouliaraki 
2010, 227)
For Chouliaraki (2010, 3), the ability to express yourself in order to make 
yourself visible and audible is key here. Therefore, creating and sharing 
content online constitutes an act of citizenship and should be considered 
as a form of citizen performance and voicing. In this sense, the changing 
media landscape, particularly the rise of the gaming industry, most definitely 
plays a signif icant role in the further exploration of playful citizenship.
Media landscape: Games as socializing agents and informal 
contexts
Games have increasingly been the focus of academic research and the field of 
game studies has matured over the last two decades (Raessens 2016). Game 
studies as an interdisciplinary f ield examines games from a communicative, 
psychological, design, and Humanities perspective approaching games as 
simulations, representations, and cultural artifacts (e.g. Le Diberder and Le 
Diberder 1998; Aarseth 2001; Frasca 2003b; Raessens and Goldstein 2005; 
Bogost 2007). Games are and have been celebrated for the specif ic proper-
ties they bring to the table. These characteristics seem to be particularly 
benef icial in settings where a player wishes to explore and experiment 
while also being able to experience the consequences that his or her choices 
might have (Jansz 2005; Squire 2007; Neys and Jansz 2010).
Games offer “a set of experiences a player participates in from a par-
ticular perspective, namely the perspective of the character or characters 
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the player controls” (Gee 2007, 23). Within a game, the player often has to 
achieve certain goals to progress further. Players can decide on their own 
how to achieve these goals by making their own choices (within a certain 
framework). There is also a system of immediate feedback in place that 
tells the player (in more or less clear terms) what the consequences of their 
actions are and how these might be improved. In this way, games in general 
encourage players to interpret their experiences in certain ways and to seek 
explanations for their errors and expectation failures. Additionally, the 
practice of gaming is often set in a social setting as well. It is not uncom-
mon for players to seek each other out and to discuss strategies or to solve 
problems related to the game (sometimes referred to as ‘augmented play,’ 
see Ito et al. 2009). As a result, the social network around the game is equally 
important in the overall gaming experience as the game play itself (Squire 
and Jenkins 2003; Gee 2007). The medium of the game can, in this sense, 
be regarded as a socializing agent.
The positive effects of playing games have been established in many 
different domains. These include, for example, increasing students’ mo-
tivation to learn in a school environment, the acquisition of more expert 
knowledge and digital skills, as well as improving the performance of 
surgeons (Lieberman 2006; Ritterfeld and Weber 2006; Gee 2007; Goris, 
Jalink, and Ten Cate Hoedemaker 2014). There are three reasons usually 
given for these effects. The f irst focuses on the entertaining properties of 
games: games are perceived as “possibly the most engaging pastime in the 
history of mankind” (Prensky 2005, 101). The second factor concerns the 
interactive nature of games: playing a digital game is impossible without 
the active involvement of the players (Cover 2006). Consequently, players 
must pay attention to what they are doing and what they see on their 
screens. Gonzalo Frasca (2003b) points out that this means games offer 
distinctly different rhetorical possibilities; games offer different tools 
for conveying opinions and feelings than do more traditional media that 
depend heavily on the mechanism of narrative representation. Games, in 
contrast, mostly rely on the mechanism of simulation. This also becomes 
clear when considering the third point. The truly unique properties of 
games arguably lie in their expressive power. According to Bogost (2007), 
digital games are an expressive medium. They visually represent how real 
and imagined systems work and invite their players to interact with those 
systems in a playful manner. The capacity of games to reveal complex 
situations (Mitgutsch 2011b) in a relatively simple and often fun way is what 
distinguishes this medium from other, more traditional, media forms (see 
also Corbeil 1999).
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However, while there gradually seems to be an increasing academic 
interest in the uses and effects of games in different areas of people’s lives, 
to date little attention has been given to the opportunities games might 
offer in relation to politics and citizenship. A notable exception is the 
research by Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans (2009), which explores the civic 
potential of video games in general. They argue that “gaming might foster 
civic engagement” (2009, 6). Since their focus is on the civic dimensions of 
video game play among young people, they have investigated what games 
have to offer youth regarding civic and political engagement compared 
to more traditional classroom settings. They f ind many parallels both in 
the structural form of the medium of the game (e.g. possibilities for some 
sort of simulation of part(s) of the political process and tools that facilitate 
collaboration and mentoring) as well as in the content of some games (e.g. 
learning how certain democratic processes work, learning about a particular 
event (war) or social issue (poverty), how to debate and share and form one’s 
own opinion). Following Dewey’s conceptualization of the democratic com-
munity, Kahne and his colleagues argue that games can be considered such 
places as well. This is particularly the case with the increase of participatory 
culture as described by Jenkins (2006) and Kligler-Vilenchik and Shresthova 
(2012). In this way, games can be seen as “places where diverse groups of 
individuals with shared interests join together, where groups must negotiate 
norms, where novices are mentored by more experienced community 
members, where teamwork enables all to benefit from the different skills 
of group members, and where collective problem-solving leads to collective 
intelligence” (Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans 2009, 6-7).
Moreover, there has also been research on the civic potential of Massive 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, or MMORPGs, such as Blizzard 
Entertainment’s World of Warcraft (e.g. Steinkuehler 2005; Curry 2010), 
as a ‘third place’ for civic development. The results of these studies seem 
to conf irm previous f indings that playing such games may help develop 
collaboration and leadership skills in general (Whitton and Hollins 2008; 
Jang and Ryu 2011) and willingness to help (Peng, Lee, and Heeter 2010). 
Furthermore, Raphael et al. (2010) suggest in their study that the “most ef-
fective games for civic learning would be those that best integrate game play 
and content, that help players make connections between their individual 
actions and larger social structures, and that link ethical and expedient 
reasoning” (2010, 199) to spark ethical reflection among their players. In 
addition, they obtained similar results as Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans 
(2009), who focused on how different civic skills were practiced and learned 
through gameplay (Raphael, Bachen, and Hernández-Ramos 2012).
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The playful environment and social structure that the medium of the 
game offers is particularly relevant in this respect. In line with political 
socialization theory, when considering the game as a socializing agent, this 
medium can be regarded as one of the most important influences on how 
young people learn civic skills and engage in civic activities beside family 
and school. These f inding are also supported the research of Bourgonjon 
and Soetaert (2013) as well as Lin and her colleagues (2010). This is especially 
relevant when we take into consideration the aforementioned shift, especially 
among younger people, toward more engaged forms of citizenship that value 
expression, autonomy, and solidarity more highly as traits of good citizenship.
Of particular interest in light of this chapter are games that are specifically 
aimed at affecting some sort of social change, that is, some form of attitudinal 
or behavioral change with their players. While such games have been studied 
for some time, it is only recently that this subdomain has required significant 
academic attention. Usually referred to as serious games,1 they can be defined 
as games that aim to do more than entertain only (Ritterfeld, Cody, and 
Vorderer 2009, 6; Bellotti et al. 2013). The creator of the game specif ically 
intends the game to be more than just entertainment, he wants it to inform 
even more, or even persuade the player in a playful yet serious manner.
Political video games: Games with an impact2
Ian Bogost (2007) coined the term persuasive games as a response to the 
dichotomy (still commonly used) of entertainment games versus serious 
games. He argues that the aforementioned terminology wrongfully suggests 
that entertainment games are not suited to communicating serious messages 
(i.e. to be used for something other than just mere entertainment). Moreover, 
the term ‘serious games’ alludes to an almost exclusive focus on game con-
tent, rather than on the process of communication of the specif ic medium. 
This procedural aspect of gaming is what allows for the communication of 
serious information in such a unique way. The term ‘persuasive gaming’ 
reflects the centrality of this procedural rhetoric while at the same time 
focusing on those games that challenge given norms and worldviews. As 
1 This specif ic delineation from entertainment games, particularly trying to def ine what 
these serious games are not, has left the f ield of game studies with a myriad of different terms 
that aim to capture this difference (e.g. games for change, social games, political games, etc.). 
For the purpose of this chapter, we will refer to such games as serious games or, when discussing 
the specif ic subf ield of interest, political games.
2 Parts of this section have appeared, slightly altered, in an earlier publication, namely Neys 
(2014).
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such, the intent of the creator of the game to persuade the player is also 
important in def ining it as a persuasive game (De la Hera 2017).
There are many different forms of persuasive games addressing different 
topics and developed by different stakeholders. There are games that focus 
on health issues, e.g. Re-Mission (Realtime Associates 2006), which shows 
children undergoing cancer therapy the importance of adhering to their 
medical treatment programs; on social awareness or advocacy, e.g. McDonald’s 
Video Game (MolleIndustria 2006), which is concerned with the meat industry 
and its negative impact on society; on humanitarian crises, e.g. Darfur is Dying 
(interFUEL 2006), which deals with the famine in Darfur and its effect on 
local families; or games that promote a particular company or organization, 
called ‘advergames.’ The military makes use of these types of games as well, 
both for recruiting and instruction. America’s Army (2002) is probably the 
most successful and well-known example in this regard. The United States 
Army, developer of the game, claimed a signif icant increase in recruitment 
information requests due to this game alone (Huntemann and Payne 2010).
The political subgenre of these persuasive games specif ically focuses 
on games that challenge certain political stances or worldviews or address 
political issues. In order to fully appreciate and understand the different 
games available within this subgenre, the different parties that can develop 
such games should be taken into account alongside the topic or issue they 
address. This differentiation mainly happens in three dimensions: political 
institutions (such as political parties), non-profit organizations (such as the 
United Nations or HopeLab), and individuals.
Now that we have def ined political video games and the theoretical 
background is set, we can explore and situate the empirical f indings in 
this f ield and try to understand whether or not this form of play might offer 
citizens new and different ways of engaging in politics.
Playing political video games: Civic engagement and political 
participation
While the subgenre of political video games is small, the f ield is diverse in 
terms of the type of games it has to offer. And while The Cat and The Coup 
(Brinson and ValaNejad 2011) and Endgame: Syria (GameTheNews 2013) are 
two of the few relatively recent examples, it is not surprising that, as most 
of these games are created in the West (primarily in the United States or 
Western Europe), so the little research that has been conducted in this f ield 
also stems from these regions.
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At the turn of the century, the first political video games started to appear. 
Several games emerged particularly in the aftermath of the terror attacks in 
New York on 9/11 2001. A good example is September 12th by Gonzalo Frasca 
(2003a). The game shows a market square where citizens and terrorists can 
be seen walking around. The player has the choice to shoot rockets at the 
market to kill the terrorists. However, a shot, no matter how well aimed, 
always results in civilian casualties, which, in turn, leads to some of the 
grieving survivors turning into terrorists as well. The intent of the creator 
was to inform players of the importance of a political stance (such as, that 
violence will only generate more violence) and to make them reflect on 
this issue, much like political cartoons (Bogost 2006; Neys and Jansz 2010).
After 2004, political video games became a true, albeit small, subgenre. 
This mainly had to do with the emergence of political video games during 
the political campaigns for the United States general elections. In that year, 
The Howard Dean for Iowa Game (Persuasive Games 2003) was developed by 
the American Democratic Party; it was one of the f irst games commissioned 
for the United States general elections and, as such, added to the overall 
success of Howard Dean in harnessing the potential use of the internet for 
campaigning. Its aim was to help supporters of Howard Dean to understand 
grassroots outreach and to encourage them to participate in pre-caucus 
campaigning in Iowa.
Bogost (2006) advocates the analysis of the games themselves in order 
to scrutinize their use of procedural (rather than verbal) strategy to convey 
their messages. His work is important for the f ield of game studies in that 
it recognizes the subgenre of political video games as persuasive media. 
It is only after this work emerged that slowly the f irst exploratory studies 
started to appear that focus on citizens’ responses to such games and have 
adopted the practice of gaming as the main focus of their research.
After just over a decade of research, the general tenure of these studies 
overall is positive. There is some evidence that suggests that playing political 
video games contributes to an increase in political participation and civic 
engagement (Neys and Jansz 2010; Waddington 2013). After playing political 
games, players indicate that they have become more engaged with the 
topic discussed in the game and have obtained more knowledge about the 
subject. They also indicate their intent to participate in more formal ways, 
for example by contacting an interest group (Neys and Jansz 2010). Jacobs 
(2016) studied My Cotton Picking Life (Rawlings 2012) about child labor in 
the cotton industry, comparing the effects of the game with those of a 
video clip covering the same issue. He found that playing the game had a 
stronger effect than watching the clip when experiencing the workload of 
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the children. In their study about Darfur is Dying, Peng and her colleagues 
(2010) observed that people’s willingness to help increased after playing. 
They compared video game play with text and video about the same topic, 
namely the famine in Darfur. They concluded that, when compared to the 
other two media formats, “playing [the game] resulted in greater willingness 
to help and greater role-taking” (Peng, Lee, and Heeter 2010, 735).
The effects on social behavior are especially evident when people talk 
with friends and family about the issues addressed in the game. This is also 
referred to as “social facilitation” (Neys and Jansz 2010) or “civic talk” (Klofstad 
2011). This relates back to conceptualizing such games as socializing agents 
that play a role in the political socialization of their players. In other words, 
it shows that the effects and impact of playing these games should always 
be set in the context of everyday life, and not be regarded as isolated events. 
Raessens (2015) concurs with this point of view in his analysis of Darfur is 
Dying and Food Force (Deepend 2005). The focus of his analysis is conceptual 
rather than empirical. He argues that the game experience of being ‘co-creator’ 
results in a “forceful discursive space and practice, with real enough power 
to influence the terms in which people think, feel and act” (2015, 258).
This becomes even more apparent when looking at longer term effects, 
as illustrated by our own research (Neys et al. 2012) on Poverty Is Not a 
Game (iMinds 2010). This game was developed by the European Union in 
relation to the European year against poverty and social exclusion (see 
also Grove et al. 2012). The game aims to raise awareness and to discuss 
the complex mechanisms underlying poverty, especially among youth. The 
study questioned players immediately after playing the game and again three 
months later through self-report measures. As was expected, the intended 
political behavior measured immediately after playing scored higher than 
the actual political behavior after three months.
The results point toward the indirect effects of playing: the player’s 
interest in and engagement with the topic in question (poverty) increased 
and, as such, had an indirect effect on participation. About one third of the 
players indicated that they had become more politically interested after the 
three months period. In fact, while these players indicated at the time of 
the f irst measurement that they were not politically interested, after three 
months they self-reported that they had become politically interested. 
Further investigation of this particular group showed that, again, social 
facilitation or civic talk was what appeared to be important for this process 
(Neys et al. 2012). While it is impossible to make any causal claims about 
what caused this positive change in political interest, research shows that 
it was this same group that indicated they had talked with their family and 
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peers about the subject of poverty the most. Playing the game can then be 
regarded as the instigator, while talking might have, at least partly, facilitated 
an increase in political interest or at least facilitated a change in perception 
about whether or not players identify as politically interested. Playing the 
game arguably transformed players’ understanding of their world in rela-
tion to the topic discussed in the game. Ruggiero (2015) observed a sleeper 
effect in her longitudinal study among players of Spent (McKinney, Urban 
Ministries of Durham 2011), a game about homelessness. The game did not 
have an effect immediately after playing, but when the participants were 
tested again three weeks later, the players held more favorable attitudes 
toward homelessness than those who did not play. Apparently, playing the 
game resulted in prolonged reflection on its subject matter.
This kind of transformative learning is exemplary for how games work. 
According to Konstantin Mitgutsch (2011a), this shows the distinctive 
power of games when compared to more traditional media. However, while 
academic research into game features, and the workings and mechanisms 
of (serious) games are increasing (e.g. Bellotti et al. 2013; Jacobs, Jansz and 
De la Hera 2017), the f ield is not currently able to make more authoritative 
claims about the way political video games do or do not engage their players 
in the long run.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored whether playing political video games can facili-
tate civic engagement and, if so, how it encourages political participation. 
While research is still scarce in this particular niche f ield of game studies, 
we can conclude in general that most, if not all, research generated positive 
results. Playing games in general, and political games in particular, does 
seem to facilitate some form of engagement and participation.
After discussing the f irst studies conducted on the issue of political 
games, we can carefully conclude that people do seem to become engaged 
with the topic or issue dealt with in the game after playing. It does seem to 
be the case, however, that these effects are of a transformational nature, 
meaning that “the perceived and achieved learning in the game and the 
contextualized and framed learning experience made through playing the 
game are transferred” (Mitgutsch 2011b, 51). The experiences in the game over 
time get applied to real life contexts and in this way, affect the player. The 
research so far suggests that the process of social facilitation is important 
in this respect, namely talking with friends and peers about the issue dealt 
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with in the game (Neys and Jansz 2010). In this way, the game functions as 
an instigator where players reflect on the issue in terms of what it means 
to them personally. As such, games can be considered as socializing agents. 
This makes sense as, after all, games and gaming are part of everyday life.
It is evident, however, that more research is needed in this f ield. Longitu-
dinal research should further investigate the long-term effects, while more 
comparative research is necessary to investigate the differences between 
games and other media. Representative and larger samples of players will 
also help in validating the f irst conclusions that were drawn here. It is also 
important to determine exactly who plays these games and if only people 
play such games that are already interested in politics. There are some 
promising indications that playing political games might also benefit those 
who do not think of themselves as politically interested. This challenging 
question is the topic of further investigation in this young and promising field 
which can shed light on contemporary forms and expressions of citizenship.
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3. Analytical game design : Game-making 




This chapter aims to show how designing and modifying games is becom-
ing a “cultural technique” (Kramer and McChesney 2003) similar to reading 
or writing, and an important requirement for active citizen engagement 
in an increasingly ludif ied society (Raessens 2006). For that purpose, 
“constructionist gaming” (Kafai and Burke 2015), i.e. game co-creation, 
is situated among other critical playing practices like theorycrafting. 
Numerous examples, from early Flash games created as commentary on the 
2003 invasion of Iraq to game jams such as the 2013 GeziJam, demonstrate 
how grassroots game development can establish ephemeral public spheres 
for playful citizen intervention. Finally, the chapter outlines analytical 
game design as a conceptual framework for incorporating these principles 
into media studies research and educational practice.
Keywords: Analytical game design, constructionist gaming, playful 
citizenship, cultural techniques, game design literacy
Media technologies are connected to the concept of citizenship in manifold 
ways and the rapid changes in media technologies are one important reason 
why, analogously, the notion of citizenship is rapidly changing. One aspect 
of citizenship in this context is the capacity to express and discuss one’s 
opinion. In that regard, media institutions like public service broadcasters 
have been interpreted as an “embodiment” of the notion of the public sphere, 
i.e. a physical, social or other kind of space for discourse among citizens, 
thereby becoming a “technology of citizenship” themselves (Nolan 2006, 226). 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
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This aspect is directly related to the notion of performativity or “performative 
publicness,” which includes “affective and playful dimensions” of social 
interaction as well as, drawing on the notion of performative utterances, 
the constitution of “civil selves” (Chouliaraki 2012, 2-4).
A conceptualization of citizenship that is more specif ically suited to the 
premise of this chapter is the notion of ‘silly citizenship,’ which foregrounds 
aspects of play, “struggle,” (Hartley 2010, 233) and contested identities. 
Accordingly, citizenship as a concept, an abstraction, has had different 
connotations in various discourses since its emancipation from the confines 
of the city in the nineteenth century. Negotiating this “conceptual baggage” 
and reaff irming the validity of citizenship, according to Hartley, requires 
a playful attitude (Ibid., 234).
Social spaces that would afford the performance of citizenship are 
increasingly permeated by layers of software (Kitchin and Dodge 2011) 
that provide new opportunities, but also come with new types of require-
ments. Emergent political parties such as the Piratenpartei (pirate party) in 
Germany or the Partido de la Red (net party) in Argentina, which represent 
common citizen sentiments on the level of polity, not only practically draw 
on software tools like Liquid Democracy (Litvinenko 2012) and DemocracyOS, 
but also use programming as a conceptual model of active citizenship and 
software as a metaphor of how a modern society should function. Douglas 
Rushkoff aptly summarized this situation using the moniker “program or be 
programmed” (2010), a phrase that emphasizes the urgency of the situation 
and the (assumed) lack of a third option. The degree to which the logic (or 
at least the rhetoric) of program code is gradually becoming embedded 
into public discourse is reflected by the fact that software has become a 
metaphor for political organization and for the role of the citizen within it.
However, with the increasing adoption of gamif ication principles and 
mechanisms at all different levels of society—including education, corporate 
training and even tentatively in parts of the public sector (Wood 2013; 
Asquer 2014), being an independent citizen arguably requires not only basic 
knowledge of software and programming, but also of games and game design.
Already in the 1950s, sociologist Norton Long proposed that we understand 
the local community as an ecology of games (Long 1958), a concept that 
has been repeatedly used to investigate policies even until the present (e.g. 
Lubell 2013). From this perspective, the manifold dependencies between 
different sectors of society, including “banking, newspaper publishing, 
contracting [and] manufacturing” (Long 1958, 251), can be understood as 
players involved in multiple, partially overlapping games at the same time. 
While Long focuses on the rationales of the ‘players’ that, in some cases, 
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have to negotiate different roles, his approach is also relevant from the 
perspective of the game designer, i.e. the policymaker, ‘modeling’ society 
as an assemblage of interlocking games.
From this angle, which has become only more plausible in light of the 
gamif ication debate, this chapter argues that citizens not only need to be 
able to assume the player’s perspective, but the game designer’s as well. 
They must strive not just to master a given game, but to understand it in 
terms of its contingencies and potential alternative ‘design choices.’ One 
example where this expanded perspective becomes particularly tangible 
is the ideology of startup ecosystems; software developers adopting the 
entrepreneural ‘persona’ by def inition use digital technology to at least 
partially rewrite the rules of a particular social ‘game’ (e.g. Uber for urban 
mobility and Airbnb for accommodation) rather than playing the traditional 
game more effectively.
With reference to ‘end users,’ the notion of “retail hacking” (Schwartz 2010) 
already tentatively indicates how an applied understanding of game design 
helps to address socio-economic issues. The term refers to the fact that con-
sumers (particularly from low-income families that would otherwise have 
problems affording the amenities of everyday life) gradually combine and 
exploit the manifold coupon and rebate schemes offered by large retailers 
(originally for their own economic benefit) to multiply their savings and to 
continue participating in society despite their f inancial troubles. While this 
situation is not explicitly game-like, the terminology and rhetoric used by 
retail hackers1 indicates that they construct (or ‘design’) their consumption 
practices as a de-facto game with the goal of maximizing value-for-money. 
For instance, techniques like ‘stacking’ and ‘rolling’ are—both conceptually 
and terminologically—reminiscent of power gaming and ‘combo’ systems. 
By taking rules from different ‘sub-games’ (the individual rebate schemes), 
they build a new game that, according to their self-perception, maximizes 
their agency as citizens and economic subjects.
Thus, the goal of this chapter is to show how, similar to reading, writing, 
and communicating, designing and modifying games is becoming a ‘cultural 
technique’ (for an overview of the term and its connotations see Kramer 
and McChesney 2003) for active citizen engagement in an increasingly 
ludif ied society (Raessens 2006, 2014). In terms of citizenship, ‘cultural 
techniques’ constitute the required skills to participate in public spheres and 
in social negotiation processes. More broadly, the term refers to culturally 
1 The term ‘hacking’, at least outside of criminal activities, already exhibits a conceptual link 
to a playfully irreverent disposition (Stober, Walz, and Holopainen 2013).
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formative practices, which are practices that afford cultural production, 
exchange and archiving/remembrance in the f irst place, but also develop 
their own characteristic quasi-cultural contexts over time. For instance, 
even though he does not explicitly use the term, Jay Bolter shows how speech 
and, more broadly, even thought processes are signif icantly influenced by 
the materiality of writing and the “writing space” (2001). A similar argument 
can be made for digital games as well; that is, if written words serve as an 
interpretive f ilter for oral rhetoric, ‘writing’ games can be conceived of as a 
f ilter for playing and interpreting games, for not just thinking about games, 
but also thinking ‘through games’.
The following section will prepare a more detailed understanding of 
game-making as a cultural technique by looking at how playing practices 
have turned games into cognitive tools and how game creation itself is 
becoming a playful activity.
From productive playing practices to playful game production
With the increasing abundance of games available and the increasing 
differentiation of player audiences, it comes as no surprise that, over time, 
playing practices have become much more diversif ied, going well beyond 
the initial aim of ‘mastering’ the game. More specif ically, many of these 
practices can be understood as productive, even genuinely ‘analytical.’ Even 
in the early days of the field of game studies, the “demystification” (Friedman 
1999) of the (digital) game as a system stood out as a central motivation. 
Ted Friedman furthermore usefully points out that—in opposition to f ilm 
reception, one might add—players approach identification from a procedural 
perspective; in the case of SimCity (Maxis 1989), for instance, they switch 
between different identif icatory positions (mayor, treasurer, head of police, 
etc.) to interpret the simulated system from different angles rather than 
build an ‘empathetic’ relationship with any of them.
More recently, theorycrafting has been investigated (e.g. Paul 2011) as an 
increasingly formalized set of playing practices aimed at understanding the 
rule system of a game, down to its variables and algorithms, by strategically 
testing and documenting the observable systemic behavior rather than 
simply ‘playing to win.’ It is important to note that this highly idiosyncratic 
and seemingly arbitrary behavior is intrinsically political, it represents a 
more or less conscious attempt at challenging (albeit not really altering) the 
political economy of the games industry. In that sense, i.e. in terms of its 
‘quasi-political’ agenda, theorycrafting is comparable to spoiling (Jenkins 
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2006), a more well-studied, subversive practice of television reception. 
Moreover, the games that theorycrafters play are often ‘virtual worlds’ 
(usually MMORPGs or hybrid games like Destiny (Bungie 2014)), continuously 
changing systems that ‘encourage’ players to experiment with policies and 
more or less formalized patterns of social control.
Theorycrafting is not the only recent playing practice that can be consid-
ered intrinsically ‘analytical,’ though. For instance, in-game photography (e.g. 
Poremba 2007), the act of taking pictures (or, more precisely, screenshots) 
in digital games rather than playing by the rules, can be understood as 
analytical on several levels. First, it draws on the player’s photographic gaze 
to produce a new understanding of the virtual environment according to 
the rationales of photography such as mise en scène and framing. Second, 
based on the types of ‘photographs’ taken, it appears that this practice 
allows for players to re-investigate established pictorial genres such as 
landscape photography, still life, and portraits, with regard to seemingly 
anachronistic notions like aura (Duttlinger 2008).2 Finally, professional 
in-game photographers adopt an analytical stance in that they document 
the parameters in which a photo is taken, thus allowing others to reflect on 
the ‘material’ contingencies, develop a media-reflexive view, and re-produce 
or modify selected aesthetic strategies.
While playing practices thus become more ‘productive’ and analytical 
over time, inversely, game development can also increasingly be understood 
as a genuinely playful and simultaneously analytical, knowledge-producing 
practice. This play element obviously is most visible in independent 
game development, which is internally organized through game jams 
(Guevara-Villalobos 2011), competitions to create games within self-imposed 
constraints,3 rather than hierarchy and technical specialization as well as 
standardization. However, professional game development also embraces 
aspects of playfulness. For example, Birdwell describes how the game 
Half-Life (Valve 1998) was created by taking apart the original prototype 
and, for instance, requiring designers to take an arbitrary set of parts and 
recombine them in novel, fun ways (1999). Moreover, Van der Graaf illustrates 
how Linden Lab, the developer of Second Life (2003), introduced a virtual 
currency called “love scores” (2012, 486) that employees could receive from 
2 A prominent archive of highly sophisticated in-game photographs can be found in Harris 
(2018).
3 Apart from the set theme that every game jam participant has to follow, the Global Game 
Jam offers a selection of ‘modif iers’, additional thematic requirements that allow for contestants 
to choose their own ‘diff iculty level’.
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other colleagues or award to their colleagues, thereby incentivizing them to 
help each other out; even though ‘love’ is paid out as a bonus each quarter, 
this is still a mostly tongue-in-cheek, highly idiosyncratic way of fostering 
group identity through ‘playful’ interaction. On that note, the following 
section will explore what kind of knowledge game-making can produce.
Between ludoliteracy and algorithmic literacy
One of the f irst steps toward game design becoming a ‘cultural technique’ 
is Adobe Flash, an authoring system that, while originally developed for 
designing interactive animations, has been among the f irst tools that 
opened up game creation to a broader, more mainstream audience. Adobe 
Flash has already been studied from a software studies perspective (e.g. 
Sorapure 2006), for example with regard to how it affects writing practices 
despite being originally intended primarily for multimodal composing. 
However, for the purpose of this argument, Adobe Flash is particularly 
relevant because it allowed for accelerating the creation of simple, digitally 
sharable applications.
Take, for instance, the Flash games created in response to the US invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, which journalist Clive Thompson described as the “newest 
form of social comment” (Thompson 2002). Many of the games Thompson 
describes convey a rather blatant (only in some cases “procedural”) rhetoric 
(Bogost 2007, 52) or use pop-cultural and game-specif ic references and 
metaphors to connote the events of 9/11. However, a few outstanding exam-
ples such as New York Defender (Stef & Phil 2001) can even be described as 
positively “persuasive” (Ibid., 59ff.) and at least enable players to potentially 
reassess the subject matter using genuinely game-specif ic means.
Apart from easy-to-use functions for collision detection and player 
interaction via mouse, keyboard, and gamepad, the most notable affordance 
of Adobe Flash as a tool to promote game creation was the Flash Player, a 
browser plug-in that quickly became ubiquitous and facilitated the distribu-
tion of Flash-enabled games. In terms of game development as a ‘cultural 
technique,’ this is relevant for multiple reasons. The accumulation of Flash 
games on platforms like Newgrounds shifted the focus from the often still 
trivial individual games toward the sheer quantity of games and, thus, 
made the amateur game developer community ‘visible’ for the f irst time, 
both for a mainstream audience and its own members. Put differently, the 
Flash game websites act as platforms that employ a set of socio-technical 
mechanisms (Niederer and Van Dijck 2010) to foster group identity, to allow 
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the community to grow organically, and to incentivize peer review in addi-
tion to learning from one another. For instance, the rating system on a site 
like Newgrounds allows newcomers to already earn some recognition without 
having to compete on ‘equal ground’ with more established developers and 
still constitutes an attention economy that motivates veterans to push the 
envelope and aim for ever higher scores.
The gradual ‘demise’ of Flash (Salter and Murray 2014) is an important 
event in software history and culture. However, for the purpose of this 
chapter, it is even more noteworthy because existing, more dedicated game-
creation tools like RPG Maker (1988-), Game Maker (1999-), and entry-level 
3D engines like Unity 3D (2005-) eventually became the f irst point of contact 
with algorithmic thinking and scripting for media users that grew up with 
video games, a fact that indicates the increasing convergence of ludoliteracy 
(Zagal 2010) and algorithmic literacy. As indicated above, creating games, 
both from an amateur and independent game perspective, is becoming 
intrinsically playful; at the same time, game design—conceptualizing a given 
subject matter by way of rule systems—becomes intrinsically technical, 
shaped by material affordances and constraints. The following section 
will elaborate on how these developments are relevant in terms of citizen 
engagement and politically mindful media use.
Analytical game design as playful citizen engagement
Experimental games already exhibit clearly observable tendencies to use 
digital games as a medium of socio-political expression. For example, Twine 
(2009-) is a freely available, highly accessible, and thus popular tool that al-
lows for creating experimental text-based games. At the same time, it notably 
enhances the use of game design as a form of public expression because it 
increases the thematic and rhetorical diversity of digital games, allowing 
for the expression of otherwise marginalized viewpoints. Unsurprisingly, 
some of the most notable Twine games tackle issues like gender identity 
and subcultural sensibilities, which otherwise rarely have a place in either 
commercial or independent game design.
Furthermore, as amateur game developers become more confident in 
the use of tools as well as procedural rhetoric, contributions to game jams 
increasingly address socially relevant or even political themes. For example, 
the Game of Politics (Telnov et al. 2012), created for the Global Game Jam 
2012, is a deck-based card game about political decision-making and the 
election process. Conceptually very similar, but developed three years later, 
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Vox Populi (Lewis and Henley-Roussel 2015) is also a game based on physical 
playing cards, in which, “[a]s your party’s campaign organizer, you must 
forgo every principle, make any deal you can, and screw over everyone else 
in order to grasp the reins of power.” In comparison, Doctrine (Mielczarek 
et al. 2014) tackles the broader issue of divergent political ideologies and 
employs less ‘naturalistic’ design mechanics, using colored f ilters worn as 
headgear and differently colored messages to indicate how ideologies can 
make a person ‘blind’ toward non-conformist opinions.
Smaller game jams are occasionally even ‘designed’ and leveraged as tools 
for political participation themselves. For instance, the GeziJam was held in 
June 2013 to support and raise awareness of the protesters trying to stall the 
destruction of the Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul. The conceptually related 
#JamForLeelah reflected on the suicide of Leelah Alcorn in December 2014 
and challenged participants to tackle the issue of transgender sensibilities 
through the creation of games. In some cases, game developers are trying to 
monetize this awareness and create games to raise funds for socio-political 
causes. For instance, the game Kubba was created by Ahmed Abdelsamea 
(2012), an Egyptian indie designer, to generate revenue benef iting the 
refugees of the Syrian civil war (Curley 2012). The game mimics the more 
or less iconic Western game franchise Cooking Mama (Off ice Create 2006), 
challenging players to prepare the eponymous Syrian dish, Kubba. The 
game is a variation of the earlier Flash game Ta’mya (2012); yet, while the 
original has English text and is available on Kongregate, a website hosted 
by United States games retailer GameStop, Kubba was only playable on the 
now-defunct Arabic equivalent GameTako.
Yet, most of these experimental games usually operate according to the 
logic (or, with Michel Foucault, the dispositif) of art rather than education. 
They all have a ‘product form,’ a defined beginning, middle, and end includ-
ing some sort of menu system. The aforementioned game jams exhibit several 
structural similarities to the system of festivals and awards that constitutes 
an important infrastructure for art in its currently practiced sense and, in 
itself, is unmistakably game-like (English 2005). Games developed by scholars 
or ‘reflective’ industry practitioners are sometimes even commissioned ‘as 
art,’ i.e. they are ordered and paid for by institutions formally or informally 
related to the ‘art world’ (Becker 1982) or publishing industry. Ian Bogost’s 
Simony (2012) and Jason Rohrer’s Game Design Sketchbook experiments are 
but two prominent examples. Second, they are sometimes displayed ‘as art’ 
in the context of a thematically integrated exhibition; again, Bogost’s Simony 
as well as many games by Tale of Tales clearly illustrate this principle. Third, 
they are often discussed and framed in terms of art discourse, focusing 
64 STEfAN WERNING 
on common tropes such as the creator persona (e.g. Rohrer’s Gravitation 
(2008)), the subversion of expectations, or a media-reflexive habitus (e.g. 
Bogost’s Cow Clicker (2010)).
In comparison, the concept of Analytical Game Design, which is phenom-
enologically explored at the Utrecht Game Lab, def ines a methodological 
framework to translate the notion of game-making to the educational 
domain and, as a potential second step, to political participation. The concept 
draws on the Kuleshov experiments, a series of f ilm vignettes—often only a 
few seconds long—produced by directors like Kuleshov and Pudovkin in the 
1920s, which systematically explore the expressive ‘vocabulary’ of f ilm as a 
then-new medium (Prince and Hensley 1992). While these experiments are 
still acknowledged for their aesthetic values and originality, it is important 
to note that they originated in an experimental culture of f ilm-making; 
thus, considering the Kuleshov experiments and the countless re-creations 
that have been created over time, both by f ilm students and acclaimed 
directors, it appears that the individual experiment does not primarily create 
knowledge, but instead the process of creating and comparing multiple 
variations on the same theme and of sharing one’s own interpretation by 
playfully remixing it.4
Adhering to these principles, ‘analytical’ game experiments as def ined 
by the Analytical Game Design framework are:
– vignettes, not ‘complete’ games;
– built on existing media and cultural studies research;
– intended to test hypotheses and challenge user preconceptions;
– easily modif iable and remixable;
– an ongoing process by constituting a ‘dialog’ with the enabling 
technologies ascognitive tools;
– usually abstract in terms of audio-visual detail and semantics;
– published in a way that affords discussion and multiplicity;
– and (optionally) utilizing analytics for non-commercial purposes.5
Few existing games can be considered ‘theory-driven’; for instance, while Dan 
Pinchbeck has implemented some of his academic inquiries into f irst-person 
gaming and “ludic manipulation” (2009) in games like Amnesia: The Dark 
4 Looking up the Kuleshov experiment on YouTube provides an overview of the manifold ways 
in which the same experiment has been interpreted—by famous directors and f ilm students 
alike—over the years.
5 For more detailed information, see the slides of a panel on the topic, organized at the 2016 
DiGRA/FDG conference in Dundee (Werning 2016).
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Descent (Frictional Games 2010), other games by the same author/company 
are only belatedly reflected upon, for instance in terms of environmental 
storytelling (Pinchbeck 2008). Will Wright’s SimEarth (Maxis 1990), a later 
instalment in the franchise started by SimCity, is one of the few games based 
on a theory, the highly contested, but still influential Gaia hypothesis (Bogost 
2006, 167) proposed by James Lovelock and co-developed by Lynn Margulis 
in 1972 and beyond. The hypothesis holds that organisms and inorganic 
matter on Earth organize to form a self-sustaining complex system; thus, 
it proposes a set of relationships between co-existing species and a number 
of system variables such as global temperature, the amount of oxygen in 
the air, or salt in the oceans. The model is conceptually ideally suited to 
formalize activities on a global scale for use in a video game, particularly 
given the technological constraints in the early 1990s. The game arguably 
not only presents an ‘interpretation’ of and commentary on the hypothesis, 
but it also uses it as part of a particular rhetoric, which is—with Bogost—a 
persuasive strategy.
The notion of Analytical Game Design aims for an even more direct 
relationship between theoretical background and ludic implementation. 
For example, Seymour Chatman famously analyzed different modes of 
narrative in literature and f ilms with a close comparative reading of Guy de 
Maupassant’s Une partie de campagne and Jean Renoir’s 1936 film adaptation 
(Chatman 1980). Chatman proposes a set of categories for his analysis, 
including concepts such as description vs. assertion (128), ambiguity (132), 
and focalized narration as well as evoking the reader’s perceived complicity 
with the morally dubious disposition of the narrator (133). While no games 
exist that systematically explore these categories,6 designing game experi-
ments would be a fruitful way to tackle these questions and to ‘translate’ 
Chatman’s approach of close-reading to (digital) games. The inherently 
playful quality of this approach is acknowledged by Stephanie de Smale, 
who expands on the concept and reads analytical game experiments against 
Theodor W. Adorno’s notion of the essay as form (2016, 4).
While the previous example pertains more to representations of individual 
perceptions, the same can be done on a broader scale, including representa-
tions of social and cultural phenomena. Simulation games like the aforemen-
tioned SimCity or Civilization (MPS Labs 1991) exhibit interesting cultural 
stereotypes through their attempts to express common perceptions given the 
6 This statement might have to be relativized a bit, as games like Gone Home (The Fullbright 
Company 2013) for instance can be interpreted as playing with the ‘mode’ of description. However, 
no games do so in a truly systematic and iterative manner.
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characteristic constraints of their rule systems. For example, while religious 
buildings have been implemented in Civilization as ‘tools’ to pacify discontent 
citizens, later instalments like Civilization IV and V (Firaxis Games 2005, 2010) 
systematically elaborate on the concept, repeatedly altering the intrinsic 
rule bias. In that sense, consecutive instalments in the same franchise and 
especially player-created modifications, which alter the game’s procedural 
rhetoric and introduce multiplicity instead of one authoritative set of game 
rules (Werning 2017), can be understood as intrinsically ‘experimental’ in 
that they modify parameters and processes, thereby making them observable 
and accessible for discussion through the players.
To summarize, games and the playful wrestling with (often self-imposed) 
constraints have been used as a tool to overcome established patterns of 
thinking. In the context of artistic production, this approach has been formal-
ized by collectives like Oulipo (Andrews 2012), but it can also be observed in 
the aesthetic principles of the Dada movement (Prager 2013), or in the work 
of composers like John Cage and John Zorn. Toy designer Shimpei Takahashi 
demonstrated the principle in a 2013 TEDxTokyo presentation using examples 
of his own. Ideally, using games as a conceptual reference point, the same 
approach can be applied in contemporary socio-political contexts, in which 
problems regularly arise from applying standardized thinking to new types of 
challenges (which is, as McLuhan argued, because “politics offers yesterday’s 
answers to today’s questions”; quoted from Genosko 2005, 235).
Conclusion
The goal of this chapter has been to demonstrate how, not least through novel 
production and distribution tools like Unity 3D and itch.io, game-making 
is gradually developing into a cultural technique and an opportunity for 
citizens to understand and shape their social environment. Thus, returning 
to Rushkoff (2010), the extension of ‘program or be programmed’ cannot 
just be ‘play or be played’; instead, being able to (co-)create games oneself 
is an important next step to altering the power relations built into the 
contemporary gamif ication of society.
Since this chapter was designed to be exploratory, rather than focusing on 
just one particular case, many issues could only be touched upon and require 
further investigation. The role of game distribution websites constitutes only 
one fruitful opportunity for further research. For instance, while platforms 
like Newgrounds arguably do not constitute a proper ‘public sphere’ in the 
sense of Habermas, they can alternatively be understood as ‘third places.’ 
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The term, which Ray Oldenburg originally coined to describe hybrid spaces 
between home and work environments, such as cafés and community 
centers, has already been applied to online games themselves (Steinkuehler 
and Williams 2006), but the concept could also be brought to fruition to 
analyze the functions of game distribution platforms as sites of mediated 
citizen engagement and game-based public discourse.7
A second way to extend the perspective outlined above would be to go 
beyond actual game creation. For instance, research on war games on the 
corresponding online forums indicates that, even without the technical 
means to change them, players intrinsically interpret and discuss digital 
games in terms of their design contingencies, and therefore their potential 
alternatives. For instance, players of America’s Army (United States Army 
2002) request and discuss the inclusion of new weapons based on their 
experience with televised documentaries (Werning 2009, 318). From that 
angle, modding (the modif ication of commercial games, often using freely 
supplied tools) constitutes an interesting hybrid case. For instance, one 
Civilization V mod called Emigration includes ‘emigration’ as a new gameplay 
mechanic, which addresses the increasing mobility of citizens both within 
a country and across borders. The mod can be understood as a comment on 
the political bias of the original game because its rules incentivize players 
to ‘use’ emigration as an offensive strategy (“[d]evelop your empire and your 
rival’s citizens will leave their homeland for your prosperous country”).8 
Another mod for the same game called FIFA World Cup Host Resolution even 
delivers a more targeted ‘message’ by utilizing Civilization V to ‘expose’ FIFA’s 
intrinsic system of power by introducing ‘migrant workers’ as new unit types. 
While the host game does not allow for a very naturalistic rendering of the 
FIFA context, particularly the effort and inevitable inconsistencies of trying 
to ‘express’ this system under the constraints of the game’s modding tools 
spark controversy and necessitate a thorough, critical engagement with the 
subject matter at hand. For good reason, serious games like the Democracy 
series (Positech Games 2005-) have been developed with mod-ability in 
mind, both to keep the game relevant over a longer period of time and to 
alleviate the discrepancy between ‘players’ and ‘designers’.
Finally, a culturally comparative perspective on game creation and the 
notion of ‘cultural techniques’ would be a useful extension of the argument 
presented in this chapter. For instance, the developer of the aforementioned 
7 One need only look at the plethora of (still often mundane but increasingly reflective) games 
created as ‘comments’ on contemporary elections, see Newgrounds (2018).
8 See the 18 May 2013 update in the change notes of the mod (Valve 2018).
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Flash game Kabba argues that “[p]olitical activism is common in Arab-
made indie games” (Johnson 2012). This suggests that ‘collective’ or at least 
culturally formative experiences can have a profound impact on game 
creation, a hypothesis that would by definition substantiate the claim that 
game-making already constitutes a ‘cultural’ technique.
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4. Re-thinking the social documentary
William Uricchio
Abstract
This chapter ref lects on how people actively engage with interactive 
documentaries and how this constitutes a shift in audience participation. 
As a playful format, interactive documentaries invite viewers to also 
become creative participants. The author makes a convincing case for 
the civic potential of allowing viewers to play with the documentary f ilm 
format, foregrounding the interactive documentary as a potent challenger 
to its traditional, linear, and author-driven counterpart. He speaks in 
this context of a ‘producerly’ audience that has an active input in the 
documentary textual interactive system. Uricchio speaks of interactive 
documentaries as a new media format, that does not so much replace 
existing, more hieratically structured media formats, but rather can exist 
alongside them as a participatory alternative.
Keywords: Interactive documentary, audience participation, producerly 
audience, playful media formats
It is happening again. The documentary, long underappreciated for its 
transformational impact on f ilm form, is again offering new ways of rep-
resenting and intervening in the world. Only this time, rather than simply 
using new techniques to represent social change, the documentary form is 
itself the subject of social and technological change. Documentary marks 
the place where our representational endeavors come face-to-face with 
reality. Little wonder that Vertov’s attempts to position f ilm as part of a 
social network remain so relevant, and that Direct Cinema and Cinema 
Verite’s efforts to redefine the f ilmmaker-subject relationship had such a 
large impact (Singer 1987; Saunders 2007). Today, at a moment when location-
aware mobile HD video cameras are nearly ubiquitous, where networked 
computers have broken the distribution bottleneck, and where game play, 
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Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
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crowd-sourcing, and the social turn have redef ined media practice and 
enabled widespread participation, documentary makers have been quick 
to respond. This chapter will explore the implications of these new voices, 
of the new, playful, interactive organizational logics and the new social and 
political enablement of the documentary form.
First, a few words about the stakes of change. As will be discussed, the 
ongoing transformation in documentary promises to empower new voices, 
encouraging ‘the people formerly known as subjects’1 to participate in their 
own representation and have a hand in shaping their texts (see Lessig 2015, 
37). It engages its users in interactive environments, offering opportunities 
to interrogate, explore, and comment upon ideas. Moreover, it enables global 
access, is available anytime, and is actively pushed through social recom-
mendation networks. Still too emergent to be ‘hard-baked’ into orthodox 
practice, f ixed def inition, or even a broadly agreed upon agenda, I shall 
refer to this direction as interactive documentary, including within it not 
just non-linear textual structures that must be navigated by the user, but 
location-based and crowd-sourced documentaries as well, since these, too, 
belie fundamental forms of interaction with text, place, and public.2
In the pages ahead, I would like to explore developments in this sec-
tor, describing some of their key attributes, locating the ‘new’ within the 
historical practices from which they have emerged, and considering their 
challenges to our inherited notions of narrative and engagement. Particularly 
in this last regard, the narrative potentials of play will loom large, offering 
useful ways to reconsider the operations—and implications—of interactive 
documentary.
The digital dynamics underlying the interactive documentary (Nichols 
1991; Galloway, McAlpine and Harris 2007; Aston and Gaudenzi 2012) are 
familiar, for we have seen them ripple through the music industry, take 
form in phenomena such as Wikipedia, and re-shape the nature of politi-
cal campaigns. Thanks to networked digital technologies, the old divides 
between producers and consumers, between experts and the crowd, between 
the center and the margins, have weakened, taking new and sometimes 
unfamiliar forms. At a moment when Moore’s Law continues its geometric 
progression of ever more powerful (and even cheaper) processing capacities, 
consumers now have easier access to audio and video equipment that less 
than a decade ago was limited to professionals. In 2013, YouTube users 
1 Title of a public conversation held by Kat Cizek and Gerry Flahive, 23 October 2012, at MIT’s 
Open Documentary Lab.
2 Other terminology includes i-Docs and web docs.
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were posting over 72 hours of video to the site every minute; and Facebook 
essentially required its over one billion active users to construct multimedia, 
autobiographical timelines on their pages, assembling their photos and video 
clips, geo-locative maps, links, and diary entries.3 Both of these examples 
testify to active popular engagement with digital media production, and 
while non-f iction is amply evident on YouTube, Facebook has managed 
to draw its users into the production of something that might reasonably 
be termed autobiographical mini-documentaries. Prof iles are shaped, 
updated with representations of recent activities, and even augmented by 
others through ‘tagging’ functions. While these carefully curated assertions 
of self may seem rather minimal as documentaries, that over one billion 
people have sorted out how to construct and navigate them, as they seek to 
present themselves and keep up with their friends, suggests that the move 
to participation in the interactive documentary may be far less radical than 
mainstream linear f ilm and video-makers and scholars might assume.
These developments underscore just how widespread public embrace of 
digital audio-visual production tools and assembly processes have been. They 
also reveal considerable levels of social exchange and collaboration and they 
point to the emergence of new collectivities of social networks unfamiliar 
to our scholarly traditions. And yet, we inhabit a moment of ‘disconnect.’ 
From the perspective of the dominant f ilm and television industries, these 
widespread activities seem largely peripheral… even insignificant. Box office 
and television viewing rates remain healthy, and the industry’s biggest 
worries are about how to coordinate content and audiences across multiple 
media platforms, how to defend their market share against erosion from 
the game industry, and how to curb piracy. Generally, with the exception 
of fast-growing interest in the ‘second screen,’ they have not expressed 
much curiosity about these new forms of production. When they have, it 
has either focused on their marketing potential, or given voice to their fears 
regarding the disruptive potentials of interactive storytelling techniques.
And yet one might argue, as does Henry Jenkins and his colleagues 
(Jenkins, Ford, and Green 2013), that even in the domain of quotidian 
media consumption, we see signs not just of an active, but of a ‘producerly’ 
public—one that contributes to the textual ecosystem, and one that knows 
3 Since then, these numbers have grown exponentially; in September 2016, Youtube statistics 
sites reported a 416 per cent increase to 300 hours of video uploaded per minute (Statistic Brain 
2016). According to a 2011 Pew Internet & American Life Project study, “Fully 71% of online 
Americans use video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Vimeo, up from 66% a year earlier. 
The use of video-sharing sites on any given day also jumped f ive percentage points, from 23% 
of online Americans in May 2010 to 28% in May 2011” (Moore 2011).
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how to pursue its interests across different media platforms and within 
interactive textual systems. Unlike the ‘active’ reader celebrated by a genera-
tion of literary theorists, where activity largely entailed creative textual 
engagements and interpretation, these readers take a hand in constructing 
their own texts from the building blocks and environments made available 
to them by what would normally be considered the ‘producing’ side of the 
equation. But the selection of which textual elements to include, their 
sequence and pacing, the ability in some cases to make external links or add 
comments, or in the case of games, to create new structures within a given 
environment, all transform the ‘reader-producer’ divide into something far 
more co-creative and collaborative on a textual level. The familiar interpre-
tive level also comes into play, of course, arguably in a reconfigured form 
since it seems bound up in some of the processes that shape the text and 
in the condition of textual uniqueness (i.e. versions of texts specif ic to the 
individual navigator or player). This combination of textual assemblage 
and interpretation—required as we move across media platforms and 
channels—today seems just as routine as the activities of myriad Facebook 
and YouTube users, and, in its own way, just as productive.
What’s happening
It is perhaps worth asserting that our history of the cinematic, in general, 
is rooted—in particular—in the documentary ref lex. The f irst decade 
of f ilmmaking was dominated by actualité—phantom train rides, urban 
panoramas, parades, industrial processes, and the curiosities of the natural 
and man-made world—continuing a long fascination with the registration of 
visible evidence that can be found in photography, painting, and panoramic 
traditions (Uricchio 2011). But one might go on to argue, in terms that echo 
André Bazin, that the whole enterprise of photo-realist cinematography 
(as opposed to animation or abstraction), whether deployed for f ictional or 
non-f ictional purposes, derives its power from an assumed unproblematic 
relationship between the recording process and the real materialities of the 
pro-f ilmic event, even if, as is often the case with our dramatic f ictional 
traditions, they are enveloped in the impossibility of magic. Much as media 
scholars can complicate and (rightly) undermine this view, our society’s 
photo IDs and our justice system’s reliance on surveillance footage and 
photographic evidence suggests how deeply rooted are these associations, 
and how much implication lies bound up within them. And these associa-
tions with the ‘real,’ in turn, help to fuel and support our engagement with 
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f ictional worlds. Like the young viewers of the Chinese magician in Vertov’s 
Man with a Movie Camera (1929), we are fascinated by that-which-cannot-
be-and-yet-seems-to-be. It remains to be seen, in an age of ever-intensifying 
digital effects, whether this cultural association will persist.4
Something transformative is taking place, and as usual in our media 
history, documentary is the canary in the coalmine. From its start, docu-
mentary has connected its audiences with the events of the world. It has 
offered a shifting metric of media’s capacity to expose, represent, engage, 
and transform that world. And, if we take a broad view of documentary as 
a discursive mode that is not inherently bound to the motion picture, it has 
consistently been at the forefront of technological and stylistic change, using 
its tools to reveal the previously hidden, and to enable its viewers to see 
the familiar in new ways.5 The history of photography, and its modulations 
through stereoscopy, the panorama, and color, returns repeatedly and 
almost compulsively to depictions of the real as a benchmark of the latest 
technological turn’s ability to ‘capture’ and document some once-missed 
aspect of the world. In the case of cinema, as well, not only was the f irst 
decennium dominated by the documenting impulse, but f ilmmakers’ 
earliest uses of innovations such as the moving camera (panoramas and 
tracking shots of cityscapes), color (Pathé and Gaumont’s nature f ilms), 
and sound (Ruttmann’s Melodie der Welt, 1929, and Vertov’s Enthusiasm, 
1931) explored the representational capacities by engaging the world around 
them.
Today’s interactive documentary represents the most signif icant change 
in documentary form, mode of address and public reach since Direct Cinema 
and Cinéma Vérité. In the early 1960s, 16mm cameras and portable sound 
equipment enabled a new relationship between the f ilmmaker and the 
subject, resulting in new and distinctive styles of f ilmmaking that, thanks 
to television, found new markets and mass audiences just as theatrical 
outlets for documentary shorts began to fade from sight. Similarly, the 
interactive documentary arises from the affordances of today’s networked 
digital technologies, redef ines the line between makers and publics by 
enabling creative collaboration, results in new styles and approaches to 
argument and storytelling, and has the internet at its marketplace. We 
4 To be clear, I do not wish to argue for the indexicality of the photographic image, nor to 
suggest that it is under siege in the digital era; rather, I am making a far softer claim regarding 
the formation and malleability of cultural associations.
5 See MIT’s Open Documentary Lab (2018) for an overview of documentary precedents and 
contemporary practices.
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have seen exponential proliferation of these new documentaries in places 
like Canada’s National Film Board and at the International Documentary 
Festival Amsterdam’s DocLab; they have been pulling in impressive user 
numbers; they are showing signs of generating signif icant engagement and 
impact; and they are f inding unexpected support and audiences in radio 
(Edmond 2015) and the online newspaper (The New York Times and Cizek’s 
Highrise project, Cizek 2010).
For the record, f ixed, linear f ilmmaking is neither dead, nor dying! It 
is alive, well, and wonderfully suited for many forms of argument and 
storytelling. However, its status and meaning are changing thanks to the 
interactive documentary’s twofold impact. On one hand, as part of the larger 
‘user-generated’ churn and breakdown of institutional f ilters represented 
by the internet, the rise of interactive documentaries re-contextualizes the 
status of institutionally produced linear stories. It renders linearity into a 
choice rather than the only option. On the other hand, it adds new perspec-
tive and technique to our expressive repertoire. It potentially maintains 
the complexity of issues that would be deformed by linearity; it enables 
new voices to be heard, to speak for themselves; and it enables users to f ind 
their own way and pursue their own interests in a story environment. The 
challenge is to know and be able to articulate which modes of documentation 
are most effective for a given task. And to the extent that communication is 
an underlying intent, it also means understanding the needs and tolerances 
of the audience. We inhabit a culture steeped in thousands of years of great 
‘linear’ storytelling, and it is a tradition that will thrive. But a growing 
portion of the population also regularly uses interactive forms (games); 
they also routinely co-create (Facebook, YouTube); and for this population, 
interactive forms are also basic components of the culture.
As we look at contemporary culture, we can see that our old habits of 
sitting back and listening to a master storyteller can be complemented by 
collaborative efforts, as people navigate their way through interactive and 
location-based experiences, provide footage of their experiences and engage 
in more immediate ways than we have seen before. Notions of ‘author-
ship,’ the stable text, and familiar divisions of labor between makers and 
viewers appear contested and uncertain. The instant temporalities of a 
connected culture have brought their own challenges, blurring the line 
between journalism and documentary, precisely at the moment when the 
institutional traditions behind these practices—the press, the cinema, 
television—themselves struggle for redef inition. We inhabit a moment 
of accelerated change, with all of the challenges to the old certainties and 
inherited traditions that this brings.
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Documentary, long identif ied with a form, with the ‘linear’ media of f ilm 
and television, has been reborn as a mission, as a mode of engagement and 
interaction that is increasingly agnostic about form. The new documentary, 
with its challenges to established categories, practices, and behaviors, offers 
the tantalizing and terrifying possibilities of a terra incognita. At the same 
time, it offers a vantage point from which we can evaluate some of our 
assumptions and established practices. As it loosens its long association 
with cinematic and television exhibition (in part because of increasingly 
limited access to both screens), it increasingly appears on the web within 
multiple frameworks, including institutions not usually associated with 
documentary such as radio and press. This shift in locus encourages one to 
reconsider the taken-for-grantedness of those earlier venues, and to look for 
other documentary practices ‘out there’ that we have ignored or categorized 
out of existence. The changes that are increasingly evident in some sectors 
of documentary practice have challenged not only established notions of the 
text and authorship, they have also challenged the institutional assumptions 
behind documentary production and exhibition. As much as these moves 
offer promise and possibility, they also offer their share of challenges for 
the status quo, for our notions of use and impact, and for the very ways that 
we understand the meaning of the term ‘documentary’.
Playing with narrative
Caspar Sonnen, director of Doclab—a festival program for new media within 
the International Documentary Festival Amsterdam (IDFA)—sometimes 
explains the difference between the traditional linear documentary and its 
interactive counterpart with the analogy of visiting a city. Nothing beats a 
great tour guide—someone knowledgeable about a location’s history and 
meanings, someone who can direct our attention to the many things we 
would not have otherwise seen, and someone who can tell great stories. 
On the other hand, we have all had the experience of wandering through 
cities on our own, and when we do, whether armed with knowledge or not, 
we attend closely to our environment, keeping an eye on addresses and 
landmarks (in the hope we can f ind our way back!), following our interests 
and desires, making unexpected detours and discoveries, and creating our 
own stories. It is a useful analogy, as much because it makes clear that neither 
of these approaches is a threat or inherently superior to the other. They offer 
different affordances, suit different needs, require different stances. And, 
I would argue, they both offer narrative engagements.
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In his many lectures, MIT’s Scot Osterweil uses a different analogy to 
make a related point. He distinguishes between the experiences of listening 
to a great storyteller and playing. In the f irst case, like the guided tour, we 
are led through experiences we would otherwise not have been privy to, 
abandoning ourselves to the craft of the narrator who leads us through the 
carefully plotted structure of the story (Marsh et al. 2011). In the case of play,6 
something many of us abandoned relatively early in life, we imagine, and 
indeed, co-create a world and its rules, inhabit a character, and have a goal 
that we share with our playmates. But we have no idea, as we play, whether 
the good guys will win or not. We do not know what our fate will be. We 
simply improvise, inhabiting our characters and living the experience as 
it unfolds. Osterweil argues that this experience, like Sonnen’s example 
of wandering, is profoundly narrative in character. The difference is that 
Osterweil’s notion of play includes notions of character (such as invented, 
f ictional notions), rules that we must adhere to, and an arbitrary goal. As the 
Creative Director of MIT’s Education Arcade—a research lab that produces 
computer games for learning—Osterweil has a notion of play-as-narrative 
that unsurprisingly aligns with thinking in the game space, where story 
outcomes are unknown while the player navigates the diegetic world and 
its rules.7
This may seem an obvious point, but mainstream academic def initions 
of narrative draw a clear distinction between those events that, like the 
guided tour and told story, are ‘narrated’ versions of past or known events; 
and those that, like wandering on one’s own or playing, are indeterminate 
and simply part of life’s experiential f low. In a strict sense, no ‘teller’ of 
‘past events’ means no narrative. And yet our experience while wandering 
or playing can seem as immersive, compelling, motivated, and coherent as 
any story; and in the case of play, it explicitly contains many of the same 
features (character, setting, rules, and an ‘as if ’ f ictional world). This latter 
point, of course, brings its share of complications to the documentary, 
but as I will suggest, it also offers important ways to rethink the place of 
6 There are, of course, many varieties of play; Osterweil’s reference is to character-based play.
7 The appearance of computer games around 1960, and particularly interactive f iction games 
such as Zork (Anderson, Blank, Lebling, and Daniels 1977), signaled a new turn in traditional 
narrative forms. Interactive literature, emblematized by the work of the Electronic Literature 
Organization founded in 1999, and interactive ‘f ilms’, rooted, for example, in the work of MIT’s 
Interactive Cinema Research Group in the late 1980s (or even earlier, in Radúz Činčera’s Kino-
automat at Expo 67), both attest to the relatively recent emergence of systematic developments 
in new forms of narrativity. However, as Whitney Anne Trettien reminds us, one can f ind much 
earlier precedents, in Trettien’s case, going back to the eighteenth century (Trettien 2009).
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imagination in the domain of the non-f ictional. But f irst, the problem of 
what constitutes a narrative.
The 1980s saw both the rise of computer games and the emergence 
of alternate views regarding narrative. Three broad strategies can be 
distinguished. The f irst more or less maintains the existing def inition 
of narrative (‘the retelling of past events’), but redef ines the player’s 
activity, with some narratologists arguing that the wanderer’s or player’s 
consciousness serves as an implicit internal voice and thus provides the 
‘teller’ to just-experienced events, which are technically ‘past’ by the 
time they are cognitively processed. A variation on this approach takes 
such challenges as the ‘just-experienced’ problem and the indeterminate 
nature of conclusions, arguing that the narrative is what is constructed 
retrospectively, after the process is completed, as we remember and retell 
our experiences. A second strategy takes a more f ine-grained approach, 
stepping back from a grand theory of narrative to focus instead on the 
micro-structures of narrative, the process by which questions are repeat-
edly posed and then answered in order to sustain viewer interest and 
move the overall narrative ahead. Rather than thinking of narrative as 
an overarching structure of the entire experience (whether Aristotle’s or 
Freytag’s ‘beginning, middle, and end’), it can instead be understood as the 
building blocks of an experience, each with its own cycle of ‘exposition, 
transformation, and resolution’.
Storytellers are quite adept at keeping us on the edge of our seats with 
this technique, interweaving mini-narratives as a means of establishing the 
characters, settings, and events that will constitute the overall narrative. 
From this perspective, certain forms of the interactive narrative—such as 
the interactive documentary or interactive literature—simply disaggregate 
these ‘mini-narratives’ from one another, allowing the viewer to reassemble 
them in a manner that suits her interest. The basic DNA of the narrative—the 
sequence—stays intact, while the larger assembly process is open to user 
modification. A third and more radical approach argues that narrative is part 
of our psychological armature, a way of seeing, rather than a character of the 
text. Best known as cognitive narratology, here, narrative describes a way 
of encountering the world, an organizing experience, an existential gestalt 
(Herman 2009). Created and experienced on the fly, it is situational and does 
not have to await post facto retelling or the aggregation of mini-narratives 
in order to constitute a narrative experience. Rather, it manifests itself in 
the perception of coherence and linkage among experienced events. The 
various claims to support the interactive documentary’s narrative status 
can be found within this spectrum of arguments.
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Of course, more than mere argument supports one or another of these 
approaches to narrative. Interactive documentaries come in many dif-
ferent forms, some of their textual structures adhering rather closely to 
long established narrative traditions; others, explicitly taking the form of 
mini-narratives that the user can move among and link; and still others 
offering rich if disaggregated possibilities to the motivated participant, 
who can connect the dots into a narrative experience. Some projects (Alma: 
A Tale of Violence, Dewever-Plana and Fougère 2012 is a strong case; Bear 
71, Mendes and Allison 2012, a weaker one) are essentially retellings of 
past events and lead inexorably to certain f ixed conclusions, despite the 
fact that users may navigate multiple routes to that end state. These forms 
share qualities of the traditional narrative (a definite story arc based on past 
events, a narrator), even as they encourage excurses and wandering. Others 
(Planet Galata—A Bridge in Istanbul, Thalhofer and Bas 2010; Question Bridge: 
Black Males, Johnson et al. 2012) require the user to wander and navigate at 
their own pace, exploring the spaces, characters, and issues that they f ind 
interesting. The makers have made choices about what to include and offer 
structures to help shape and lend coherence to the user experience, but 
there is no preordained conclusion or story arc other than that conjured 
up by the user. Another, perhaps more extreme example may be found 
with 18 Days in Egypt (Mehta and Elayat 2011), which offers a database of 
crowd-sourced mini-documentaries, tagged with minimal metadata, so that 
users can follow a particular maker or topic. Although quite fragmented, 
coherence in this case emerges from the pro-f ilmic event (the 18-day long 
revolution whose symbolic center was Cairo in 2011 and its aftermath) and 
the interface design, enabling motivated users to move among the many 
differently authored shards of still and video documentation and emerge 
with a rich multi-perspectival view. Like Question Bridge and Planet Galata, 
the onus is on the user to make sense of what is encountered; unlike them, 
the dispersed nature of the event coupled with the very different voices and 
styles of representation it includes (and the minimal metadata and guidance) 
requires greater levels of user motivation to work through the database.
The space between Sonnen and Osterweil’s analogies of ‘wandering’ and 
‘play’ is a fruitful one as we consider the ongoing development of interactive 
forms. One of the reasons that some documentary makers—rather than 
f iction makers—have so quickly adopted these new techniques is that in 
many cases, users already know the neighborhood in which they will wander 
and play. Users’ pre-existing familiarity with ‘reality’ provides ample context 
and motivation for them to explore interactive options and have them cohere 
as a unif ied and meaningful experience. In a f ictional setting, by contrast, 
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the diegetic frame must f irst be established before users can meaningfully 
wander around the story world—something we can see from game design. 
In either case, the structure of the textual environment bears heavily on the 
nature of the user experience; just as the perception of narrative depends 
heavily on the user’s affect. Sonnen’s sense of ‘wandering’ makes great 
sense for non-f iction: we, the wanderer, are oriented, have some sense of 
our setting, and go on to explore it. As stated, ‘reality’ provides a suff icient 
context and motive. By contrast, Osterweil’s notion of ‘play,’ peopled with 
invented or assumed characters who are rule-bound by the conceits of the 
game, makes great sense for f iction. But it costs time and energy to establish 
these invented characters, to delineate the basic contours of the f ictional 
world and its operating rules. The threshold for the ‘player’ would seem to 
be higher than for the ‘wander.’ And yet, to restrict the player to f ictional 
worlds would be to impoverish non-f iction, denying it imaginative and 
invented entry points and characters (as if a purely objectivist stance were 
even possible!).
We have only to look back on the ‘off icial history’ of our documentary 
tradition, which begins in ‘creative interpretation,’ as John Grierson’s 1926 
review of Flaherty’s Moana reminds us. Several generations of documentary 
historians jumped on the bandwagon, underscoring the point by simply 
dismissing as ‘naïve’ the hyper-realist renderings of cities, factory processes, 
and peoples that dominated non-f iction from 1895 until the early 1920s, 
and embracing Flaherty’s story conventions. This is a troublesome view, 
not because of its acceptance of an expansive vocabulary and notion of 
imaginative engagement, but rather for its exclusion of a rich representa-
tional tradition rather akin to wandering, one, moreover, that stands as 
the culmination of several ways of seeing in the late nineteenth century. 
That said, Moana’s invented characters, like those of Nanook of the North 
(1922) before it and generations of documentaries after, remind us that the 
f iction / non-f iction divide is not quite as clean as some would like it to be. 
And Osterweil’s notion of the player goes one step farther, reminding us that 
meaningful invention need not only manifest itself in on-screen f ictions, 
but rather can infuse our way of seeing as we walk through—and play in—a 
world. That is, rather than (like Flaherty) f ictionalizing elements of the 
pro-f ilmic world in order to sharpen insights into its operations, being ‘in 
character’ allows us to bring a new vantage point to the world that we are 
exploring, to see it with new eyes, to engage it with an assumed agenda. One 
of the great potentials of interactive documentary is the f lexibility that it 
affords the user to f ind her way through a constructed environment. That 
one can do this ‘in character’ would seem to provide ways of discovering 
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new aspects of the world, of engaging with it in fresh ways, rather than 
simply seeing the world through the eyes of the other in the form of the 
maker of a linear f ilm. Instead, as in the act of playing (rather than listening 
to the story told), we have the opportunity to assume a set of instincts, to 
invent a viewing position, and to enact it, respond through it, and in the 
process, learn.
Today’s interactive documentary caters to the wanderer, and with wonder-
ful effect. But it has an as-yet-underutilized capacity to address the player. 
For this to happen will require more than the efforts of documentary makers: 
we also have to do our part, and re-learn the art of abandoning ourselves to 
imagined roles, to the assumed rules and goals of a narrative conceit, and 
to ‘play’ our way through documentary environments.
Engagement
Over the past decade or so, ‘engagement’ has become an oft used term in the 
worlds of marketing and audience metrics, indicating a shift in interest from 
the mere ‘exposure’ of audiences to texts, to the quality of the audience’s 
experience. Although initially presented by qualitative researchers as a 
challenge to a media industry built upon counting eyeballs and clicks, it 
has gained traction, encouraged by the rapid state of media change and the 
evident need for new perspectives. The internet as well as computer games, 
e-readers, and digital television all share potentials for user interactivity as 
well as data tracking, offering a quantitative underpinning to qualitative 
concerns, and helping to drive an emerging paradigm shift in institutional 
notions of audience participation.
This broad shift serves as a backdrop for the operations of the interactive 
documentary, which seems to promise enhanced opportunities both for 
user engagement and—especially for the funders of social impact documen-
tary—for measuring something that might be interpreted as such. Among 
such ‘engagement-inducing’ activities we can distinguish: crowd-sourced 
funding to support particular documentary initiatives; crowd-sourced 
footage and community co-design; user-determined routings through textual 
environments; and the ‘after-life’ of projects that remain as active platforms 
for ongoing community interaction. Of course, not all of these are unique 
to the digital domain: crowd-sourced funding and sourcing, co-design, and 
even the community-based ‘afterlife’ of projects all have analog precedents. 
But the digital domain greatly facilitates these practices, and has the added 
value of making their operations in some senses more visible.
RE-ThINkING ThE SoCIAL DoCuMENTARy 85
There is much here that we do not know. For example, are contributors 
to crowdfunding initiatives (say, Kickstarter or JuntoBox, which offer ways 
to fund projects without promising the funder any ownership of the project 
or revenues from it) more likely to feel engaged? Since this is a self-selecting 
group, contributing resources on the basis of interest, the answer is presum-
ably ‘yes’—they were engaged as a condition of giving to the project. But how, 
beyond funding, might this manifest itself? Might they draw in their circle 
of friends? Promote the project and its cause in a personal way, encouraging 
others around them to share their interest? Might they, in other words, take a 
more active role in proselytizing the project, thereby having a social stake in 
its use, than a non-involved participant? The same might be asked of people 
who contribute footage to a crowd-sourced initiative, such as Perry Bard’s 
2007 and ongoing Man with a Movie Camera: The Global Remake project 
(which offers remixes of user-generated footage to remake Vertov’s f ilm 
every day), or Kevin Macdonald’s 2011 Life in a Day (which drew from 80,000 
YouTube submissions). While the act of submitting footage presumes a high 
level of engagement, does this, in turn, lead to ongoing efforts to engage a 
larger cohort of participants and viewers to the project? I am unaware of 
detailed evidence regarding these behaviors; but the amplif ication logics 
of social media are increasingly well studied, and may offer an appropriate 
analogy for these behaviors.
Collaborative documentaries also avail themselves to forms of co-design. 
This established practice, dating back at least to the 1970s, is related to 
user-centered design and participatory design (although it does not presume 
that any stakeholder is more relevant than another). It is process-oriented, 
blurring the roles of designer and author, much as some documentary 
projects blur the roles of author and user. Co-design developed with the 
notion that better designs emerge from directly involving stakeholders in the 
design process; so, it seems reasonable to draw on this tradition if we want to 
enhance engagement, involving stakeholders in the documentation process. 
An example of such an approach is the cross-platform project Sandy Storyline 
(Premo, Falcone, and Gottesdiener 2012), described by Tribeca’s Ingrid Kopp 
as “a community-generated narrative of the storm that seeks to inspire a 
safe and more sustainable future. […] It creates a living archive that shows 
the potential for sharing stories on a very human scale” (2012). Organized by 
members of the social justice movement, Sandy Storyline’s avowed goal is to 
foster civic dialog so communities can decide, from the ground up, their own 
futures. Sandy Storyline, like Hollow: An Interactive Documentary (McMillion 
2013)—an initiative “for the community, by the community,” is deeply 
embedded in the lives of those who are its co-producers. Hollow uses video 
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portraits, user-generated content, photography, soundscapes, interactive 
data, and grassroots mapping not just to document a community’s past, but 
to play an active role in building its future. Although both projects are, as 
of this writing, quite new, they have no ‘end’ in sight, serving as ongoing, 
growing, and dynamic resources for their participants, who continue to 
contribute imagery and comments. Less of an ‘artifact’ (in the sense that 
f ilms tend to be once completed and shown) than an ongoing forum for 
documentation, reflection, and exchange, projects like Sandy and Hollow 
point to a new and largely unexplored dimension of the ‘new’ documentary 
to which we need to attend. Their civic character holds great potential, 
providing ways for communities to share knowledge and experience, and 
offering citizens incentives for sustained participation.
As noted, one can certainly f ind precedents in the analog past for these 
incentives to engagement, such as Britain’s 1930s Mass Observation Project 
that involved thousands of citizens for its f indings (Sheridan 1993). But the af-
fordances of networked computers and digital cameras have greatly lowered 
the barriers to participation and enhanced a two-way dialog between project 
developers and the public. As alluded to in the previous section on narrative, 
the interactive character of these documentaries, their requirement that the 
user ‘wander’ or ‘play,’ adds a distinctive opportunity to engage by making 
participants co-constructors of the text itself, rather than ‘mere’ readers. 
The user’s interests presumably direct the process of negotiation through the 
documentary environment. While we can surmise that the ensuing textual 
experience differs from encounters with ready-made texts, like storytelling 
differs from play in Osterweil’s terms, the nature of that difference and its 
implications for user engagement—as in the other cases—remains under 
researched and unknown. We do know that in some digital environments, 
users leave traces, allowing designers to discern behavioral patterns. Traces 
may offer evidence of engaged behaviors; and perhaps more importantly, 
they may offer insights into barriers to participation, points that could be 
redesigned or tweaked in some way in order to encourage more sustained 
participation. Because there is no f ixed text, but rather a textual environ-
ment ripe with narrative possibilities, producers can continually ref ine 
the project, responding to aggregated behaviors and user feedback. Like 
the long ‘afterlife’ of some projects, this ability to continually f ine-tune an 
interactive documentary in response to user behaviors offers a potentially 
new and powerful dimension for exploration.
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Looking ahead…
Mobile telephony did not initiate distant communication, but it certainly 
enabled us to redefine fundamentally our notion of being connected. Indeed, 
the mobile phone’s potential to connect us anytime and anywhere seems 
to have acquired a new sense of urgency, at least for those of us who carry 
one, most evident in the panic that sets in with forgotten phones or dead 
batteries. Moreover ‘connection,’ in the age of the smart phone, has come to 
mean far more than the potential to reach others or be reached by them. It 
entails experiential forms and cultural logics once relegated to distinctive 
media practices. It means being always connected to one’s favorite music, 
photos, and books; connected to geo-locative information and spatially 
oriented; connected to email and online social networks; connected to the 
world through an ability to share experience through live-streamed and 
recorded audio and video. This conflation of once separated media practices, 
both enabled by technology and embodied in our everyday enactments, is 
familiar from the computer and examples across nearly every other digital 
platform (cameras that can also send images, e-books that play music, etc.). 
And this remix of our media practices, sensibilities, and opportunities, is 
fundamental to the new turn in documentary.
As noted at the outset, conditions such as the widespread penetration 
of cell phones, many equipped with HD video cameras, and those that 
are not, still enabled to carry out the work of documentation thanks to 
software systems like Vojo and Vozmob or Mobile Voices/Voces Móviles,8 
have shifted the locus of representation. The ability to record and transmit 
image, sound, and data such as location, is now in the hands of that 102.2 per 
cent of the (in this case, American) public equipped with mobile phones. 
The intertwining of recording and transmitting systems, the ease of ac-
cess to web-based aggregating systems (whether live streaming sites such 
as Qik and USTREAM or aggregators of recorded material like YouTube) 
and elegantly simple story assembly tools (such as Zeega, Cowbird, and 
Storyplanet), have all empowered that public to take the next step, and tell 
their own stories. And, in cases like Sandy Storyline, 18 Days in Egypt, and 
the many stories aggregated on Cowbird, they have done so. At the same 
time, the more active stance encouraged by these new affordances (not to 
mention, the daily realities of negotiating the internet and portals such as 
YouTube or sites such as Facebook) has also encouraged people to navigate 
8 Vozmob provides a platform for immigrant and/or low-wage workers to create stories about 
their lives and communities directly from simple cell phones.
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their own way through the audio-visual environments provided by others, 
in the process creating their own experiences and stories. Here, too, the 
quotidian status of the smart phone has not only made trivial the process 
of textual construction, but has greatly expanded the space of reception. 
We can view and interact with this material virtually anywhere that we can 
receive a signal; and thanks to geo-location technologies, documentaries 
can potentially be viewed in situ, interacting with the spaces and places 
that they document.
The implications of these shifts from over a century of professionalized 
documentary production and institutionalized sponsorship, distribution, 
and exhibition, are just beginning to be felt. On one hand, some professionals 
and institutions have reached out to the public, embracing them as partners 
in the project of collaborative documentation, as can be seen in the work of 
the National Film Board of Canada with Kat Cizek’s Highrise series (2010) 
or Hugues Sweeney’s A Journal of Insomnia (Duverneix et al. 2013). And on 
the other, as noted with Sandy Storyline and the many projects enabled 
through Vozmob, activists and the public have found ways to make their 
voices heard largely outside the domain of professional and institutional 
practices. Add this to the changes already noted—the destabilization of 
the f ixed text, the challenge to the authority of the author, and new roles 
of contributor and collaboration taken up by the public, and the contours 
of the situation seem both new… and familiar. This shift from a limited, 
centralized, institutional discourse to an open, decentralized, and participa-
tory process is familiar in the network age. Similar transformations might 
be condensed into the ‘Encyclopedia Britannica/Wikipedia’ dynamic: 
one, carefully vetted, attributable, and stable; the other, open, more or less 
self-regulating, and dynamic. Each have important affordances, but the 
shift from an institutional monopoly to a pluriform and open environment 
requires a perceptual shift. Faith in institutional vetting and the cult of 
expertise is no longer suff icient grounds (as if it ever were!) to navigate the 
world. Instead, the onus is on users to develop a critical stance, to assess, 
compare, and be open to contingencies. At this moment of regime change in 
the domain of representation, rather than fixating on a notion of unassailable 
truth (or lamenting its passing), we need to demand transparency, and to 
bring our critical judgment to bear, rather than relying on faith in—or 
giving obeisance to—a higher authority.
Like Sonnen’s reference to wandering in the city versus taking a guided 
tour, or Osterweil’s notion of play versus listening to a great storyteller, 
participation and collaboration in the representation of reality will exist 
alongside our long reliance on hierarchies of expertise. This is not a situation 
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of either/or, of the well-authored, carefully crafted, and institutionally 
endorsed documentary versus its user-negotiated, participatory, and grass-
roots counterpart. Rather, it is a tale of different affordances and, more 
importantly, of the emergence of a new and critical stance. The appearance 
of a new art of documentary, though still f inding its way, has necessarily 
recontextualized the long (and still) dominant tradition. And with that 
recontextualization, we can expect the critical reception practices required 
in the participatory age to bleed into even the most vetted and institution-
ally endorsed of documentary productions. In this sense, Sonnen’s and 
Osterweil’s heuristic binary opposition might well be complicated by unruly 
tours and playful listeners, practices that, repositioned within the civil 
society, add up to responsible citizenship.
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Contemporary games are increasingly used to make a difference at an 
individual, community, and/or societal level. Ecological games are one kind 
of such ‘games for change’: they seek to contribute to ecological thought 
and turn players into ecological citizens. This chapter draws inspiration 
from the conceptual framework of psychologist Stoknes. He theorizes the 
‘psychological climate paradox’: the fact that although climate science 
facts are becoming more solidly documented and disturbing every year, 
most people either do not believe in these facts or do not act upon them. 
This chapter discusses how Collapsus – Energy Risk Conspiracy (Palotta 
2010) might contribute to solving the paradox by making people reflect 
on the global, political, and cultural implications of climate change and 
act accordingly.
Keywords: Climate communication, ecological citizenship, games for 
change, psychological climate paradox
When I say, ‘Optimism is a duty,’ this means not only that the future is 
open but that we all help to decide it through what we do. We are all jointly 
responsible for what is to come. So we all have a duty, instead of predicting 
something bad, to support the things that may lead to a better future.
Popper (1999, 143-144)
Contemporary digital games are increasingly used not only to entertain, but 
also to persuade people, raising their awareness and changing or reinforcing 
their attitudes and behavior for the good of society. Ecological games belong 
to this category of ‘persuasive games’ (Jacobs 2017; Jacobs, Jansz, and De 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
doi: 10.5117/9789462984523/ch05
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la Hera 2017). They seek not only to contribute to ecological thought, but 
also “‘to make’ people become ecological citizens” (MacGregor 2014, 120). 
In the last few years, digital games have encouraged support, sympathy, 
and action for a variety of ecological issues.1 In this chapter, I examine how 
Collapsus – Energy Risk Conspiracy (Pallotta 2010) frames the immanent 
energy transition from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources.2 My analysis 
aims to offer a conceptual clarif ication of the rhetorical (textual) strategies 
that a ‘gamelike’ production such as Collapsus uses to raise awareness about 
the issue of energy transition. I use the word ‘rhetorical’ here in the sense 
of a persuasive discourse “adopted by members of a particular aff iliation 
to persuade others of the veracity and worthwhileness of their beliefs” 
(Sutton-Smith 1997, 8). My investigation draws inspiration from the con-
ceptual framework of psychologist and economist Per Espen Stoknes, who 
theorizes what I would call one of the most pressing issues within the f ield 
of climate change communication, the ‘psychological climate paradox’: 
the fact that “climate science facts are getting more solidly documented 
and disturbing every year,” while “most people either don’t believe in or do 
not act upon those facts” (2015, 3). Though Stoknes provides a productive 
framework for understanding and overcoming the obstacles of conventional 
climate communication strategies, his set of recommendations remains 
very general. By analysing the empirical building blocks of Collapsus, I 
will develop Stoknes’ framework further in order to turn it into a strategic 
toolkit for civic action that can be used in the domain of playful ecological 
communication. In the f irst section, I will briefly introduce Collapsus and 
discuss how Stoknes defines the psychological climate paradox and how he 
envisions solving it. In the second section, I will further develop and theorize 
some of his strategies. In the third section, I will discuss in detail if, and if so 
how, Collapsus might contribute to solving the paradox by making people 
reflect on the global and political implications of the energy transition and 
act accordingly. I present my conclusions in the last section.
1 For an overview of recent examples of environmental games, see the Games for Change 
(G4C) website, where we f ind its mission statement to be “catalyzing social impact through 
digital games” (G4C 2018). Also see Raessens (2017, 2018).
2 Collapsus was commissioned by the Dutch broadcasting company VPRO and produced by 
Amsterdam-based company Submarine Channel. It can be played at collapsus.com. Collapsus is 
an important case to discuss because it succeeded—back in 2010—in imagining the social and 
political implications of global warming in an innovative way. It was aimed at a predominantly 
younger and connected generation. Statistics show that it is diff icult for documentary f ilms to 
reach young audiences; only 18-20 per cent is younger than 34 years old. Collapsus reached 41 
per cent of that age category.
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The psychological climate paradox and how to solve it
The ‘psychological climate paradox’ that Stoknes is referring to—the more 
climate science facts you hear, the less likely you are to take action—is only an 
apparent paradox. It might be solved once it becomes clear, for example, that 
strategies other than presenting ‘facts only’ might indeed convince people to 
change their behavior regarding ecological issues. The persuasive argument 
in a documentary like An Inconvenient Truth (Guggenheim 2006) is primarily 
based on factual evidence about global warming. Former United States vice 
president Al Gore sketches a doom scenario, as its title already indicates, 
suggesting only at the end of the film that the climate crisis might be solved 
and how this might be achieved. This Changes Everything (Lewis 2015), a 
documentary inspired by Naomi Klein’s book of the same name, on the other 
hand, frames global warming as an opportunity to build a better world. It does 
so by presenting compelling stories of communities all around the world that 
are resisting our ‘failed’ economic system and supporting environmentalism.
Another example of such a compelling story is Collapsus – Energy Risk 
Conspiracy (Pallotta 2010). Collapsus is an online production that engages users 
with realistic future scenarios (2012-2025) about anticipated energy crises and 
the necessity of transitioning from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources. This 
interactive experience consists of three screens or panels contained on one web 
page (for the three-panel structure, see Figure 5.1): it merges a fictional storyline 
via live action and animated graphics, with minigames (both presented in the 
center panel), documentary clips (right panel) and simulation games (left panel).
Collapsus is usually presented as a game. The Games for Change website, 
for example, refers to Collapsus in their list of environmental games. Subma-
rine Channel, the production studio behind Collapsus, also includes Collapsus 
under the category of ‘games.’ We can use the f ive shared characteristics of 
games—they are goal oriented; the player has to follow specif ic rules; the 
system provides some kind of feedback; often there is a competition element; 
and participation is voluntary (Jansz 2016)—to understand the ‘gameness’ 
of Collapsus. The overall goal of Collapsus is to play it until the end while 
unlocking all the information made available by the three panels. More 
specif ically, you have to win the minigames to reveal specif ic information, 
and win the simulation games by producing enough sustainable energy 
to meet the rising demand. One important rule is that you have to unlock 
the information when it becomes available in the different panels. You can 
cheat by skipping the minigames, for example, but then you would fail to 
understand some important aspects of the story; the system provides the 
player with feedback during the minigames and sim games. You do not 
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compete with other players, but you do compete with the game’s system. 
And you decide yourself whether to play or not.
From the perspective of ‘mediality,’ Collapsus can be seen as multi-medial, 
because it combines multiple media forms, or transmedial, because the 
media forms are complementary. But I would prefer to identify it as an 
intermedial production because the media forms in the different panels 
interact with each other. As Chiel Kattenbelt points out, intermediality 
results “in a redefinition of the media that are influencing each other, which 
in turn leads to a refreshed perception” (2008, 25).
If we want to answer the question if, and if so how, Collapsus can be 
used to engage individual citizens in the issue of energy transition, we 
f irst need to improve our understanding of the reasons why conventional 
climate communication does not always work optimally, or, worse still, works 
counter-productively (erecting barriers). Moreover, we need to know what we 
should do to overcome these barriers (solutions) and what concrete strategies 
we should use to make communication work (strategies), see Table 1.3
Table 1: Barriers, solutions, and strategies
Barriers
(first section of this chapter)
Solutions
(first section of this chapter)
Strategies
(second section of this chapter)
distant in space and time close, human, personal, 
urgent
*  moral ideas: progressive, 
optimistic
*  persuasion: narratives, 
documentaries, games
*  social networks: many-to- 
many communication
* citizenship: post-liberal, global
doom scenario opportunities, hope
not compatible with 
our values
in line with our values
3 For a summary of Stoknes’ argument, see his chapter ‘From barriers to solutions’ (2015, 
87-94). I present my own interpretation of his argument in Table 1.
5.1: Collapsus – Three-panel structure.
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Three barriers might cause conventional climate communication to lead 
to a state of denial. The f irst barrier arises when global warming is framed 
as being distant in space and time. For the majority of us living in the West, 
the impact of global warming is still relatively far away, both in time and 
space. That is why Rob Nixon refers to climate change as ‘slow violence.’ He 
writes it is “a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of 
delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional 
violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (2011, 2).4 For example, 
research shows that only a minority of the Dutch population believe that 
fossil fuels have a signif icant impact on the climate; and only a very small 
minority see energy transition as an urgent challenge, especially when 
compared with issues such as the economy and migration (SCP 2016). The 
second barrier arises when global warming is framed as a doom scenario, 
an apocalyptic-movie mode without any thinkable practical solutions, 
which is depressing and generates the desire to avoid the topic altogether. 
Energy transition is indeed not uppermost in the Dutch mind (Ibid.). The 
third barrier arises when global warming is framed in such a way that it 
is not compatible with our values or our sense of identity. Dutch citizens, 
for example, are interested in the transition to other energy sources, not 
so much because of climate change, but because they like the idea of being 
energy independent; they want the stable delivery of energy and support 
the potential economic growth that results from such a transition (Ibid.).
In order to make climate communication productive, we need to turn 
these three barriers into solutions. First, climate change must be framed as 
being close, human, personal, and urgent. One possible way of doing this—as 
Collapsus does—is to link the subject (energy transition) to violent events 
taking place in the here and now of the story world. As a result, the energy 
transition is experienced by the characters and, hopefully, the players as 
“immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting 
into instant sensational visibility” (Nixon 2011, 2). Second, climate messages 
must be framed in a positive, hopeful way, providing opportunities for 
consistent and visible action. As we will see later, Collapsus combines an 
alarming message with a variety of hopeful opportunities through different 
scenarios of civic engagement. Third, climate change must be framed in 
such a way that the solutions are in line with our values. That is, as long 
4 This is, of course, not the case for those communities that are directly threatened by global 
warming (Lewis 2015), “particularly (though not exclusively) across the so-called global South” 
(Nixon 2011, 4). The most visible impact of global warming in our everyday lives in the West is 
in extreme weather conditions, like heatwaves, hurricanes, droughts, wildf ires, and f loods.
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as they are not conflicting with the notion of environmentalism, as I will 
discuss in the next section. As I have discussed elsewhere, people ‘play’ their 
identity: people play their values, they play on the basis of who they are, 
how they understand themselves, the values they want to live by, and who 
and what they want to become (Raessens 2015). Collapsus tries to persuade 
its audience by presenting a variety of role models with different beliefs, 
values, and behaviors that the audience can identify with. For example, it 
links the necessity of energy transition with the notion of the stable delivery 
of energy and economic independence.
Strategies for raising awareness
On the basis of these three barriers with their corresponding solutions, I 
propose four complementary strategies to make climate communication 
more effective. The discourse around climate must mobilize and reinforce 
progressive and positive moral ideas; it must be persuasive, changing 
attitudes and behavior by using narratives, documentary information, 
and games; it must stimulate social learning by using the power of social 
networks; and it must stimulate a post-liberal and global form of citizenship.
Moral ideas: Progressive and optimistic. In order to increase our under-
standing of how Collapsus frames energy transition, it is productive to use 
Lakoff’s distinction between conservative and progressive moral systems 
(e.g. Flanagan and Nissenbaum 2014). The two systems represent contrasting 
ideas about environmentalism, which is def ined by Lakoff as follows: “The 
natural world is being destroyed and it is a moral imperative to preserve 
and reconstitute as much of it as possible as soon as possible” (2010, 80). 
Whereas the conservative system includes a number of ideas that work 
against environmentalism—such as nature being there for human use and 
exploitation, a let-the-market-decide ideology, and the idea that making 
a prof it and economic growth are goals in themselves (Ibid., 74-75)—the 
progressive system includes various ideas that support environmentalism, 
such as empathy linking us with other beings and other things, responsibility 
for taking care of yourself and others, and the ethic of excellence calling 
on us to improve the environment (Ibid., 76). This is in line with Stoknes’ 
argument: “We ought to […] protect and compassionately care for ourselves, 
current and future generations, and the other beings we share the planet 
with” (2015, 118). One important thing Stoknes is adding here is that we 
need to reframe the climate message in such a way that the message is 
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supported with hope, positive emotions, and opportunities. Collapsus, for 
example, presents progressive strategies for improving the environment 
via the transition from fossil fuels to solar and wind power.
Persuasion: Narratives, documentaries, and games. Collapsus tries to raise 
awareness about the diff icult choices we all have to make in relation to 
the impending energy crisis. A better understanding and use of persuasive 
technology “will signif icantly expand the toolbox for climate communica-
tion” (Stoknes, 130). Because Collapsus combines a f ictional storyline with 
documentaries and games, we need to analyze the persuasive rhetoric 
of these different media, not only separately, but also in their intercon-
nectedness. The problem is that while strategies of persuasive rhetoric have 
been studied, the research has mainly considered these media forms in 
isolation. Think, for example, of the analysis of written, text-based media 
(Killingsworth and Palmer 1992) and image-based media (Dobrin and Morey 
2009). To understand how persuasiveness is embedded in Collapsus’ design, 
I will focus on the narratives it portrays (or allows the player to develop), 
the documentary information it presents, and the system and rules of the 
games it allows the users to play.
Narratives. In his study of persuasive games, Ruud Jacobs (2017) refers to 
the importance of character-based narrative persuasion. Research done on 
screen-based media in general, such as f ilm, television, or games, shows that 
users’ attitudes are more likely to change—leading, for example, to civic 
engagement—when the users identify with role models or protagonists who 
go through the same stages of change (on screen) as the users are supposed 
to (e.g. Slater 2002; Green and Jenkins 2014; Jenkins, Ito, and boyd 2016). Or, 
as Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner put it: “The slow transformation of 
ordinary people into informed opponents of the corporate system probably 
appealed more to audiences than if the characters had begun as radicals” 
(Ingram 2000, 169). As we will see in more detail later, this form of social 
learning is what Collapsus aims to do. It wants to offer players the oppor-
tunity to identify with characters such as Vera and the changes she goes 
through in the various stages. Stoknes identif ies three extra characteristics 
that storytelling should have in order to be able to convince people of the 
necessity of environmentalism. First, narratives must foster creativity: “There 
must be room for humour, emotion, visualization, point of view, climax, 
surprise, plot, drama. Above all, make it personal and personif ied” (2014, 
148). Second, there must be room for more than one narrative perspective: 
“I don’t think there is just one right type of climate story to tell to get people 
to understand the urgency of the issue and move them to action. Rather, 
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a plurality of stories is needed, each creating meaning and engagement 
for different groups of people” (Ibid., 132). Third, the stories must offer the 
possibility of some kind of feedback. Stoknes asks: “Can we really measure 
if we’re changing in the right direction […]?” (Ibid., 152). As we will see in 
more detail in the next section, this, again, is what Collapsus tries to do.
Documentaries. Collapsus not only provides accurate documentation of 
the imminent energy transition, but it is also a playful re-enactment of this 
event. To better understand the persuasive power of Collapsus as a whole, 
we can direct our attention to what documentary theorist Michael Renov 
calls “the four fundamental tendencies or rhetorical/aesthetic functions 
attributable to documentary practice,” which are to express, to analyze 
or interrogate, to reveal, and to persuade or promote (1993, 21). These four 
discursive functions are indeed present in Collapsus’ f ictional storyline, 
news reports, minigames, and simulation games, albeit in different forms: 
the diff icult choices we all have to make are expressed in the lives of the 
main characters within the f ictional storyline; the geopolitical implica-
tions of the energy transition are analyzed and interrogated in the news 
reports; the complexity, the best solutions and a conspiracy are revealed 
in the minigames and simulation games. Collapsus uses these three func-
tions—expression, analysis/interrogation, and revelation—in the end to 
promote a specif ic position in this debate, and to persuade users to adopt 
this point of view.5
Games. According to Ian Bogost (2007), persuasive games have the unique 
capability of employing what he calls ‘procedural rhetoric’ to address serious 
topics, such as global warming. The goal of a game—for example ‘supporting 
environmentalism’—can be found in its formal system, more specif ically 
in the properties of the rules. Players are presumed to surrender to the 
seduction of a game by interpreting the game as suggested and being guided 
by its rules. The idea that procedurality structures, helps facilitate, or has a 
(strong) impact on the game’s interpretation seems to be a valid observation, 
but not to the extent that it ‘determines’ its meaning (Sicart 2011). Games, 
and this applies to Collapsus as a whole, are polysemic and therefore open 
to many readings. Players may activate three interpretative strategies as 
a reaction to what Sherry Turkle calls the “seduction of simulation” (1996, 
71). They can either surrender to the seduction by interpreting it more 
or less according to the encoded ideological message (resignation); they 
may understand—and possibly oppose—a simulation by decoding the 
5 For the argument that not only news reports but also f iction and games can be used as a 
documentary medium, see Raessens (2006).
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assumptions that are built into a medium (understanding); or they can 
completely disavow the social and political importance of these kinds 
of media (denial). In the case of Collapsus, simulation resignation seems 
to be the dominant reaction.6 Dutch f ilm magazine Skrien, for example, 
calls Collapsus’ combination of narratives, documentaries, and games a 
“trendsetter for the future […] Collapsus takes place in the coming decades 
and confronts you with realistic [my italics] future scenarios about the 
expected global energy crisis” (De Crom 2010, 8-9; translation by the author).
Social networks: Many-to-many communication. Stoknes emphasizes the 
use of the power of social networks. This idea can help us to understand an 
important aspect of global warming communication. We should not only use 
one-to-many communication models (such as television documentaries), but 
also interactive many-to-many communication models (such as meetups, 
whether online or offline). This is because group behavior can be a powerful 
way to influence individual people’s behavior: “Being part of an eco-network 
is one of the biggest determinants of pro-environmental behavior” (Stoknes 
2014, 105). This is why, for example, Tegenlicht, a documentary series from 
the Dutch public broadcaster VPRO,7 and the cultural organization Pakhuis 
de Zwijger have been organizing regular meetups since 2013 that take place 
a few days after a particular television documentary has been broadcast. In 
these meetups, the audience can participate in discussions with experts about 
the specif ic topics dealt with in these documentaries, and reflect together 
with others on their meaning. As research shows, this social aspect of media 
use—known as ‘debriefing’ or ‘social facilitation,’ either online via weblogs 
or off line in a physical setting—can enrich reflection on the topic and 
positively affect persuasion or learning (e.g. Raessens 2007; Neys and Jansz 
2010; Jacobs 2017). Although Collapsus is a single-player game and meetups 
in a physical setting had not yet started in 2010, audiences and experts could 
still meet virtually and exchange ideas via VPRO’s weblog, energy.vpro.nl.
Citizenship: Post-liberal and global. Stoknes emphasizes that we must “act as 
social citizens, not individuals” (2014, 91). Faced with worldwide problems 
like global warming, pollution, and energy transition, environmental change 
6 Collapsus received a Digital Emmy Award for Best Digital Fiction, a People’s Choice Award, 
and Interactive Award nominations at the Dutch Spin Awards, and a World Summit Award for 
its technical and aesthetic qualities, and its convincing message.
7 VPRO Tegenlicht is a series of informative programes that research new ideas and trends 
in the world of politics, economy, society, technology, and science.
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can only be envisioned when four conditions are met. First, green citizens, 
post-liberal politics, and environmental social justice movements need to 
mutually reinforce each other on a local and global scale. Second, green 
citizens need to behave pro-environmentally and participate in public 
debate. Third, post-liberal politics need to regulate markets and industries 
across borders via more stringent environmental legislation. And fourth, 
environmental social justice movements need to carry out ecological change 
on a global scale through group action. Changes in personal attitudes and/
or behavior (think of green lifestyles and ethical consumption) should 
strengthen socio-political solutions, not replace them (Barendregt and 
Jaffe 2014; Klein 2014). As we will see in the next section, these four ideas 
are embodied by Collapsus’s characters. Global ecological citizenship is 
understood as “including the right to a non-polluted environment and 
the responsibility both to refrain from harming the environment and to 
participate in its preservation and rehabilitation” (MacGregor 2014, 114).
Unpacking Collapsus
As I explained earlier, Collapsus consists of three screens or panels contained 
on one web page (see Figure 5.1). The main f ictional storyline is presented 
in the center panel. In approximately 35 minutes of playing time, you can 
observe the consequences of the energy crisis in the everyday lives of ten 
people. The right and left panels light up at certain points in the story. This 
storyline is designed in such a way that users have to choose their own 
perspective as the storyline unfolds by participating in three different ways. 
If you click on the right-hand, documentary panel, you can get a broader 
perspective by watching CitizEnergy web vlogs—with an average length of 
two and a half minutes—presented by two characters, Elena and Esperanca. 
They include comments from other Collapsus characters and short docu-clips 
where scientif ic experts provide players with background information. If 
you click on the left-hand, game panel, you can play simulation games with 
the goal of avoiding future blackouts. As part of the storyline in the center 
panel, minigames can be played.
According to Henry Jenkins, “transmedia storytelling is the art of world 
making. To fully experience any f ictional world, consumers must assume 
the role of hunters and gatherers, chasing down bits of the story across 
media channels” (2006, 14). To be able to reconstruct Collapsus’ storyline, a 
time-consuming task, users indeed have to interactively f ind ways to move 
around and inside the game’s different elements. Experiencing Collapsus is 
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what Katie Salen, Eric Zimmerman, and Miguel Sicart might call a playful 
activity. To play with Collapsus is to interactively play “with all of these 
structures […] f inding ways of moving around and inside them” (Salen and 
Zimmerman 2004, 304). “Play is creative […] play is the act of creatively 
engaging with the world […] to play is to make a world […] play is a creative, 
appropriative activity” (Sicart 2014, 17, 73). Depending on the perspective 
you take, playing Collapsus can thus not only be interpreted as ‘gamelike’ 
or ‘intermedial’—as I argued above—but also as a ‘playful’ experience.
On the landing page of the website collapsus.com we recognize the 
London Eye—the place where the story will start—and are given the pos-
sibility to click on the ‘enter collapsus’ link. When we do so, we see a short 
introductory clip that gives us a little taste of what is to come; it creates a 
context for the upcoming experience. We can read the following text: “All 
over the world energy resources are drying up and the world is blacking 
out.” The text is accompanied by frightening music and worrying images of 
a woman in the middle of a civil-war-like situation. Later, we will discover 
that she is the story’s main protagonist Vera, vlogging from Tehran, Iran. 
After the intro the title emerges—Collapsus – Energy Risk Conspiracy. I will 
present what happens next in four steps. First, I will summarize the thirteen 
episodes of the f ictional storyline and introduce the main characters. I 
will then present the three ways in which this storyline is completed or 
annotated, starting with the f ifteen documentary news items in the right 
panel, followed by the six minigames within the center panel; and f inishing 
with the two simulation games to be played in the left panel.
Fictional storyline. Collapsus is a conspiracy thriller about ten, mostly young 
people, located all over the world and how the worldwide energy crisis 
affects them. To help us, a world map is shown in the left panel where we 
can obtain information about the characters and where we can constantly 
track their locations (see Figure 5.2). In the f irst episode (①London»2012; 
see Table 2) the nine main characters are introduced: Vera, a world citizen 
and the leading character, who likes to vlog; Marianne, Vera’s mother and a 
member of the European Parliament; Jack, an American oil trader; Elena and 
Esperanca, founders of the CitizEnergy.org vlog that informs people about 
the impact of the energy transition; Tony, an environmental activist who 
resists the economic elite that obstructs the development of new, cleaner 
forms of energy; Chen, a representative of Tiger NRG, a Chinese energy f irm; 
and Ali and Amir, two Iranian brothers who discuss the energy situation in 
Iran. In episode ③, Vera gives birth to her daughter, Liana, the tenth main 
character. Jack is Liana’s father.
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At the bottom of the screen we see the storyline, which starts in 2012 and 
runs, as we discover when the story unfolds, until 2025. The story events take 
place in six different years, and consist of thirteen main episodes that are 
explicitly mentioned in the center panel (see the upper two rows in Table 2).
Table 2: Structure of Collapsus
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5.2: Collapsus – World map.
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Following the adventures of the main characters, we are led into a world 
of failing energy supplies and political and economic powers trying to cope 
with the transition from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources, while 
dealing with political dissension, uprisings, and a population terrif ied 
by increasingly frequent blackouts. London, for example, is confronted 
with blackouts and power failures in its energy network①②③; a climate 
conference is organized in Sofia and the energy order discussed④; terrorists 
blow up ships in the Strait of Hormuz, a highly strategic location for the 
international oil trade⑤; there is civil war and dictatorship in Iran⑥; there 
are food riots in Angola, and space-based solar power (SBSP) is introduced⑦; 
ideas for a peaceful and productive Middle East are discussed⑧; the world 
is in chaos⑨; research is conducted into new energy technologies, such as 
SBSP⑩; we see the demise of the fossil fuel industries, i.e. oil, gas, and coal 
businesses⑪; Tiger NRG executives like Chen are arrested, accused of an 
energy conspiracy⑫; and, f inally, there is a multiple screen with several 
characters reflecting outloud on what they have done up to that point and 
what their ideas are for the future⑬.
This portrayal of a worldwide energy crisis, with all kinds of economic, 
political, and social implications, is an important persuasive dimension 
of Collapsus and in line with Stoknes’ argument that “[t]he solutions to 
curbing wasteful practices and overconsumption are systemic, large-scale, 
and societal” (2015, 91). But to get there, as Stoknes also points out, we “need 
many small-step solutions in the right direction” (Ibid.). The reactions of 
most of the nine characters to the energy crisis are these kinds of ‘small-
step solutions.’ The positive values the storyline attaches to them (and the 
negative values attached to Chen, and Jack to a lesser degree), are crucial 
in understanding Collapsus’s persuasive argument.
The nine characters positions can be understood best based on the f ive 
major stages of the stages-of-change model (see Table 3) and the segmenta-
tion analysis of Global warming’s six Americas (Yale 2016). Merging the 
models of Slater and Yale helps to analyze how Collapsus ‘uses’ characters 
for persuasive purposes.
The f irst, precontemplation, describes people who have no intention of 
changing and often no awareness that there may be reasons to consider a 
behavior change. In the second stage, contemplation, people have recognized 
that a problem exists and are considering taking action in the not-too-
distant future, but have not yet committed themselves to taking action. 
Preparation is a transitional stage in which people have begun to experiment 
with or attempt the relevant action and are intending to try the action 
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again, but have not yet successfully modif ied their own behavior. Action 
represents, then, successful behavior changes for some specif ied length of 
time. Maintenance, the f inal stage, is the ability to sustain the behavioral 
changes over time (Slater 1999, 337).
Table 3: Stages-of-change model applied to Collapsus
Precontemplation Contemplation Preparation Action Maintenance
Vera X → X → X → X → X







Ali & Amir XX
Marianne [X] 
(Marianne retires)
This stages-of-change model can be complemented by the segmentation 
analysis of Global warming’s six Americas (Yale 2016):
The Alarmed are fully convinced of the reality and seriousness of climate 
change and are already taking individual, consumer, and political action 
to address it. The Concerned are also convinced that global warming is 
happening and a serious problem, but have not yet engaged the issue 
personally. Three other Americas—the Cautious, the Disengaged, and the 
Doubtful—represent different stages of understanding and acceptance 
of the problem, and none are actively involved. The f inal America—the 
Dismissive are very sure it is not happening and are actively involved as 
opponents of a national effort to reduce greenhouse emissions. (Yale 2016)
As we can see in Table 3, Vera is the character that passes through every 
stage. In her f irst vlog (episode②), Vera is reporting on the London blackouts. 
Like her friends from CitizEnergy, she has a list of dos and don’ts for the 
next blackout. When the power outage starts, she advises us: “You eat all 
the ice cream in the freezer, read a book by candlelight, go out on the roof 
and gaze at the stars, or do the one thing we all do very well in the dark: 
have sex. Well, that’s about all I have to contribute.” She is more focused 
on her own personal problems, in particular being pregnant while the 
baby’s father Jack is not around. And when her mother Marianne tries to 
explain the energy crisis to her, she answers: “I do not even know what that 
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means.” She calls it leftish talk; the most important thing for her is being 
pregnant (precontemplation). In her second phase, Vera visits her mother 
in Bulgaria④, where she is attending a conference on climate change. Vera 
seems to accept her mother’s political analysis, but without committing 
herself to action. Her contemplation is being interrupted by her crying 
child. A little later, she seems to realize the need to resist when her mother 
Marianne tries to convince her to join her friends at the CitizEnergy network: 
“Vera, join them, use your audience, do some real reporting” (contemplation). 
Vera’s vlog about the civil war in Teheran, Iran⑥ is her f irst attempt to do 
some real reporting. But she is still in doubt about what to do. On the one 
hand, she wants to stay and join the peaceful protests of the people of Iran; 
on the other hand, she wants to seek a safe haven and leave the country 
via Tehran’s airport: “I’m almost home, dear Liana” (preparation). Vera’s 
successful behavioral transformation begins when she meets Tony, just as 
she is getting ready to go back home. Tony asks her to follow him to see the 
truth⑥, that China and the United States are supporting the Khameini 
regime by delivering weapons (action). Vera’s last phase starts when she 
tries to persuade Jack to share her point of view⑥—“Look around you, Jack. 
Look deeper. Is this the world you wanna live in? Oil and coal, ineff icient, 
dirty, both limited resources that are bad for the world, bad for people. Do 
you see where this leads to?”—and ends with her announcement that she 
will become the new administrative head of the European SBSP program 
and will stop vlogging⑬ (maintenance).
Whereas Vera only gradually becomes alarmed about the energy crisis 
and chooses—in the end—to go for a technological solution (SBSP), six 
other characters are alarmed from the beginning. They are Elena and 
Esperanca, Marianne, Tony, and Ali, and Amir. They represent three other 
strategies—media, political, and activist—for dealing with the energy 
crisis. Elena and Esperanca are reporting, for example, about the climate 
change conference in Bulgaria and explaining how the food riots in Angola 
are caused by the energy crisis. While Esperanca dies in Angola, Elena 
continues this important work. Their vlogs can be seen in the right-hand 
panel of Collapsus—I will return to this later. Marianne’s political career is 
shown from the beginning (her election as a member of the EU parliament) 
up to the end when she retires. She visits a climate change conference and 
explains her position to Vera: “The UK is falling behind, the infrastructure 
is laughable. What will they do? Allow themselves to be held hostage by 
Russia? As if foreign fuel is any kind of solution. You can trust the wind, you 
cannot trust Russia.” And when Vera answers that she does not understand 
this, Marianne continues: “It means: why don’t they diversify their sources 
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of electricity: wind, nuclear, solar. Why don’t they build storage facilities?” 
Tony, an environmental activist, is the f irst character we meet; his f irst 
statement sets the tone: “Do not believe the lies. Whose lies? The lies of 
the corporations who manipulate prices, and the countries that oppose 
alternative energies so that their resources are getting exploited and their 
pockets get fat.” Tony uses the metaphor of a game and play to explain 
the energy crisis. According to him, these corporations and countries are 
strategic players within a worldwide arena (Duyvendak and Jasper 2016). 
They “game the system,” manipulating and exploiting the current energy 
crisis to their own advantage: “Everybody’s a player, it’s a big game for them 
and no one is innocent. The name of the game: the free energy suppression 
and ecological devastation.” At f irst sight, as Tony admits himself, people 
often see him as a crazy conspiracy theorist. But what he basically wants 
is not so illogical. When he meets Vera, he says: “You [Vera] want the truth, 
like I do. That’s why I am here. I want the world to see, to really see. Follow 
me and I will show you the truth.” Three elements of the story show that 
he is right: the subtitle of Collapsus, ‘Energy risk conspiracy’; his discovery 
that China is indeed delivering weapons to Iran; and his disclosure of secret 
documents—framed as an act of civil disobedience—(in the ‘Unlock the 
vault’ minigame) that proves that there is a conspiracy between individuals 
within the coal, gas, and oil industry. Ali and Amir are working toward a 
peaceful and productive Iran, or even the entire Middle East, avoiding two 
extreme positions, i.e. people representing the Iranian government and oil 
interests, and people who want to use violence against the government.
Chen and Jack represent the other end of the spectrum. Chen is the 
archetypal bad guy, he is dismissive and shows no intention of taking climate 
change seriously. He blackmails Jack to join him at Tiger Energy (NRG), 
and is exposed and arrested in the end. Initially, Jack also defends the 
oil business (“Oil is cheap, it’s versatile, oil built the 20th century,” in his 
conversation with Vera), but he is realistic enough to change his position 
from dismissive to doubtful: “The [oil, coal] business is gone to hell, Chen.” 
Jack also suggests that Vera should meet the representative of SBSP, David 
Peng. However, Jack is not committed to taking action himself: in the last 
episode, he is at home, taking care of Liana.
Collapsus ends with a multiple screen showing competing voices and 
images, with Vera in the center screen (see Figure 5.3). This is in line with 
Stoknes’ argument that a plurality of stories is needed. Vera reflects on the 
energy transition (“It will be a rough transition, with heavy costs on all 
sides; and who’s to say it’s a transition we can manage”) and announces her 
new job and her decision to stop vlogging: “Others will still do the work,” 
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she recounts, “and you should listen to them. Elena and the others know 
that we are not out of the woods yet.” Marianne retires from politics (“It’s 
time to let others take my place. I did not see how complex the world was 
when I f irst began this”), Elena continues vlogging (“We must always have 
a voice”), Ali and Amir are on the run (“We know things. Things about our 
old masters that will shine a light in dark places. It will be dangerous, but 
we must strive to reveal the truth”), Tony continues with his activist work 
(“I have tried to make a difference, I think I did, but at what cost? I have 
to keep trying, I have to”), and Chen tries to arrange a deal with the police 
to get out of prison (“I will sell everybody off, I’ll be safe, I’m always safe”). 
These reflections on what happened in Collapsus are forms of ‘interpassive 
feedback’ (Pfaller 1999). This last episode provides the player with possible 
interpretations of the actions of the main characters; this media produc-
tion is designed in such a way that it provides for its own reception. Even 
so, ultimately, it is up to the individual players to come up with possible 
interpretations.
Documentary news items. The f ictional storyline is complemented by 
fourteen CitizEnergy news reports that pop-up at certain points in the 
storyline (see Table 2, row 3: ‘O’). The f irst one, for example, pops up right 
after Tony’s initial statement: “Do not believe the lies” (see Figure 5.4). We 
see the CitizEnergy logo, a world map with—in red—the place where 
the vlog comes from (in this case, London), the name of the vlogger (in 
5.3: Collapsus – Multiple screens.
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this case, Elena) and a short text: “London, June 2012. World Hit by Fuel 
Chaos. Global shortages and United States monopoly of Asia and Middle 
East energy resources call for dramatic, regional ‘proto-blocking.’ Rapid 
Russian-Chinese and Central Asian alliances required to decentralize 
control and consumption of renewable energy resources.” There are com-
ments from the main characters, in this case Tony, Jack, and Esperanca, 
and a link to the Tegenlicht website. In the bottom right, we see a short 
documentary video clip with highlights from the VPRO Tegenlicht docu-
mentaries on energy that were broadcast on television. In the f irst news 
report, for example, we hear about America’s addiction to oil, the Iranian 
interest in destabilizing oil regions to keep prices high, China’s strategic 
need for energy supplies, and the diff iculties of initiating reform. The 
news reports provide a solid basis for the stories and the urgency of the 
Collapsus characters’ changing their behavior. Some examples include 
Tony’s claim that countries and companies manipulate prices and oppose 
sustainable technologies out of self-interest, and Vera’s progression from 
unconcerned to alarmed.
Collapsus is part of a long-term VPRO Tegenlicht documentary project 
on the imminent energy transition and the geopolitical energy wars caused 
by this transition. The three-part project took off in 2006 with a weblog and 
two television programs: Energy War, Part I. The New Owners of the World, 
and Part II. The Green Race. These programs portray the West as addicted 
5.4: Collapsus – CitizEnergy news report.
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to oil and gas, which are often imported from unreliable petro-capitalist, 
authoritarian states with a questionable reputation with regard to democracy 
and human rights. Countries such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela use their 
energy supplies as a political weapon to defend their strategic interests. Only 
by developing new green technologies or green power, such as solar power, 
wind power, and biofuels, can the West diminish its dependency on these 
countries and, at the same time, stop destroying our planet and improve our 
environment. In 2008, VPRO Tegenlicht made an update, Energy War. Plenty 
of Energy. In this second part of the project, our dependence on fossil fuels 
is characterized, again, as being highly problematic. The greenhouse effect, 
rogue oil states, the reduction of world oil production and simultaneous 
increase in the demand for energy, and uncontrollable, f luctuating prices 
contribute to a common feeling of crisis. Tegenlicht raises the question of 
whether we can manage to adopt a new, green energy regime in time using 
alternative energy sources such as solar power, or whether we will lose this 
race against the clock.
The last part of this trilogy consists of a television program, Energy 
Risk, and the game Collapsus, both made in 2010. In Energy Risk (broad-
cast on 22 March 2010), two alarming future scenarios are presented to 
a panel of foreign experts in order to assess what kind of geopolitical 
conflicts Europe might end up in. In the f irst scenario, Russia abruptly 
and completely cuts off the gas supply to Europe because of a gas boycott 
in Uzbekistan. It becomes clear that Europe is too dependent on Russian 
gas, and, because of that dependency, too reliant on Russia’s foreign policy. 
In the second scenario, the oil supply from the Middle East to the West 
is stopped unexpectedly by Iranian movements in the Strait of Hormuz. 
Iran can raise oil prices by destabilizing the region. The West is confronted 
with enormous oil shortages and the United States therefore decides to 
intervene militarily, but meets with opposition from China and Russia. 
Both scenarios demonstrate how geopolitical conflicts about remaining 
fossil fuels can potentially affect Europe, Europe’s increasing vulnerability, 
and the necessity to switch more rapidly to alternative sources of energy. 
Collapsus was off icially launched at the end of the Energy Risk program 
with a presentation of its trailer.8
8 Energy Risk was watched by 214,000 viewers. In the f irst three months, Collapsus.com had 
200,000 unique visitors, 25 per cent from the Netherlands, 20 per cent from the United States, 
10 per cent each from France and Germany, and 5 per cent from the UK (these statistics date 
from June 2010; information from VPRO Tegenlicht and Submarine).
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Minigames. The seven minigames play a small, yet important role in Col-
lapsus (see Table 2, row 4). Three of them are related to Tony’s effort to reveal 
some secret information. In the f irst minigame, the player has to move 
the cursor to reveal a message from Tony. If you fail or skip this game, you 
cannot read Tony’s message: “I’m on the inside now […] I trust you know 
what to do with this.” In the sixth minigame, the player has to unlock the 
vault: “Head off ice f ilepad: Passkey protected. Slide to unlock,” we can read 
on the screen. If you fail or skip this game, you cannot read the shocking 
documents Tony hands over to Vera later on, which will lead to the arrest 
of the Tiger NRG’s representatives (see Figure 5.5).
In the seventh minigame, you have to move the cursor to reveal the 
following text: “We will use this info to destroy the puppet masters at any 
cost.” If you fail or skip this minigame, you do not know that Tony is about 
to expose Tiger NRG’s representatives. In two other minigames, the player 
has to tune into a conversation. If you fail or skip the fourth one, you miss 
a crucial point where Marianne convinces Vera to do some real reporting. 
If you fail or skip the f ifth one, you cannot understand the relationship 
between the two brothers Amir and Ali. The second and third minigames 
do not play an important role.
Simulation games. In the second and fourth episodes, a binary choice pops 
up for the player (see Table 2, row 3) to see a news item (O) or to play a 
short-session sim game (Φ). Sim games are games that simulate aspects of 
reality relying on rule-based interactions as their core mode of signification. 
5.5: Collapsus – Tony unlocking the vault.
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The player has to carry out two simple assignments.9 The f irst time a binary 
choice pops up for the player, it is under the label ‘Blackouts.’ The news 
item in the right panel ‘London: New Blackout Panic’ deals with our energy 
dependency and how to deal with such a blackout. If you click on the left 
panel, you see a world map with Great Britain in red and London flickering. If 
you move your cursor to Britain, the following text pops up: “London—Avoid 
the blackouts. The UK has lowered its energy production using coal and 
nuclear energy by 30%. Demand has risen. Avoid the blackouts. Choose 
wisely!” If you click again, the playing f ield pops up (see Figure 5.6).10
You see that energy production (37 gigawatt) falls short of the demand 
for energy (46 gigawatt). The game has a simple goal: you have to produce 
more energy to meet the demand, making a choice between several energy 
sources (coal, gas, imported gas, nuclear, and wind) while keeping a harmoni-
ous balance between the three Ps: People, Prof it, and Planet. The three Ps 
incorporate social, economic, and ecological dimensions that measure and 
9 I will only analyze the f irst sim game. The second sim game deals with the gas crisis in 
Bulgaria, after Russia decided to cut the gas supplies. The goal of this sim game is to f ind alterna-
tive energy resources. The conclusion is that wood is better than coal, while oil is the worst 
choice.
10 As part of the British government’s goal to improve the environment, they decided to generate 
less electricity from coal and nuclear fuel. Because of global warming, the use of air conditioning 
has exploded, which leads to an increase in demand (information from Submarine).
5.6: Collapsus – Playing field.
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evaluate the impact of an organization’s activities on the world—in this 
f irst game the impact of augmenting energy production in the UK.
The basic rule of the game—according to Bogost’s procedural rhetoric, the 
most important element of a game’s meaning—is an ideologically motivated 
one: players can win the game by choosing a specif ic energy source, or a 
combination of sources that meet the energy demand while keeping the 
impact on the Planet as low as possible. Coal turns out to be the worst choice, 
then gas, then nuclear, while wind is the best. I can demonstrate that this 
is the case by selecting f ive different actions and seeing what their impact 
is on the three Ps (Table 4).
Table 4: Impact of different energy sources
Source Giga- 
watt
People Impact on 
People
Profit Impact on 
Profit
Planet Impact on 
Planet
Coal 9 13 % +27/6=+4.5 - 7.3 
billion
+4.8/6=+0.8 - 0.6 -1.3/6=-0.22
+6 (15) 40 % - 2.5 
billion
- 1.9
Gas 12 13 % +61/11=+5.55 - 7.3 
billion
+8.2/11=+0.75 - 0.6 -1.4/11=-0.13






8 13 % - 7.3 
billion
- 0.6
+8 (16) 60 % - 0.4 
billion
- 1.6
Nuclear 9 13 % +33/6=+5.5 - 7.3 
billion
+5.2/6=+0.87 - 0.6 -0.2/6=-0.03
+6 (15) 46 % - 2.1 
billion
- 0.8
Wind 1 13 % +9/2=+4.5 - 7.3 
billion
+1.2/2=+0.6 - 0.6 0.0/2=0.0
+2 (3) 22 % - 6.1 
billion
- 0.6
In the black cells, we see the initial state that was recorded. The People 
have a satisfaction rate of 13 per cent, the Profit is -7.3 billion euro and the 
Planet has a score of -0.6. Then, we increase the different energy sources to 
try to meet the demand: we increase coal from 9 to 15 (+6), gas from 12 to 15 
(+3), imported gas from 8 to 16 (+8), nuclear from 9 to 15 (+6), and wind from 1 
to 3 (+2). In each case, this is the most that you can do with one energy source 
in the short term. When you have reached the maximum for coal, imported 
gas, nuclear energy, and wind, a pop-up tells you: “To produce more, you need 
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an extra plant. It takes two years to build one. Do you want to, yes or no?” 
With gas you get the message: “You can’t produce more gas than you do.” 
For every extra gigawatt of energy, Table 4 shows its impact on the three Ps:
– On the Planet: The impact of wind is 0.0 (0.0/2), nuclear is -0.03 
(-0.2/6), gas is -0.13 (-1.4/11) and coal is -0.22 (-1.3/6). Conclusion: 
coal and gas have more of a negative impact than nuclear energy; 
wind is neutral. This supports the idea that electricity generated 
by wind turbines will not pollute the planet in the way that other 
energy sources do.
– On Profit: The impact of wind is +0.6 (+1.2/2), nuclear is +0.87 (+5.2/6), 
gas is +0.75 (+8.2/11), coal is +0.8 (+4.8/6). Conclusion: the positive 
impact of wind is only slightly less than that of coal, gas, and nuclear 
energy. This supports the idea that wind energy is not as expensive 
as it is assumed to be.
– On People: The impact of wind is = +4.5 (+9/2), nuclear is +5.5 (+33/6), 
gas is +5.55 (+61/11), coal is +4.5 (+27/6). Conclusion: the positive 
impact of wind is comparable to that of coal, nuclear energy and 
gas. This supports the idea that wind is indeed the best solution.
This conclusion also makes clear that a focus on Collapsus’s ‘rule-based’ 
procedural rhetoric alone is not enough to understand its meaning. In 
the Netherlands, for example, few environmentally minded people accept 
nuclear power as a serious alternative (SCP 2016) and they would probably 
oppose any positive reference to nuclear power if they were to play Collapsus.
A player can gain two important insights by playing this sim game. The 
f irst insight is a general one and in line with Marshall McLuhan’s idea that 
the medium itself can persuade us, rather than the specif ic message it 
conveys (Dobrin and Morey 2009, 257-277). In playing the game, the user 
is actually experiencing the diff iculty of harmoniously balancing the three 
Ps; the dilemmas and consequences of making choices become clear. The 
second insight is more precise and related to specif ic implicit or explicit 
environmental messages incorporated into the game design. As I showed in 
my analysis, this sim game privileges as an outcome investment in sustain-
able energy such as wind, rather than nuclear energy, gas, and coal—at least, 
if the player takes the impact on the Planet as the main criterion. Another 
player might privilege Prof it, in which case nuclear energy, coal, and gas 
would still be a better choice than wind. We learn that diversif ication of 
energy resources—especially in the f irst two years—is necessary because 
it takes time to build new power stations and develop new, experimental 
solutions like space-based solar power. Wind energy only is not a solution.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed how Collapsus uses a set of rhetorical 
strategies to engage individual citizens in climate issues. Collapsus is only 
one example (older, but still timely) of a growing number of ecological 
games that can serve as effective tools for promoting attitude change, pro-
environmental behavior, and a better understanding of the complexity of 
the issues around climate change (Raessens 2017, 2018). Textual analyses 
like this chapter allow us to better understand individual productions 
like Collapsus, providing insight into its construction and socio-cultural 
relevance. According to many researchers, there is growing evidence on the 
effectiveness of games as a medium for persuasive communication (Neys 
and Jansz 2010; De Grove et al. 2012; Ruggiero 2015; Jacobs 2016, 2017; Jacobs, 
Jansz, and De la Hera 2017). This kind of validation research could help in 
the design of better games, and in determining the conditions that would 
help actualize the ‘civic potential’ from playing these games and help turn 
players into ecological citizens (Kahne et al. 2009).11
Research into the persuasiveness of media must allow for the fact that 
it is not always easy and straightforward to determine what exactly the 
intended message is. In relation to Collapsus, two kinds of limitations are 
of importance. First, the design process was characterized by pragmatic 
limitations. Because of f inancial and time restrictions, the designers of Col-
lapsus needed to limit the number of variables in the sim game I discussed. 
To solve the problem of rising energy demands, the player can only try to 
increase energy production. Lowering the demand via energy-savings—a 
logical variable—is not an option. Second, realistic future scenarios had 
to be designed within the framework of existing generic conventions and 
the limitations of the narrative economy. The conventions of a conspiracy 
thriller for example, require that the complexities of a historical situa-
tion—such as energy transition—are simplif ied in a kind of morality play 
in which bad characters (such as Chen and, to a lesser degree, Jack) embody 
bad behavior, and good people (such as Tony and Vera, unraveling the 
conspiracy) defeat them in the end. And for reasons of narrative economy, 
Vera’s politicization and personal growth from ‘dismissive’ to ‘alarmed,’ 
and from ‘precontemplation’ to ‘maintenance’ occur in short, simplif ied 
stages-of-change. The optimistic end she proclaims might also be misleading. 
11 In our research project Persuasive gaming. From theory-based design to validation and back, 
we try to integrate these three research strands of analysis, design, and validation, see NWO 
(2018) and PGiC (2018).
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She announces, “who can say what the future will bring? Well, me! I will 
be the new administrative head of the European SBSP programme.” The 
intended message is that Vera will stop vlogging and start doing something 
more signif icant in the world. The game designers revealed to me in a 
conversation, that the technical solution Vera seems to embody (SBSP) is 
of minor importance for the storyline.
Environmental issues pose formidable imaginative and political dif-
f iculties for media producers. Collapsus tries to solve this by designing a 
story in which realistic energy transition scenarios are being described 
that are personal and urgent, having a direct impact on the characters 
from 2012 through to 2025. Collapsus shows different possible answers to 
the energy crisis, embodied in the beliefs, values, attitudes, and behavior 
of the different characters. By being in line with different sets of values 
and their possible stages-of-change, it can connect with, and possibly 
persuade, different groups of players. When we look at the strategies for 
raising awareness that I presented in section 2, we can conclude that Col-
lapsus frames energy transition in a progressive and optimistic way so we 
can come up with solutions by developing empathy and responsibility, and 
that it uses different media (narratives, documentaries and games) and 
social networks to persuade its players to adopt a post-liberal and global 
form of citizenship. Collapsus is one possible answer to a question posed 
by Nixon: “How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into 
stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political 
intervention?” (2011, 3). Because of its playful combination of a f ictional 
storyline, documentary, and games, Collapsus was able to draw the attention 
of a large group of people, who were younger than the normal audience 
for documentaries, to the subject of climate change. Collapsus embodies 
what Henry Jenkins describes as ‘civic imagination.’ It shows the ability 
of a network of political agents (green citizens, politicians, activists, and 
vloggers) to imagine both a future world and how to turn this world into 
a better one (Jenkins et al. 2016, 152).
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6. The broken toy tactic: Clockwork 
worlds and activist games
Anne-Marie Schleiner
Abstract
The focus of this chapter is on ‘activist simulation games,’ which are 
motivated by an activist or political intention on the part of the game-
maker, and which attempt to harness simulation and procedurality in the 
game to convey the maker’s political critique or message to the playing 
public. Schleiner argues that that the ‘toyness’ of the world of such games, 
the miniature abstraction of the model that announces itself as game, 
not life, contributes to a nullif ication of the game’s critical impact. To 
break away from this situation, she argues, requires a ‘broken toy tactic’ 
of interruption or sabotage that breaks the spell of games’ procedural, 
operational logic.
Keywords: Activist games, serious games, procedurality, simulation, toy 
worlds, no play
Toy trains circle through a 1:25 scale model of traditional Dutch buildings and 
landmarks in the miniature city of Madurodam. Miniature cargo ships float 
along canals and toy delivery trucks loop around a peripheral freeway. These 
vehicle circulations have followed a reliable daily schedule ever since the 
tourist attraction was constructed in 1952 as a memorial to George Maduro, a 
young Jewish member of the Dutch Nazi resistance. On travel blogs, visitors 
remark on the punctuality of the miniature city’s transportation, recalling 
their childhood fascination with the moving parts of Madurodam’s toy 
vehicles. Despite the vacant artif iciality of the setting, the frozen-in-place 
postures of Madurodam’s doll-citizens, and the peculiar conglomeration 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
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of national landmarks in one Disney-like city, young and old still delight 
in the liveliness of the toy city.1
With similar interlocking, repetitious movements, like the hypnotic 
circuitous loops of a model train set, miniature computer game worlds 
draw the player into convincing abstractions of everyday operations. The 
hum of movement within a computer game, the automated circling of 
artif icially alive ‘non-player’ characters, the scheduled passages of toy-like 
trains and vehicles and the movement of the sun and clouds, synchronize 
with outside-the-game spheres of operations, convincing the player of the 
parallel eff icacy of the clockwork model. Bespelled by these motions, the 
player believes in the model regardless of whether game characters appear 
in photorealistic detail or are capable of a convincingly human, artif icially 
intelligent conversation. Moving interlocking parts conform to a functional, 
rational diagram of a rhythmic clockwork universe where all is running 
as it should.
Similar to the application of simulation in the f ield of computer science, 
all manner of lively processes from the world are modeled into game worlds, 
from gardening to crowd fluxuations.2 For instance, in the classic simulation 
genre game, designer Will Wright’s The Sims (Maxis 2000), the domestic 
life of a suburban North American family is simulated in a doll-house-like 
game where vivacious Sims people eat, walk, urinate, socialize, and speak in 
‘Simlish,’ a pseudo-language of emoticons. In this chapter, I will in particular 
draw on the investigations of Gonzalo Frasca (2001), Ian Bogost (2008), and 
Chaim Gingold (2003) into simulation and the ‘procedural’ logic of games, 
the lively processes and movements that unfold each time a game is played. 
Much of this theorization comes out of a post-graduate study program 
directed by Janet Murray, who initially proposed that a computer game is 
a cultural work produced by a “procedural author” (1997, 153).
Although my argument in this chapter will be informed by the substan-
tial inroads that Bogost and others have wrought theorizing the dynamic 
1 Last time I visited Madurodam, on a weekday in June of 2011, the aging toy city seemed 
somewhat forgotten by the Dutch, although it was still attended by busloads of Indian and 
Chinese tourists.
2 The term ‘simulation’ also invokes post-modern philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s theories of 
simulation and ‘simulacra’, especially in reference to Disneyland and suburbia. Yet, Baudrillard’s 
interest in simulation seems primarily bound up with describing the artif iciality of a post-modern 
capitalist condition that has replaced authentic experience, a mourning for a loss of authenticity. 
Simulation in computer games, on the other hand, like in computer science, takes the artif iciality 
of the model as a given without moral qualms—even as such models attempt to improve their 
f idelity to real life processes assumed to still be running outside the game.
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procedural rhetoric of games, what has been somewhat overlooked, even by 
critics of ‘procedurality’ like Miguel Sicart (2011), is a closer consideration 
of procedurality itself. In particular, I am interested in the impact of these 
‘gamic’ procedures on political or social critique in what are called ‘serious 
games.’ Serious games is a grab-bag appellation for diverse educational, 
training, and activist games, which I will for this chapter primarily limit to 
the analysis of ‘activist simulation games,’ games such as Climate Defense 
(Auroch Digital 2013) or Sweatshop (Littleloud 2011) with explicit political 
and/or persuasive ambitions on the part of their concerned citizen makers. 
A one- or two-person developer is often solely responsible for all aspects 
of the game-making in these independent small companies, including art 
direction, design, programming, and playtesting. The maker of an activist 
simulation game attempts to make use of mimetic algorithms in the game to 
present a persuasive argument in motion, to launch a social, environmental, 
or other activist critique, or to open a political question. As more ordinary 
citizens come of age among the ‘ludoliterate’ versed in the language and 
genres of gameplay, relatively easy to produce casual games are becoming 
an attractive vehicle for political action (Raessens 2010). Still, we are only 
beginning to forge an understanding of how such games both serve and 
fail as activist tools, as tactics, among others, available to the concerned 
citizen. Therefore, my def inition in this chapter of an ‘activist simulation 
game’ is both: a. motivated by an activist or political intent on the part of 
the game-maker, and b. attempts to harness simulation and procedurality 
in the game to carry the maker’s political critique or message to the playing 
public.3
A def inition relying partially on the game-maker’s intention does en-
counter inherent contradictions, as when, for example, games not explicitly 
intended to be politically persuasive, such as entertaining war games, can 
easily be read as propaganda. But the desire on the part of the game-maker 
to use a game as a form of political argumentation with a broader public, 
both when it succeeds and fails as it is countermanded by aspects of the 
game, is a primary tension that I will explore in this chapter. Referring to 
this diff iculty in designing serious games Mary Flanagan writes: “These 
play spaces must retain all the elements that make a game enjoyable while 
effectively communicating their message” (2009, 249).
3 The activist simulation game contrasts to another common variant of serious games where 
a ‘normal’ entertaining game is interspersed with packets of ‘serious’ or pedagogic information 
that the player swallows like cans of vegetables in between courses of fun.
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In an activist simulation game, a play move is not only an inconsequential 
act of fun, but also carries symbolic weight by referencing real issues and 
world problems, for instance signifying whether a member of a threatened 
species like the polar bear in Polar Plunder (AIMS Games Center 2013) can 
f ind enough food under the ice for her cubs despite Arctic climate change. 
And yet, in spite of this added worldly weight and consequentiality, it is often 
diff icult to take serious games seriously. Although game-makers set out to 
shock players with a moving diagram of harmful and tragic operations, play-
ers conversely succumb to the enchantment of lively, toy-like, mechanical 
processes within the miniature, abstracted clockwork game world, no matter 
how damaging the actual operations in the exterior world, regardless of how 
many dolphins are killed or how many tracts of rainforest are destroyed. 
The game asks to be played and mastered, inviting the player to enter into 
its cause and effect mechanical loops, regardless of the consequences—it 
is only a game, after all.
The ‘toyness’ of the world of the game, the miniature abstraction of the 
model that announces itself as game, not life, contributes to this nullif ication 
of the game’s critical impact, as I will discuss further on. Moreover, I will 
argue that the operational movements running inside the game induce 
a complacency akin to what Martin Heidegger referred to as “everyday 
sight,” a way of “Being-in-the-World” already familiar to us from procedural 
interactions in the world outside the game (1927, 107). In order to better 
understand the effect of the procedurality of the game on the player, in 
this chapter I will draw on what may seem an unlikely and acontemporous 
source from outside the f ields of game studies and computer science, where 
procedurality itself has often been accepted at face value as a positive rhe-
torical tool within games.4 In Being and time, his primary work devoted 
to forwarding a temporal, embodied phenomenological understanding of 
human existence, Heidegger theorized a common, everyday mode of being 
(ontology) and a mental framework that he understood as a submersion 
within the everyday circulations and procedures of the work-a-day, social 
world (Ibid., 78). This practical view of the workings of the world is what 
he refers to alternately as “everyday sight” and “circumspection” (2003, 
107). A railway line transports workers from the suburbs to the city; the 
4 Heidegger is often considered an apolitical philosopher, or judged for his Nazi era actions 
as a university administrator in Freiburg, and therefore might seem distant from political 
critique or philosophy. Even so, his deconstructive philosophical method was highly influential 
for critical theory in the latter half of the twentieth century, and informed, for instance, the 
deconstructive methodology of Jaques Derrida. Also, Heidegger’s phenomenological framework 
impacted political philosophers like Hannah Arendt and Georgio Agamben.
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suburban train stops to let a passenger off at an inner-city station guarded 
by a vigilant conductor who steps back and forth on the station platform. 
Such an interlocking set of functional workings, which we also see running 
compellingly in the toy city of Madurodam, is supplementary to Heidegger’s 
“Dasein in the They,” an immersed everyday orientation within the common 
world (1927, 167). We seldom question or “disclose” our place or the place of 
others in such work-a-day utilitarian operations, for to do so continuously 
would impede our ability to plug into the “equipmental workshops” we use 
to take care of daily business (Ibid., 105).
The dilemma that confronts the activist game-maker is that the very 
procedural logic of the simulation game that he or she hopes to harness for 
a provocative critique has a bewitching effect on the player, comparable 
to Heidegger’s state of fascinated absorption in the practical workings of 
the world (1927, 107). Examples of equipment in Being and time, of clocks, 
hammers, planes, and needles, speak of a more rhythmic, mechanical, 
Industrial Age, but almost a century later, well into the Information Age, 
much of our world is still composed of functional, instrumental relations, 
on and off the screen (Ibid., 99). Circuitous operationality has found yet 
another abode in the weightless, abstract toy workings of computer games.
And yet there are exceptions to this rule of the genre, ways for concerned 
citizens to design games that snap the player out of the hypnotic circle of 
toy operationality, via what I will refer to as the broken toy tactic. A rupture 
in the game catapults the player outside the comforting and rewarding 
operational sphere of the clockwork game world and induces him or her 
to critical reflection, contestation, or action. While analyzing two popular 
activist games closely, I will argue that the player’s shift from fascinated 
immersion in moving game world operations to a disturbed confrontation 
with a malfunction of play mirrors Heidegger’s anxious illuminations of 
the operational clockwork loops of the world that might arise when a tool, 
6.1: September 12th – Game screenshot.
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like his oft invoked hammer, is broken or missing (1927, 102). A break in the 
smooth functionality of the game discloses its operational logic in greater 
“totality” (Ibid., 105). For Heidegger, a “clearing” of everyday sight uncovers 
the disquieting temporality of “the who’s” existence, as well as illuminat-
ing his possibilities (Ibid., 167). Yet, in the hands of the concerned citizen 
game-maker, this unsettling existential pause or stop, this interruption 
of the game’s workings, is also a moment ripe for critical ref lection and 
evaluation that precedes the formation of a political stance and possible 
action, the intended transformation of ‘games for change.’
Overseers of toy world operations
Let’s enter into a closer comparison of toy world operations at work in two 
widely played pioneering activist simulation games. The player of Uruguayan 
Gonzalo Frasca’s airstrike simulator game, September 12th (Frasca 2003a) 
assumes a ‘god’ or ‘bird’s-eye’ position overlooking a Middle Eastern city 
from above (see Figure 6.1). This is similar to the perspective on Will Wright’s 
classic SimCity (Maxis 1989) where the player as city planner constructs and 
manages a city from above. In fact, many simulation games, following the 
genre template set by SimCity and The Sims (Maxis 2000), position the player 
as a distant overseer of automated, minutely scaled, toy working worlds.
The goal at the outset of September 12th, similar to many commercial 
war games released after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 
September 11, 2001, appears to be to eliminate terrorists from the streets of 
a Middle Eastern city, identif iable by their gray robes and machine guns. 
But as the game proceeds, the player recognizes that the more frequently 
he launches missiles on the terrorists in the city, the more neighboring 
civilians, including women and children, are converted into terrorists. 
Forging a rational feedback loop between the player’s actions and visible 
outcomes in the game environment, September 12th simulates an escalating 
cycle of conflict exasperated by the War on Terror. This interactive, escalation 
between player and game becomes a dynamic, interactive argument for 
“violence begets violence.” Thus, the game procedurally makes a case for 
peace via the interactive simulation of strife between the terrorists and the 
player—who is cast in the role of an air force striker.
But here we may be slightly misled in applying Frasca’s own belief in the 
rhetorical eff icacy of simulation to the analysis of the game (2003b). The 
cycle of the escalation of violence largely becomes illuminated in a critical 
light because the game does not work properly as a game—the only way 
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to ‘win’ the game would be to abstain from playing, from interacting with 
the game! On the flip side of the ‘positive’ simulation of a damaging cycle of 
the escalation of violence, lies a negative argument for non-intervention, for 
non-engagement, a ‘no play imperative’ in either war or games. Paradoxically, 
can the simulation of a harmful process only become visible (disclosed) to 
the player, and thereby leveraged as critique, if the game is made frustrat-
ingly unplayable, in effect rendered a broken toy? Before we continue with 
this question, let’s take a few moments to consider how procedurality and 
simulation have been understood in game scholarship thus far.
Murray was one of the f irst to call attention to the procedurality of games 
and electronic media. According to Murray,
[p]rocedural authorship means writing the rules by which the texts appear 
as well as writing the texts themselves. It means writing the rules for the 
interactor’s involvement, that is, the conditions under which things will 
happen in response to the participant’s actions. It means establishing 
the properties of the objects and potential objects in the virtual world 
and the formulas for how they will relate to one another. (1997, 152-153)
Bogost refers to the rhetorical impact of such gamic procedural mecha-
nisms on the player as ‘procedural rhetoric’: “I suggest the name procedural 
rhetoric for the practices of using processes persuasively, just as verbal 
rhetoric is the practice of using oratory persuasively and visual rhetoric is 
the practice of using images persuasively” (2008, 125). As a rhetorical form, 
game procedurality appears to be an important new form of communica-
tion available in the public political sphere. Similarly emphasizing the 
communicative power of gamic procedures, according to Frasca, a game 
designer or ‘Simauthor’ (simulation author) communicates via the rules, 
logical processes, and algorithms in the game that model the trajectory of 
outside the game workings and outcomes:
Whoever designs a strike simulator that is extremely hard to play is 
describing his beliefs regarding social mechanics through the game’s 
rules rather than through events. […] They are not only able to state if 
social change is possible or not, but they have the chance of expressing 
how likely they think it may be. (2003b, 228)
Activist game-makers such as Frasca therefore believe it is possible to harness 
the procedures of the game to mimic the probable outcome of a military 
assault, and to thereby communicate a particular belief about the workings 
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of the world to the player-citizen, a citizen who may have voting rights and 
live in a nation with influence over the course of the war. Simulation games 
deliberately encourage the forging of correspondences from inside-the-game 
actions, procedures running within Johan Huizinga’s “magic circle” of play 
(1950), to external spheres of action, so as to provoke a confusion that Bogost 
dubs as ‘simulation fever’: “But for the magic circle to couple with the world, 
it must not be hermetic; it must have a breach through which the game world 
and real-world spill over into one another” (2006, 136). Therefore, for the 
purposes of this discussion, what is important from Huizinga’s much-cited 
and challenged magic circle is the relation between procedures running 
inside the game and those outside the game.
Worldly goings-on, when transposed via simulation to the game sphere 
or magic circle, become magically enchanting because they are miniature 
toy-like abstractions. My application of the magic circle to contemporary 
simulation games is not intended to imply that such digital games are 
magical, sorcerous rituals, as in Daniel Pargman and Peter Jakobsson’s (2008) 
critique of the contemporary usage of Huizinga’s term. The movement of 
causal loops within the game exerts the more mundane, everyday magic 
of the toy miniature, what Chaim Gingold (2003) refers to as a “miniature 
garden,” a spatially reduced, abstracted world like a Japanese garden, 
model train set, or a doll house. Over the course of his Master’s thesis, also 
conducted at Georgia Tech, Gingold expands on the term he encountered 
in an interview with Shigero Miyamoto, the influential Japanese game 
designer of Nintendo computer games. Gingold writes:
[A] garden has an inner life of its own; it is a world in f lux which grows 
and changes. A garden’s internal behaviors, and how we understand 
those rules, help us to wrap our heads and hands around the garden. […] 
Gardens, like games, are compact, self-sustained worlds we can immerse 
ourselves in. (2003, 7)
The reduction in scale and in complexity in a Japanese garden, the scaling 
down from forest to tree, from lake to pond, serve in a game as a cognitive aid 
for the player’s apprehension of the systematic clockwork world, a miniature 
sphere of operations.
The simulation game’s ‘procedural argument’ intentionally blurs the 
line between the miniature game world and the outside world, but there 
are important differences between the operations running on either side 
of this fence or ludic border. Although all games have dynamic, time-
based procedures, not all of these play moves make much sense outside 
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the game—in other words, to state the rather obvious, not all games are 
simulation games. For example, when a player makes a move in checkers, 
this does not correlate to a specif ic action undertaken in the world outside 
the game. In this way, the falling, colorful squares of Tetris (Pajitnov 1984) 
are just that, falling colorful squares. These primarily signify play moves. 
In such abstract games, actions procedurally advance the game forward 
toward a goal (or multiple goals) triggering wins and losses. By contrast, in 
the simulation game, actions and processes have a double signif ication as 
both gamic procedures and as metaphoric actions.
And yet this added layer of metaphoric signif icance does not mean 
that the player will reflect critically on the simulated operation in activist 
games, as will become apparent in the following example. By way of com-
parison to September 12th, let’s now consider another widely played, free 
for download, activist simulation game that affords the player an overview 
of a miniature toy world. Similar to September 12th, Paulo  Pedercini’s 
farcical McDonald’s Video Game (Molleindustria 2006), simulates a harmful 
operation, in this case, an environmentally destructive fast food corporate 
industry. McDonald’s Video Game is structured as a managerial simulation 
game, and although designed and programmed entirely by Pedercini, 
the prolif ic creator behind Molleindustria, the game implements a slick 
graphical user interface button panel (see Figure 6.2) reminiscent of 
commercially produced The Sims. The McDonald’s Video Game player 
alternates between managing four distinct production cycles: a. overseeing 
farm production; b. administering a cattle feedlot; c. managing a chain 
of hamburger-grill workers; and d. negotiating policies and marketing 
campaigns in ‘corporate headquarters.’ The challenge of the game is to 
effectively multitask, manage, and maintain the production routines 
in all four areas without letting one slip. As the player’s skill improves, 
outcomes of actions in one sphere of operations have ramif ications else-
where in the game. For instance, if not enough cattle are raised, negative 
consequences arise further up the supply chain, ultimately effecting the 
McDonald’s corporation bottom-line. Although McDonald’s Video Game 
periodically discloses snippets of textual information about fast food 
industry practices, it is this simulation of lively processes that imparts a 
convincing overview of interlocking cycles of fast food bio-production, 
from deforestation to raising enough cattle for meat to fastfood public 
relations campaigns.
Despite recurrent dips into bankruptcy, McDonald’s Video Game operates so 
well as managerial training software with the management of a miniature, 
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toy-like, cheerful cow and hamburger world that the ironic subtext of this 
being an unethical business practice is often missed by players. For instance, 
when my game design students in Singapore played McDonald’s Video Game, 
they seemed largely unconcerned about the detrimental side effects of this 
type of production on workers, animals, consumers, or the environment. 
They were willing to undertake whatever was necessary to keep the game 
system alive and the McDonald’s corporation above the bottom line, even 
adding diseased cows to the food chain.
The enchanting ordinariness of toy world equipment
Unlike the vehicles circulating in the toy model city of Madurodam, games 
like September 12th and McDonald’s Video Game require interaction from 
the player via buttons or a graphical user interface (GUI), conventionally 
organized into an instrumental dashboard at the edge of the screen. Sep-
tember 12th presents the player with a weapon for targeting and shooting 
the terrorists; McDonald’s Video Game offers the player a colorful toy-like 
button interface of slaughterhouse machinery to f irst convert the livestock 
into hamburgers, and then a different range of equipment for converting 
hamburgers into dollars. This observation on the equipment of the game 
interface may seem obvious, but it is this very ordinariness in game interac-
tion that poses another challenge to critical and activist game design because 
‘equipmental’ interactions with game procedures contribute to the player’s 
6.2: McDonald’s Video Game – Game screenshot.
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‘everyday sight.’ In a chapter of Being and time entitled ‘The worldhood of 
the world,’ Heidegger describes the equipment required for his everyday 
operational view of ‘Being-in-the-World’: “In our dealings we come across 
equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. […] 
A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the ‘in-order-to,’ 
such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability” (1927, 97).
When observable in the clockwork toy world, these equipmental op-
erations impart everyday common sense. Referring to the simulation of a 
natural cycle in a clock, Heidegger writes: “In a clock, account is taken of 
some definite constellation in the world system” (2003, 72), and further on 
he writes: “When we make use of the clock-equipment, which is proximally 
and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, the environing Nature is ready-to-hand 
along with it” (Ibid., 101). In other words, those earthly relations that are 
simulated or incorporated in the equipment, such as the movement of the 
sun from day to night being replicated in the clock, are easily ‘discovered’ 
and naturalized in the ‘clock-equipment’.
Equipment, or the “ready-to-hand” is easy to see, contrasting to Hei-
degger’s “presence-at-hand,” the term he uses to refer to the sounds and 
colors of perceived but not yet differentiated “reality,” such as a rumble of 
noise that upon reaching the ear does not quite resolve into the screech of 
a passing motorbike (1927, 228). Unlike the confusion that an intrusion of 
“presence-at-hand” reality might occasion, the equipmental operations of the 
ready-to-hand world are easily apprehended, made sense of, or ‘discovered.’ 
The equipment’s functionality seems obvious, running smoothly in plain 
sight, in the common-sense realm of ‘the They.’ Naturally, the player would 
want to use the available buttons to operate the farm machinery and pro-
duce hamburgers. Thus, simulation games simulate alleged processes from 
outside the game sphere in plain view, invoking the everyday perspective of 
how things work, the operations of fast food production, or of an eff icient 
airstrike. If we apply an extended Heideggerian interpretation, ‘equipment’ 
refers not only to interface buttons, but also to the larger operations (in his 
terms ‘workshops’) that these buttons trigger or manipulate. For instance, 
September 12th presents the player with a weapon for targeting and shooting 
the terrorists; while McDonald’s Video Game offers the player a colorful 
toy-like button-interface of slaughterhouse machinery to turn livestock into 
hamburgers, and then a different range of equipment for turning hamburgers 
into dollars.
Although ready-to-hand equipment is easily discoverable, it is also hid-
den, in another sense. The familiarity of everyday sight or circumspection, 
conceals “the totality” of a clockwork operation, the in-order-to relations that 
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it is connected to, including objects and persons at a distance (Heidegger 1927, 
105). Immersion in the clockwork world’s operations is a state of “concernful” 
absorption that is to a certain extent blind and alienated, not only to its own 
existence, but to the larger repercussions of the operation (Ibid., 101). The 
game’s movement compels the player to accept its operations as ordinary, 
as unquestionable cycles of everyday life, unfolding within plain view 
or, to be more precise, in relation to simulation genre games, within the 
elevated plain view of the great overseer of the toy world operations. The 
challenge that then confronts the concerned citizen game-maker is that no 
matter what these simulated operations are, as they run with the evocative 
mimicry within miniature toy worlds, they acquire everyday currency and 
uncritical acceptance among players via the motion of their interlocking, 
toy-like workings.
Player vs. game
But do the toy world’s procedures really subsume the player to such an 
extent? Is the operational functionality of the game truly so bewitch-
ing? Furthermore, an allegation could be made that Bogost’s rhetorical 
transmission of procedural game logic from the sender (the game-maker 
or ‘Simauthor’) to receiver (the player) is limited by a communications 
model of sending and receiving. The player in this analysis, even while 
interacting with the game, becomes a passive recipient of rhetoric in mo-
tion. In a similar vein, Sicart critiques the limited role that players are 
afforded in designer-weighted, instrumental ‘proceduralist’ game studies, 
writing that players “are important, but only as activators of the process 
that sets the meanings contained in the game in motion” (2011). Are game 
designers, then, the only ones afforded the role of agents of engaged ludic 
citizenship? In support of player agency, Frasca proposes that players, not 
only game designers, potentially impact the ultimate rhetorical “outcome” 
of a game by channeling the course of play into directions unimagined by 
the game-maker (2003b, 228). Frasca calls upon Brazilian theater director 
Augusto Boal’s “Theater of the Oppressed” as a model for how a game can 
depart from Aristotlean narrative closure. Frasca writes “one of [Boal’s] 
most popular techniques, re-enacts the same play several times by allowing 
different audience members to get into the stage and take the protagonist’s 
role,” resulting in unforeseen outcomes (Ibid.).
For instance, such player-directed outcomes are evident in the spectacular 
demise of artif icial game life, of entire families and their pets, in a dark genre 
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of the Sims known as ‘Disaster Sims.’ The player’s influence on the game’s 
rhetorical outcome in such cases amounts to a breaking of the original 
game designer’s ‘script’ to breed a suburban American family. With these 
morbid, broken games, often ending in f ire, we return via a different path, 
following the player’s initiative rather than the game-maker’s, to derailed 
and broken game equipment.
On the other hand, when the toy is not broken, when the system is running 
without interruption, as when the player engages with the productive fast 
food mechanizations of McDonald’s Video Game, the player remains blind 
to its workings even as she plugs into its persuasive everyday perspective. 
Losing track of time, the player immerses herself in a sequence of game 
challenges that, if designed well, alternates rewards (points, bonuses, and 
additional tools) with escalating peaks of diff iculty, oscillating within 
what psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi refers to as a pleasurable “flow 
state” between challenge and skill (1990, 74). Thus, the player’s fascinated 
state of absorption during gameplay suggests a loss of agency to the game’s 
mechanics, except for when the player willfully alters the course of the 
game’s ‘oppressive script’.
Similarly, again from the realm of phenomenological philosophy, Hei-
degger’s student Hans-Georg Gadamer makes the inverse proposal that 
the game plays the player rather than the player the game (1975). Gadamer 
conducted an inquiry into aesthetics and art that brought him to the phe-
nomenology of play. Gadamer’s player gives up his will to the game while 
performing the reflexive moves demanded by a game: “The structure of 
play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of 
taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence” (1975, 
105). The player merges with the game, entering into an ongoing interactive, 
ref lexive feedback loop: “What happens to us in the experience of art, 
Gadamer suggests, is very much like what happens to us in play: we lose 
ourselves” (Weinsheimer 1985, 102). Unless the player is forced to reflect 
upon correspondences reaching beyond the game, the player’s critical 
and reflective capacity, political or otherwise, is easily bewitched amid 
the movement of game actions. Reacting with neither doubt, nor, on the 
contrary, belief, the player f lows with the game’s operational allegations 
about how the world works.
Only when the model is broken or interrupted by a renegade player, such 
as the maker of a Disaster Sim, or a game cheater or breaker, or through 
some form of sabotage installed by the game-maker, does the toy world’s 
algorithms and workings become visible. Frasca’s September 12th catapults 
the player outside the cozy assumptions of the clockwork game world and 
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the comfortable correlations between rewarding player prof iciency with 
toy weapons and ‘how things work.’ The brokenness of September 12th 
manifests in that playing well delivers loss, subverting the expectation 
of the player to master a rewarding challenge of eliminating terrorists. In 
McDonald’s Video Game, on the other hand, the very operationality of the 
model of fast food production cycles transmitted to the player overcomes 
the game’s critical impact. Beautiful toys that run too well are always 
enchanting, no matter how ugly the outcome of their workings. The player 
is lost in the game.
Broken toys and the no play imperative
The operational logic of the game takes hold. A player’s action inspires a 
resulting reaction on the part of the game. The game, in turn, compels the 
player to further ref lexive play moves and if the game is designed well, 
the player loses herself, losing even a sense of the passage of hours and 
days, within the game, absorbed into the game’s workings, immersed in a 
feedback loop, Gadamer’s aesthetic union of player and game. The player 
performs a role among other processes running within the clockwork world 
through interaction with the game machine and the management of its 
simulated processes. Like the imprint of a popular tune that demands to 
be liked through its repeated exposure to the ears, players unreflectively 
absorb the logic of military operations, internalize the production cycle of 
hamburgers, and f low with the hum of tractors. How satisfying when at 
least the toy world is operating as it should.
In the rational, operational spheres of games, as in the instrumental 
spheres of life, one’s everyday perspective turns away from suffering and 
the consequences of damaging human operations. Most feel powerless to 
disengage from, halt, or redirect harmful goings-on that are naturalized. 
Players f lee their own mortality to the artif icial circulations of ageless 
clockwork, toy worlds. In this sense, Madurodam’s endless ship and train 
circulations are a soothing and forgetful memorial to the untimely demise 
of young George Maduro.
A tactical recipe for the activist simulation game consists then of two 
steps, f irst a positive, then a negative; f irst to constructively program 
a simulation of a harmful operation from the world into the game, fol-
lowed up by either a game-maker, or player instigated interruption, or 
sabotage that breaks the spell of the game’s movement and procedurality, 
thereby illuminating its operationality in a critical light. Absorption in 
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the everyday world of ‘equipmental’ dealings and transactions are broken 
at this rift of ‘in-order-to’ relations among entities, things, and persons. 
Induced to a discomforting re-evaluation and analysis of the games’ 
operational logic, the player performs a critical diagnosis of the wrongness 
or rightness of the broken play equipment. After being subjected to the 
broken toy tactic, a worldly operation’s common sense, the everyday claim 
on existence comes into dispute, becoming a matter of critical concern 
for the citizen-player.
What is paradoxical with the broken toy tactic is that the game and 
activist critique remain in the last instance incompatible—only by inter-
rupting or ejecting the player from the game, the no play imperative, is a 
critique illuminated and a political questioning made possible. Moreover, 
the intended effect of such games is not just a break in the game, but also 
the possibility of putting a stop to the destructive worldly procedure that 
is being simulated. The no play imperative extends beyond the game to the 
refusal to be a ‘player’ in the harmful processes of the world, a refusal to 
play at war, a refusal to play at the exploitation of the environment in the 
production and consumption of fast food. Thus, the most earnest mixture 
of politics and games seems to be delivered in games that do not believe in 
playing per se, but in the impossibility of separating the world and game, of 
separating procedurality in one realm or the other on either side of the ludic 
border. The activist game attempts to catapult the player from absorption 
in the clockwork toy world, to a realm of politics that he or she is otherwise 
quite busy avoiding.
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7. Video games and the engaged citizen : 
On the ambiguity of digital play
Ingrid Hoofd
Abstract
This chapter questions how video games may aid civic engagement by 
youths. It does so by critically examining recent empirical f indings on 
this topic, noting that such f indings are often couched in a too optimistic 
view of the possibilities for civic engagement through games. It backs 
up this claim by connecting digital play with informational capitalism, 
proposing that this analytical connection should be complemented by 
foregrounding the subversive origins of play as a ‘challenge’ or ‘duel’. The 
chapter ultimately suggests that play carries radical potential in terms 
of a transgression of oppressive social structures, but that this potential 
can only be tapped by pushing playful engagement beyond the logic of 
the cybernetic control mechanisms on which it is currently predicated.
Keywords: Serious games, civic engagement, Baudrillard, informational 
capitalism, cybernetics
Modern repression is carried out in the name of play.
– Baudrillard (2001, 66)
The mission to keep young people interested and engaged in a variety of 
forms of civic participation certainly seems to be a laudable enterprise for 
any self-respecting progressive and democratic society. Hard-won democratic 
rewards and virtues like voting, volunteering, and giving to charity, would 
appear to be rights and responsibilities that need to be inculcated in the 
young as soon as their proper socialization sets in. Especially when in the 
1970s and 1980s it seemed that young people’s participation in civic behavior 
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was declining in many Western countries—leading to perhaps overwrought 
claims of supposed youthful political apathy (Ghosh 2011)—this led educators 
and politicians to start to look at alternative ways to re-engage youth to 
ensure the continuation of democratic institutions and behaviors and, by 
extension, of society. With the rise of the internet and social media, many 
research studies have been conducted concerning the potential benef its 
and shortcomings of e-democracy, online government services, and online 
civic engagement, and policy changes have been adopted. Indeed, a plethora 
of sociological studies emerged in the 1980s and 1990s around the potential 
of the internet for civic activism and online social movements (OSMs), as 
well as their impact, however limited, on real social and political change 
(see for instance Donk et al. 2004, as well as McCaughey and Ayers 2003). 
Simultaneously, the rise of video-gaming in those decades has led to a 
barrage of studies on serious gaming for educational purposes that range 
from computer-assisted chemical modeling to games that simulate ethical 
decision-making (Michael and Chen 2006).
This chapter will engage the question of how video games may—or 
especially also, may not—aide morally upright civic engagement by young 
people. It will do so by critically examining the empirical f indings on this 
topic discussed in Joseph Kahne, Ellen Middaugh, and Chris Evans’ landmark 
study The civic potential of video games (2009), arguing that the writers of 
this otherwise helpful study eventually adopt a too optimistic view of the 
possibilities of civic engagement through video games. This chapter will sup-
port this assessment by discussing literature that spells out the connection 
between digital play and informational capitalism, in particular building 
on Stephen Kline, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and Greig de Peuter’s excellent 
study of the connections between video games and ‘the military-industrial 
complex’ in Digital play (2003). However, this chapter suggests that the latter 
study, however insightful, should be complemented by looking closer at 
the subversive origins of play as ‘challenge’ or ‘duel’ in order to analyze the 
potential of digital play in more depth. The chapter, in turn, suggests by way 
of an examination of some of the work of Jean Baudrillard that the foundation 
of play does carry a certain radical or subversive aspect in terms of a potential 
transgression of oppressive social structures and boundaries. This radical 
potential can however only be tapped by pushing playful engagement beyond 
the safety of their existence as foremost cybernetic control mechanisms; in 
other words, the contemporary ‘civic’ potential of video games lies in the 
ways it may exacerbate informational capitalistic risk. Hence, this chapter 
eventually seeks to raise the stakes of what true civic engagement, when 
dealt with from a politico-ethical angle that questions the relationship 
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between cybernetic play and contemporary forms of gendered, raced, and 
classed disenfranchisement, may really entail. In order to arrive at this 
point, it will start off by drawing out the assumptions that emanate from 
the empirical research in The civic potential of video games, after which 
it will propose a perspective that re-theorizes the relationship between 
contemporary cybernetic play and civic socialization within an unequal 
economic landscape marked by simulation and risk.
Promoting civic engagement: To what or whose ends?
Interestingly, as Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans in The civic potential of video 
games point out, large-scale empirical research studies into how video games 
in particular may specif ically aide or hinder civic engagement among the 
youth have been rather scarce. Moreover, most research conducted on video 
games and citizenry have instead speculated that playing video games 
simply takes time away from the exigencies of democratic citizenship or 
have assumed that the violent or individualistic content of video games will 
lead to anti-civic behavior (2009, 3). Given that a large segment of young 
people admits to playing video games more or less regularly, researching 
the ways in which gaming concretely relates to civic behavior like voting, 
volunteering, or helping the less fortunate, then certainly appears to make 
political, moral, and societal sense. In The civic potential of video games 
therefore, Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans set out to report on one of the f irst 
truly empirical investigations into the ways in which video games provide 
the grounds for potentially engaging young people in democratic processes 
in the United States. As they themselves confirm, their research, funded by 
the Chicago-based MacArthur Foundation, endeavored to collect empirical 
evidence for Henry Jenkins’ famous claim in Confronting the challenges 
of participatory culture that new digital and networked tools bring about 
“participatory cultures” with “relatively low barriers to artistic expression 
and civic engagement” (2009, 5). In order to operationalize their research, 
Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans aimed at f inding possible links between 
video-gaming and democratic behavior. They set out to collect survey 
data pertaining to self-reported forms of civic behavior, racial, and gender 
identification, as well as people’s age and income bracket, together with time 
spent playing and the relative popularity of video games among the various 
groups. They also collected data about actual civic behavior and participation 
that the data-subjects undertook during the course of the survey. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the authors conclude in their report that youth’s civic 
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engagement can be increased if done in a proper context—for instance, 
together with a classroom debate or with parental follow-up—with serious 
games that specif ically simulate civic or moral behavior. Examples of such 
games are Real Lives (Educational Simulations 2001), Democracy (Positech 
Games 2005), Zora (Bers 2001), SimCity (Maxis 1989), and Civilization (MPS 
Labs 1991), and the researchers encourage parents and teachers to actively 
stimulate the playing of such games among teens, although they do note that 
the level of experienced civic engagement appears to be lower for girls than 
for boys (2009, 47). Of course, the researchers agree that the relationships 
between gaming and civic behavior are mere correlations; they did not for 
instance “control for respondents prior [civic] commitments,” nor did they 
delve deeper into the problem around the method of self-reporting such 
‘civic experience’ (2009, 41). Nonetheless, the research study appears to 
support the idea, however judiciously, that video games can be harnessed 
for inculcating democratic values into youngsters.
Besides the more obvious problems (lack of proof of causal links, biases in 
self-reporting) with the empirical survey method however, there are a range 
of other issues and assumptions that riddle this well-intended and otherwise 
well-conducted research project. This range of issues primarily emanates 
from the fact that the authors do not consider the general role of gaming 
technologies in the wider United States and global social environment that 
is shaped by a fundamentally uneven political economy. In other words, the 
correlations may simply stem from the equivalences between the unequal 
amounts of cultural capital of various socio-economic backgrounds, and 
levels of civic engagement in general. But more specif ically, the researchers 
do not take into account the fact that Jenkins’ astute observation about new 
technologies allowing for a more ‘participatory’ culture points toward the 
non-neutral emergence and imbrication of video-gaming (as well as other 
cybernetic technologies) in an updated form of global capitalism with 
its own new forms of disenfranchisement. Various scholars prefer to call 
this updated form ‘informational capitalism’ with an eye on the ways in 
which the apparently laudable attempt to spread digital media and media 
content in, for instance, schools in fact paradoxically exacerbates inequalities 
(Morris-Suzuki 1986; Van Dijk 2005; Fuchs 2007). Informational capital-
ism in turn for the most part thrives, as, for instance, Tiziana Terranova 
famously argues in ‘Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy,’ 
on various forms of ‘free labor’ that internet users and online gamers provide, 
thereby facilitating an enmeshment of what seems to be leisure time with 
new forms of production (2000, 33). This imbrication of play with industry 
interests, as Julian Kücklich has subsequently pointed out, leads to forms 
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of ‘precarious playbour’ in which, for instance, ‘modders’ provide crucial 
in-game innovations by putting in large amounts of pleasurable, yet unpaid 
time on the off-chance of perhaps getting a temporary job for a video game 
company (2005, n.p.). Therefore, what is lauded as ‘user agency,’ ‘volunteer-
ing,’ and ‘active participation’ is actually a novel type of value extraction 
from new media ‘prosumers.’ And while this, in and of itself, may arguably 
not be that problematic as long as these prosumers at least willingly or 
voluntarily give their time to provide free labor for new media companies, 
Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans write in a discursive register that mistakes 
the individual exercise of democracy, freedom, and the bringing about of 
actual social change with a sneaky socialization of gaming youth via new 
media technologies that eventually helps them comply with the workings 
of this uneven and immoral global capitalist order.
The problem, then, is that the harnessing of video games to boost demo-
cratic behavior may irresponsibly pre-empt the possibility to challenge the 
profoundly undemocratic configuration of the global information society. 
In other words, Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans mobilize a too-simplif ied and 
optimistic understanding of the promising connection between video games 
and civic society. What is therefore required beyond this empirical study, 
is to instead elaborate on the wider connection between video games and 
responsibility in order to propose another route for civic engagement proper. 
In order to do so, I suggest that a better understanding of the imbrication of 
video games and capitalism should first engage with the various deep-seated 
and problematic assumptions and aims that underlie such a simplif ied 
analysis like the one proposed in The civic potential of video games. Allow 
me, then, to elaborate how the researchers sneak such youth normalization 
efforts in via an arguably outdated register of democratic and civic effects 
emanating from what on the surface appear to be ‘bottom-up’ democratic 
gaming activities. According to the authors, the playful acquaintance with 
issues of political import via games simply allows young people to start 
caring for civic problems in a manner different from unhelpful top-down 
educational and parenting techniques. Youths after all, they proclaim, “prefer 
to talk with friends […] rather than with their parents” and “prefer action that 
is informal and grass-roots” (2009, 50-51). Moreover, the authors argue that 
“traditional instruction in a civics curriculum has frequently been cited as a 
major reason civics courses in general have little impact” (2009, 52). Hence, 
the authors propose that digital gaming allows for the dissipation of such 
top-down approaches to the inculcation of civic virtues among the young. 
By especially immersing young players into games like SimCity or Democracy 
that simulate civic or democratic activities, these games supposedly allow for 
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creating an environment that, for instance, John Dewey claimed is crucially 
centered on the democratic ideals of “dialogue and active experimentation 
that reflects social concerns” (2009, 4). Seen in this light, play in general 
and hence digital play in particular, with its implied association to forms of 
improvisation and behavioral freedom, would certainly appear to have the 
potential of a liberatory and democratizing politics that caters to the desires 
and interests of its user rather than to systemically oppressive entities. New 
technologies that provide an essentially playful environment may therefore 
on the surface aide in for instance allowing citizen-users of all ages with 
a ‘freer,’ more interested and less directed engagement with their social 
and civic surroundings. The fact that adolescents play video games a lot is 
according to the authors fortuitous, since it allows for the “nurturing [of civic 
behavior via video games] to begin [at] a time when youths are thinking 
about and trying to anticipate their lives as adults” (2009, 5).
Despite the implication of a ‘freer’ and less directed engagement however, 
the authors’ aim actually turns out to be quite directed indeed. The ways 
in which these social researchers tend to be unwittingly implicated in 
social and economic normalization procedures becomes apparent in how 
the report seeks to hide its government-managerial socialization agenda 
with a veneer of positive words and recommendations, as if collaborative 
and simulatory games can simply be harnessed in the ‘right familial or 
educational context’ for the creation of a more egalitarian United States and 
global society. In light of this, it is telling that their research is sponsored by 
the MacArthur Foundation, which in its online ‘About Us’ says it concerns 
itself with the effects of new technologies on youth in order to “improve 
U.S. public policy” while claiming that such studies will in fact bring about 
a “more just, verdant and peaceful world” (MacArthur Foundation, n.d.). 
The term ‘verdant’ (also meaning ‘lush’) is signif icant here, as its usage in 
this context may not only point toward the ideal of a ‘greener’ world, but 
also of a more commercially ‘thriving’ society. This usage therefore sug-
gests an imbrication of this private foundation with potential commercial 
interests—some of which may obviously lie with those media industries 
who want to capitalize on the ‘civic potential of gaming.’ Moreover, we can 
notice this imbrication with commercial interests also in the argumentation 
for and research background of The civic potential of video games itself, as it 
nowhere questions the non-neutral terms and conditions of civic techniques. 
This can for instance be gleaned from its assumption that “raising money for 
charity” (2009, 5) is a democratizing act, even if various scholars have pointed 
out that f inancial philanthropy as a virtue only makes sense in a starkly 
unequal economic environment (see e.g. Gomberg 2002). It furthermore 
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talks about simply teaching students “the dynamics of economic, political, 
and legal systems” (2009, 18), thereby discursively normalizing such systems. 
And f inally, the argument for the more effective ‘marketing’ of games for 
youth ultimately betrays an at least partially commercial mindset (2009, 
50). The research presented in The civic potential of video games therefore 
arguably has a stake in the United States’ social and political economy not 
only via its ideological register around active participation, ‘freedom,’ and 
democracy, but also regarding the ensuring that any critique or analysis of 
video-gaming does not potentially hurt the United States’ media industry.
But, I would argue that the general problem with studying the influ-
ences of video-gaming without regard to its imbrication in a novel political 
economy that primarily enriches affluent media owners in the United States 
and abroad, does not stop there. The real problem lies instead in the ways in 
which the emergence of digital play is symptomatic of the more insidious 
shift toward a consumer culture in which games and play, despite their basic 
radical potential in society, have been denigrated to become mere functional 
elements in this global economy. This denigration can be noticed in the 
subtle ways in which the authors of The civic potential of video games make 
problematic slippages and confusions between a gamer’s or game character’s 
actual political, economic, and social environment, and the simulation that 
is the video game they are playing. This slippage emerges when they, for 
instance, discuss the moral and political virtues of games like Halo: Combat 
Evolved (Bungie 2001), SimCity, and Real Lives, in which youths subsequently 
report that they experience collaboration, how to manage a city, and how 
to empathize with another youth in an impoverished country. But pre-
programmed in-game experience is always fundamentally different from 
real-world ambiguities that cannot be computed or simplified in advance. As 
I have argued previously in ‘The neoliberal consolidation of play and speed: 
Ethical issues in serious gaming’ (2007) via an analysis of Real Lives and 
Global Warming: CO2FX (Global Warming Interactive 2010), such experiences 
of managerial control or empathy with the underprivileged should crucially 
be analyzed as simulatory experiences that f irst and foremost bolster the 
fantasy of cybernetic control while dangerously removing its user from the 
actual messy reality of cities and poverty. Moreover, such games danger-
ously obscure the extent to which global cybernetic systems of control and 
prediction are in fact the motor behind the aggravation of local and global 
inequalities, thereby leading to what I call a “double objectif ication”—a 
stereotyping on top of a distancing effect—of the other (2007, 14). It does not 
help that the The civic potential of video games authors also obscure the ways 
in which cybernetic technologies hide their complicity with, for instance, 
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growing income gaps by arguing for the potentially leveling effects of games 
as “equalizing civic learning opportunities” with regards to age differences, 
while completely dodging the much more pernicious issue of class disparities 
in their report (2009, 47). As I conclude in ‘The neoliberal consolidation’ 
(2007), the aggravation of contemporary oppression is, paradoxically, a 
direct result of the well-intended and novel forms of empowerment that 
gaming technologies allow. This is because these gaming technologies, as 
accelerated cybernetic infrastructures, are at the same time tools of an 
intensif ied surveillance and disenfranchisement (2007, 13).
Video games and the cybernetic quest to eliminate risk
While one may argue that drawing out such complicities is beyond the 
scope of The civic potential of video games’ explorative research, the re-
sulting silence from the authors about the ways in which video games 
are thoroughly implicated in the novel form of capitalism and its various 
forms of inequalities along lines of gender and class, warrants a closer 
look at this imbrication if we really want to take their laudable call for a 
more democratic and egalitarian society seriously. I therefore now turn 
to Kline, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter’s illuminating study on this 
imbrication of games with the reproduction of power in Digital play: The 
interaction of technology, culture and marketing (2003). This book claims, 
following the neo-Marxist interpretation of David Harvey in The condition 
of postmodernity (1990), that the emergence of video-gaming exactly marks 
the moment of “significant ‘sea change’ in which capitalist societies operate” 
(2003, 60). This change has to do with the need for capitalism to constantly 
open up new markets in a situation in which the market of material goods 
started to be largely saturated from the 1960s onwards. This, in turn, led to 
the emergence of new areas for consumption in the form of ‘experiential 
commodities,’ in which leisure and pleasure are sold as if they were true 
human needs. It is also important to note that these kinds of commodities 
emerged out of Cold War research and development, and therefore integrate 
the consumer more intimately within a cybernetic logic of command, 
control, communication, and information, or in military parlance: ‘C3I’ 
(2003, 88). Therefore, Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter argue that digital 
play in particular constitutes the exemplary consumer good of what they 
call ‘post-Fordist/postmodern/promotional’ capitalist societies and their 
strong ties to especially military research and development (2003, 60). 
This is because the commodification of leisure and pleasure via cybernetic 
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technologies allows for the continuous involvement of the user in ongoing 
capitalist production across time and space, as these new commodities are 
ephemeral, portable, networked, and interactive, and allow for the continu-
ous creative expression of the user’s simulated identity via playful lifestyle 
choices. Due to the cybernetic logic and aesthetics of video games, according 
to Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter, digital play tends to open up specific 
‘subject positions’ that amount to ‘masculine and militarized’ positions that 
“mobilize fantasies of instrumental domination and annihilation” (2003, 
255). This is a result of the historically intimate connection between the 
military and game design industries, which larger logic in certain games 
re-emerges in the remediation of spectacular and violent media content 
that we also see returning in televised news and in blockbuster Hollywood 
movies. Digital play as a simulation therefore crucially parallels and feeds the 
hyper-real simulation that is highly mediated global capitalism—in short, 
video games’ simulated content points to the fact that it is our reality that 
is a very intricate simulation (2003, 69). Exploring this critique of digital 
play further, Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter in their follow-up Games of 
Empire assert that video games provide ‘machines’ that lock subjects f irmly 
into the workings of the ‘military-industrial complex’ by being a particular 
manifestation of ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter 2009). 
Hypothesizing that “videogames are a paradigmatic media of Empire […] 
and some of the forces that presently challenge it,” (2009, xv) they f inally 
argue that virtual gaming is “ambivalent” insofar that “game virtualities 
remove us from, but also prepare us for, these actual subject positions 
[…] simulat[ing] the normalized subjectivities of a global capitalist order” 
(2009, 192 and 312). Importantly, they do suggest, following the work of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, that such machinic forms of subjective 
control can never be total and will inevitably lead to aggravated tensions 
in society at large. I will return to this alternative ‘potential’ of games later.
Moreover, such intricate simulations have the effect of what Elizabeth 
Losh in ‘The desert of the unreal’ warningly calls “the efficiencies of learning 
and other forms of psychic integration” of the player into a setting geared 
toward military goals that may be beyond the player’s purview (2009, 109). 
Following this point, as well as the general analysis in Digital play, I again 
argue that to have citizens engage via these digital tools with issues of 
national and political import—regardless of whether this is done via Halo, 
SimCity, or Civilization—therefore also potentially carries the implied aim 
of indoctrinating and implicating these users into a normalization of a more 
intricate and subtle capitalistic and militaristic social environment, depend-
ing on to what extent these games obscure such relations and connections. 
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This environment, then, is only ‘post-capitalist’ insofar as the system of labor 
and consumption no longer relies on the alienation of the user-consumer, but 
in the merging of the ‘prosumer’ with the cybernetic feedback system that 
modern capitalism has become. Crucially, what then superf icially appears 
as forms of empowerment or emancipation via these tools is paradoxically 
also exactly its opposite: the near-total immersion of the citizen-consumer 
in a web of pre-shaped ‘points of cybernetic play’ in which all outcomes have 
been predicted, pre-structured, or pre-empted as much as possible within 
the generalized attempt of such machinery to ‘eliminate risk’ (Beck 1992, 47). 
Understood in this way, youths’ civic and moral responsibility is captured 
and displaced into a media network in which they can no longer truly make 
a difference for the United States or global society, except perhaps by fatally 
exacerbating the possibility of a true event.
This understanding of games as having been depreciated as normalization 
and indoctrination mechanisms mirrors the ways in which our society 
conceptually denigrates play as a mere developmental stage in children. 
What I claim is at issue, therefore, is f inally the way in which two def ini-
tions or versions of play and games are operable in a report like The civic 
potential of video games as well as in the more optimistic theories around 
video games and the ‘ludif ication’ of culture as such. These two definitions 
of play are f irstly, the dominant and erroneous psychological def inition of 
play (like in children’s play) as a way to experiment with and even push 
social rules and boundaries, and secondly, the cybernetic def inition and 
function of play, in which play and gaming consists of the manipulation of a 
system of control toward its optimal performance. The problem, I contend, 
is that these two def initions often mesh into one another when debating 
the positive aspects and effects of digital play. This is because, while the 
former def inition sees video games as a return to a childlike ‘freedom’ 
away from or in denial of the demands and responsibilities of society, the 
latter def inition in fact creates a correspondence between the gaming 
subject and the objective demands of a capitalist and technocratic system 
that, for instance, Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter call “ludocapitalism” 
(2009, xiv), whereby the gamer obliquely becomes the eventual object of 
an insidious form of manipulation. It is for this reason, I suggest, that Jean 
Baudrillard’s work on play and games, for instance his ‘Police and play,’ tends 
to make the point that playing games—and not just digital games, but also 
games as mere leisure in general—in our highly mediated society primarily 
consists of a “trap” of “symbolic counter-dependence which forms part of our 
cultural mechanisms” where “generalized repression […] becomes part of an 
intense participation” (2001, 61). The pleasure of playing games, according 
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to Baudrillard, stems from the artif icial production of needs and desires, 
leading to a “complicit euphoria” when engaging in the generalized game 
that cybernetic society on the whole has become (2001, 61). In other words, 
Baudrillard suggests that our entire modern society consists of a capitalist 
seduction of the masses to engage in playing, as well as the accumulation 
of pleasure and experience as not only a new form of production, but also 
as a way to divert libidinal energy away from an actual challenge to or 
transgression of this seductive system. The ludif ication of society, then, far 
from being a true revolutionary or freeing transformation for the subject, 
instead ensures that that subject is “harmoniously integrated into the 
dynamics of production” by providing the illusion that play and gaming 
allows her or him to guiltily give in to his own childlike desires (2001, 65). 
Gaming is thus presented in the popular imaginary as a return to a freer and 
infantile state, whereas actually it is engaging in the highest-order demands 
of cybernetic capitalism. Moreover, the ‘guilty pleasure’ of playing games 
is “above all socially orchestrated like any other cultural trait of behavior 
or clothing,” ensuring that the consumption of culpability itself allows for 
the misunderstanding of the mere “signs of play” as a true playing with the 
actual stakes of life and the social order (2001, 66). Actual transgression or 
radical social change, then, seems near-impossible, and can only be found 
in what he calls the “unpredictable transgressions and convulsions in the 
system of values.” One may think here of events that seemingly have little to 
do with video games, like the never-explained flash crash of 2001, terrorist 
suicide attacks, or the ongoing increase in high-school shootings in the 
United States. At the same time, however, video games may have contributed 
to such accidental events by raising the stakes of informational capitalism 
in much more obscure ways, which I will address next.
Play as challenge to neoliberal socialization
After taking the important caveat by Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter 
as well as the assessment by Jean Baudrillard in ‘Police and play’ seriously, 
the possibilities and impossibilities for citizen-directed liberatory and 
democratizing play via digital tools like video games and other forms of 
digital play should be understood as paradoxically oppressive because they 
are seemingly emancipatory. It is, namely, the very same computational 
and infrastructural mechanism that allows for student empowerment, 
which at the same time re-distributes social and economic hierarchies in 
exceedingly unequal ways. But here, too, is an oblique relation to be found 
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between the excessive events mentioned just now and video games: the 
f lash crash resulted from ‘playing’ the stock market, and the shootings 
simulate the simulations that are shooter games. I would therefore also 
suggest that a totalizing theory of capitalism as a system that can completely 
predict and pre-empt outcomes—and ultimately eliminate all risk—via 
games and play in the ways Kline and his colleagues sketch, forgets that 
capitalism today actually relies on extremely unstable illusions, which get 
illustrated via such excessive and surprising events. Therefore, I propose 
that one can always imagine upping the stakes via a challenge to the rules 
of leisure and pleasure as such; in other words, any system can be ‘gamed’ 
beyond its limits. In order to grasp this potential of video-gaming on a 
more extra-structural level, I propose that the seemingly pessimistic and 
totalizing assessment Baudrillard makes in ‘Police and play’ nevertheless 
should be complemented with his more intricate analysis of the symbolic 
logic of rules and games in his earlier work Seduction (1990). In this work, 
he seeks to comprehend ‘prosumerist’ seduction as the potential thwarter 
of the pervasive order of production, which he jokingly calls the “Great 
Neutral Aleatorium” (1990, 143). Here, too, Baudrillard argues that play today 
is the “ambience or playful eroticization of a universe without stakes,” but 
that games in their original agonistic character of the ‘duel’ actually form a 
superior form of social ordering vis-à-vis a society based on the production 
and assuaging of supposedly essential human needs and desires (1990, 
156). This is because in cultures where the gods (or any large powers) are 
invited—for instance, by ways of ritual sacrif icial offering—to show their 
powers, humans actually play for real and there are potentially lethal stakes 
that may completely change a community, a society or the course of history. 
This means that societies that truly acknowledge seduction as the flip-side 
of production are able to ‘place bets’ that are truly radical in the face of the 
law or of authority. So, while in our modern society games are co-constitutive 
of a “demand [which] is prompted by the model, and the model’s precession 
is absolute, [so that] challenges are impossible,” still games and rule-based 
play can be seen as a remnant of a “yearning to be free of the contract and 
the social relation, the longing for a crueller if more fascinating destiny for 
exchange,” in short, “a yearning for a more adventurous world, where one 
plays with value more recklessly” (1990, 152-157).
What I take from Baudrillard’s assessment is that, even if our society 
is one where seduction in Baudrillard’s words has become “cool” or “cold” 
since it no longer raises any stakes (1990, 162)—and therefore does nothing 
to really change society toward a more egalitarian or democratic state—the 
incessant pushing of production via the seduction of video gamers into 
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leisurely ‘prosumerism’ nonetheless carries with it an equally increasing 
unpredictable or risky element. This is because ‘cold’ seduction via ‘prosump-
tion’ is centered on the individual satisfaction of desires and pleasures that 
eventually appear unreal in the face of truly giving oneself away for a larger 
cause, whether this cause be moral, civic, democratic, or otherwise. Altruistic 
self-satisfaction via digital engagement is, therefore, always ultimately 
unfulf illing because the performance and experience of empathy or leader-
ship is, ultimately, indeed only a simulatory illusion that will forever stand in 
tension with actual moral and material global effects that is in part caused 
by the machinery of ‘cold’ seduction. Moreover, it is quite possible that young 
people, due to their underdeveloped socialization, may at some level be more 
sensitive to the tensions around such ‘altruism’ than well-adjusted social 
researchers. The much-lamented youthful political and moral “disaffection” 
that I noted at the onset of this chapter, is hence, I suggest, best interpreted 
as a symptomatic effect of the “fake game without stakes” that modern 
living has become (Baudrillard 1990, 163). Since the acknowledgement of 
the power of seduction is, according to Baudrillard, historically gendered 
in Western societies, this may also explain why in the United States “girls 
experience lower civic gaming opportunities” as the authors of The civic 
potential of video games bewilderedly note (2009, 47); they may not be as 
easily seduced into video games’ ‘militarized masculinity.’ After all, not only 
are in-game representations frequently sexist (Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and 
De Peuter 2003, 265), but girls are possibly more sensitive to the fact that 
gaming relies on an illusion that is at some level complicit with a highly 
gendered and patriarchal social order. This also means that games are, or at 
least can be, much more serious than the regular psychological def inition 
of play as a supposed recursion to a childlike phase gives it credit for, and 
that it is f inally on the level of the theatrical function of the media industry, 
which obscures that industry’s imbrication in the productive and predic-
tive function, that the real challenge to the inequalities of contemporary 
capitalism should be played out. Or, as Baudrillard puts it rather obliquely 
at the end of ‘Police and play’: “only subversion of an instinctual order can 
constitute a point external to the system” (2001, 68).
Conclusion: Raising the stakes of civic subversion?
The f inal question, then, becomes what might accomplish such a subver-
sion? In light of this question, I would like to briefly discuss two promising 
ways in which software programmers and designers have tried to up the 
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stakes in video-gaming by pointing toward a beyond of its pervasive, yet 
never totalizing grasp on play’s potential radicalism. The f irst way entails 
introducing an explicit element of self-reflexivity in a game, such that the 
in-game representation no longer obscures its relation to an unequal global 
economy, but instead critically re-stages this relation. There are a number of 
interesting attempts made in this area, like for instance the games Necessary 
Evil (Gualeni 2013a) and You Have to Burn the Rope (Bashiri 2008), which 
both seek to frustrate the player’s usual sense of smooth control over the 
game-world, or thwart the escapist disconnection with the context in which 
video games are played. As Stefano Gualeni, one of the makers of Necessary 
Evil, nonetheless admits in ‘Self-reflexive video games as playable critical 
thought,’ such games often encompass a kind of “uncouth gameplay” that 
might lead to an unpleasant or indifferent gaming experience, which may 
aim for some kind of player awareness but will not fundamentally alter 
the rules of the larger game that is post-Fordism (2013b, n.p.). The reach 
of self-reflexive video games will therefore—also seeing that it will still 
have to operate entirely within the contemporary economy of ‘seductive 
prosumerism’—eventually remain limited to the uneventful stakes of 
contemporary informational capitalism. The second way would encompass a 
more serious transgression of the rules of digital communication via various 
forms of malicious hacking. However, while challenging the status quo via 
malicious hacking obviously transgresses some moral or legal boundaries, 
informational capitalism, with its emphasis on the constant harnessing of 
ephemerality and creativity via the seduction of also a player’s more obscure 
impulses, may simply incorporate and produce such transgressive activities 
as part of what Stephen Flowers has called “outlaw innovation” (2008, 178). 
So, even self-reflexivity as well as hacking may ultimately not lead to the 
subversion of the ways in which our social order relies on the production of 
subversive instincts and pleasures via video games. Nonetheless, I suggest 
that they point in the right direction, and would urge critical social scientists 
and game designers to further ponder its ‘uncouth’ potentials. And while 
Kahne, Middaugh, and Evans also seek to point toward such potentials, the 
overall argument in The civic potential of video games nonetheless remains 
stuck in a moralism about proper civic behavior that does not lead to any 
of the necessary ‘uncouthness’ at all.
To sum up, this chapter has argued that much contemporary digital 
play—whether done via more obviously militarised games like the Halo 
series or more blatantly ‘civic’ games like Democracy—is wholly wrapped 
up in the logic of cybernetic prediction, oppression, and the reproduction 
of the inequalities of global capitalism. As such, the seduction of digital 
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gaming is a ‘cold’ one in which there is nothing really at stake. The chapter 
has proposed that such a digital environment in which stakes and risks 
have been pre-empted at least to a larger extent than in a pre-cybernetic 
media environment, can never allow for true ethical engagement and radical 
democratic change implied on the level of certain video games’ ‘civic’ content. 
Hence, the chapter concludes that, following especially Baudrillard’s assess-
ment of the ambiguity of play while also paying attention to the warnings 
of Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter, eventually only play that engages 
on the structural, formal, or functional level of its digital tool may open up 
the possibility of a liberatory politics. Games like SimCity or Zora, as The 
civic potential of video games report claims, therefore, certainly generate a 
particular experience of moral and civic learning, but such an experience 
primarily involves the practice of playing within the general ambience of the 
optimization of “self-control” technologies geared toward the management 
of risk (Beck 1992, 234). It therefore does not translate into the nurturing of 
a more democratic and ethically just society, but instead socializes youths 
into a contemporary technocracy fraught with multiple forms of inequality. 
This is because the in-game spatial or social representation, while seemingly 
full of ‘freedom’ of movement and choice, only serves to hide the way in 
which such ‘freedom’ reproduces an essentially oppressive functionality 
within contemporary global informational capitalist society. In their place, 
the chapter has pointed out that certain forms of playful self-reflexivity and 
hacking offer promising routes to subversion that nonetheless still need to be 
pushed way beyond the system’s breaking point so as to potentially accom-
plish play’s essential radicality. This chapter therefore has positioned itself 
initially in-between, but f inally beyond the debates of Kahne, Middaugh, 
and Evans as well as Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter, as it holds that 
the former fail to suff iciently address how video games are also microcosms 
of larger, socially oppressive, and unequal arrangements, while the latter in 
Digital play forget how structural play with ‘dubious’ technologies is always 
possible on the level of the tool’s rule-based grammar. It concurs with the 
latter that the stakes for a liberatory politics indeed have been partially 
compromised and complicated, as truly subversive, radical, or civically 
engaged play is rendered increasingly diff icult to discern and carry out in 
our informational capitalist societies due to the near-total enmeshment of 
emancipatory desires and new media. But it also suggests that one can always 
‘up the game’ and its unjust and f inally arbitrary rules by exposing these 
rules as simulations. Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter do try to investigate 
the possibility of raising such stakes by looking at a variety of promising 
games in the chapter ‘Games of multitude’ in Games of Empire, like tactical 
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games, polity games, hacktivism, and other forms of counterplay. Eventually, 
however, this investigation still leads them to conclude that the “play of 
multitude still remains locked inside games of Empire” (2009, 213). This 
is because all these games still fundamentally rely on extracting surplus 
value by locking users into preprogrammed interactive subject positions. 
Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter therefore propose that perhaps “gaming 
alternatives that open onto truly ‘new universes of references’ come mainly 
from outside the play factory” (2009, 212). I suggest that if we really want 
our youth to grow up with a sense of democratic purpose in which they can 
bring about a world in which we can all lead meaningful lives, we should 
perhaps understand that, paradoxically, youth’s seemingly irrational and 
‘passive’ civic behavior, borne out of a logical disaffection with zero-stakes 
technocracy, is not so much the problem, but the key to a more just society. 
This is not to say that indulging in passivity constitutes the opposite of 
the problems of interactivity, but that youth, as the The civic potential of 
video games report correctly showed at the start, f ind themselves on the 
threshold of what it really could mean to become a responsible adult. And 
their instincts may tell them that deep down, not all is well in the sphere 
of civic simulation.
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 Introduction to Part II
René Glas, Sybille Lammes, Michiel de Lange, Joost Raessens, 
and Imar de Vries
Part II of the book is concerned with how play, civic engagement, and 
knowledge can be understood as intimately related. It counters the as-
sumption that play and science are incompatible concepts and instead seeks 
to identify a productive interconnectedness between them. What we wish 
to discuss here is best described by what René Glas and Sybille Lammes 
call ludo-epistemologies in their contribution to this book. Building on 
philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend’s concept of anarcho-epistemology, 
they use this term to make a case for forging productive relations between 
play, civic participation, and knowledge production.
Hailing from different f ields and backgrounds, the authors in this section 
share a keen interest in f inding ludic ways to overcome the asymmetry 
between the ‘bastions’ where knowledge is produced and daily life. All too 
often, we seem to live with these techno-scientif ic artefacts thrown at us 
like a deus ex machina or an external fate. The contributions in this section 
probe the use of play as a means to overcome this asymmetry and develop 
a critical academic stance as to how play can be a meaningful method, 
design, or tactic for accomplishing this.
Jessica Breen, Shannon Dosemagen, Don Blair, and Liz Barry take a very 
hands-on approach to this in their collective contribution Public laboratory: 
Play and civic engagement. Here, the authors talk about play as a means of 
civic engagement. They see play as a tactic to bring about social change, in 
particular by giving citizens the possibility to map pollution and other social 
issues. Their Public Lab, based in the USA, offers a wide range of playful 
tools as everyday items—such as kites and balloons—and also organizes 
playful gatherings to encourage citizens to take civic action. Their work 
is a testimony to how civic action and scientif ic practices can be shaped 
through play and shows that this can lead to the production of alternative 
knowledge that can empower citizens.
In her chapter Sensing the air and experimenting with environmental 
citizenship, sociologist Jennifer Gabrys also speaks about the potential 
of civic engagement through playful approaches. However, she ref lects 
on site-specif ic citizen-sensing projects where creative means are used 
to engage citizens with technologies for measuring air pollution. Gabrys 
argues that such local and material initiatives should be approached as 
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material processes in which new ways of data retrieval and democratic 
engagement are developed that can potentially give rise to new power 
relations in knowledge production. Play and creativity, according to Gabrys, 
are important parts of such experimental processes and allow us to come 
to more symmetrical ways of living and doing knowledge.
In Biohacking: Playing with technology, new media scholar Stephanie de 
Smale takes a similar approach to the lab as an experimental site. She reflects 
on how quotidian experimental sites (urban communities, a building) can be 
turned into laboratories. De Smale shows that bastions of techno-scientif ic 
production can literally be moved elsewhere by creating alternative labs 
outside their traditional boundaries. The Public Lab mentioned above is 
an interesting example of an attempt to embed labs in daily life through 
DIY practices. De Smale discusses another strong case, the production of 
microscopic images outside the traditional laboratory, and shows how 
hacking as play can be an important method for the production of alternative 
knowledge.
The f inal chapters in this part could be read as a trialogue, or perhaps 
as a mini-debate, about how playful citizen science can be envisaged, criti-
cally examined, and understood, especially in relation to citizen science 
games. Although the authors do not speak directly to each other, they take 
positions in a highly timely debate, and their views resonate with and 
complement each other. The f irst contribution is the aforementioned text 
by Glas and Lammes, Ludo-epistemology: Playing with the rules in citizen 
science games. Drawing on the f ields of game studies as well as science and 
technology studies (STS), the authors want to push the envelope with a 
discussion of how citizen science games are conceptualized and designed. 
They propose a radical move in which citizen science games become more 
than just top-down instruments for teaching science or feeding data back 
to scientists, and call instead for a reconceptualization of what people think 
science is and can become, what citizenship is and what play is. Taking up 
Paul Feyerabend’s challenge that scientists are also citizens and that we 
need to break down boundaries in order to adopt a more democratic kind 
of knowledge production, they argue that this should also prompt us to 
rethink the potential of citizen science games. They argue that by making 
games that give players agency to bend or break established rules, we can 
bring play into knowledge practices.
This contribution is followed by two more chapters about the intercon-
nectedness between play and knowledge production in games. In The playful 
scientist: Stimulating playful communities for science practice, game scholars 
and designers Ben Schouten, Erik van der Spek, Daniël Harmsen, and Ellis 
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Bartholomeus take a similar stance to Glas and Lammes. From a more 
designer-informed perspective, they call for citizen science games that are 
less one-directional and engage citizens more directly with what knowledge 
production is about. To accomplish this, so they maintain, games have to 
be designed in such a way that they hold the interest of players for a longer 
time span and they have to trigger players’ intrinsic motivation.
In their chapter Laborious playgrounds: Citizen science games as new 
modes of work/play in the digital age, game scholar Sonia Fizek and anthro-
pologist Anne Dippel take a critical look at the promises and pitfalls of citizen 
science games and how they can put citizens in the role of ‘playborers,’ doing 
work for scientists by playing and unwittingly providing free labor. The 
asymmetries that we mentioned in the f irst paragraphs of this introduction 
are thus reiterated instead of being destabilized or weakened, so they warn.
In summary, the contributions in this section all engage with how play 
and knowledge can be combined in productive ways to stimulate creativity 
and empower citizens. Yet, as many authors also point out, we should look 
at this potential in a highly critical (and maybe even skeptical) way, as play 
can also enforce the asymmetries between where techno-science flourishes 
and where it is produced when used in a non-reflective, one-directional, 
and unengaged way.
8. Public laboratory: Play and civic 
engagement
Jessica Breen, Shannon Dosemagen, Don Blair, and Liz Barry
Abstract
This chapter explores the potential of play in relation to community-based 
civic science research using DIY scientif ic tools made possible by the Public 
Laboratory for Open Technology and Science (Public Lab). It discusses 
projects and approaches that the Public Lab has developed since its launch 
in 2010 to facilitate meaningful civic science collaboration. This includes 
a focus on narrative forms to connect participants to science research, 
relying on a spontaneous, playful emergence of collaborative activity 
rather than pre-developed forms of gamification to allow the incentives for 
participation to be intrinsic to the nature of the activity. This transforms 
the practice of scientif ic research and civic engagement into something 
that is both effective and ultimately enjoyable and productive, for all of 
those involved.
Keywords: Public Lab, civic science, playful participation, civic engage-
ment, DIY, community
Right before we reach the end of LA-23, a long stretch of road through 
Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, we turn off into the parking lot of a marina. 
The drive from New Orleans to Venice took us through a landscape of 
rural agriculture, ref ineries, and tight-knit communities and into one 
of the epicenters of the oil spill cleanup. We’d spent the drive cutting 
up two-liter soda bottles, installing the Canon Hack Development Kit 
(CHDK) on a Canon camera and guessing what it would be like when we 
got to our f inal destination, the Chandeleur Islands. It had only been a 
few days since we had listened to the news of the Deepwater Horizon rig 
explosion. Now, it was 9 May, and after endless days of navigating work, 
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confusion, and media, we heard that the f irst signs of oil were headed 
toward the Chandeleur Islands. We were meeting a charter boat captain 
who had volunteered to take the three of us—equipped with a weather 
balloon, helium tank, duct tape, and other miscellaneous parts—to one 
of his favorite sport f ishing spots out there. He wanted to see the oil’s 
impact, too.
We motored slowly down the long canal that would lead us into the Gulf 
of Mexico. We passed trawlers converted into oil skimming vessels, the 
remnants of pipeline structures, and the quickly disappearing Breton 
Sound, f inally making our way into the relatively calm waters within 
the Chandeleur Island chain. Over the side of the boat, coagulated red 
objects f loated past, swimming among the oily sheen. A foul smell hung 
in the air, leaving us all with aching eyes and heads by the time we 
returned to shore later in the day. We spent the afternoon navigating 
the coastline, considering wading to shore (but not feeling comfortable 
getting into the alien-looking water), and playing with the balloon map-
ping materials we brought along. With a toolkit that consisted of one 
large balloon, a newly constructed soda bottle rig, kite reel, a camera 
and gloves, we experimented with different tie-off techniques on the 
balloon, duct taped shut a hole that formed in the rubber of the balloon, 
and f inally launched it into the perfectly calm afternoon. Floating 1,500 
feet above us, well below the off icial 3,000 foot f loor that had been 
imposed on f lyovers that week, we swapped stories, watched pelicans 
and helicopters f lying on and off the island and captured images that 
would later illustrate a story of the surreally beautiful devastation that 
was unfolding around us.
Play is an activity that is positively viewed by the player, self-motivated, 
freely chosen, and actively engaging (Garvey 1990). This concept of play 
extends back to what play meant to us in an educational context when we 
were young children, i.e. exploration and experimentation and f iguring 
out how to engage with the space you occupy in new ways. We construct 
this chapter based on two central questions: how do we bring play into 
civic engagement? And how do we come to engage as a community of civic 
science practitioners in a space that requires us to constantly re-imagine 
play through exploration?
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A brief history of the Public Laboratory for Open Technology 
and Science
In the spring of 2010, NGOs, Gulf Coast residents, and members of Grassroots-
Mapping.org, coalesced to collect over 100,000 aerial images of the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster. Access to the coast was restricted in the aftermath of the 
oil spill, with local residents and journalists alike prevented from witness-
ing affected areas. There was much frustration due to the lack of volunteer 
opportunities to assist in oil clean-up, the media blackout, and diff iculties 
accessing information vital to assessing ecological and public health risks. In 
response, the Public Laboratory for Open Technology and Science (Public Lab) 
formed to pilot a Do-It-Yourself method of collecting aerial imagery utilizing 
a helium-filled weather balloon and kites equipped with refurbished digital 
cameras housed in repurposed soda bottles to prevent them from fluttering in 
the wind. By flying these improvised rigs between 500 and 2,000 feet off the 
ground, we were able to capture high-resolution photos of the spill’s effects 
and provide an inexpensive mechanism for grassroots community engagement 
and for monitoring both corporate and government response to the spill.
Since that time, Public Lab has expanded its toolset to include the develop-
ment of DIY scientif ic tools to address a broad swath of environmental and 
social justice issues. These tools include a spectrometer, available as a kit 
on the Public Lab website, which was developed with the aim of identifying 
polyaromatic hydrocarbons in soil and sediment, but has been explored 
within the community for a variety of other further uses. The Public Lab 
community has also developed a ‘thermal flashlight’ for detecting thermal 
leaks, modif ied Roombas that paint with light to map indoor air pollutants 
like formaldehyde, devised hydrogen sulf ide detectors that make novel use 
of photographic paper to sense emissions near hydro-fracking sites, and 
designed near-infrared cameras that produce images of plant health. We 
continually work to expand our articulation of community-based participa-
tory models of science-based environmental engagement, adapting and 
ref ining our DIY research tools within a socially and politically aware 
context (Dosemagen, Warren, and Wylie 2011).
Why so serious? Intersections of play and civic engagement
Within Public Lab the intersection of play and civic engagement takes differ-
ent forms. It can be found in our engagement with the broader citizen science 
community as we choose to relate our work in both narrative and visual 
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formats, including the research notes and videos on the community website 
and the illustrated guide to balloon mapping included in our balloon kits. 
It is also to be found in the very tools we use and the means through which 
they are created. Science is, at its heart, a creative, collaborative process. 
It is advanced as individuals question their world, design experiments to 
challenge assumptions, and share their results with a community of other 
thinkers, who, in turn, question, experiment, and share their f indings. 
Employing multiple modes of learning helps to engage a broader transect 
of people and expands the Public Lab community by rendering complex 
information accessible to many different types of researchers and learners. 
Likewise, the creative repurposing of everyday items as scientific tools, along 
with the collaborative nature of tool creation, helps return the scientif ic 
process to its roots as a collaborative community endeavor (Latour and 
Woolgar 1979).
Bringing play back into science: Narrative forms of scientific research 
and engagement
The purpose of the Public Lab process and tools is, fundamentally, to tell 
stories (de Certeau 1984). We believe that narrative forms of scientif ic 
research and engagement allow individuals to better connect to their topic 
and each other, thus the toolkit of civic science should, in the ethos of Public 
Lab, create an opening for people to develop a narrative process around an 
exploration that they are undertaking. The Public Lab community embeds 
technologies themselves in a narrative—a set of possible uses, which enable 
specif ic inversions of power in communities with environmental concerns. 
This is not just ‘balloon mapping,’ but ‘grassroots satellite photography’—
it matters who does it and why. For example, Public Lab created a DIY 
spectrometer that has been distributed to over 3,000 people around the 
world. The process of engaging with the tool has become one of creating 
a community that experiments, explores, and learns together in all stages 
of the process. Extending the range of your vision by sending cameras 
up thousands of feet on a balloon, connected to you by a tenuous ‘optic 
nerve’ of kite string (which lets you hear and feel the wind itself through its 
vibrations), and exploring an area from a new perspective is just one way 
Public Lab members playfully reconfigure technology to suit their needs. 
Tools created for civic science practices are ones that, at the root, require us 
to question both our social and physical boundaries. Maps created by the 
community with these images allow for a joint process of transcribing new 
narratives into the images. Questions can be developed about preconceived 
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ideas of state instituted boundaries such as language, composition of ethnic 
populations, ideas of urbanity, and physically segregating markers.
Creating narrative layers in the process of civic science tool development 
and use can also help to connect us to the longer running, potentially genera-
tional narrative of engagement within our neighborhoods. The collaborative 
art of using tools that allow a community to investigate, connects us to the 
past while serving to help us formulate future means of engagement and 
management with our environment. An example of this type of engagement 
with civic science tools can be demonstrated by community members 
working around the Gowanus Canal in Brooklyn, New York. They have 
used aerial mapping tools to link the past use of a site, through a narrative 
format, to future management and preservation efforts as a part of a larger 
community effort of remembrance and reconstituting ownership. As written 
in a research note on the Public Lab website:
The key reasons for interest in the site was that this particular lot had been 
identif ied as the sole remaining remnant of ‘Marylander Hill,’ described 
by historians as a grave site for early colonial settlers, slaves and War of 
Independence soldiers […] Based on historical maps and recorded evidence 
[…] the ‘Over My Dead Body’ Mapping Team launched their 56” diameter 
red weather balloon from the nearby Gowanus Canal Conservancy’s high 
tech Mission Control Center, home of GLAM (Gowanus Low Altitude 
Mapping) at 2nd Avenue and the Gowanus Canal […] Looking at the 
photographs a couple of minutes later […] a curious fact was uncovered by 
scrutinizing the high-resolution images: the cracks in the concrete—the 
‘grassroots’—were telling a story. (Diegel 2012, n.p.)
The above case demonstrates that in civic science there is the potential to 
create engaging narrative to form a compelling story about the environ-
ment that gives a call to action. The ‘Over My Dead Body’ Mapping Team 
were able to support their argument that there was in fact a Revolutionary 
War cemetery located on Marylander Hill by using simple tools showing 
that the cracks in the concrete line up with the kind of soil settling one 
would expect to see in a cemetery. By incorporating problem identif ication, 
tool development, data collection and analysis, the Public Lab model can 
facilitate a feeling of involvement in one’s space and environment through 
the transformative narrative of engagement (Blair et al. 2013). This process 
outlines key points relating to play in the form of questioning and creating 
new ideas and interpretations, but also holds formal engagement methods, 
such as the open source licensing that Public Lab uses as key to ensuring 
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an exploratory environment that prides itself on allowing and encouraging 
reinterpretation and new discoveries. In detailing a process that asks people 
to think about how they can once again become engaged in the management 
and use decisions of their environment, the process provides a critical means 
for engaging at every step of the process.
In moving away from the classic model of citizen science, wherein indi-
viduals assist professional research scientists by submitting data points as 
part of a larger research project, some of the steps in the Public Lab process 
that allow deeper engagement include:
1) Engage people as fellow researchers, not subjects; the community 
is involved in all aspects of the project from question development, 
research design, and data collection to analysis;
2) Taking seemingly complex consumer technologies and with simple 
hacks, re-imagining them as instruments for data collection;
3) Build in social engagement and accountability as part of the process 
of play in civic science. For instance, aerial mapping, through a 
balloon attached to a kite string, links the process of data collection 
to the person holding the string, making that person visible and 
accessible;
4) Create collaborative workflows allowing people to continue work-
ing together after the balloon mapping is complete. Open source 
platforms such as Public Lab’s MapKnitter.org allow people to work 
together to create a community-based map of their neighborhood;
5) Use open source to encourage the adaptation and reuse of Public 
Lab tools and methods and, in essence, ensure a safe space for 
people to collaboratively create and build locally modif ied tools 
which can then be adopted for grassroots investigations in diverse 
communities.1
“Easy on the eyes”: The role of the visual in civic science participation
Public Lab embraces legibility and chooses to rely on people’s intuitive 
visual f luency. This helps avoid jargon. Stylistically, engaging visual com-
munication in Public Lab so far has ranged from sketched cartoons to 
pixelated, low-resolution graphics, with new genres cropping up all the time. 
Public Lab f inds that there are several advantages to emphasizing informal 
1 These points were f irst developed by Mathew Lippincott, Shannon Dosemagen, and Sara 
Wylie for a keynote at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute’s Triple Helix Technoscience as Activism 
conference on 28 June 2012.
168 JESSICA BREEN, ShANNoN DoSEMAGEN, DoN BLAIR, AND LIz BARRy 
visualizations in our work. These advantages are found primarily in two 
realms: tool development processes and data structure design.
While many people would say the reimagining of science tools using 
reusable, recycled material is playful, an equal number of people may f ind 
that while it may be a fun form of play for the technologists, it is diff icult 
for average people to participate. Part of the way Public Lab connects the 
knowledge of people with technological expertise to people with a place-
based expertise is the use of illustrated instructional materials.
Public Lab is re-orientating the space of design, engineering, and col-
laboration (back) into a more legible and accessible place: a piece of paper. 
We have observed that open source software groups and scientists often 
erect barriers through prerequisite software/tools that they take for granted. 
Sketches can readily be posted to the Public Lab website via an emailed 
digital photo, allowing immediate community information sharing and 
feedback, and a continuous stream of documentation. Often the drawings 
and sketches assembled during the process of tool development f ind their 
way into an illustrated guide for the tool’s use—Public Lab’s preferred type 
of instruction manual.
Designing tools goes hand in hand with designing the data structures 
used for recording environmental information. Since most people f ind 
image-based data easier to directly understand with less interpretation 
(in contrast to a spreadsheet of numbers), drawings and raster images are 
central to how Public Lab communicates its research. Examples of image 
data include aerial photographs, aerial maps, video of a spectrum emitted by 
a chemical, time-lapse photo that captures thermal flashlight ‘heat painting,’ 
and videos of experimental setups and techniques. Therefore, Public Lab’s 
model for tool development prioritizes users’ ability to immediately produce 
visual output from their tool; Public Lab is less interested in sensors that 
are unable to be assembled without extended training and that create data 
which require a complicated series of steps between data acquisition and 
visualization. Public Lab prefers to start visual and stay visual.
Research tool use: Play as a mode of interaction ‘in the field’
Engaging in research activities outside, in public places, can enable chance 
encounters with neighbors, business owners, workers, local authorities, 
school children—in short, a full cross section of the citizenry. Public Lab 
seeks to enable and encourage such serendipitous engagements with the way 
in which its tools are employed in the f ield. Public Lab’s work invokes a sense 
of play in the very tools we employ in our mapping techniques—including 
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outsized helium balloons and brightly colored kites with fuzzy tails. These 
objects radiate an aura of playfulness that facilitates engagement across 
boundaries of age, education, and politics. For these reasons, the Public 
Lab community prefers, for example, to use kites and balloons instead of 
the practice of using drones for aerial imaging, in which the operator is not 
easily apparent. In-person accountability and opportunities for building a 
coalition around the issues at hand are some of the most salient benefits of 
the socially grounded environmental research that Public Lab carries out.
That our aerial cameras are both launched from, and returned to, the 
group of people holding the string seems like an obvious point, however 
it has wonderful consequences—candid group shots of people young and 
old looking up, smiling and pointing at every mapping excursion. Taking 
f ield research to the next level, balloons and kites can even be launched 
from a boat, which invokes the spirit of intrepid and adventurous activities 
in the pursuit of science.
Once a year, the online Public Lab community meet at an event referred 
to as a Barnraising—a gathering of community members from across the 
country (and beyond) focused on the creation of a new tool. This is somewhat 
like a conference, but with an emphasis on ‘doing stuff together’ rather than 
just presenting papers and discussion. In the spirit of bringing a community 
together to collectively raise a structure such as a barn, Public Lab gather 
to develop tools, toolkits, supporting materials, such as guides and tutori-
als, to test the tools and to develop new research directions and projects. 
Participants represent a wide range of interests from technologists and 
designers to social scientists and community organizers. We hold these 
events at a ‘f ield research station’ out in the Louisiana Delta and we make 
sure to leave enough time every day to go outside and play.
Fieldwork respects the expertise of residents and workers who have a 
long-standing lived experience of the environment in question. Fieldwork 
enhances embodied knowledge, and builds a deeper connection with the 
environment and environmental issues. Fieldwork equips people to speak 
from a place of authenticity through personal experience. Building the 
equipment to capture a dataset that vouches for one’s site observations 
adds a level of personal investment and this personal investment can add 
fuel to resulting advocacy campaigns.
Reinventing the citizen science toolkit
In the Public Lab community, sometimes the genesis of a new grassroots 
science technique is the identif ication of a specif ic need—the requirement 
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for an airborne device that will capture certain frequencies of light, for 
example, or a DIY method for identifying contaminants in water—which 
inspires researchers to then begin brainstorming about designs for a new 
device. This is a creative and collaborative process, guided always by the 
constraints of producing a tool that is effective, inexpensive, and accessible. 
Often the most useful ideas emerge after initially taking design constraints 
lightly and proposing whimsical concepts that are later seen to contain the 
kernel of a more solid design.
Just as signif icant, however, is a tool design dynamic that follows a sort 
of reverse trajectory: researchers discover, or are presented with, a new 
tool, and after some thought realize that this existing tool might, with 
modification, be used to address an outstanding research problem. At Public 
Lab, we have witnessed this dynamic occur many times: people with an 
interest in the environment are shown a balloon mapping kit—the simple, 
but novel combination of a digital camera attached to a balloon—and ideas 
immediately begin to materialize ways in which the kit might be used to 
answer questions they already have. Most people do not realize that they 
would have any use for a DIY spectrometer until they see a demonstration of 
its ability to distinguish between different brands of olive oil or vintages of 
wine; their eyes light up, and they begin to imagine new uses for the device. 
At an event called LEAFFEST, parallel discussions of an airborne webcam 
device and the uses of aerial near-infrared (NIR) imagery playfully merged 
into a solid design for a new device: a near infrared webcam device capable 
of creating composite images on the fly.
Who sets the rules of the game? Gamification vs. playful 
participation
In describing the sort of interactions that Public Lab aims to facilitate in civic 
science, it is important to make a subtle, but significant distinction between 
a ‘playful’ approach to engagement, and the relatively recent trend toward 
the gamification of science (Deterding et al. 2011; Prestopnik and Crowston 
2012). We find the gamification approach problematic. Akin to the manner in 
which crowd-sourcing is employed, gamification is typically carried out by 
experts invested in a particular research or behavior modification outcome; 
this outcome is often communicated to game participants, if at all, as an 
afterthought, resulting in game-players whose energies are being spent in 
service of an agenda which they are not fully aware of. Further, the incentive 
structure embedded in most games assumes that ‘racking up points’ will 
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sustain enough interest and be suff icient incentive to induce participation; 
anyone who has played such a game more than a few times knows that these 
games can become tiresome (Iacovides et al. 2013; Mekler et al. 2013). Most 
importantly, because game players are typically not co-creators of the rules 
of the game and the associated assignment of points as rewards to various 
behaviors, they do not have an opportunity to embed their own values in 
the game’s incentive structure. We f ind the potential distance between the 
values and goals of the game’s designers, and the values and goals of game 
participants, to be a troubling aspect of typical gamif ication approaches.
In contrast, the playful approach embodied in Public Lab’s activities seeks 
engagement through a spontaneous emergence of collaborative activity, 
in which the incentives for participation are intrinsic to the nature of the 
activity (“I am building a kite mapping kit so that I can see my neighborhood 
from 1000 feet up”); the result is a set of practices and tools that ref lect 
precisely the priorities, interests, and values of each participant.
Conclusion
From launching a balloon over the Gulf of Mexico to sitting in front of 
a computer as a rainbow-like sample from a spectroscopy experiment 
appears, civic science creates a space for diverse groups of people to engage, 
collaborate, share and create. An oft-repeated mantra in the Public Lab 
community when encouraging people to post their f irst research note 
is “things going wrong are just as important as things succeeding.” This 
notion stands in direct contrast with traditional practice in science and in 
education which does not usually publish failed results.2 Nevertheless, this 
is emblematic of Public Lab’s approach. Accepting that mishaps and failures 
are important events for learning, empowers participants to be more open, 
free, playful, and creative in their scientif ic explorations, recognizing the 
point at which a change of direction is necessary, and making space for new 
research directions to emerge.
The open source, collaborative set of practices that Public Lab uses 
allows for a continually growing space—one that is not typical of more 
traditional scientif ic institutions. Our agendas, research questions, and 
methods follow an open, grassroots, bottom-up approach, in opposition to 
2 With the possible exception of the International Journal of Negative & Null Results, established 
in 2012 to publish scientif ic work deemed unpublishable by other scientif ic journals because it 
was unsuccessful.
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traditional top-down, hierarchical dynamics. This is evidenced in the way 
in which changes to tool designs are valued in the community, where even 
the slightest contributions—such as a community user-suggested change 
from using cardboard to plastic stabilizers to f ly a camera rig, based on 
experience in the f ield—ultimately develop into an improved, widely used 
research tool design.
Further, and most importantly, these collaborative practices ensure 
that the research activities in which Public Laboratory engages—practices 
which emerge from the myriad small and large contributions of a diverse 
community—always reflect the values, priorities, and preferred modes 
of interaction of the people that constitute its research community. This 
transforms the practice of scientif ic research and civic engagement into 
something that is both effective, and ultimately enjoyable and productive, 
for all of those involved.
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This chapter analyzes community-led citizen sensing projects as a new 
form of environmental citizenship. Sensing and monitoring air quality 
can be playful forms of civic engagement with public issues. In these 
site-specif ic citizen sensing projects, creative means are being used to 
engage citizens in measuring air pollution with the aid of technology. The 
chapter argues that such experimental initiatives should be approached 
as material processes in which new forms of data retrieval and democratic 
engagement are developed that can potentially give rise to new and more 
just power relations in knowledge production. 
Keywords: Environmental citizenship, citizen sensing, data, air quality, 
citizen science
If you should find yourself standing outside the Hobgoblin Pub on New Cross 
Road in the Borough of Lewisham, London, you might notice a grayish-white 
box approximately two-and-a-half meters high scrawled with a faded and 
cascading line of graff iti. Wedged in a space between the buildings and 
facing out toward the road, the air vent and monitoring equipment at the 
top of this structure may be one of the few details that betray the purpose 
of this object, which is to measure air quality at this f ixed spot in London. 
One of the stations in the London Air Quality Network (LAQN) that covers 
33 boroughs, this monitoring station contributes to the hourly indexes of 
air quality and news of episodes of high pollution risk in London. Detecting 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), particulate matter 10 and 2.5 (PM 10, PM 2.5), as well 
as nitrogen oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2), the station generates 
data that indicate whether the UK is meeting EU air quality objectives for 
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Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
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both the short- and long-term emission of pollutants. The data also inform 
environmental science research and are managed and made available by 
the Environmental Research Group (ERG) at King’s College London where 
this network is managed and run (London Air Quality Network n.d.).
Passersby may experience in a potentially f leeting way the connection 
between this station, the local air quality, and the data it generates, which 
typically circulate in spaces of environmental science and policy. The 
data that is generated at this f ixed site could be seen to be black-boxed, 
and located in spaces somewhat remote from everyday experiences of air 
quality on the street. In order to bring air pollution data gathered at this 
station and the approximately 100 other stations in the LAQN, ERG have 
designed a ‘London Air App’ to allow people to observe emissions levels 
at key monitoring sites, and to make inferences about their own personal 
exposure when passing through these sites. While this strategy makes the 
data of f ixed sites more accessible through an air quality app, the modes 
of pollution that individuals experience in their everyday trajectories may 
be quite different than the types of pollution that are captured through 
f ixed monitoring sites generating data that is averaged over set monitoring 
periods. For instance, the f ixed point at the New Cross Road station typically 
records an annual exceedance of NO2, which is a pollutant formed in the 
combustion of fuel and is largely the result of high levels of automobile use 
in the city. In fact, this site exceeds the EU air quality objectives which 
is no more than 40 µm/m3 of NO2 per year. Yet, all along New Cross Road 
individual moments and locations of exposure may generate a far different 
set of ‘pollution episodes,’ with different consequences for urban dwellers 
in these areas.
Inevitably, the question emerges of how individuals may map their own 
exposure to air pollution, which is likely to differ from the sites of the official 
monitoring stations. One response that attempts to monitor air quality 
beyond fixed sites includes community deployments of diffusion tubes which 
are a low-cost analog method for gauging air pollution, but require many 
week-long deployments of tubes that are then sent off to labs for analysis 
and data production. In this case, the process of gathering air pollution data 
may be more egalitarian, but the generation and analysis of meaningful data 
is something that takes place in a remote laboratory setting. Beyond this 
approach, environmental monitoring is now proliferating from a project 
undertaken by environmental scientists and governmental agencies to a 
practice in which DIY groups and creative practitioners are engaged, often 
as a form of citizen or grassroots science. Many of these monitoring projects 
might be called ‘citizen sensing,’ since they typically deploy smart phones 
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and portable sensors with the intention of democratizing the collection and 
use of sensor data. The general ethos of these projects is that by enabling 
the monitoring of local environments, it may also be possible to achieve 
increased engagement with environmental concerns.
One primary way such citizen-sensing projects have sprung up is through 
direct engagement with sites of contamination or pollution. Air, noise, and 
water pollution are local environmental disturbances, even if distributed, 
that most urban dwellers experience on a regular basis. Yet, even then, 
some urban residents experience more than others since sites of pollution 
are often concentrated in lower-income urban areas. Citizen sensing of 
pollution is a strategy that attempts to bring pollution data from the spaces 
of expert and governmental oversight to an experience that is available to 
citizens equipped with mobile phones and portable sensors. A proliferation 
of creative practice, creative computing, and DIY projects have emerged in 
the area of sensing environmental pollution. Some citizen-sensing projects 
use the itinerant aspects of individual exposure to air pollution as a site for 
unique and mobile monitoring experiments, which cannot be compared 
to f ixed sites of detection. For example, Preemptive Media’s Area’s Immedi-
ate Reading consists of a mobile and individual air monitoring device for 
gauging individual exposure to air pollutants (Preemptive Media 2006). 
Other projects suggest that by focusing on environmental disturbances new 
questions about the health of individual bodies in relation to environmental 
health can emerge. For instance, Natalie Jeremijenko’s Environmental Health 
Clinic tests pollutants in river water samples to raise discussions about 
individual health and exposure to environmental pollutants (Jeremijenko 
n.d.-a). Whether displaying pollution levels or developing platforms to make 
pollution information more accessible to help facilitate sound decision 
making, the majority of citizen-sensing pollution projects attempt to make 
the details of environmental pollution more immediate and actionable.
These projects test, experiment with, and mobilize alternative modes 
of environmental citizenship in order to address environmental concerns. 
Yet, in what ways do practices of environmental monitoring with sensing 
devices give rise not just to experimental modes of participation and civic 
engagement, but also to different modalities for experiencing environ-
mental pollution?1 Within these projects, how does the experience and 
1 This discussion on the experience and experiment of sensing air pollution draws and builds 
on my previous work on environmental sensors, which I develop in the context of Isabelle 
Stengers’ analysis of the shared (French) etymology of experiment and experience (in relation 
to Whitehead). See Whitehead 1929; Stengers 2008; Gabrys 2012.
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experiment of air pollution become a site of political as well as potentially 
playful engagement? In this chapter, I consider how creative practices that 
sense air pollution, also experiment with the tactics and arrangements 
of environmental citizenship in order to open up the possibility for new 
experiences, engagements, and political encounters with environmental 
matters of concern. These experiments and experiences, however, are not 
just a matter of enabling citizens to use technology to act on their environ-
ments. Rather, as I suggest here and in the larger Citizen Sense project that 
this work draws from, computational sensing technologies are bound up 
with the generation of new relations, entities, occasions, and interpretive 
registers of sensing. Sensor-based engagements with environments do not 
simply detect external phenomena to be reported, rather they bring together 
experiencing entities to make possible new arrangements of environmental 
sensing and data.
While citizen-sensing practices attempt to generate new modes of civic 
and actionable environmental data, at the same time I consider in what 
ways it might be possible to develop an analysis of these environmental 
practices that does not necessarily f ix them as objects of study, but rather 
creates generative approaches by considering the data practices that emerge 
through these projects, which might further spur new experiments with 
additional data practices. With an examination of citizen-sensing projects 
that develop experimental and creative approaches to monitoring air quality, 
including Feral Robotic Dogs, Pigeon Blog, and Air Quality Egg, I consider 
how these technological modes of sensing generate distinct practices of 
environmental citizenship in and through engagement with data.
While these environmental sensing projects are ostensibly focused 
on creating opportunities for citizen scientists (of sorts) to generate their 
own data, these projects also create additional data in and around the 
practices they set in motion. This is another way of saying that rather than 
consider environmental citizenship as something that inheres within a 
particular subject position, I am instead interested in considering how 
practices distributed across human and more-than-human registers might 
emerge through distinct performances or enactments of environmental 
citizenship. Environmental citizenship is by no means a new concept, 
and has been discussed at length across a range of literatures too vast to 
summarize here. But I take as a cue, from Rebecca Ellis and Claire Waterton, 
the notion of “environmental citizenship in the making” (Ellis and Waterton 
2004), or as I would further suggest, a processual and relational approach to 
environmental citizenship based on Whitehead’s conception of citizenship 
(Whitehead 1929), as a way to think through the emergent practices of 
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monitoring and sensing urban air quality as a distinct performance and 
articulation of environmental citizenship (Gabrys 2013).
In considering the types of practices that emerge, I examine environ-
mental citizenship as a distributed process rather than as something that 
is situated at the site of a f ixed human subject. Distributed and more-than-
human modes of participation contribute to air pollution and its monitor-
ing. From computational sensors to moving air masses, manufacturing 
and transport, vegetation and animal bodies, temperature gradients and 
topography, economic inequality and real estate, as well as policy and 
modeling, a number of factors converge in the project of experiencing 
and experimenting with sensing air pollution. Which of these processual 
entities are more or less evident in monitoring the air? What does the air 
(and ‘the environment’) become through monitoring devices, and what 
are its materializations and experiences? What are the relationships, 
political engagements, and ways of mobilizing data that make for the 
most a/effective environmental practices? And if monitoring and citizen 
sensing are emerging as new modes of environmental participation, in what 
ways do these experiments further enable practices for engaging with and 
addressing air pollution, and for speculating with environmental objects 
and environmental politics?
Citizen science, citizen sensing, and doing science differently
The current range of citizen-sensing projects can be perceived to draw on 
a longer history of environmental practice in the form of citizen science. 
Amateurs’ monitoring of their environment, for instance, have in the past 
contributed to the emergence of natural history, while more contemporary 
attempts have informed the rise of popular environmentalist movements 
and the public’s current engagement in environmental matters of scientif ic 
and political controversy. Science and technology studies (STS) focused 
on citizen science—environmental and otherwise—have, in many cases, 
analyzed how public engagement with science is variously organized to 
influence the ways in which the public can be constituted as entities able 
to participate in environmental politics (Irwin and Michael 2003). Amateur 
natural histories, biodiversity monitoring projects and toxic waste events 
have been among the citizen-science and public engagements studied by 
STS researchers (Wynne 1996). In these studies, citizen science and public 
engagement with science emerge not as easy f ixes to making science more 
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democratic, but rather as particular expressions of environmental politics, 
citizenship, and matters of concern.
Citizen science—and sensing—can be seen as both an augmentation 
to science, as well as an expanded way of practicing science in relation to 
pedagogical and political aims (Jasanoff 2003). Many current scientif ic 
initiatives suggest that the observation and monitoring of earth processes 
remains one of the core areas for advancing scientif ic understanding of 
environmental change. At the same time, environmental monitoring projects 
often seek to f ind ways to broaden the scope of environmental observation 
beyond the sciences exclusively, and to make ecological observation more 
accessible and engaging to a diverse range of participants. The process of 
gathering and making these observations more participatory is often seen 
as a way to overcome the relative crisis of environmental engagement in 
political and cultural spheres: by making environmental change more 
evident and distributed across sensing subjects, environmental action may 
also be facilitated.
There is extensive literature discussing citizen engagement in monitor-
ing air pollution, although often at the level of how the public responds 
to or engages with scientif ic f indings, and not as practitioners of science 
themselves (e.g. Bickerstaff and Walker 2003; Whitehead 2009). Yet, at the 
same time, analyses of participatory and environmental-justice-focused 
engagement with air pollution have discussed the many and even non-
computational ways in which air samples may be collected in order to inform 
environmental science and politics. The Louisiana Bucket Brigade is an 
environmental activist group that Gwen Ottinger discusses as engaging in 
a DIY-bucket collection method of monitoring air quality in a neighborhood 
adjacent to oil and gas ref ineries located in a region referred to as “Cancer 
Alley” in a part of the United States with particularly high rates of cancer 
(Ottinger 2010). While the bucket becomes a device for collecting air samples 
in a more democratic and local way, the analysis of the air samples must 
still take place in laboratories (similar to the diffusion tube air analysis) 
that are not sites of citizen engagement. The project presents a low-tech 
way of conducting a version of citizen science, which is largely focused on 
environmental activism and justice.
From citizen science to participatory sensing, crowd-sourcing, civic 
science, DIY media, and citizen sensing, a number of terms have emerged 
to describe these widespread practices of environmental monitoring and 
data gathering that work in various ways to democratize technoscientif ic 
tools and our understanding of the environment. While these terms are 
used in different ways to stress the scientif ic, big data, or civic aspects 
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of these practices, in this chapter I work with the term citizen sensing 
in order to draw explicit attention to the ways in which computational 
and mobile practices of environmental monitoring might be discussed as 
modes of citizen sensing, specif ically. Citizen-science projects, I suggest, are 
increasingly transforming into citizen-sensing projects, where digital devices 
equipped with sensors are used to monitor environments and gather data.
Practices of monitoring and sensing environments that were once the 
focus of scientif ic disciplines have migrated to a number of everyday par-
ticipatory applications, where users of smart phones and networked devices 
are able to track, study, and report on their environments. Citizen sensing, 
as I am defining the practice here, encompasses or refers to those sensing 
activities that often use computational sensing technologies in the form 
of smart phones, mobile and low-cost electronic devices such as Arduino, 
Nanode and Raspberry Pi, and platforms to report and potentially act on 
environmental events.2 Such distribution of sensing capabilities across sensor 
networks and multiple mobile and individualized platforms, have arguably 
become a focused site for environmental and technological engagement. 
Citizen-sensing projects are closely related to citizen-science studies, but 
differ in how they seek to enable environmental practice through direct 
engagement with environmental monitoring technologies, rather than as 
necessarily f iltered through engagement with experts. The citizen-sensing 
applications that strongly resemble citizen science projects most often are 
based on similar practices of individuals voluntarily tracking and monitoring 
environmental data related to everything from pollution to biodiversity 
counts. Citizen-sensing practices have been described at times as making 
inventive contributions to both the research and development of technologi-
cal tools and to the varing methods of environmental monitoring (Burke et 
al. 2006). These practices range from undertakings that address the ways in 
which microsensor data may complement other environmental observations, 
including remote sensing in order to provide more complete pictures of 
environmental issues, as well as ubiquitous-computing approaches that 
often focus on the capacities and practices of sensor technologies. These 
2 The most commonly referenced platform for environmental data is one that has been in 
continual transformation. First taking the form of Pachube, as developed by Usman Haque, 
this platform was subsequently developed as a quasi-open yet commercially based structure 
in the form of Cosm, as has now become a more commercial and subscription-led platform 
rebranded as Xively. The development and migration of this platform from an open community 
to a commercial enterprise is a topic that could be researched and analyzed at length. However 
there is no room in this paper to deal with this parallel development in how environmental 
sense data may actually be aggregated, presented, and made accessible in an online format.
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practices can also include social or civic media projects that emphasize the 
ways in which social networking can mobilize collected data in new ways 
to effect policy and mobilization.
Sometimes mobile sensor technologies have enabled more thorough 
practices of environmental monitoring and observation than those 
already being conducted by citizen-science initiatives, as in counting 
and tagging biological activities. In other cases, the capacities of mobile 
sensor technologies have enabled more distributed and potentially more 
accurate collection of data, such as urban air or noise pollution. Some 
applications extend the scope of citizen sensing to encompass not just 
microsensor data and the use of smart phones, but also draw on remote 
sensing and mapping to enable the tracking of deforestation or animal 
movements. In still other instances, these mobile sensor applications 
have enabled new forms of democratic organization and communication 
about environmental issues by effectively crowd-sourcing environmental 
observations in order to inform environmental policy and action. What 
emerges in this diverse set of practices that are in many ways connected 
to citizen science is a set of proposals for democratizing environmental 
engagement and developing other ways of doing environmental science 
and politics.
Many of the claims for citizen sensing are arguably still in the realm of 
proposals and experiments, where the hope is that distributed capacities 
of computational sensors will enable increased civic engagement with 
environmental issues. But in what ways do citizen-sensing engagements 
influence the modes of environmental participation that emerge? And 
what does it mean to ‘sense’ or experience air pollution with computational 
sensors? While the impacts of air pollution on human health are one of 
the key motivators for establishing quality standards, often the means 
of monitoring and enforcing these standards misses the more localized 
pollution experienced by people who actually live in urban areas affected 
by these events. Environmental health and individual health are bound up 
in articulations of what does and does not count as a ‘pollution episode.’ 
Strategies for monitoring pollution at the citizen or individual level are seen 
as a way to counter or redress the possible gaps in data, but there is more to 
these projects than this, since in mobilizing sensors to bring environmental 
monitoring into a more democratic set of engagements new material-political 
actors, engagements, and experiments emerge—along with new political 
possibilities and controversies.
Sensing technologies are entangled with and mobilize new environ-
mental monitoring practices and new ways of gathering data. But, the 
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other more primary reason for engaging with these practices as citizen 
sensing practices, is to draw out the ways in which computational devices 
are at once sensing and actuating technologies, as well as modes for sens-
ing and experiencing environments. In this sense, citizen science and 
citizen sensing may have similar objectives in observing and monitoring 
environments, but they unfold through very different material entangle-
ments and relationalities, ways of practicing and generating data, and in 
their articulation of what counts as environmental politics. The modes 
of engagement and spaces through which data is gathered, analyzed, and 
communicated are key aspects to the emergence of these environmental 
modes of practice. Citizen-sensing projects are frequently described as 
data campaigns, or as identifying an issue about which more data may 
be needed in order to effect policy changes. As numerous STS researchers 
have noted, however, data are always embedded within political practices, 
structures and institutions that inform everything from how data are 
delineated and collected, to how they are joined up, communicated and 
acted upon (e.g. Bowker 2005). It is these practices of data gathering as 
characteristic of environmental monitoring and engagement that I will 
focus on for the remainder of this chapter by looking at three projects that 
engage specif ically with computational modes of sensing environments 
in order to gather data and inform environmental action. I am interested 
in f inding out what relations, practices, and political possibilities emerge 
from these distinct mobilizations of environmental data.
Dogs, pigeons, and eggs: Creaturing data
In many ways, pollution monitoring has been a key initiator for creative prac-
tice and creative computing projects engaged in gathering environmental 
data. Area’s Immediate Reading, Pigeon Blog, Common Sense, Street Sweepers, 
Feral Robotic Dogs, Air Quality Egg, and others, are various scientif ic and 
environmental monitoring projects that have different actors, arrange-
ments, tools, and spaces where the readings are conducted. At the same 
time, in pollution monitoring projects, the gathering of sense data is often 
closely tied to affecting and effecting political action and environmental 
change, by addressing how data is collected, generated, and acted upon. 
Yet, in each of these projects environmental sense data emerges not as 
a universal category or form, but as a concrete entity that is a part of the 
process of participating in environments. “The actual world is a process,” 
as Whitehead writes, and this “process is the becoming of actual entities. 
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Thus actual entities are creatures; they are also termed ‘actual occasions’” 
(1929, 22). Actual occasions are living creatures, or lively meetings of entities 
that concretize routes in and through events. In this sense, the gathering 
of data might be identif ied as more than a static fact that documents air 
quality at any given time or place, and instead be approached as a practice 
that gives rise to particular entities that further generate concrete worlds. 
These entities are “creatures” that form and are formed by processes—here 
through practices of gathering environmental data.
Working with this Whitehead-inspired analysis of how the specific entities 
of environmental data emerge through sensing, I suggest that environmental 
sensing projects are creaturing processes, where the entities that emerge 
are continuous with specif ic situations and modalities of participation. The 
projects I discuss below engage in the creaturing of data in a double sense, 
however, since they also deploy more-than-human participants, including 
robotic dogs, homing pigeons, and plastic eggs, as concrete entities for draw-
ing together citizen-sensing practices. Data, in this sense, are not an abstract 
store of information or something to be coherently visualized, but rather are 
bound up with the making of actual occasions and material processes. Data 
may typically appear to be the primary objective of environmental sensing 
projects, which focus on obtaining data in order to influence environmental 
policy and practices, but along the way the relations and material arrange-
ments that data gathering sets in place begin to creature (and in the process, 
materialize) new entities and societies of objects that emerge through these 
practices. By turning to the creaturing and materializing of data, I consider 
in the projects that follow how data mobilize or underwrite environmental 
practices, while at the same time often failing to materialize in the ways 
anticipated which generates participatory arrangements that are different 
than those intended. The failure of environmental sense data to perform as 
an easy spur to environmental action, it turns out, can even be a key way 
in which the creaturely aspects of data emerge. Data unfold less through 
instrumental or even epistemic registers, arguably, and more as affective and 
materialized attractors for experimenting with environmental citizenship.
Dogs
One of the earliest creative practice projects to engage with environmental 
sensing, Feral Robotic Dogs, was originally developed by Natalie Jeremijenko in 
2002 and advanced with additional versions and deployments through 2006. 
The project adapted existing Sony Aibo toy dogs by upgrading them with 
all-terrain bodies, and environmental-sensing brains and noses. Ready-made 
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robotic toy dogs with pre-programmed tasks were identified as having more 
interesting potential use: these are creatures that so to speak await further 
instructions. The f irst generation ‘gamma dog’ was designed to store and 
transmit environmental data from any radioactive source that exceeds EPA 
thresholds. It was anticipated that the deployment of these dogs in multiples 
could “provide informational spectacle and conclusive on-data convergence 
in a given local area” (Bureau of Inverse Technology n.d.). During its develop-
ment, these semi-autonomous gadgets were rerouted to ‘sniffer’ dog mode by 
fitting them with environmental sensors capable of detecting environmental 
pollutants including volatile organic compounds, carbon monoxide and 
methane, while at the same time providing general indications of air quality.
A number of deployments for the dogs were then arranged at sites likely 
to be polluted, including a former gas plant at East 173rd Street Works at 
the Bronx River in New York, where the dogs scouted for volatile organic 
solvents and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons; and at Baldwin Park in 
Orlando, Florida, where the robot dogs were deployed to search for volatile 
organic compounds at ‘sites of community interest,’ including a former 
landfill site that was a proposed site for a new middle school. This Florida 
deployment specif ically sought to:
provide an opportunity for evidence driven discussion of the environ-
mental issues facing the community, and the opportunity to coordinate 
diverse opinions and interpretations of the phenomena at hand. Because 
the dog’s space-f illing logic emulates a familiar behavior, i.e. “sniff ing 
something out,” anyone can participate and try to make sense of this 
data in real time without necessarily having the technical or scientif ic 
training usually required to interpret data from other sources on the 
same phenomena. It has the potential to raise the standards of evidence 
involved, promote diverse valid interpretations involved in complex 
environmental and political processes. (Jeremijenko n.d.-b)
Environmental data was to be obtained by the dog’s movements since they 
were designed to map pollutants by moving toward them and sniff ing them 
out. This is one way of rendering environmental data more perceptible, and 
more spectacular, while also changing the possibilities of who can generate 
and access data, as well as who has the evidence necessary and means 
for contributing to environmental and political debates. Inevitably, the 
process of monitoring pollutants here and in the projects discussed below 
is bound up with available sensors that are able to measure specif ic gases. 
Such versions of data-led environmental citizenship become tied to prior 
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investments in developing sensors with specif ic technical capacities, often 
for industrial or scientif ic uses.
While discussing this project, the group of artists and technologists that 
came together to work on the project suggested that robotics, environmental 
sensing, and mapping could propel activism in new ways to different types 
of engagements, where both gathering data and creative exploration with 
environmental monitoring might generate renewed engagements with local 
environments (Lane et al. 2006). Here is a sensing project that is speculating 
about the possibility for participatory and even citizen-based data collection 
that intends to create what Benjamin Bratton and Natalie Jeremijenko have 
elsewhere called “shorter circuits” between environmental information and 
the observers of that information (Bratton and Jeremijenko 2008). With the 
collection of environmental data, it is expected that a more immediate and 
accountable mode of environmental action may also be possible.
Yet, this direct connection between data and action is not necessarily 
automatic, and in many ways draws on a presupposed efficacy that scientific 
data are assumed to have in the world. The ways in which climate change 
data, for instance, fails to have an immediate effect on political action may 
give rise to speculation about whether data necessarily constitute incontro-
vertible evidence which can be used to inform and change environmental 
politics. The failure of data to lead to environmental action may, on one 
level, have to do with the assumed force of a scientif ically evidenced and 
‘rational’ argument, where decisions made in relation to environmental 
matters of concern are suffused with competing political interests. Yet, on 
another level, the ways in which data in and of themselves are meant to 
be—and yet may also fail to be—compelling may raise questions about the 
affective registers of data. Is a robotic dog a more affective and effective 
data-creature than a spreadsheet or bar chart? The point here is not to set 
up a false dichotomy between these data forms, but rather to ask about the 
ways in which the creaturing and materializing of data may be one way to 
experiment with the modes and practices of environmental citizenship. In 
these creaturely arrangements of dogs, pigeons, and eggs, new distributions 
of participation environmental data and political action may even emerge, 
but the ways in which this participation informs environmental debate 
remains an open question that continues to be explored and taken up in 
subsequent environmental and citizen-sensing projects.
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Pigeons
If the Feral Robotic Dogs project deployed air-sensing technologies through a 
robotic toy to make new technical modalities of environmental monitoring 
more widely available, the Pigeon Blog project raises the question of how 
air quality sensing shifts even further when pigeons are the reporters and 
carriers of sensing equipment. Pigeon Blog, developed by Beatriz da Costa 
with Cina Hazegh and Kevin Ponto in 2006, is a project that used sensor 
backpacks f itted to homing pigeons to collect low-attitude air quality 
readings while the pigeons f lew through the frequently polluted skies of 
Southern California. The sensor backpacks consisted of a combined GPS 
receiver that provided latitude, longitude, and altitude readings, a dual 
automotive carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide sensor, a temperature 
sensor, and a purpose-built mobile phone for transmitting text messages. The 
backpack kit was developed as a miniature unit small enough to be carried 
by the pigeons, so that real-time air quality data could be transmitted and 
visualized as pollution levels on the Pigeon Blog and within a Google Map 
visualization (da Costa 2006, 2008).
Situated in Southern California and initially developed in Los Angeles, the 
project addressed the ongoing problem of air pollution and environmental 
justice by developing an open-source sensing kit that could be used for 
“grassroots scientif ic data gathering” (da Costa 2006). The Pigeon Blog 
project specifically responded to the limited number of f ixed air monitoring 
stations that are focused on generating long-term average data about air 
quality, and which may not necessarily be located in areas of the highest 
pollution episodes. By increasing the number of local measurements and 
data about local exposures, the Pigeon Blog project sought to complement, 
if not challenge, existing data on air pollution by looking at the distribution 
of pollution at a f iner and more inhabited level. This approach was shared 
with Area’s Immediate Reading, or A.I.R., a 2006 Preemptive Media project 
(briefly mentioned in the introduction to this chapter), in which da Costa 
collaborated along with Brooke Singer and Jamie Schulte. Consisting of port-
able air monitors, A.I.R. enabled urban dwellers to complement coarser and 
f ixed air-quality data by collecting local data through individual journeys 
(Preemptive Media 2006). Equipped with GPS and coordinated to a database 
of known pollution sources, the air monitor senses carbon monoxide (CO), 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), and ground level Ozone (O3) at distinct locations, 
and provides real-time visualizations of air pollution levels in relation to 
an (EPA) air quality index. By making individual maps of urban air pollu-
tion exposure, urban dwellers could become more aware and engaged in 
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discussing environmental issues through everyday exposure, individual 
risk, and neighborhood-level mapping.
In both Pigeon Blog and A.I.R., citizen sensing is presented as an activist 
project of sorts, yet this is not the usual approach to environmental politics 
that most often develops in relation to issues such as urban air quality. By 
specif ically enrolling pigeons into the project of sensing air, the Pigeon Blog 
project questions how to develop a mode of “interspecies co-production in 
the pursuit of resistant action” (da Costa 2008, 377). The pigeons were sent 
out as ‘reporters’ to draw attention to the issue of air pollution, while at the 
same time providing inventive and more accessible ways of gathering data in 
order to provoke new possibilities of political action. Pigeons participated in 
this project in multiple ways. Pigeons are not only creatures with particular 
navigational abilities that often fly according to major landscape features 
such as highways, but they are also a pervasive bird (if often reviled) in 
urban areas. Moreover, most pigeons have a close proximity to polluted 
urban areas, and may provide a specif ic view of low-altitude air pollution in 
areas of high traff ic. Further, pigeons can act as biosensors making distinct 
urban experiences available through proxy modes of sensing so we can 
obtain more insight into our environment.
Pigeons can also be seen to be key contributors to creaturing data and 
environmental participation in ways that move beyond the usual space 
of environmental activism. Da Costa makes the point that projects such 
as Pigeon Blog generate new capacities for engaging with environmental 
information and for mobilizing participation that are not exclusively focused 
on “how bad things are” (2008, 379). While the project initially set out to 
provide alternative datasets that might be more widely gathered to add to 
the expert approaches to environmental monitoring, in many ways this 
objective was not achieved. Long-term or even complementary datasets were 
not generated from the project, and this anticipated outcome even became 
somewhat incompatible with the project’s attempt to experiment with 
new modes of environmental practice and participation. Instead, the most 
enduring contribution made by Pigeon Blog was its method of experimenting 
with urban, technological, and more-than-human entities that were to 
become part of the project of sensing, experiencing, and reporting on air 
quality. It may be that, while this approach began with a focus on data 
about air quality, it arrives with a wider approach to environmental practice 
that is less exclusively data-driven, and is more attentive to the expanded, 
even ecological, modalities of citizenship that might emerge with such a 
distributed approach to sensing environments (Braidotti 2006; Gabrys 2012).
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Eggs
As early experiments into environmental sensing, Feral Robotic Dogs and 
Pigeon Blog test ways in which new and distributed modes of participation 
among human and more-than-human modalities can shift the possibilities 
for political engagement in air quality. These projects continue to inform 
current citizen-sensing projects, which have only proliferated in the past 
few years because of the increasing availability and affordability of sensor 
technologies. Air Quality Egg is another project in this area that seeks to con-
nect maker communities developing digital devices that will enable citizen 
sensing of air quality (Wicked Device n.d.). Developed as a ‘community-led’ 
project, where the community is largely comprised of creative technologists 
located in New York, London, and Amsterdam, the egg project consists of a 
Nanode sensing platform that detects carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide 
that the project participants identify as key air pollutants. The air-sensing 
apparatus is housed in a rapid-prototyped egg-shaped shell that was f irst 
tested at the second Citizen Cyberscience Summit in London in 2012. The 
project has subsequently earned considerable backing on Kickstarter. The 
project website indicates that the eggs are primarily located in the United 
States, Europe, Australia, and Japan, and gather various measurements that 
are uploaded to a Xively data platform.
While the Air Quality Egg project is ostensibly focused on air quality 
monitoring, its origin stems from technical communities that are highly 
motivated to experiment with the kit of sensing devices, or to engage in what 
has been referred to as ‘participatory sensing’ experiments by bringing the 
functionalities of sensors to more explicit points of encounter (DiSalvo et 
al. 2012). At the same time, there are many questions that arise as to how 
these devices perform, and the extent to which the data they generate are 
accurate. Concerns about the Air Quality Egg project have led to a heated 
debate about how viable it is to monitor air quality accurately given the 
scale and coarse instrumentation of these technologies, and whether the 
sensors were even accurately calibrated. To what extent are egg-gathered 
data useful and accurate? And what if the egg fails to even function in the 
f irst place (as was the case in several of the prototyping workshops)?
In a project video, however, commentators on the project suggest that 
accuracy of data was not the primary concern, since sense data may provoke 
environmental concerns that could always be followed up with more thor-
oughly scientif ic studies. Here, they argue, the focus was on the community 
of egg users and developers inclined toward testing devices that may create 
further calls to action, even if the links between the local, sporadic, and 
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somewhat momentary datasets and informing environmental science, policy, 
and behavior were not always clear. At one point in the project video, which 
captured the testing of the egg during the London Cyberscience event in 
spring 2012, a participant remarked, “the chicken is not ready,” referring to 
the back-and-forth attempts to have the egg set-up, calibrated and ready 
to gather measurements.
In the context of creaturely data, this project seems to be an entity 
in formation where a sensor-led technical kit is the egg-like impetus for 
galvanizing and drawing together environmental issues and action. The 
environments that emerge here are highly informed by computational 
modes of sensing and acting. Data gathered through electronic sensing is 
seen to be the force that propels perceived possibilities for activism, but 
here the force of data depends less on the accuracy of data and more on 
the process of making a device that can draw attention to data practices 
as materialized and potentially political engagements. Data is creatured 
in the Air Quality Egg as a data-generating device ready to hatch and 
give rise to new modalities of data-driven activism. Yet, it can be argued 
that the modes of participating in making devices and generating data 
are very different entities and occasions than modes of participating in 
environmental activism, which in the case of the egg may be a legitimating 
subtext, but which is not the primary focus in this tech-led approach to 
participation.
Conclusion: Experimenting with environmental citizenship
The three projects discussed here share a similar approach to environmental 
sensing by pursuing more democratic engagements of data gathering in 
order to inform environmental politics. Yet beyond these similarities, very 
different entities and modalities of citizenship come together in these 
projects. The Feral Robotic Dogs project tests specific deployments in landfills 
and the proposed site of a new middle school, making the point that from 
these specif ic sites, new communities of interest might emerge to influence 
environmental debate. Dealing with data is rendered as a more haptic and 
materialized experience, something demonstrated through a fleet of sniffing 
robotic dogs. The Pigeon Blog seeks to make urban air quality visible through 
a more-than-human engagement, which at once redistributes environmental 
participation while adopting a more experimental approach to sensing urban 
environments. And the Air Quality Egg focuses on developing an Internet 
of Things approach to creating a worldwide sensor network, where new 
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devices and the data they generate are seen to lead to new possibilities for 
participation and the formation of communities.
Yet with each of these projects, the transition from environmental sensing 
experiment to citizen-based engagement in environmental issues remains 
unclear. There are multiple issues that emerge with more grassroots modes 
of environmental monitoring. As the London Air Quality Network points out, 
monitoring air quality on a DIY-level may not be as easy as it f irst appears 
due to the expense of precisely instrumented sensors, and the questions 
of accuracy that pertain to sensing projects that use less ref ined sensing 
equipment, or that are not set-up in a systematic way to study environments 
over time. The dogs, pigeons, and eggs of these projects are not gathering 
data with the required rigor of a scientif ic study, but they are making a case 
for the development of complementary data sets that influence what is 
monitored and how it is brought to our attention in order to be acted upon.
At this level of action, additional questions emerge as to how environmen-
tal sense data may inform environmental politics and actions. In an earlier 
human-computer interaction research project, Common Sense, which tested 
the deployment of sensors for measuring air quality on street sweepers, the 
project participants concluded that environmental community organization 
is actually the most critical factor in order for data generated through sensor 
deployments to be relevant, meaningful and actionable (Aoki et al. 2008). In 
some cases, community environmental organizations have been shown to 
be rather skeptical about the extent in which more data from computational 
sensors will necessarily facilitate more effective action. In this way, some 
researchers question whether more localized and data-led processes of 
environmental observation and monitoring actually do enable greater 
environmental participation.
While environmental sense data gathered without a clear link to com-
munity projects may not have the anticipated a/effects of facilitating 
greater participation in environmental matters of concern, these projects 
do experiment with the methods, techniques, communities, modes of 
participation, sites of monitoring, and evidential modes of activism and 
politics that might emerge as new entities and processes for engaging with 
environments and environmental issues. These experiments with affectivity, 
effectiveness and practice make space—as well as contribute to further 
controversies—regarding different approaches to environmental politics 
and participation that might be investigated further. Data as typically 
conceived may not be the critical unit for mobilizing environmental citizen-
ship and action, and a gadget-led process for engaging with politics may not 
be the most def initive answer to developing new modes of environmental 
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engagement. However, these citizen-sensing projects raise the question of 
what other experiments might emerge that open up the possibility for new 
types of environmental politics, and new modes of collective participation 
(Gabrys and Yusoff 2012). Within this space, the modes and practices of 
data—the creaturely entities in and through which data manifest and give 
rise to worlds—are arguably an area yet to be fully explored, since data are 
so frequently presented as the dematerialized evidence of environmental 
fact. But the modalities, materialities, and creatures of data may be one 
way of experimenting with the ways in which monitoring practices might 
establish new sites of environmental engagement, where affectivity might 
be one way to reconsider the effectiveness of data.
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10. Biohacking: Playing with technology
Stephanie de Smale
Abstract
This chapter examines the process of image production by open-source 
microscopes from the perspective of play. The question what happens 
to images when microscopes move from the lab to open-source hacker 
spaces is probed by deconstructing the material layers of its production. 
Politically motivated to democratize science, open-source translations 
transform the use and function of biotechnology. And while the process 
of translation may compromise microscopes’ scientif ic capability, they 
gain in value from experimentation by artists and citizens. As a result, 
playing with biotechnology is an educative and creative exploration of the 
use and construction of scientif ic instruments, where the multi-layered 
process of making an image becomes observable to the naked eye.
Keywords: Hacking, biotechnology, citizen science, open source, material-
ity, objectivity
On 8 October 2013, a group of artists, activists, and scientists gathered 
at the Waag Society in Amsterdam to discuss the relationship between 
biotechnology, the life sciences, art, and hacking (G-netwerk 2013). A central 
topic of this evening was biohacking, an emerging term that is used to 
describe activities that aid in the democratization of science, such as hacking 
laboratory equipment to create open source equivalents. Biohacking tries to 
take science out of the lab (Delfanti 2012, 163). It is practiced in garages, open 
hacker spaces, or ‘open wet labs,’ and is facilitated through the production 
of low cost laboratory equipment based on open source hardware (OSHW). 
From a biohacker’s perspective, these technologies emancipate science by 
enabling the production of data and knowledge by non-professionals in the 
public realm (Delfanti 2012; Kera and Dusseiller 2012). A prominent example 
of this is the open source do-it-yourself (DIY) microscope developed by 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
doi: 10.5117/9789462984523/ch10
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platform Hackteria.org. Users are free to create and adapt the design of 
these microscopes, and to produce data by creating images in any way they 
see f it. The appropriation of the microscope and the claim that biohacking 
is a counter-practice in the production of knowledge, makes it necessary 
to take a closer look at the production process of scientif ic images. Many 
scholars have written extensively about the role of microscopic images in 
scientif ic research (Knorr-Cetina and Amann 1990; Wise 2006; Daston and 
Galison 2007). Underlying their work is an oscillation between objectivity 
and subjectivity in scientific knowledge production, which has changed with 
the introduction of digital technology in (microscopic) image production. 
Digital scientif ic images are interactive and can be used, cropped, cut, and 
colored. The image is not f ixed, but a result of the complex interrelation 
between producer, technology, and context.
Science historians Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2007, 382) recognize 
the introduction of digital image production as a shift from representation 
to presentation, “[i]mages in which the making is the seeing.” Historian 
Norton Wise expresses a similar idea that visualization in science is not an 
illustration, but an argument (2006, 81). The microscope has been around for 
a while, but what does the appropriation of this device in different contexts, 
such as an open wetlab, do to scientific image production? Changing environ-
ments and settings can leave room for other, more playful encounters with 
(bio)technologies. This is also strongly associated with practices in citizen 
science projects that stimulate citizens to collect large amounts data for 
research projects. One example is the game Binary Fission (Verigames 2015), 
a puzzle game where users aid in testing the validity of algorithms. Using 
a microscopic perspective as a scientif ic backdrop for the game, the player 
works toward the formation of parts by moving them around. Both projects 
aim to involve citizens in knowledge production, but how do citizen science 
and biohacking relate to each other? Zooming in at biohacking in particular 
raises interesting questions about the cultural value vis-à-vis the scientif ic 
value of hacked lab equipment.
This chapter examines the process of image production in the DIY micro-
scope from the perspective of play. Play is not tied to a particular activity, 
such as a game, but is brought out by a complex interrelation between 
people and their interactions with an object. It is an expression of creativity, 
which can be rebellious, political, and often goes against the grain. Indeed, 
as some scholars argue, play appropriates, distorts, and performs (Sicart 
2014). Through the lens of play, I address the question of what happens 
to the production and appropriation of images when microscopes move 
from the lab to open source hacker spaces. The playful production and 
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appropriation of Hackteria’s DIY microscope serves as my main case study. 
Framing digitally distributed scientif ic images as objects in their own right 
brings attention to how they are made. Central to this argument is the text 
Objectivity (2007) by Daston and Galison, where scientif ic images are pre-
sented as tools that are interrelated with the producer and practice. Digital 
art and software scholar Ann-Sophie Lehmann asserts something similar 
by arguing that shaping the digital image is a craft with multiple layers of 
materiality (2012, 169). By materiality, I refer to both the physical materials, 
and social processes that shape the image. Using a similar approach as 
Lehmann, I conduct a material object analysis to uncover the material 
layers in the production of a DIY microscope. These layers constitute the 
process of encoding and decoding the microscope, such as the creation of 
prototypes, or digital schemata. Studying the translation of the microscope 
into the DIY microscope, I focus on the relationship between hacking as a 
playful practice and a process of creating knowledge.
First, by placing microscopic image production in the context of digital 
manipulation, I will analyze the relationship between microscopic image 
production and the notion of objectivity. Although this concept is highly 
contestable, it remains one of the pillars of modern science. Furthermore, 
by addressing how the producer, image, and practice are interrelated, I 
argue that this also creates space for a diversion of scientif ic practices. 
In the second section, I examine biohacking and the production of DIY 
microscopes to address the type of knowledge production afforded through 
the process of hacking and making. A citizen science game and biohacking 
are two different playful appropriations of science. The former is a game 
where the player collects data for the game’s producers, the latter is an 
example of knowledge production through play as an iterative explora-
tive process. Analyzing the production of the DIY microscope highlights 
how it is framed as an epistemic tool, where every translation or layer of 
materiality affects its message. In turn, the playful appropriation of the 
microscope shifts its epistemic message. Indeed, as the production process 
becomes an important part of the DIY microscope, the images tend to 
gain in cultural and educational value what they might lose in scientif ic 
appropriation. Furthermore, the context of play affords a specif ic form 
of knowledge production. This allows me to illustrate how play is f irmly 
connected to hacker practices, and that biohacking is a critical product of 
playful experiments to liberate science.
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Bringing science out of the lab
Dividing this section into three parts, I focus first on the function of scientific 
images and microscopic image production in providing objective knowledge. 
This allows me to highlight the paradox of modern microscopic image 
production as both a symbolic function of objectivity, and a tool for digital 
manipulation in the second part. The ability to capture and manipulate 
images digitally invites scientists to play around with the aesthetics of their 
images, extending the function of these images to the cultural realm. As I 
will discuss in the third part, this extension also works the other way around, 
as citizen science games contribute to knowledge production through play.
Function and manipulation of scientific images
How does contemporary image practice affect the notion of objectivity in 
science? This question draws attention toward the function of image produc-
tion in scientif ic research. Throughout scientif ic history, instruments have 
been considered an objective tool in visualizing nature. The invention of the 
microscope not only opened up a whole world of biology once hidden from 
the eye, but was used as a tool to observe nature on a micro scale through an 
objective lens. Its function is both constitutive and symbolic, as instruments 
like microscopy served as “a means to and a symbol of mechanical objectiv-
ity” (Daston and Galison 2007, 139). With the microscope as an objective 
mediator, scientists tried to eliminate the subject. The epistemic message 
of the microscope is a tool for creating objective knowledge. Today, more 
involvement and subjectivity of scientists in microscopic image production 
is common practice. Using software programs to correct, to crop, or to alter 
images is a commonplace. For instance, color is often added in order to 
highlight specif ic elements of an image. Objectivity can be defined as “the 
suppression of some aspect of the self, the countering of subjectivity” (Ibid., 
36). Throughout history different instruments require a different level of 
suppression and attitude toward suppressing the self.
In modern science such as nanotechnology, scientists can manipulate 
their sample on a micro scale. Nanotechnology is the manipulation of matter 
on the scale of atoms and molecules. The microscope becomes the hammer 
where the scientist sculpts the image into form: “With clicks and keystrokes, 
these digital images are meant to be used, cut, correlated, rotated, colored” 
(Ibid., 383, emphasis added). The image can be altered at multiple levels. 
Daston and Galison separate the practice of manipulation into virtual 
images and haptic images. Virtual images are a presentation of nature that 
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are stored as a data set in image galleries and can be modeled after creation. 
Haptic images are a presentation of nature that is modified before the image 
is taken. Tools that afford the creation of both virtual and haptic images are 
microscopes like the scanning tunneling microscope (STM), or the scanning 
electron microscope (SEM). These microscopes can change the specimen 
under the microscope at an atomic and molecular level: “[T]he same device 
was used at one and the same time to image and to alter” (Ibid., 402). The 
STM captures atoms by tunneling signals in high vacuums, such as water. For 
a sample to be analyzed by the SEM, it needs to be plated in specif ic types 
of metal, for instance gold. This limits the type of specimens that can be 
analyzed, but does afford the scientist the ability of manipulation on a nano 
scale. As illustrated in the previous section, the affordance of the microscope 
is both influencing in, and influenced by scientif ic practice. The function 
and use of the microscope allow for manipulation of the image beforehand 
and after. Here, we see how the notion of objectivity is problematized, as 
data are manipulated on multiple levels. How can it still be classif ied as 
‘objective’ when specimens are manipulated? A partial explanation lies in 
the materialization of microscopic images in different (scientif ic) contexts.
Materialization of the image
The subjectivity of digital scientif ic images is hidden under the cloak of 
mechanical objectivity. Sociologists Karin Knorr-Cetina and Klaus Amann 
dissect the constructed nature of images in scientif ic research, and argue 
“images are not just taken, they are designed and made” (1990, 259). Different 
environments play a role in knowledge creation, namely “the domain of 
laboratory practice; the context of invisible physical reactions; the future 
image as it will appear in publication; and the domain of case precedents and 
reference” (Ibid.). The image can be both an object of knowledge creation, 
and an object used to illustrate an argument. Voicing a similar argument, 
media scholars Mirko Tobias Schäfer and Frank Kessler show that the notion 
of mechanical objectivity is also present in the computational power of the 
computer (2013, 14). Computational processes that create digital images are 
ambivalent, because these images can change in context and be turned 
into different arguments. The universality of the computer and its software 
materializes scientif ic images in variable contexts. Physical, mechanical, 
and electronic techniques in the creation and manipulation of images are 
translated into software programs that can edit images with the click of a 
mouse. These types of software share the same environment and start to 
interact, mutate, and create hybrids. Lev Manovich refers to this as media 
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hybridization. As he points out, “the unique properties and techniques of 
different media have become software elements that can be combined 
together in previously impossible ways” (Manovich 2013, 176). Considering 
the different techniques working together to create a scientif ic image, it 
becomes a hybrid product between the producer, their knowledge and 
intent, as well as the different materials with which it is made. For example, 
a scientist can use software programs—such as Photoshop—to alter images 
pixel for pixel, in the same way a designer does.1 When analyzing microscopic 
images, it becomes clear that media hybridization also influences identity 
expressions of the scientist.
Analyzing the oscillation of objectivity and subjectivity in microscopic 
image production, Galison recognizes the scientist’s self diverging into 
other expressions such as those of an artist (2010, 29). One example of 
this crossover is the Dutch microscopist Frans Holthuysen, who works as 
a researcher at Philips and makes images with a SEM-microscope for his 
research projects at the MiPlaza’s Technology Laboratories Group. The 
images produced by Holthuysen not only have their scientif ic purpose, they 
also have aesthetic value. For instance, he won second prize at the MNE 
micro and nano-graph contest. This contest selects the best micrography 
images submitted by not only scientists, but also artists. The microscopic 
images Holthuysen makes have often been published and displayed at 
different museums, such as the ‘design and the elastic mind’ exposition, 
held at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 2008 (Museum of Modern 
Art 2008). Holthuysen combines the ethos of a scientist and artist, playing 
around with his images in different contexts. The relationship between 
digital practice, microscopic image technology, and the producer’s intent 
creates room for a playful appropriation of images. Photoshop or other 
programs, invite scientists to play with their data and appropriate images. 
While the extent of manipulation differs depending on the context, it cannot 
be denied that the availability to alter and enhance the image changes the 
epistemic message of the image itself. The boundary between science and 
culture is blurred as images meant for scientif ic research travel outside the 
lab and find their way in to museums. This cultural appropriation also works 
the other way around, as citizens are increasingly invited to participate in 
scientif ic research.
1 Manipulating images for publications is a grey area in scientif ic research. An ongoing debate 
in scientif ic journals and magazines such as PLoS One or Nature, is concerned with the f ine line 
between what is considered as fraud, or the ‘beautif ication’ of scientif ic images (Gilbert 2009). 
In response, many of these journals have created guidelines for editing images.
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Rise of citizen science games
Digital technologies and the internet infrastructure stimulated the involve-
ment of amateurs and non-professionals in scientif ic research. Mobile 
and wireless technology has aided in the increase of non-professionals in 
the collection of data. This is stimulated by openness and collaboration, 
where interactions between users produce new insights about larger sets of 
scientific data. Henry Jenkins has dubbed this concept ‘participatory culture’: 
a culture with the presence of “artistic expression and civic engagement, 
strong support for creating and sharing one’s creations, and some type of 
informal mentorship” (Jenkins et al. 2006, 3). Citizen science is the practice 
of research by amateurs and non-professionals, who use decentralized 
communication and media to collect scientif ic data and produce new 
knowledge. Crowd-sourcing and open research seem to be central ideas 
to this development.
Play as an epistemological tool can be used to better understand the 
development of citizen science and its role in the scientif ic community. Play 
is both an activity and an attitude. As an activity, play is an expression, “a 
mode of being in the world” (Sicart 2014, 2). We play board games and digital 
games, but we also play with technologies such as a smartphone. Indeed, we 
also play with software and hardware. However, why do we play around with 
some objects and not with others? I argue that it has to do with the design of 
the object and conditions of its use. Play happens in contexts that afford that 
activity, and this is created not only through rules, but also through objects, 
situations, and spaces. In other words, “[p]lay is contextual” (Sicart 2014, 6). 
Citizen science, seen from the perspective of play, redefines what it means 
to do science. The traditional rules of engagement in scientif ic knowledge 
production are very closed, as only trained scholars are deemed suitable 
to collect and interpret data. However, in citizen science projects, which 
are based on data collection by non-professionals and amateurs, everybody 
can participate in the creation of knowledge. As illustrated below, there are 
different forms in which this takes place.
Within the boundaries set by the producers of the project, citizen scien-
tists are able to aid in the production of knowledge. This context lends itself 
to play, as the player is able to move around within a closed system. More 
recently, collecting scientif ic data has been transformed into games. One 
example of an organization avidly developing games is the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Crowd Sourced Formal Verif ication 
(CSFV) program, which has established VeriGames, a project to develop 
several citizen science games where players aid in collecting data by playing 
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games. One example is Binary Fission, a puzzle game where players are 
Fission Initiative Network (FIN) agents and have to separate blue particles 
from orange particles to create sets for further processing. Binary f ission is 
a biological process of division. For instance, the division of a cell into two 
cells, which can be analyzed under a microscope. Interestingly, although 
the representation of this microscopic process is visually presented to the 
player, it serves as mere decoration. For the game’s producers, the valuable 
knowledge lies in mining the player’s actions in the game. Behind this playful 
layer, algorithms are being tested for their correctness and the value of this 
application is the formal verif ication of software.
Binary Fission illustrates two critical issues concerning the role of citizens 
in citizen science projects. First, player agency and intent may provide 
different outcomes in the game. For instance, as a player in Binary Fission, 
I can decide that I want to play with different objectives. Instead of trying 
to separate the blue and yellow atoms, I can decide that I will try to pack as 
many atoms together, consequently changing the outcome. This agency of 
the user to play with the rules, problematizes data collection in the sense 
that it raises questions about the concept of validity. In the game, the player 
is not anonymous, since playing involves registration and the player has to 
sign in to play. As a consequence, the registered player/data collector could 
hypothetically be excluded from the study if he or she does not follow the 
rules. Although in some projects the collective wisdom of the crowd might 
eliminate the deviation of some data collectors, this process is not so easily 
traceable in other citizen science projects. Similar issues are raised by Glas 
and Lammes in Chapter 11 of this volume. Are citizen science projects only 
successful if the result can be quantif ied, measured, and validated? If so, 
then the future of this type of informal knowledge production will lead 
to homogenous projects for the ‘hard’ sciences. Therefore, we may need to 
come up with other types of data collection instead.
The second issue in citizen science projects like these is the political 
question of who benefits from the knowledge produced. In this particular 
example, the benef iciaries of the game are Verigames and DARPA, since 
the player is not actually aware of the results of his or her effort. It seems 
that the status quo of traditional scientif ic practice is not really disrupted. 
Instead, the player is used as a data-mining machine to generate small 
pieces of information. Just as we play around with toys, we play around 
with media. But toys, just as media, can be appropriated in different ways, 
and even be destroyed. Play is an appropriation of objects such as Binary 
Fission, or microscopes. As a result, play can be destructive, political, and 
serious. This is what scholar Mary Flanagan (2009) calls “critical play,” or 
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Miguel Sicart (2014) defines as “carnivalesque play.” This form of play “takes 
control of the world and gives it to the players for them to explore, challenge, 
or subvert. It exists; it is part of the world it turns upside down” (Sicart 2014, 
4). As I will illustrate later in this chapter, biohacking is a perfect example 
of this appropriation.
Citizen science projects and biohacking activities are both activities 
performed by non-professionals, artists, or citizens, but with a different 
mode of appropriation. While the intent of citizen science projects is to 
contribute to research experiments and contributors are expected to ‘follow 
the rules,’ biohacking is a bottom-up movement that is based upon subverting 
existing knowledge structures. When historian Johan Huizinga theorized 
the role of play in everyday life, he discerned between four different types 
of “players” (Raessens 2014, 106). These four types of users have different 
attitudes toward objects or events. First, there is the regular user who does 
not question the rules of the system and follows them blindly. Second, there 
is the cheater, who only “pretends to be playing the game” (Huizinga 1955, 
11). This is a player who does not play by the rules of the game and cheats in 
order to advance. This user is aware of the implicit and explicit rules. Third, 
there is the spoilsport, or the modder in modern terms, who modif ies the 
rules of the game if the system will afford it. Open source products afford 
this modularity, since users are able to remix and alter the work. Finally, 
there is the “outlaw, the revolutionary” (Ibid., 12). These users transcend 
the system by inserting new ideas and functions in the game, consequently 
altering the entire system. For a citizen science project to succeed, the game 
needs regular players that behave and play the game as it was intended. 
While games such as Binary Fission rely on players to follow the rules and 
try to discourage cheating, in biohacking, the user is invited to be an outlaw 
by hacking and modifying the system.
In summary, I have shown from a broader perspective the dual function 
of scientif ic images as a source of knowledge and of evidence. The examina-
tion of microscopic image production revealed that digital images can be 
shaped in any form or according to any illustrative argument. Even though 
manipulation is becoming more common in pre- and postproduction of 
the image, dissecting this image reveals the symbolic and functional role 
of objectivity. Play as both an activity and an attitude is instrumental in 
citizen science projects. However, different levels of playability illustrate that 
concepts like objectivity need to be redefined. Furthermore, the extent to 
which these projects emancipate science is questionable. In a way, biohacking 
is a response to this. In the next section, I will unpack where and how this 
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play takes place to illustrate how hacking lab equipment is a critical and 
playful appropriation of science.
Playfulness of hacking
In this section, I trace the process of decoding and encoding the microscope 
from the lab to the open hacker space and the attempt of biohacking to 
emancipate science from its institutional form. First, I trace the relationship 
between biohacking ideology and scientif ic knowledge production, which is 
illustrated by the act of hacking lab equipment. Then, I explore how hacking 
as a playful practice can be seen as a playful form of knowledge production. 
In the subsequent sub-sections, I trace hacking as a playful practice by 
closely analyzing Hackteria’s DIY microscope. Lastly, I illustrate how the 
player and the microscope’s design inform the type of knowledge produced.
Political message of biohacking
What kind of knowledge is produced in biohacking, and how does this 
relate to science? We have seen the function, manipulation, and regulation 
of knowledge production in science, and how citizen science complicates 
notions of validity and objectivity. In order to place practices of the DIY 
microscope in this context, both the images produced and the microscope 
will be analyzed. The environment and personal background of the producer 
influence the use of the microscope as an instrument and therefore a closer 
analysis of biohacker ideology is needed.
Biohacking brings biotechnology and lab instruments to a context that 
affords play. Biohacking is an expression that describes emerging movements 
of amateurs conducting life sciences outside traditional settings such as 
the lab or universities (Delfanti 2012, 163). Very often low-cost equipment 
is made in order to experiment outside the lab. One creation is the DIY 
microscope, developed in 2009 by micro- and nanoscholar Marc Dusseiller. 
The DIY microscope is made with open source ideology in mind, which 
means the microscope’s design for everyone. In this context, it means 
“‘free speech’ not free beer” (Weber 2004, 5). Open source software (OSS) 
is computer software which is design to be released non-commercially. 
According to the Open Source Initiative (OSI), the main characteristics of 
OSS are its modif iable nature, public availability, and open distribution 
(Open Source Initiative n.d.). Open source hardware is based on the same 
principles. The ideology of open source is based on open distribution and 
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modif ication and availability for everyone. Biohacking can be seen as a 
hybrid of open source ideology and hacker practices in the scientif ic realm 
of biology, life science, and biotechnology. Moving biotechnology from the 
context of a formal lab environment to a hacker space introduces these 
tools, technologies, and processes to non-professionals and amateurs. This 
results in the introduction of different approaches and appropriations 
of biotechnology and equipment. Hacking can be seen as this sort of ap-
propriation, which is def ined as an activity that appropriates material 
objects such as computers, or immaterial objects such as software in an 
attempt to redefine the existing system and subvert its affordances. Hack-
ing as a form of play is “a contextual appropriation of a situation with the 
purpose of creating new values, expressions, or knowledge” (Sicart 2014, 67). 
Although play is formally bound to specific rules in a specific space, hacking 
as a playful practice renegotiates the existing status quo, or game, if you 
will. The intent is to purposefully create new ideas, knowledge, generate 
different values and to go against the grain. A biohacker space is the ideal 
ground for re-appropriating existing technologies and generating different 
scientif ic values. One such an example is Hackteria, an online platform, 
which advocates the open sharing of knowledge, open source technology 
and art in biology, life science and biotechnology (2013a; 2013b). Founded 
in 2009 by artist Andy Gracie, nano-scientist Marc Dusseiller, and artist 
Yashas Shetty, Hackteria publishes open source designs online and organizes 
workshops where they collaborate together with scientists, artists, educators, 
engineers, and hackers to create knowledge and share ideas. One central 
activity is hacking lab equipment together in order to share this technology 
with a wider public. The foundation is based on temporal spaces, and the 
emphasis is on mobility. This less formal context explicitly tries to be break 
open scientif ic knowledge production, which is reminiscent of the level of 
playability mentioned in the previous section.
The modder and hacker tries to divert the system by making up his/her 
own rules. The ethos of biohackers to deinstitutionalize science manifests 
itself in the practice of hacking lab equipment, and sharing those designs 
with the use of open web tools for collaboration such as wikis. Sociologist 
Allesandro Delfanti observes the development of biohacking as an ethos 
of activism, entrepreneurship, and artistic expression. According to this 
perspective, the practice “can be interpreted as an example of a direct 
transposition of free software and hacking practices into the realm of cells, 
genes, and labs” (Delfanti 2012, 163). What is clear is that biohackers are 
changing the rules of the system by bringing commercial lab equipment 
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outside the traditional lab environment, and creating open source models 
based on these technological principles.
According to Delfanti, hacking lab equipment can be seen as an “active 
approach in the shaping of the institutional environment in which biological 
research takes place and in the questioning of the proprietary structure of 
scientif ic information” (2012, 164). Arguing for the relevance of biohacker 
spaces like Hackteria, Kera and Dusseiller point out these spaces are “be-
coming important sites of translation between scientif ic knowledge and 
technological innovation produced in the traditional and off icial labs and 
the everyday interests, practices and problems of ordinary people around the 
world” (2012, 3). As part of their argument, the authors illustrate their desire 
for hacker practices to liberate scientif ic knowledge. However, the question 
can be raised whether the practice of biohacking actually contributes to 
scientif ic research not just in the traditional sense. To evaluate if this is 
actually the case, we will need to take a closer look at the practice of making 
the DIY microscope. As Wise points out, when “the subject of making visible 
in science leaves the domain of mere illustration or mere technology and 
becomes a matter of making knowledge, then the making acquires much 
higher status” (2006, 79). By analyzing materiality, I aim to provide more 
clarity about the epistemic message of biohacker practices.
Materiality of playing
Figure 10.1 is an example of a DIY microscope that citizen scientists can 
create and use to analyze specimens. Since the instrument is also produced 
by the user, biohacking practices like the DIY microscope make hybridity 
of image and producer even more complex. There are multiple layers of 
materiality that affect image production. Just as Ann-Sophie Lehmann 
argues, the process of making an image has multiple layers of materiality, 
“from the making that leads to its encoding, to the material reality of the code 
itself, the CG [computer graphic] object being in-material, the simulation of 
diverse material qualities and therefore being all-materials, and f inally, its 
re-translation into the analogue” (2012, 183). The process of interacting with 
different layers of material creates a deeper understanding of the thing itself.
How does this biohacker context materialize itself in an environment 
for playful knowledge production? The availability of open source software 
and hardware designs invites open-ended play. Playing, or tinkering affords 
knowledge of the object at hand. Tinkering, which is closely related to playing, 
is an iterative style of learning, where users learn about a technology through 
open-ended interaction (Resnick and Rosenbaum 2013). The relationship 
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with tinkering highlights the material aspects of playing. This approach is 
often seen in do-it-yourself (DIY) and maker cultures. The rapid development 
of the consumer 3D printer is one example of the playful engagement with 
materials, as users literally have to put their own device together. As I noted 
elsewhere, playing around with technology enables a deeper understanding 
and stimulates creativity (de Smale 2014). In the case of the 3D printer, this 
has led to innovations in software and hardware that would not have been 
developed elsewhere. Due to the subjective nature of experience it is not 
possible to create experience, however, it is possible to design for a specif ic 
experience (Arrasvuori et al. 2011, 3). This suggests that there are specif ic 
design principles that afford the context of play. Play scholars Mitchel Resnick 
and Eric Rosenbaum (2013, 174) identify design principles that afford playful 
knowledge production: f luid experimentation, immediate feedback, and 
open exploration. The extent to which these design principles are found in 
the material layers of the DIY microscope will be explored below.
Fluid experimentation
The f irst layer of materiality is the process of making and encoding the 
DIY microscope. The inspiration for the DIY microscope with laser cut 
Z-stage is a regular optical microscope. Figure 10.2 shows the design for 
the Z-stage—drawn by Marc Dusseiller. In 2009, Dusseiller f irst wrote 
about hacking a digital microscope he called the DIY microscope. The DIY 
10.1: The DIy microscopy stage kit (hackteria.org).
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microscope has many different forms and designs, but the basic principle is 
hacking a digital camera, for instance a webcam. The camera is attached to 
a microscopic lens, and mounted on a Z-stage that can be made of plywood, 
plastic, glass, or any other hard material available. Practices like hacking lab 
equipment are as much an epistemic statement, as a tool for the production 
of images.
The open source nature of the DIY microscope allows for f luid experi-
mentation, stimulating a context of play: “Tinkerers start by exploring and 
experimenting, then revising and refining their goals, plans, and creations” 
(Resnick and Rosenbaum 2013, 176). Prototyping is a technique for f luid 
experimentation that allows for fast results and a quick iteration. Figure 10.2 
shows how the microscope as a scientif ic tool is being broken down into 
parts. The black box of the regular optical microscope is opened up, and 
translated into a new design. While the affordance of the traditional mi-
croscope is most often hidden because of its design, all the parts are visible 
with the open source design. This serves as an important instrumental 
function, since it allows for open exploration of the technologies. It is up 
to the user to assemble the microscope. The process of putting it together 
is very modular which allows for an iterative style of learning. This design 
is easily produced in open hacker spaces like Fablab with the help of a 
10.2: Designing the DIy microscope (hackteria.org).
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laser cutter. The original design of the microscope is changed to f it the 
epistemic virtue of biohackers, namely open source design, availability of 
biotechnology for the public, and the desire to share knowledge. This is 
evident in the design choices made by Dusseiller. Materials that are easily 
ready at hand can be used for this kit. Plexiglas, plywood, glass, or any other 
material that is hard enough can be used. After the analog drawing, the 
f irst prototype is made. The closed objective structure of the microscope 
is hacked and appropriated into a modular microscope that can be built 
outside the factory. In this process, the system, technology, and material 
of the microscope have been altered, affording a high level of playability.
Immediate feedback
The materiality of code is easily forgotten, but it plays a central role in 
the playful production of knowledge. After the prototype, the design was 
drawn in Adobe Illustrator (see Figure 10.3) as a Computer-Aided-Design 
(CAD). CAD drawings can be seen as a technical blueprint. The user chooses 
to design in Illustrator because it creates designs that are vector-based. 
Vectors can be blown up and cropped without losing shape or form. This 
means the microscope can be as big or as small as desired. The original 
CAT f ile is downloadable via wiki. This example illustrates the willingness 
of biohackers like Dusseiller to share knowledge and designs of the DIY 
microscope. Even though Illustrator is not open source, the open source 
ethics of open access for everyone, open distribution, and modularity are 
present. However, the modularity of shape and size might potentially be a 
problem with the production of scientif ic images, since the quality of the 
photos and the ability of the microscope to zoom may differ which would 
result in different types of images.
When translating the microscope into open source hardware and software 
processes, traditional lab space is transgressed. According to Kitchin and 
Dodge (2011, 61-63), software plays a significant role in the conceptualization 
of space. Coding the microscope into a machine-readable open source design 
means it can be distributed freely. Instead of a closed environment that is 
only accessible for scientists and researchers, hypothetically everyone with 
an internet connection has access to the design of a microscope. All the 
information about how to design a DIY microscope was placed on a wiki 
page. Wiki is a tool for collaboration, and users can also become authors by 
adding knowledge. The software environment is based on open collabora-
tion, where the process of building a microscope also becomes a means of 
participation, through the openness and modularity of the software. The 
malleability of software and the ability to contribute allows for quick results 
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and feedback. Users are functioning in a context that allows immediate 
feedback and an environment that stimulates appropriation of existing 
technologies. By designing the digital environment to encourage tinkering 
with the design, a playful context is stimulated.
Open exploration
The ability for users to change the design, size, and materials of their micro-
scope creates a context that allows for open exploration and user agency. 
As visible in Figure 10.4, its meaning has become modular. The design is 
flexible and open for the creation and re-creation of different practices. The 
last material translation is the re-translation from the design into an analog 
material, the DIY microscope. The materiality of the DIY microscope shows 
how the scientif ic image is broken down, and changed with every layer. The 
re-materialization of the microscope can come in different shapes, sizes and 
forms. This primarily depends on the choices the user makes in the material 
design, the type of webcam, and the type of (open source) software that 
is used. This means all the microscopes will be different, there is not one 
DIY microscope, but there is the idea of a DIY microscope that is expressed 
through the user. Offering this type of f lexibility enables user agency and 
stimulates creativity. This creates a setting, a stage that invites players to 
interact, explore, play, and change the rules.
10.3: Encoding the microscope (hackteria.org).
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The analog version of the DIY microscope could not have existed without 
its digital form and the ability to create the microscope oneself changes 
the relationship between the producer, image, and microscope. The DIY 
microscope can be seen as an epistemic image, because it incorporates 
knowledge about how a microscope works.
This helps to “understand that the medium is not a black box, but an 
active instance translating, and thus interpreting and shaping, data input 
into the image we see” (Schäfer and Kessler 2013, 14). The process of building 
a microscope is equally—if not more—important than creating microscopic 
images. The value of the knowledge produced is not as much about what is 
seen under the microscope, but what it is made of. A microscope in science 
is used to analyze specimens and collect data. The microscope is a tool to 
achieve this goal. However, in the example of the DIY microscope it seems 
that the value lies more in the process itself and knowledge produced for 
the user.
10.4: Materials needed for the DIy Microscope (hackteria.org).
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Knowledge production
When analyzing the type of images that were produced and published on 
the Hackeria platform, it is evident the process of building a DIY microscope 
and of producing microscopic images cannot be separated. When looking at 
the images produced, there are two sets of images. On the one side, images 
that share knowledge about the process of building a device like the DIY 
microscope. On the other side, there are microscopic images that were made 
with the DIY microscope. But these images represent the end product, and 
are shown as part of the process of building. Figure 10.5 is an example of 
the appropriation of microscopic images with the use of a DIY microscope. 
Here, students at the Bauhaus-Universität Weimar hacked a webcam, made 
the DIY microscope, and created microscopic images to use in an artistic 
project. Analyzing its use, these images were used in creative contexts like 
an art project, or video projection. While the image has lost a direct scientific 
purpose, it has gained cultural and educational value. The environment of 
shaping an image is broadened, and the producer has both shaped and is 
shaping the production process. Comparing this with the citizen science 
game Binary Fission, there is a different output in knowledge production. In 
the game, the output is the data produced by the player. The player actively 
participates in knowledge production, but is left to wonder what the purpose 
of their participation is. With biohacking and the DIY-microscope, the value 
is much more process-oriented and dependent on the user’s intent. The 
output of knowledge is not about the end product, such as the collection of 
data. Rather, it is about knowledge of technological processes and systems. 
Its value lies in understanding the technology and how it is made, and 
the pleasure is not in playing a game, but understanding the rules of the 
system and choosing to comply or ignore them. This changes the context of 
knowledge production. The DIY microscope is no longer a tool for analyzing 
data, but a process. Although this means that this knowledge is valuable 
for the player, the output is not necessarily valuable for scientif ic research. 
In this sense, hacking the microscope is a fruitful experiment of learning 
by tinkering, but it leaves the desire of Hackteria to liberate science—as 
of yet—unfulf illed.
In summary, by analyzing the process of making a DIY microscope, 
I have exposed the material layers that form the context of knowledge 
production from a tool for data analysis to a process of the playful production 
of knowledge. The material layers of the microscope interact to create an 
environment favorable for play. Fluid experimentation through prototyping, 
immediate feedback in playing with digital designs, and open exploration 
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in the form and function of physically making the DIY microscope set the 
stage for playful learning. As we have seen, the central goal for Hackteria is 
the practice, creation, and distribution of knowledge in biology, life sciences, 
and biotechnology. Although, with the case of the DIY microscope, the 
process of building it is more interesting than the images it creates. Play 
as epistemology illustrates how the practice of hacking is a context that 
affords the playful appropriation of science.
Conclusion: Image production from the lab to playful hacker 
spaces
The DIY microscope is a critical product of playful experiments to democ-
ratize science. In this form, it is not so much about the knowledge produced 
with the device, as about the valuable knowledge produced in hacking the 
microscope and creating open source variants. Citizen science projects like 
Binary Fission use those who play science games as data-collecting machines, 
where the design of the game allows little agency for the player. This formal 
environment of data collection does not emancipate science, but instead 
re-enforces a hierarchical, institutional form of science. An extension of that 
development—and in some parts a reaction to—is biohacking. The political 
message behind hacking lab equipment is the attempt to deinstitutionalize 
science.
Biohacking practices like the DIY microscope are still in an experimen-
tal stage, and the lens of play can help to explain how transporting the 
microscope from the lab to open hacker spaces alters its context. There is a 
specif ic form of play in biohacking since it creates a context for tinkering. 
Play is materialized in the design principles of f luid experimentation, 
immediate feedback, and open exploration. First, f luid experimenta-
tion is seen in the rapid iteration of building prototypes, of hacking the 
microscope and translating it into an open source microscope. From a user 
perspective, building a microscope creates the opportunity to learn how it 
works, and what the technological limits are. Second, immediate feedback 
10.5: Appropriation of microscopic images in education (Neupert 2013).
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is afforded through the adaptability of software. Third, open exploration 
is seen in the agency of the user to build the DIY microscope with any 
material and in any size he/she desires. Subsequently, there is a strong 
educational value in learning to understand how the microscope works. 
Yet the microscopic images that are produced with the DIY microscope 
are often used in an artistic or cultural context, where the artistic value 
is more important than the images possible scientif ic value. These images 
are part of the material process of creating a microscope, not of creating 
objective images.
On a broader level, digitizing the microscope “modulates the conditions 
under which sociospatial processes operate” (Kitchin and Dodge 2011, 64). 
This is visible in the translation of the microscope from the lab to the open 
hacker space. When image production moves from a closed centralized 
scientif ic environment to an open decentralized hacker environment, 
production becomes more complex. More layers of materiality affect shaping 
of the image, and the producer is intimately connected with the microscope. 
As a result, the process of production creates valuable knowledge for the user 
about technology and the system of the DIY microscope. It is too early to tell 
if the open source lab equipment is suitable for scientif ic data collection, 
but for me this is not the point of hacking lab equipment. Perhaps liberating 
science is found in educating a wider public about scientif ic instruments 
and how they can be made and used. While the motivation of translating 
the microscope may be political, the means through which this is achieved 
is play.
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11. Ludo-epistemology: Playing with the 
rules in citizen science games
René Glas and Sybille Lammes
Abstract
In their chapter, Glas and Lammes critically investigate the limitations of 
citizen science game design when it comes to having amateurs playfully 
participate in the production of scientif ic knowledge. Moving away from 
the traditional distance between the scientist as expert and the citizen as 
layperson, and between science as serious and play as trivial, they argue 
for a recognition of play as fundamental to the scientif ic endeavor and see 
rule breaking and bending as an essential part of this process. From this 
perspective, they consider an approach to citizen science game design that 
includes playing with the rules as a more critical way of having citizens 
think about and participate in science.
Keywords: Citizen science games, production of knowledge, cheating, 
rules of play, theorycrafting, ludo-epistemology
Industry terms like ‘serious games’ and ‘gamif ication’ convey, or at least 
suggest, that games and other forms of playful media can be designed 
and implemented in such a way that users are not just entertained, but 
also educated, persuaded, or trained by engaging them in playful conduct. 
Citizen science games take this one step further, as such games implicitly or 
explicitly invite non-professionals to contribute to scientif ic research and 
knowledge production through play. Yet, as we will argue in this chapter, 
we need to reconsider what the concept of citizen science games can mean. 
Although we appreciate that existing citizen science games are highly 
valuable tools for (meta)data gathering, fact checking, and problem solving, 
we think that there is need for a different type, or understanding, of citizen 
science games. Moving away from a classical model based on the distinction 
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between the scientist as expert and citizen as layperson, we call for a new 
kind of citizen science game that goes beyond such strict boundaries and 
truly merges the two positions by recognizing the play in science and the 
potential of citizens to critically ref lect upon and engage with science 
through play.
To do so, we investigate how play can be a means of critical intervention 
and how citizen science games can provide players agency in bending or 
breaking established rules, as processes inextricably linked to both play and 
knowledge production. Using both game studies as well as a philosophy of 
science perspective, we argue that not just play, but also playing with rules of-
fers new venues of critical engagement for the production of knowledge. Play 
can be a powerful means for opening up scientif ic endeavors to ‘amateurs,’ 
and the directly related activities of rule breaking/bending opens up new 
perspectives for designing alternative citizen science games.
In its classical form, citizen science is often defined as “a form of research 
collaboration involving members of the public in scientif ic projects to 
address real-world problems” (Wiggins and Crowston 2011, 1). As Bonney 
et al. (2009, 978) have pointed out in relation to biology, the notion of 
voluntary public participation in scientif ic research has a long history, 
with early examples in biological research going back to the late nineteenth 
century. The contemporary concept of citizen science, with “its integra-
tion of explicit and tested protocols for collecting data, vetting of data by 
professional [scientists], and inclusion of specif ic and measurable goals 
for public education,” they argue, only evolved over the past few decades 
(2009, 978). Digital games, being rule-based systems, are a good f it for 
this systematic collection and analysis of data and, being an increasingly 
popular medium, are often considered to be a good platform for educational 
purposes of knowledge advancement as well (see Squire 2011). A host of 
citizen science games have appeared over the past several years, including 
Foldit (University of Washington Center for Game Science/Department of 
Biochemistry 2008), Phylo (McGill Centre for Bioinformatics 2010), EteRNA 
(Carnegie Mellon University and Stanford University 2010), Quantum Moves 
(UA Ideas CODER 2012), Fraxinus (The Sainsbury Laboratory 2013), and Stall 
Catchers (EyesOnALZ 2016), which are based on such principles. Many of 
these games can be seen as a form of human-computer interaction, where 
human activity is crowd-sourced to help computer systems solve problems 
by, for instance, interpreting data it cannot manage by itself. Yet, games 
relying on human-based computation via crowd-sourcing, like “games 
with a purpose” or GWAPs (Von Ahn 2006) or the games created through 
the Metadata Games platform (Flanagan et al. 2013), are not necessarily 
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all citizen science games.1 Dickinson and Bonney, argue for instance, that 
scientif ic interests, and the aim to publish results based on project data, 
should be part of a citizen science project from the outset, adding that “if 
researchers have no interest in the project, or in analyzing its data, then 
we would consider a project unsuccessful” (2012, 2).2 Citizen science games 
like the ones mentioned above were initiated by the scientif ic community, 
and have indeed yielded publications in high-ranking journals (Hand 2010; 
Cossins 2013). One such study published in Nature dealing with the player-
created scientif ic breakthroughs concerning protein-folding puzzle game 
Foldit even mentions the players (as ‘Foldit Contenders Group’ and ‘Foldit 
Void Crushers Group’) as co-authors (Khatib et al. 2011). Such publications 
show the potential of using games to engender new productive links between 
citizen science and play.
Foldit is often mentioned as an example of a citizen science game (see 
also Chapters 12 and 13 in this volume), yet it represents in our view just one 
pathway for this ‘genre.’ To be sure, we do not deny that games like Foldit can 
yield interesting crowd-sourced data and analyses, but at the same time we 
should be aware of the ideological, pragmatic, and missionary underpinning 
of such games: that ‘science should be brought to the people,’ so then, why not 
through play. As a provocative experiment, we ask ourselves: what happens 
if we embrace the notion that ‘real’ scientists are citizens as well, the latter 
being pivotal to how philosopher Feyerabend understood citizen science 
(1978). By breaking away from an assumed asymmetry between scientists 
and citizens, we want to explore the idea that doing science through play can 
be fruitful not only to enroll ‘citizen-laymen,’ but that it also can encourage 
citizens to more critically scrutinize scientif ic processes. In other words, we 
have to change our assumptions of what citizens are and can do in relation 
to science. Such a re-evaluation enables us to rethink the potential of citizen 
science games as critical and creative tools for engagement.
1 An interesting discussion is whether or not most citizen science games can actually be 
considered traditional games according to formal def initions (see Juul 2005) or should be seen 
as gamif ied media, in which gamif ication stands for “the use of game elements in a non-game 
contexts” (Deterding, Dixon, Khaled, and Nacke 2011, 2). While the distinction is relevant for 
formal analysis and design-related questions, as both elicit active engagement from users 
through playful interaction, which is the main goal of citizen science games, we do not engage 
with this distinction here, since we are primarily interested in the relation between play and 
knowledge production. 
2 The game Citizen Science (Filament Games and Squire 2013), which aims to teach scientif ic 
literacy through play (see Gaydos and Squire 2010) would not adhere to this def inition. While 
this educational goal is also part of the citizen science movement, this game does not invite the 
public to directly engage or collaborate in scientif ic research. 
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Scientists play too
Our reconsideration of the relation between, citizens, science, and play, 
also includes a recognition that scientist are citizens, which means ‘real’ 
scientif ic practices can be playful. To some it may be obvious and to others 
it may sound far-fetched, but scientists also play and they actually love it. 
Play may indeed seem, at f irst glance, the very antipode to science; as a 
popular kind of f ictional entertainment, play seems irrational, infantile, 
and unsophisticated, all qualif ications that scientists would rather avoid 
than be associated with. Yet, play is a major driving force of knowledge 
production and not necessarily opposed to seriousness (see Ehrmann, Lewis, 
and Lewis 1968). As play theorist Sutton-Smith argued in ‘The playful modes 
of knowing’ (1970), play is a fundamental way of obtaining knowledge. He 
maintained that play is an intelligent practice that helps us to explore, 
test, and evaluate situations. According to Sutton-Smith, “all forms of play 
are transformations of one or other of four basic modes by which we know 
the world,” and the modes he recognized are: “copying,” “analyze and seek 
causes,” “predicting,” and “synthesis” (1970, 2). It does not require much 
imagination to translate these leading principles of knowing through play 
to scientif ic practices, such as scientif ic exploration, testing, and reproduc-
tion. Similarly, philosopher of science David Hull maintains that play is an 
important characteristic of scientists’ practices and describes this innate 
quality as “play behavior carried to adulthood” (1988, 305). In economic 
models of scientif ic communities, scientists are even seen as reward-driven 
gamers and the research they conduct as “a kind of game, a puzzle-solving 
operation in which the solution of the puzzle is its own reward” (Hagstrom 
1965, quoted in Stephan, 1996, 1203). Although we are wary about drawing a 
direct connection between economical systems, science, and games, such 
observations do show that play and science are not or do not need to be in 
contention with each other. Play is actually key to processes of exploration 
and is therefore also an important part of techno-scientif ic change. Play 
may thus be crucial for developing the frame of mind that is needed for 
‘serious’ social practices such as knowledge production (Csíkszentmihályi 
2009; Mainemelis 2010).
Yet, play is also often viewed as infantile, trivial, serendipitous and at 
times even insane. These qualities seem rather far removed from how 
we want to perceive good and ethical scientif ic practices. This may be 
an important reason why scientists shy away from showing their playful 
sides in public. Or, as chemist Pierre Laszlo writes in a personal note in 
American Scientist:
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Play in scientif ic research is seldom discussed in print. Perhaps we 
scientists take it for granted. Or maybe we are a little self-conscious and 
try to hide it from others. After all, we don’t want taxpayers to think 
they are subsidizing adults who are acting like a bunch of kids, thereby 
squandering hefty amounts of public money. Play in science is thus an 
elusive and diff icult topic. (Laszlo 2004, 389)
There is a great difference between how science and artefacts are presented 
to the ‘outer world,’ and how they are actually produced in workplaces such 
as laboratories. This is important to acknowledge if we want to open new 
potential for citizen science games. Play is crucial to processes that precede 
the formation of scientif ic artefacts, but we, as ‘normal’ citizens, are not 
supposed to see this. Playing is an intrinsic part of scientif ic knowledge 
production, yet it is mostly covered up, or ‘black-boxed’ for outsiders, for the 
reasons sketched above. It is, however, important to acknowledge the asym-
metry between the insider and the outsider when we want to understand 
what citizen science games are about and how they could be designed in 
different and innovative ways. If we want to make games that engage citizens 
critically, we have to acknowledge that play is not antipodal to science and 
that scientists are actually civium ludens as well. Then, citizen science games 
are no longer a contradiction in terms, but actually lay bare what science 
really is about. Moreover, it suggests that games can have the potential to 
become powerful tools for engaging citizens critically, encouraging them 
to reflect upon and to transform scientif ic processes through play.
As anthropologists of science Latour and Woolgar already showed in 
their seminal study Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts (1979), 
production centers of techno-scientif ic artefacts are by no means the clean, 
tidy, and rational places they seem from the outside. Artefacts are social 
outcomes of complex processes in which actors form ever-changing alliances 
that are at times messy, ‘warm,’ and trivial. Sometimes we, as outsiders of 
such bastions of knowledge production, catch a glimpse of this side of science, 
albeit often in the shape of myths. A myriad of anecdotes spring to mind 
of stories of scientists’ imagination or “mind-play” (Sutton-Smith 2001). To 
name just a few, one includes Nobel laureate and play theorist John Nash 
(Nasar 1998), who allegedly suffered from ‘insane’ genius, or other stories 
of ‘incubator’ dreams like Kekul apparently dreaming about snakes, which 
helped him f ind the ring-shaped molecular structure of Benzene (Tweney 
1996). Such narratives are passed to the ‘normal’ citizen as acts of visionary 
or even religious genius (Noble 2013) in which a “new force takes hold of 
the soul and directs it, toward theoretical insight” (Feyerabend, 1987a, 701). 
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Although relying heavily on the romantic ideal of individual instead of 
collective creativity (Theodore 2010), these stories allow people outside the 
centers of knowledge production to at least catch a whiff of the less orderly 
and serious parts of laboratory lives and the (mind) play that is part and 
parcel of scientif ic endeavors.
If we accept that scientif ic practices can be playful ventures, we can 
instantly recognize instances when the rules were bent or broken. In its 
extreme form this becomes deviance, which is most often considered unruly, 
unethical, and unwanted behavior that, when detected, can lead to the 
subsequent end of play, and when applied to the ‘real’ world, the end of 
actual academic careers. From pseudo-science to hoaxes, from plagiarism 
to fraud—where scientists play, they also break or transgress rules. Far 
more than with games, deviance in science easily clashes with our notion 
that outsiders should be able to trust scientists. For instance, cheating in 
scientific practices is rightly seen as an indication of unethical, ‘bad’ scientific 
conduct, and it comes in many different shades and forms. As sociologist 
Bridgstock points out, there are many reasons for fraud, or cheating in 
science, such as strong beliefs in developed theories, but they can also 
include “career motivations and political views” (Bridgstock 1982, 364). 
Lesser forms of deviance, showing that fair play in academia is not always 
tenable, are highly common practices of (sexist) nepotism in peer-review 
systems in which we can recognize the (albeit sometimes unconscious) 
bending of rules in order to promote particular scientif ic schools, ideas, or 
gender relations (Wennerås and Wold 1997; Langfeldt 2001).
Looking through the cracks
As examples of cheating in science show, playing with the rules of scientif ic 
practices is not uncommon and varies in form and gravity. Judging from 
the sensational press coverages of floundering scientif ic projects, one could 
conclude that citizens love to see scientists cheat. This cultural fascination 
with failing and unethical science is related to the asymmetry that we 
described earlier. Similar to the myth of the insane and genius scientist, 
it brings to the surface what we deep down knew all along: scientists are 
human beings and citizens too. It points us to cracks in the plaster of the 
scientif ic bastions through which we can catch, albeit distorted, a glimpse 
of the game of science including its duplicitous, tricky, and deceitful sides. It 
reveals that scientif ic knowledge production is not at all aloof to deviance or 
playing with rules. Outside the closed fortresses of knowledge production, 
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we are simultaneously fascinated, confused by, and estranged from what 
scientif ic practices entail.
We mention these examples to show how closed most techno-scientif ic 
strongholds are and how intrigued and scandalized we become when we 
witness the other “Janus face” (Latour 1993) of scientific practices in their less 
orderly forms. We also point this out because it is one of the rare moments 
we realize that scientists can play with rules to the extreme of cheating 
and being duplicitous. Yet, play can also be a highly ethical and productive 
element of techno-scientif ic change and acknowledging this may open new 
ways of overcoming the asymmetrical relationship between scientists and 
other citizens that is particularly important for developing innovative citizen 
science games. That bending the rules can be an important and positive 
element of knowledge production has been stressed by both philosopher of 
science Feyerabend, as well as by his less radical peer Thomas Kuhn (Bailin 
1990). Feyerabend took a very uncompromising stance on how science 
could be revolutionized by calling for an anarchic epistemology in which 
rules were no longer a pre-given. Although probably both too radical and 
relativistic, his stance does provoke us to think differently about ingrained 
rules in science and how they can hinder new knowledge production as 
well as the development and design of true citizen science games. Or, as 
Feyerabend wrote himself in Farewell to reason (1987b) about his previous 
works (1975, 1978):
In Against Method (AM) I argued that the customary accounts of scientif ic 
knowledge and scientif ic method are faulty and that scientists do not 
proceed ‘rationally’ in the sense of rationalist philosophers. In Science 
in a Free Society (SFS) I argued that the sciences are particular ways of 
gaining information and of interfering with the world, that there are 
other such ways and that these ‘other’ ways are satisfactory in the sense 
that they meet the material and spiritual needs of those who use them. 
I added that, like all institutions in a free society, the sciences should be 
subjected to a democratic control. (Feyerabend, 1987b, v)
Going beyond rationality and changing rules were important aims in Fey-
erabend’s democratic project. He believed that bending or negotiating rules 
should be a crucial part of innovative scientif ic practices and could improve 
the quality and democratic value of science. In her article about science 
education entitled ‘Creativity, discovery, and science education: Kuhn and 
Feyerabend revisited’ (1990), Bailin points out that both Feyerabend and the 
influential philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn related the improvement 
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of science (in Kuhn’s case rational and ‘progressive’) to rule bending and 
rule breaking during creative processes. Through deviant ways of using 
rules in method and theory or even discarding them all together, paradigm 
shifts can occur:
Revolutionary science […] is characterized by a radical departure from the 
prevailing paradigm and the creation of a completely new one. It involves 
the overthrow of the presuppositions underlying the old paradigm and 
the establishment of a radically new framework. This new paradigm is 
not a logical continuation of the previous one, but involves a new way of 
viewing phenomena and is, thus, incommensurable with the old paradigm. 
The postulation and acceptance of the heliocentric view of planetary 
organization, would be an example of this kind of revolutionary science, 
upsetting the presupposition that centrality and f ixity were necessary 
properties of the earth, and establishing a whole new framework for 
astronomical observation and theory. (Bailin, 1990, 35)
So, play is an important element of knowledge production in scientif ic 
workplaces, and negotiating or bending rules is also part of such processes 
and not necessarily a bad or unethical practice either. According to Fey-
erabend, it can even lead to innovative theories and methods that can be 
more democratic. If we want to come to a better and more symmetrical 
approach and understanding of citizen science games, such insights about 
the relation between play and the making of science are highly valuable. 
Playing—including playing with the rules of the game—and doing science 
have more in common than we may think at f irst glance, and the term 
citizen science games no longer seems to contain an internal contradiction 
when we take this perspective on board. Looking at existing citizen science 
games, which we will turn to next, paints a very particular picture of the 
freedom play is allowed.
The dangers of the cheater
Serious games generally have a very specif ic goal in mind. With citizen 
science games this is generating usable scientif ic data. Deviating from 
the preferred form of play might endanger such goals. It is for this reason 
that Sicart sees such forms of instrumental play as play “subordinated to 
the goals and rules and systems of the game” and “subordinate to reason, 
to the logic of achievement and progression externally determined by the 
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player” (2011). For Sicart, this undercuts the more free-flowing, experimental 
nature of play, but within citizen science games limiting player freedom 
this is deliberate.
In order to understand how citizen science game design approaches 
the limits of play, we can f irst look at how it approaches cheating. In Clark 
Aldrich’s The complete guide to simulations and serious games, for instance, 
we f ind a def inition of cheating which reads: “to cheat is to purposefully 
subvert the intent and design of the experience,” adding that it “reduces the 
effectiveness” of a game (2009, 262). This, as one could image, is problematic 
and needs to be prevented by design. This can be achieved in a gentle way 
by reminding players of the way a game is supposed to be played. In Eyewire, 
a game with the aim to map the human brain, players early on in the game 
receive a reminder not to initially worry about their mistakes: “[D]on’t 
worry—even if you’re wrong, you won’t hurt science” (Wired Differently 
2012). In literature on the design of citizen science games, the potential 
harm of cheating or other deviant play behavior concerns the quality of 
the data gathered and is discussed more directly. In an evaluation of the 
design process of Happy Match! (Syracuse University School of Information 
Studies & Arts 2012), a citizen science game concerning animal classification, 
Crowston and Prestopnik note that they are unsure of the effects of adding 
game elements to citizen science, as “creating too strong an incentive to get 
a high score might lead to participants attempting to cheat or ‘game’ the 
system, diminishing rather than increasing data quality” (2013, 4). In another 
similar study of the design of Verbosity (Carnegie Mellon University 2006), a 
game using human-computation to collect common-knowledge facts, Speer, 
Havasi, and Surana show they are very aware of deviant behavior, stating 
that “we need to detect the patterns that indicate cheating, frustration, or 
‘bending the rules,’ and remove or alter those assertions so that what remains 
is reasonable common sense knowledge” (2010, 106). The creators of Foldit 
mention cheating as part of the Gameplay Guidelines in their Community 
Rules overview on the game’s website, stating that:
Any method of copying data from other players or external sources in 
order to increase your solo score is cheating. If you’d like to collaborate 
or expand upon another person’s work, you must do so as an evolver. 
Cheating circumvents the intention of Foldit and jeopardizes its scientif ic 
goals. (Foldit Community Rules 2015)
The concerns mentioned above are understandable, and we do not want 
to trivialize efforts to curtail cheating or other potentially destructive 
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forms of deviance. The whole point of citizen science games is to draw the 
public in to participate in research, not to cause potential havoc through 
unethical practices.
From a broader game design, but also from a cultural perspective, go-
ing beyond simply playing by the rules is not just common, the notion of 
rules themselves are also negotiable. It is important to remember there is a 
difference between the rules determined by a game’s design (and thus the 
creators) and the rules that exist a priori to a game and/or are the result 
of social negotiation between players. The latter can be seen as ‘implicit 
rules,’ which concern “etiquette, good sportsmanship and other implied 
rules of proper game behavior” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 130). The rules 
can also be game specif ic or genre specif ic social codes of practice, like 
the “tenets laid down by individuals within the game who have no design 
power or automatically conferred authority” (MacCallum-Stewart 2011, 45). 
Therefore, whether or not something is considered deviant play or cheating 
is not always reliable from the perspectives of players. As Mia Consalvo 
points out in her book Cheating: Gaining advantage in videogames, a f ixed 
definition of cheating is hard to provide, but on the whole, the overarching 
definition used by players is that cheating gives cheaters an unfair advantage 
(2007, 87). This advantage usually presides over others, but the notion of 
having an unfair advantage works in single-player games as well. Here, we 
f ind purist players for whom cheating simply means anything other than a 
solo effort in completing a game (Ibid., 88). In single-player games, a player 
can for instance use cheat codes or a walkthrough guide to get ahead in a 
game. As game scholar Julian Kücklich puts it:
The pleasure of any game depends on a balance between its rules and the 
freedom these rules leave the player for unconstrained interaction. Cheats 
can solve this dilemma by decreasing the perceived level of constraint 
in the game, thus setting the playing process in motion again. (2004, 5)
In sum, what is considered as impermissible behavior with or within a game 
is not, or not merely, up to a game’s designer—at least not from a player’s 
perspective. What is considered unfair in the unfair advantage Consalvo 
mentions is an interpretation usually made by players concerning what 
they consider to be fair play.
With their emphasis on instrumental forms of play and relatively tight 
control on players’ freedom to play otherwise, citizen science games might 
work well with the structured approach of scientif ic research. At the same 
time, to return to Sicart, they turn “the act of playing a game into a labor-like 
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action, into work toward an externally decided, predetermined, and rational 
outcome designed by others than the players” (2011). While this might be 
the goal of citizen science games, for Sicart this contradicts the act of play:
Play, for being productive, should be a free, f lexible, and negotiated 
activity, framed by rules but not determined by them. The meaning of a 
game, its essence, is not determined by the rules, but by the way players 
engage with those rules, by the way players play. (Ibid.)
Part of this freedom, this f lexibility, and process of negotiation, is not just 
following the rules, but playing with them, and at times deviating from them. 
Again, we do not wish to argue that serious game design, or citizen science 
game design, is misguided for being overly instrumental. The point here is 
that examining different views on playful science can help to broaden the 
scope of citizen science games, as we will argue next.
Another play on citizen science
We are not arguing that existing types of citizen science games should be 
open to rule-breaking forms of play since these could potentially negatively 
impact the data generated by the players; what we are arguing is that the no-
tion of citizen science games needs to be extended beyond the more narrow 
definition of primarily being human computation-based games. This would 
allow forms of citizen science that do more justice to the inherently playful 
nature of science discussed above. To do this, we want to look at practices 
within the genre of the massively multiplayer online role-playing game 
(MMORPG), in which we recognize exactly this notion of citizen science.
Successful games from this genre like World of Warcraft (Blizzard 
Entertainment 2004) have spawned massive communities of players who 
actively engage in participatory practices, like the creation of fan art, user-
interface modif ications, information databases, and so on. While some of 
these practices are expressive in nature, others are more instrumental, 
resulting in enhancing knowledge about and skill within the game. Among 
expert players, a specif ic type of investigative activity aims to obtain a 
better understanding of the inner workings of the game itself. This process, 
which has become known as theorycrafting, gives players a sense of access 
into and insight over the black box that is the game software, which is 
subsequently used to enhance tactical knowledge and skill for the most 
challenging gameplay situations the game has on offer. Among the tools for 
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such investigations are user-interface modifications, also known as AddOns, 
which collect and visualize data generated by player actions within the game. 
Such AddOns are also created and distributed by the player community. 
Game scholar Torill Elvira Mortensen (2008, 208) distinguishes between two 
types, one is a deviant form of playing with the intended game design that 
is not counterproductive (“that which hinders personal progress”) and the 
other is destructive (“that which ruins the progress of others”). But rather, it 
seems this is a form of productive deviation that excels or surpasses normal 
progress, resulting in what Glas calls “hyperproductive demystif ication” of 
a game: “instrumental progress going above and beyond the game’s own 
challenges and fiction, both of which are deconstructed in the process” (2012, 
90-100). Such forms of play notably change the experience and meaning of 
a game, creating new forms of, and norms for, playing the game.3
The reason for relating theorycrafting to citizen science is that the prac-
tice of theorycrafting brings to light a convergence of play with scientif ic 
habits of mind, with players displaying forms of scientif ic argumentation, 
model-based reasoning, and theory-evidence coordination (Steinkuehler 
and Chmiel 2006; Steinkuehler and Duncan 2008). For game scholar Karin 
Wenz, theorycrafting can, in fact, be seen as the “scientification” of gameplay, 
referring to a positivist approach to science using quantitative methods 
(2013, 181). Like the participants in the citizens science games discussed 
earlier, the player’s theorycrafting practices here show “an engagement 
with data not primarily as part of research but as part of a leisure activity” 
(2013, 181). One could argue that theorycrafting does not involve a team 
of professional researchers who initiate the research process, analyze the 
data, and publish the results, primarily with public education in mind. The 
distinction between citizens and scientists, however, collapses here: the 
players instigate research through scientif ic means themselves. And they 
publish their results also, since reports of their f indings are transferred to the 
public (i.e. the game community) in the form of discussions, formulas, tools, 
guides, and tutorials through various websites and knowledge databases 
dedicated to theorycrafting. From a game design perspective, we can say 
that, when a game like World of Warcraft allows players to collect and analyze 
3 It should be noted that theorycrafting is not merely seen as benef icial to a game’s com-
munity, as it also invites discussion on elitism between players (one well-known website for 
the theorycrafting community is even jokingly called ‘Elitist Jerks’) and can leads to social 
control and other disciplinary effects as players judge each other’s play performance based 
on collected data rather than social skill or experience (Paul 2011; Glas 2012; Wenz 2013). For 
Wenz, “theorycrafting as a form as scientif ication of gameplay thus legitimizes both control 
mechanisms: control over the game and control over those who play it” (2013, 191).
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data about (parts of) its inner workings, we can see that scientif ic discursive 
practices can and often do emerge among the player base.
Probing the rules in games, then, can be productive for players. Within 
the f ield of game studies, it has also been recognized as productive for 
research purposes. While play as a dedicated method to investigate games 
is considered an essential part of digital game research (Aarseth 2003; 
Mäyrä 2008), Julian Kücklich emphasizes the advantages of using cheating 
as a methodological tool:
[It] allows us to reflect upon the presuppositions that we bring to games, 
no matter from which perspective we are studying them. It also enables 
us to identify blind spots in our research perspectives and thus discover 
new avenues of inquiry with regard to the phenomena we study. Perhaps 
even more importantly, taking into account unorthodox forms of play 
can help us recognize flaws in our theoretical models, which are so often 
built upon the experience of playing by the rules, rather than breaking 
them. (2007, 357)
Researchers might, of course, already be prone to take such a position 
toward their research material. For people being asked to become citizen 
scientists, being confronted with few options to actually pursue such acts 
of reasoning and reflection as a result of experimentation within games, 
the benefits Kücklich mentions remain limited.
Conclusion
What we want to maintain in this chapter is that acknowledging the existing 
close relationship between more open forms of play (including potentially 
deviant ones) and science may be fruitful for broadening the scope of what 
we envisage as citizen science games, or citizen science play. This encourages 
or allows players to be reflexive about what the rules are and, by doing so, 
come to a better understanding what science is about—going beyond the 
presumed paradox of play and science. Play is not only a common practice 
in traditional centers of knowledge production, but is also productive in such 
settings. As such, it is not only a kind of preparation for the “real thing,” 
as Sutton-Smith (1970) would have it, but also for being able to think ‘out 
of the box’.
To make players productive rule-benders may sound like too radical a 
step to take, but it is after all a crucial intrinsic ‘quality’ of both playing 
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and doing science. So why not use that potential to the full? It may be used 
in games as a way to make players into critical citizens who rise above the 
voyeurism of looking through the cracks that we described earlier in this 
chapter. Players can thus understand what scientif ic knowledge production 
is or could be and can also become more reflexive about how scientists 
as citizens operate, as well as becoming critical about the limitations of 
scientif ic engagement. It may also be used to create awareness that some 
kinds of rule bending are crucial to knowledge production, as Feyerabend 
claimed. Probing what is conceived as unbendable often leads to new 
insights. Feyerabend calls in this context for epistemological anarchism 
(1975) or, as Staley puts it, “abandoning any attempt to separate the good 
from the bad in science according to a f ixed view of rationality” (1999, 603). 
We call for games that take ludo-epistemologies to heart, games that invite 
scientist to view themselves as citizens, and citizens to engage with the 
playful act of doing science.
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12. The playful scientist: Stimulating 
playful communities for science 
practice
Ben Schouten, Erik van der Spek, Daniël Harmsen, and Ellis 
Bartholomeus
Abstract
In this chapter, the authors elaborate on serious games and playful interac-
tions in modern scientif ic practices, and on the way they can engender 
mutual scientif ic growth. They use a research-through-design approach, in 
which three possible scenarios and prototypes are studied to envisage the 
new role of the public library in practicing science in a changing society. 
Their conclusion is that the public library of the future should employ 
citizen science projects that are fun, accessible, malleable, and participa-
tory, so that its new role can focus on offering meaningful information 
at the right time in the right place, contextualizing information using 
playful solutions, bringing together communities to share information, 
and enabling new scientif ic practices in unexplored f ields.
Keywords: Citizen science games, playful, research through design, public 
library
Traditional methods for practicing science rely mainly on experts. How-
ever, newer forms of science practice have started to allow for non-experts 
to participate as well, a trend mirrored in societal change toward more 
participatory cultures. Citizen science projects exist in various forms and 
offer many ways for the public to participate. What most of these projects 
have in common is that participants contribute to scientif ic activities made 
available by experts through apps and desktop applications. What these 
projects often lack is the community building that allows the science projects 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
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to be meaningful for the citizen participating. In this chapter, we want to 
elaborate on serious games and playful interactions in these modern science 
practices, and look at the way they can engender mutual scientif ic benefit. 
We used a research through design approach; more specif ically, we have 
designed three possible scenarios and prototypes to envisage the new role 
of the public library in science practice in a changing society.
Our starting point in this chapter is the current state of the art in what 
can be called citizen science. Citizen science (also known as crowd science, 
crowd-sourced science, civic science, or networked science) is scientif ic 
research conducted, in its entirety or in part, by amateur or non-professional 
scientists, often by crowd-sourcing and crowdfunding. In this chapter, we 
would like to address the practice of citizen science as part of the chang-
ing role of scientif ic institutions such as the public library. Funded by a 
research grant from the city of Eindhoven (the Netherlands), we studied 
several alternative roles for the library as an institute designed to cultivate 
knowledge and scientif ic literacy among the city’s citizens.
We challenged a group of students at the Department of Industrial Design 
at the Eindhoven University of Technology to design a series of (playful) 
citizen science scenarios in which there is a clear role for the public library. 
In addition we invited an industrial partner, IJsfontein from Amsterdam, to 
join the consortium as a designer in residence. In this way, we want to bolster 
the ecosystem of the creative industries in the Netherlands, especially in 
bringing together the different stakeholders to co-create applications for 
social innovation.
The methodology that we used is that of research through design. 
Research through design is about creating knowledge through action-
reflection with prototypes in a design process (Jonas 2007). Insights from 
these intermediate results (prototypes) are used to create more general 
conclusions (Sein et al. 2011). To reflect on the possible role of the library 
and citizens we (iteratively) designed prototypes followed by reflection, 
analysis, and synthesis. We wanted to focus on the process of experiential 
learning by citizens themselves within a participatory setting, as opposed to 
a more classical approach of consulting an expert or knowledge base made 
available by the public library. In this chapter, we would like to elaborate on 
how playful citizen science can impact the process of knowledge gathering, 
the conf iguration of knowledge itself, and the way knowledge is applied 
and shared.
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State of the art in science practice
The World Wide Web has gradually grown as a source of information; 
much of the knowledge taught in schools can be found readily and on-
demand on the internet, through online encyclopedias such as Wikipedia, 
social networks and internet forums. This socially distributed, collective 
intelligence (Lévy 1997) afforded by the internet may obviate the need 
for a large active knowledge base. However, it also has its downside. For 
one, it requires a new way of thinking about (and the education required 
to cope with) this hyper-connected world, often encapsulated in what is 
called twenty-f irst century skills and new media literacy (Jenkins 2009). 
Among these twenty-f irst century skills, problem-based learning is often 
employed and emphasis is placed on sense-making in authentic contexts 
(Lombardi 2007). In addition, as young people grow up constructing 
knowledge from various (often highly-pleasing sensorial) trans-medial 
sources, traditional instruction can be considered boring from their 
perspective.
Members of the millennial generation increasingly show a lack of motiva-
tion to learn with classical skill and drill practices (Ryan and Deci 2000; 
Deen and Schouten 2011) and prefer a more experiential and social approach 
to learning (Oblinger and Oblinger 2005). They generally spend more time 
using screen media, distracting them from their studies (Jenkins 2009). To 
encourage more autonomy-supportive educational practice is generally 
accepted as the best way to create more intrinsically motivated students 
(Deen and Schouten 2014).
As young people f ind things that intrinsically motivate them, they often 
join online communities, also called aff inity spaces (Gee 2005; Schouten 
2015), where they can share knowledge and skills pertaining to their interests 
with other people from across the globe. People share and learn from ‘life-
hacks’ on YouTube and exchange elaborate co-constructed architectures and 
virtual landscapes in Minecraft (Mojang 2011). This participatory culture, in 
turn, shapes the worldview, or epistemic frame, of its community members 
(Shaffer 2006).
However, the internet as a knowledge base is fragmented and data are not 
always provided in a clear context. Moreover, while democratized cultures 
of participation can lead to creativity, it is well known that learning without 
proper guidance (there are typically no experts in grassroots movements 
who can provide guidance) can send people down “garden paths” (Gee 2004), 
meaning the epistemic frames that are formed may be skewed. Furthermore, 
in the last decennium, we see another development where interaction has 
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contributed to processing information, for instance in computer games and 
apps. Or, to put it differently, in addition to the vast amounts of data made 
available by the use of sensors installed on run-of-the-mill smartphones, 
now everybody can become a scientist. For instance, in Ispex (Figure 12.1), 
a simple smartphone is used in combination with an add-on device to 
measure air pollution in the atmosphere. The resulting data is aggregated 
over thousands of devices in order to draw maps and identify the most 
polluted areas that can pose potential risks to the health of individuals.
In these applications, there is a clear shift from just gathering data to 
processing the data into meaningful information that can empower citizens. 
One thing became clear in our research effort, citizen science makes it more 
fun for people to contribute to science and the main reason why citizens want 
to participate with applications such as Ispex, besides curiosity, is that they 
feel they can add (personal) value to society by contributing in some way.
In summary, a number of trends can be discerned. We see 1) that the World 
Wide Web seems to obviate the need for a knowledge base and classical 
information institutions such as libraries; 2) a shift to a participatory culture 
where citizens want to contribute within aff inity spaces where groups of 
people are drawn together because of a shared commitment to a common 
activity; and 3) citizens of the millennial generation need expert guidance 
in acquiring a proper epistemic frame pertaining to their aff inity space.
12.1: A smartphone with the Ispex add-on.
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In the next section, we contend that cultivating and nurturing these 
cultures of science participation within aff inity spaces can be a valuable 
new role for the public library, and that games and playful design offer 
ways to achieve this.
A symbiotic relationship through playful science
Games can play an important role, both as a means to motivate the citizen 
to engage in citizen science projects, but also to create real value for the 
citizen scientist through the engendering of complex learning, scientific skill 
acquisition, and empowerment. Games are so engaging because they satisfy 
the basic psychological needs of competence, autonomy, and relatedness 
(Przybylski, Rigby, and Ryan 2010). Through a process of encountering 
problems and autonomously f inding ways to overcome them, the game 
player feels that they become more competent and is more likely to engage 
subsequently in the activity (Van der Spek 2012). What is more, the persuasive 
nature of games (Bogost 2007) has been shown to be a powerful tool for 
inducing attitude change (Wouters, Van der Spek, and Van Oostendorp 2009). 
Being engaged in collaborative science games can not only increase a person’s 
knowledge about the subject, it can also improve his or her disposition 
toward science and learning. Related to this, science games can let players 
experience being a scientist, thereby acquiring the epistemic frame of a 
scientist and learning how to think scientif ically (Shaffer 2006). Apart 
from being fun, games are experiential sense-making tools, where players 
immersed in the game learn about complex systems, at their own pace 
and volition, thereby acquiring the necessary cognitive skills to deal with 
increasing complexity (Squire 2003).
These aforementioned affordances are important for the concept of citizen 
science and in our case, the new role of the public library, for two main 
reasons. One is data, because as the possibilities of capturing data increase, 
so too do the complexities of dealing with it. With the internet, the Internet 
of Things, and big data as key concepts in the new information age, the 
necessity of having a large set of declarative knowledge decreases; however, 
the need for relevant cognitive skills and attitudes in order to deal with the 
ubiquitous complexity increases. Games are ideal ways to train for these skills 
and attitudes (Zimmerman 2007). While participating as individual players 
in a pervasive game of crowd-sourced information at different places, they 
also learn about the pervasiveness of individual information bits constituting 
a complex system. The feedback provided by the overarching game can 
then be used to comprehend the compound system and train for the skill 
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of systems thinking. In addition, playing with these systems stimulates an 
improvisational and creative attitude necessary to operate in a world with 
ill-defined complex problems (Lombardi 2007; Zimmerman 2007).
For this reason, the new library can most accurately be envisioned as an 
institute, which focuses on (playful digital) interactions; predominantly 
digital, occasionally traditional, often serious, sometimes fun. The new 
library creates and curates aff inity spaces where citizens can come together 
and contribute to science, and where games are used to make the process 
engaging, playful and more meaningful for these citizen scientists. This 
relates to the twenty-f irst century skills with which citizens self-organize 
social practices and learning, based on civic-driven change that 1) supports 
bottom-up approaches instead of top down decision making; 2) enables 
co-creation, allowing a large audience of users and experts to participate; 3) 
incorporates wisdom of the crowd and agent technology where information 
and decisions can come from many sources; and 4) provides a more dynami-
cal and balanced way of research, less restricted by fixed rules or regulations.
Game design to improve citizen science uptake
While there is great potential for the many uses of citizen science, its efficacy 
is often hampered by the one-directedness of its value proposition. Clearly the 
scientist benefits from contributions (such as large data sets) freely provided 
by the general public, but what does the citizen stand to gain? Citizen science 
projects try to make contributing (to science) more fun and create a longer 
lasting appeal by adding playful elements for the participants. The game 
Foldit (University of Washington Center for Game Science/Department of 
Biochemistry 2008), for instance, is described in Wikipedia as
an online puzzle video game about protein folding. The objective of the 
game is to fold the structure of selected proteins to the best of the player’s 
ability, using various tools provided within the game. The highest scoring 
solutions are analyzed by researchers, who determine whether or not 
there is a native structural conf iguration (or native state) that can be 
applied to the relevant proteins. Scientists can then use such solutions 
to solve ‘real-world’ problems, by targeting and eradicating diseases, and 
creating biological innovations. (Wikipedia 2015, n.p.)
Some citizen science projects have incorporated additional game elements. 
These elements are often basic and are usually an added feature instead 
of a focus point. In most projects, these elements are achievement-based, 
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where participants need to perform an action a certain number of times to 
gain points or proceed to more advanced levels. An example of this can be 
found in Cornell Lab of Ornithology’s CamClickr project,1 which
uses basic gaming technology to provide a friendly spirit of competition. 
In level 1, the participant receives one point for each image sorted into an 
album (e.g., eggs, nestlings, or adults). After participants sort 99 images, 
they can move on to level 2 and earn four points for every tagged image. 
The challenge in level 2 is to classify each image with behavioral tags 
such as feeding young, preening mates, and incubating or rotating eggs. 
(Cornell Lab of Ornithology 2008)
While Foldit contains puzzles that can be intrinsically and cognitively 
interesting, most of the other citizen science projects primarily rely on 
isolated, superf icial gamif ication principles such as competitive scoring 
mechanisms to keep the player engaged. This ‘pointsif ication’ (the scoring 
of points as the sole motivation to play) as an extrinsic reward can stimulate 
perseverance to complete an arduous task, but is only partially what games 
are about (Robertson 2010). There is little in the way of stimulating the player’s 
fantasy (Malone 1981) or of providing moment-to-moment ‘game feel’ in the 
interaction (Isbister 2011). This means that a player already has to be motivated 
to start playing the game, the game itself does not provide a lot of meaning 
to the player. The community is sustained, but does not rise above itself.
Projects such as CamClickr, Foldit, and EyeWire (Wired Differently 2012) all 
claim to be games, but because their game elements (such as pointsif ication) 
do not add much fun or playfulness, we f ind it diff icult to call these applica-
tions games. Moreover, these applications are what we call expert systems, 
meaning that results contribute to the knowledge base of the initiator and 
cannot be freely interpreted by users. Citizen science projects that are 
intrinsically fun because they contain game elements (such as storytelling) 
are rare. However, this does not mean that citizen science projects are not 
fun. Other aspects can make the projects attractive to people such as having 
a personal interest in the subject or providing a sense of accomplishment 
and making a larger contribution, as well as being part of a community or 
creating the opportunity for exploration.
1 CamClickr was launched in 2008. This project catalogues nesting behavior of birds captured 
in over 600,000 images. The resulting imagery led to the publication of one scientif ic article 
and CamClickr was featured in a biology curriculum (Vos and Cooper 2010), using a free online 
citizen science project to teach observation and quantif ication of animal behavior.
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A future role for citizen science
In this section, we want to discuss a design research project entitled KLOS 
developed at the Eindhoven University of Technology to elaborate on 
more advanced functionalities and future scenarios for citizen science 
projects, using applied gaming and playful interactions.2 The idea is 
to build (digital) playful labs for science practice, with the purpose of 
acquiring skills which in turn are organized and synthesized by the 
public library.
KLOS is a Citizen Science in Urban Gaming research project set up with 
cooperation by the Eindhoven University of Technology, the city council 
of Eindhoven, the public library of Eindhoven, and f inally IJsfontein 
(Amsterdam), an industrial partner interested in participating in playful 
interaction design and research. As part of the Dutch government’s new 
policies to cultivate collaborative relationships between industry, research, 
and government (known as the triple helix), this initiative resulted in the 
appointment of a designer-in-residence from the industry to Eindhoven 
University, for half a year. The starting point of the project was the following 
research question: How can citizen science and urban gaming contribute to 
the collaborative creation and dissemination of experiences to educate and 
obtain skills in several domains and how can the public library Eindhoven 
contribute to this new role?
Our students approached the research question by adopting a methodol-
ogy of Ref lective Transformative Design in order to obtain disruptive 
innovative systems (Hummels and Frens 2011). By imagining a different 
world, they try to break free of current constraints and try to come up 
with unique new products and services. We challenged around 25 students 
from Eindhoven University and Fontys University of Applied Sciences 
to design prototypes for the ‘Library of the Future.’ Over the course of 
thirteen weeks, the students worked in teams under the supervision of a 
professional expert. Together with supervisors and staff of the university, 
the students’ design processes were observed and their concepts and 
questions were discussed. In the next section we will elaborate on some 
of the design cases.
2 KLOS refers to the Dutch expression ‘Kennis Ligt Op Straat,’ which roughly translates to 
‘Knowledge can be found everywhere’.
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The library of the future
As part of our efforts to contribute to the triple helix policy, strengthening 
the collaboration between research institutes, industries, and govern-
mental bodies, we invited a designer in residence from the renowned 
industrial partner IJsfontein. The role of the designer was to ref lect on 
the newly proposed concepts delivered at the later stages and develop 
a f inal proposition for the public library to be realized after the initial 
research projects.
We envisaged the Library of the Future as a new type of institute designed 
to address the needs of a new type of citizen. In a future, when knowledge 
is just a f inger tap away, this new institute will help develop twenty-f irst 
century skills, such as connected collaboration, critical thinking, and creativ-
ity. So, what is it precisely? The Library of the Future can most accurately 
be described as an institute focusing on skills and attitudes. Its services 
change constantly as people interact with it, much like the boundaries of 
science constantly change as we explore new f ields. In traditional learning 
and skill and drill exercises with books, knowledge is transmitted to those 
willing to learn. In most of these cases there is a lack of interaction during 
the transfer of knowledge. The student simply ‘consumes’.
The Library of the Future is different. Using the metaphor of a tree, it 
behaves like a fruit-bearing tree, with fruits of knowledge, skills, and at-
titudes (see Figure 12.2). Citizens can pick the fruits, harvest the seeds, and 
then plant trees of their own, feeding back into the system. The citizen will 
create the actual structure of this knowledge base and the library acts as the 
community gardener, introducing relevant playful activities and providing 
ties to pertinent experts.
12.2: During our design process, we envisioned the new role of the library, using the metaphor of 
a tree bearing fruits that can be harvested, re-seeded, and consumed, in reference to the different 
roles of the library: dissemination, education, and utilization.
244 BEN SChouTEN, ERIk VAN DER SPEk, DANIëL hARMSEN, AND ELLIS BARThoLoMEuS 
Another key shift of the Library of the Future is one of teaching skills 
for learning by oneself as opposed to offering knowledge. Citizens of the 
future might only need to learn where information can be found when 
they need it, and they should be focused on learning practical skills and 
working on new ways to access knowledge. To be more precise, the new 
services of the library will help facilitate 1) how meaningful information 
can be retrieved; 2) how data can be processed, used, and contextualized; 3) 
how information can be shared and thus contribute to science; and 4) how 
education and exploring new areas of research can be encouraged. We see 
the library as a dynamic system with several features, namely excellence, 
wisdom, conjunctive and connected, and contemporary.
Excellence
The primary function of the library is to create meaning and context for 
citizens and offer them twenty-f irst century skills such as critical think-
ing, creativity, and the ability to solve problems. The constant ‘hunger’ 
for information will be put in context. The role of the library is to bring 
quality to the process. Knowledge is levered, giving a sense of what you 
want to know or should want to know. The library offers suggestions on 
where to go next in your quest for information. It is important where the 
right ‘knowledge’ tree can be found (see Figure 12.3). As an example, in the 
future, this could be the latest augmented reality apps that enable a user 
to simple scan an object, a building, a word, and f ind useful information 
about it.
Wisdom
If you know where to look, you have a very good chance of f inding the answer 
online. But this ‘quick f ix’ answer lacks any context (see Figure 12.4). You can 
12.3: Different kinds of fruit, with one 
corresponding tree.
12.4: fruit out of context.
12.5: Connecting sections of fruit. 12.6: Tree that bears alternative produce.
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google ‘how long to boil corn?’ and f ind the precise number of minutes. But 
it teaches you nothing more about cooking, nor does it suggest where to go 
from there. Knowledge has become common with the help of the internet 
and mobile handheld devices. There is almost too much now. Sometimes 
it is hard to assess the quality of it, or to form an opinion on a subject. The 
Library of the Future will be focused on providing expertise and helping 
to process information.
Conjunctive and connected
The library tries to connect citizens by finding other people who have similar 
interests (see Figure 12.5). It also allows experts who are knowledgeable to 
f ind interested civilians and vice versa. The process can work both ways. 
An expert might be in need of fresh ideas, reviews, or just a lot of data. A 
citizen might have a brilliant idea but needs help to develop it. The Library of 
the Future will be a knowledge broker, facilitating the connection between 
citizens and experts alike. In many ways, everyone will be able to become 
an expert.
Contemporary
The Library of the Future will provide new ways to practice science, as 
it wants to support bottom-up approaches of research (starting with 
the user) instead of top-down research. This will allow entirely new 
and alternative bodies of knowledge to be developed (see Figure 12.6). 
New experts, no matter how insignif icant they might feel, can add new 
insights and knowledge to the library and can be found by anyone within 
the system.
The future will hold entirely new products not yet designed. Each product 
will be tailored to transfer specif ic expertise in the best and most eff icient 
way possible. Increasingly, more devices will be connected to other devices, 
allowing for even more exciting capabilities and for a much greater focus 
on making knowledge accessible, more interactive, and fun. In the next 
section, we will examine three example projects that the Library can host 
in the future.
Examples of playful science practice
In this section, we will show how the requirements discussed above resulted 
in various design projects. We studied three of the projects, based on differ-
ing expertise: 1) Music experience (Rhytmos); 2) the art of debating (Battle 
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of Wits); and 3) science education (Blob). We analyzed them according to 
seven different factors (see Table 1).
Table 1: Projects and analytical factors
Rhytmos Battle of Wits Blob
Fun factor ++ ++ +


















Design case 1: Rhytmos by Milan Knust Graichen
Objectives: The first project was targeted at understanding rhythm in playing 
music. The library can serve as a public music instrument where people/
citizens can learn about rhythm and the interaction between tones and 
tunes. It is anticipated that by playing music together in a public environ-
ment, getting connected, and experiencing the process of mutual learning, 
users should become more interested in playing music. The library could take 
an active role in contributing to peoples’ music skills and their experiences of 
making music, instead of just simply lending music CD-ROMs and literature. 
In this way, the library’s focus is on enabling citizens to develop and create 
music and obtain new skills instead of just consuming.
Description of design: Rhytmos helps people to develop rhythmic skills in 
a playful way. It is an LED floor on a city square with a moving line on the 
floor (see Figure 12.7). Depending on where you position yourself, the rhythm 
will change, and the player/user will understand the consequence of that 
position and explore its relation to other players. While some people have a 
natural ear for music and a sense of rhythm, not everyone is born with these 
skills. This urban sculpture is designed to trigger people’s curiosity and invite 
people living in urban spaces to explore and investigate rhythm together.
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Analysis: Providing and enabling citizens to co-create and experience music 
in a public space creates an engaging and collective environment in which 
they can explore and learn. Intrinsic motivation is triggered by curiosity. 
The threshold to communicate with a stranger or your neighbor is lowered. 
Music can elicit engagement and curiosity in itself; in this concept, people 
are free to participate or just be a spectator of other people who play and 
explore. The curiosity to understand sound interaction is engaging and 
playful, there are no other rules and no interaction can be wrong. Users 
can learn from their experience. For instance, one person who does not 
understand their influence in the playful interaction can have it explained 
so they can then be invited to explore it further.
Design case 2: Battle of Wits by Doenja Oogjes
Objectives: This project promotes the skill of debating. The library will not 
only provide knowledge, but the Library of the Future will enable people to 
build and develop their resources and play around with ideas and perspec-
tives as parts of furthering citizen science. Critical thinking and debating 
exercised in a playful way can elicit creativity and perspectives or counter 
arguments that can be examined, since the game provides a safe environ-
ment in which no argument is ever right or wrong. But for the sake of the 
game, the citizen scientist/player is triggered to explore a certain mindset.
Description of design: Battle of Wits is a game meant to stimulate an open 
approach to gaining knowledge. The game consists of two sets of chalkboard 
hexagons, chalk markers, a deck of playing cards containing statement cards 
(with statements about current subjects or ongoing issues), and chance (see 
Figure 12.8). By coming up with as many original arguments as possible, 
players have to consider the topic from all different points of view, or at least 
experiment with various perspectives and lenses. The game is won when 
one player/team locks in the other team with arguments.
12.7: Rhytmos is a LED floor on a city square with a moving line for music experiences. The rhythm 
changes according to your position relative to the line and the other users.
248 BEN SChouTEN, ERIk VAN DER SPEk, DANIëL hARMSEN, AND ELLIS BARThoLoMEuS 
Analysis: In this app for the Library of the Future, we focused on open 
access to information, citizens’ skill development, relationships with peers, 
and critical thinking. The playful context of a game enables/allows higher 
contrast and freedom and more creativity to view a topic from new, different, 
and even extreme perspectives. It includes listening well and acknowledging 
other players’ creativity and opinions for the sake of the discussion without 
being offended or becoming defensive or being concerned with who is right 
or wrong. Final judgment is not about being ‘right,’ but about being creative 
and open-minded.
Design case 3: Blob by Sam Janssen
Objectives: In this project, we wanted to focus on learning skills. To be 
more specif ic, we wanted to look at how the library can provide and enable 
children’s curiosity for nature, inviting them to discover and explore their 
outdoor surroundings instead of experiencing the world only through 
digital interaction and using the computer. A second objective we had was 
to get children outdoors and to teach them skills of examining, questioning, 
unscrambling, and analyzing the world around them. The role of the library 
would be to 1) provide tools and devices to develop these skills; 2) be the 
caretaker and curator of the data collected and harvested; and 3) collect 
methods developed for and iterated by the users.
Description of design: Night lamp Blob becomes a child’s friend and requests 
daily input about nature to be able to survive and shine its protective light 
and colors at night. Its functionalities are like those of ‘Siri,’ the intelligent 
personal assistant from Apple that helps you get things done (Aron 2011). In 
this case, communication and interaction are not only conducted through 
voice input, but also with the help of photos, audio, and ambient lighting 
(see Figure 12.9). The idea is that the child explores nature and takes pictures 
of an interesting object or specimen, after which the lamp ‘asks’ questions 
in order to comprehend the object and its larger context. The player learns 
to study objects more closely by reflecting on the questions asked by Blob: 
12.8: Battle of Wits is a game about debating. your argument can be locked by arguments from the 
other team configured on the table.
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how big, how heavy, what color, how soft? The child should be able to adopt 
an explorative attitude in order to acquire better learning skills.
Analysis: The child becomes motivated to connect with their very personal 
friend. After recognizing the benefits of knowledge, they learn to naturally 
explore on their own. Their efforts are rewarded by the increasing illu-
mination of the night lamp. Meanwhile, the player becomes more aware, 
confident, and competent in nature since they learn about the outside world 
in a safe home environment with the Blob.
This collective, dynamic growth at the library will result in the collection 
of large amounts of big data including photos, questions, and answers. 
These data are literally ‘food for thought’ since the lamp will attempt to 
recognize patterns; what pictures are taken in which seasons and in what 
areas/locations (i.e. city or countryside) by what type of players. Little 
data gems can be found in the big data collected by the children who are 
primarily driven by curiosity to feed their night lamp. Players learn to 
become scientists without realizing it, since their motivation is to nourish 
the lamp, and only indirectly experience the growth of information. The 
product teaches you to question your environment and by asking you to 
contribute to the development of the science of nature. Moreover, the photos 
can also produce a lot of contextual information about natural phenomena 
such as seasonal characteristics and/or climate changes.
12.9: Night lamp Blob is a smart object that is able to serve as a knowledge base for children using 
Apple’s Siri technology. The child presents photos and objects to Blob, after which the lamp gives 
back additional information pertaining to the objects shown.
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Conclusion
The goal of current citizen science practices is to encourage larger groups 
of users to contribute to scientif ic research. It is not hard to see the benefit 
for scientists as well as science. However, apart from the particular research 
topic and its results receiving more general public attention, little meaning is 
created for the citizen scientist, in terms of fostering a scientif ic worldview, 
as well as in the game design employed to make it more engaging. The 
functionality of the state of the art projects is gathering knowledge from the 
public to science and not the other way around. In order for citizen science 
to live up to its potential, a number of factors need to be addressed to better 
target citizens. The f irst we like to mention is the fun factor. Citizen science 
can be fun and motivate people to contribute to science. It seems that the 
main reason why people participate in citizen science projects is because 
they feel they can add value by contributing. Citizen science projects need to 
make citizen contributions more fun and more intrinsically motivating, as 
well as trying to create a longer lasting appeal by establishing communities 
and aff inity spaces for the participants through meaningful gamif ication 
(making the interaction more playful and/or achievement based). A second 
important aspect is accessibility. Projects should be made more accessible by 
being web-based or smartphone-based. By doing this, citizens can contribute 
at any time and from any location.
Another aspect we would like to put forward is ownership. At the level 
of scientif ic values, we like to mention review, verif ication, and f iltering. In 
some projects, f ield experts review, verify, and f ilter people’s contributions; 
in other projects, those who contribute most are the ones that review, verify, 
and f ilter the contributions; and in still other projects, the contributions 
are f iltered by a computer which compares the results to f ilter the ‘odd 
ones out.’ In order to improve the validity of collaborative citizen scientist 
reviews and verif ication processes in future participatory cultures, more 
care should be invested in fostering the scientif ic paradigm pertaining to 
the aff inity space these citizen scientists are participating in. We contend 
that entrenching the communities of citizen science practices in intrinsically 
motivating and meaningful games can help in reaching such a suff icient 
scientif ic level.
Citizen science projects are usually designed to be accessible to ensure 
as many people as possible can contribute and participate. This is done 
by either making the subject or f ield more accessible, or by making the 
interaction (analysis/data entry) more simple and playful! And this brings 
us to the role of science institutes, in this case, the public library. In line 
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with the arguments discussed above, it is the library that should encourage 
the opportunities to practice citizen science and as a result their role should 
shift from archiving information to processing information to allow citizens 
the opportunity to participate and create meaning. This new role focuses 
on 1) offering meaningful information at the right time and right place as 
part of everyday life; 2) contextualizing information using playful solutions; 
3) bringing communities together to share and network information; and 
4) enabling new scientif ic practice in other unexplored f ields.
In this project, we focused and played around with the concept of a library 
practising science. Our starting point was the current behavior of citizens, 
their needs and desires, and how to encourage the curiosity of people and 
how to invite people to become engaged in pursuing knowledge and skills 
and building their own resources to become more autonomous and deal 
with life’s problems around us. It is clear that curiosity engages citizens 
and elicits learning. Besides, by being connected to others with the same 
interest, users experience partnership and are willing to cooperate and 
co-create. This could eventually result in science (or public understanding, 
so to say) based on alternative theories and lines of thought different from 
current state of the art science practices.
We all need to play more in order to learn more and hone our skills and 
stimulate our interest. Citizen science has the ambition to invite and enable 
people to co-create, participate and explore.
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13. Laborious playgrounds : Citizen science 
games as new modes of work/play in 
the digital age
Sonia Fizek and Anne Dippel
Abstract
Via citizen science games, players are invited to contribute to the production 
of knowledge. In their chapter, Fizek and Dippel see the games as laborious 
playgrounds, with qualities associated previously with leisure or pastimes 
and with productive or useful time. The chapter investigates citizen science 
games as new modes of work/play, surpassing a strictly dualistic mode 
of thinking and showing how the capital-oriented logic of a productive 
human existence is encoded into play. Fizek and Dippel argue that such 
blurring lines lead us into an age of post-ludification, urging us to consider 
these playful technologies and phenomena as empowering, engaging, and 
participatory, or to observe them with caution, restraint, or even suspicion.
Keywords: Citizen science games, work/play interference, playbor, post-
ludif ication, productive play, capitalism
If anything could be said to characterize new modes of work/play, it would be 
precisely this sort of interplay.
– O’Donnell 2014, 12
The computer screen gradually f ills up with ever more complex geometrical 
patterns. Thousands of players go online to combine and rearrange colorful 
building blocks. With every level, the shapes become more ref ined, the 
patters harder to build, and the achievements more diff icult to obtain. The 
leaderboards with the highest scores are published online and available 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
doi: 10.5117/9789462984523/ch13
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to the entire playing community. The in-game mission outcomes are also 
shared via social media platforms.
The game outlined above would not differ substantially from other 
abstract online digital puzzles, such as Bejeweled (PopCap Games 2001) 
or Candy Crush Saga (King 2012), if it were not for one crucial detail—its 
collaborative drive for an external goal. EteRNA (Carnegie Mellon University 
and Stanford University 2010) constitutes a big data-driven digital labora-
tory (“Solve Puzzles. Invent Medicine”), where more than 38,000 citizen 
player-scientists assemble shapes representing ribonucleic acids (RNAs), 
tiny molecules that are the basis of every living cell. The best virtual RNA 
designs are selected and synthesized in the biochemistry laboratory at 
Stanford.
Like numerous other citizen science games (also known as serious games, 
human-based computation games, or games with a purpose, GWAP), EteRNA 
is an example of a much broader playful/laborious phenomenon. The term 
itself is opening up three signif icant f ields for the understanding of citizen 
science games as playful collaborations for a common goal lying outside 
the game itself.
The ‘citizen’ emphasizes the importance of the collaborative social ele-
ment, lying at the etymological heart of the Proto-Germanic word ‘game’ 
(ga—together, mann—man). In digital games such as EteRNA, large numbers 
of citizens are crucial, for their collaborative endeavors not only influence 
the gameworld, but more importantly reach outside of it, and contribute to 
the production of knowledge. The ‘scientific’ dimension provides an external 
goal for the citizen players. It is placed in the realm of seriousness, associated 
with work. The ‘game’ on the other hand, with its freedom of action within 
internal rules, achievement-based mechanics, and playful aesthetics, belongs 
to the realm of play performed for entertainment. Those three aspects 
become the points of departure in the analysis of this phenomenon as a 
work and play interference, where both qualities permeate each other.
Citizen science games can be discussed in terms of the gamif ication 
(Deterding et al. 2011) of science (introducing playful elements into an 
originally non-game context), but this explanation seems to be leading in 
one direction only—play entering the non-game domain and changing it 
into a playful entity. However, in this encounter, not only the gamif ied or 
ludif ied activity changes, but also play itself is undergoing transformation. 
Citizen science games may be perceived as laborious playgrounds, placed 
between the two poles of ludus and labora, oscillating between qualities 
associated previously with leisure or pastime and with productive or useful 
time.
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In the following sections, drawing upon interdisciplinary academic 
approaches of game studies, media theory and socio-cultural anthropology, 
we are going to discuss this relationship, and analyze citizen science games 
as new modes of work/play, where both qualities overlap or even hybridize.
Collaborative gaming with a purpose
We’re calling on gamers to help connect the dots by playing a game to map the 
brain.
– Wired Differently 2012
Large collaborative online environments, including some citizen science 
games, are the most recent incarnation of ideas that were put into practice 
already a few decades ago. The f irst attempts to use the collaborative power 
of humankind in combination with games were proposed at the beginning 
of the 1960s by Buckminister Fuller, who introduced the World Game, an 
educational simulation for solving problems of overpopulation and the 
uneven distribution of global resources. As the author himself claimed, he 
had played it without the assistance of computers since 1927. The World 
Game that Fuller envisioned was to be a place where individuals or teams of 
people compete, or cooperate, in order to “[m]ake the world work, for 100% of 
humanity, in the shortest possible time, through spontaneous cooperation, 
without ecological offense or the disadvantage of anyone” (Buckminister 
Fuller Institute n.d.). Fuller conceptualized a playful systemic tool that could 
engage large numbers of participants in a strategic game based on statistical 
data about the world, its minerals, manufactured goods and services, humans 
and their needs (Buckminister Fuller Institute n.d.). However, what he did not 
have at his disposal, were the essential components of today’s collaborative 
digital games with purpose: big data, the calculating machine able to process 
the deluge of information, and a network that would connect thousands of 
minds. The turning point came in 1989 with the invention of the World Wide 
Web (at CERN by Tim Berners-Lee). Its emergence led to the development 
of a new gameplay phenomena—a massively multiplayer online game 
(MMOG).1 It is only in the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s that a game world 
could be populated by millions of players simultaneously. One of the most 
1 The f irst multiplayer real time virtual worlds, such as Multi User Dungeons (MUDs) emerged 
at the end of 1970s. They could be, however, played online exclusively as experiments in the 
ARPANET network or within internal university networks.
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recognizable MMORPG titles, World of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment 
2004), in its peak had twelve million active players (Statista, n.d.).
What if those millions of participants, instead of performing f ictitious 
online battles, were united in order to solve existing and potentially prob-
lematic scenarios, following Fuller’s vision? Collectively, we spend a few 
billion hours a week gaming. Why not turn this abundance of pastime into 
productive time, and collaborative gameplay into socially positive ends, 
—asks game designer Jane McGonigal (2010, 2011). In order to achieve this 
McGonigal used Alternate Reality Games (ARGs), combining the physical 
world with the online world, where she emphasizes role play turns into 
real-play. In 2007, ITVS Interactive launched World Without Oil online as 
“a massively collaborative imagining of the f irst 32 weeks of a global oil 
crisis.” The players contributed with their own stories and possible scenarios 
via email, fora, uploading video material, or comics. The game attracted 
1,800 players. Evoke (World Bank Institute 2010), the next collaborative 
ARG, brought together more than 20,000 people all over the world with a 
common goal to f ind solutions to the most urgent social problems, such 
as food shortages, water crises, or women’s empowerment, among others.
The productive, anticipatory, and systemic real-play has been ref ined 
further in the most recent collaborative ludic phenomena—citizen science 
games. In contrast to previous ARGs, citizen science games unite all the 
players online within a consistent game platform with specif ic rules and 
tasks to perform. Within these big data collaborative play spaces, players 
solve puzzles, categorize, identify and tag data, participate in challenges, 
and by doing so contribute to the advancement of scientif ic research. The 
free digital labor (Scholz 2013) of thousands of amateur science-players 
helps researchers deal with various subjects, from biology, neuroscience, 
astronomy, high-energy physics, to linguistics and history of art, among 
others. With these citizen science games, the players can predict protein pat-
terns (the earlier mentioned EteRNA), map neural retina pathways (Eyewire, 
Wired Differently 2012), classify the morphologies of galaxies (Galaxy Zoo, 
Galaxy Zoo Team 2007), program algorithms identifying the Higgs boson 
(Higgs Boson Machine Learning Challenge, CERN 2014), tag social language 
(Metropolitalia, Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich 2012), and art 
works (ARTigo, Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich 2010).
One of the f irst digital citizen science games was Foldit (University of 
Washington Center for Game Science/Department of Biochemistry 2008). 
It was developed as an online challenge of synthesizing molecules. The 
input from the online playful laboratory turned out to be so successful 
that its initial prototype, developed as a science project at Stanford and 
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Carnegie Mellon Universities, was transformed into a worldwide ludic 
experiment renamed EteRNA (see Figure 13.1). Its gameplay is based on the 
complex pattern recognition process. The player’s task is to assemble shapes 
representing ribonucleic acids (RNAs). Since humans are currently much 
more eff icient in deciphering and predicting the structures of proteins 
than existing computer algorithms, the initiators of the project decided 
to use the form of an online puzzle to attract potential participants. Their 
actions are collected in a big data assemblage with the aim to improve the 
development of algorithms for pattern recognition.
Big data collaborative games and challenges have become such an effec-
tive scientif ic tool in the past few years that they led to the development 
of entire online platforms for collaborative volunteer research projects 
such as Kaggle or Zooniverse, among others, where academic institutions 
and research centers create their own games and outsource the tasks to 
citizens around the world.
Those lofty and idealistic attempts to change the world by turning gam-
ing into something productive embody what Alexander Galloway (2012) 
refers to as contemporary romantico-cybernetic understanding of play. 
On the one hand, play is perceived as a spontaneous, careless, and almost 
childlike activity. On the other hand, in many instances, it has become 
almost synonymous with complex iterative systems. Commercialization 
and systematization of play, gamification, or productive collective gaming 
operate in accordance with the systemic and structural quality of play. At 
the same time, they draw from the Huizingian spirit, associating play with 
13.1: A screenshot showing gameplay in EteRNA.
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something pure, almost poetic, and above all else meant to entice pleasure. 
And this romantico-cybernetic fusion invites people into the world of 
something they intuitively associate with pleasure and frivolity, all the 
while performing productive tasks for an external purpose.
Work and play interference
Play turns to seriousness and seriousness to play.
– Huizinga 1938/1992, 8
The process of blurring the lines of work-play and seriousness-playfulness 
was f irst described in the last chapter of Homo ludens (1938/1992), in which 
Johan Huizinga discusses the loss of purity of a frivolous playful experience 
and focuses on the confusion of where play ends and non-play begins. 
To support his claim, he uses the example of professional sports, which 
systematizes pure play and corrupts it through the principles of paid work. 
He then moves on to the world of commercial rivalry and emphasizes the 
agon element in business, noticing that “some of the great business concerns 
deliberately instill the play-spirit into their workers so as to step up produc-
tion” (Huizinga 1938/1992, 200). By doing so, according to Huizinga, they 
turn business into play, and as a result play becomes business. The two 
allegedly mutually exclusive aspects of human practice, work and play, 
interfere and transform the everyday life. Their boundaries collapse and 
as a result playfulness leaks into labor, and the latter unfolds moments of 
drudgery within play.
The Huizingian distinction between play and work, and the portrayal of 
the latter as a productive and paid activity indirectly relates to the Marxist 
understanding of work ethics and productivity. For Karl Marx, work is 
def ined as a useful and productive activity that may be translated into the 
value of commodities produced. It is also part of a natural human behavior, 
“a productive expenditure of human brain, muscle, nerve, hand, etc.” (Marx 
1887/2015). In the Grundrisse, he also points out the Abrahamic def inition 
of work as toil that seems to have been placed on human shoulders at the 
moment of the ancestral sin: “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till 
thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, 
and unto dust shalt thou return” (Holy Bible 2011). While the foundational 
text of Abrahamic monotheism represents work in terms of a curse leveled 
upon humans by God, Marx departs from this perspective and defines work 
as a chance for the “individual’s self-realization,” an a priori act of utmost 
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freedom, which encompasses happiness, even if throughout history mostly 
corrupted, self-alienated forms of work or “external forms of labour” have 
emerged (1858/1973, 611). In this, he rejects the understanding of Adam 
Smith, who argued that work “obtains its measure from the outside through 
the aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it” 
(Elster 1999, 59).
The differentiation between work and play appears already in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean ethics (1971). Both qualities, according to Aristotle, are required 
in order to achieve happiness and freedom. Gregory Bateson (1972), on the 
other hand, differentiates between play and combat, drawing from the 
animal kingdom. Here, playing is opposed to serious activities required for 
the sustainment of life or defense from danger. With such dualisms, Brian-
Sutton Smith (1997) notices the rhetoric of frivolity, which carries in itself an 
implicit work ethic, moving play into the domain of fun, non-seriousness, 
and nonsense. Salen and Zimermann notice that in modern times this sort 
of rhetoric inverts the classic work ethic view of play, “against which all the 
other rhetoric exist as rhetoric of rebuttal” (2004, 305).
Games and play seem to be determined by their self-suff iciency and 
closely def ined “magic circle,” which is creating a temporary world within 
the ordinary one (Huizinga 1938/1992, 10). They remain at the opposite end 
of drudgery as long as they are non-serious (Ibid.), unproductive (Caillois 
1958/2001, 10), joyous (Scheuerl 1979, 69), and utterly absorbing (Huizinga 
1938/1992, 10), making the players lose themselves in the constellation of 
playful time and space. The magic element within the play experience 
points toward the very suspension of time, as if past and future did not exist. 
The time within play is def ined and perceived as pastime, for the players 
need to be entirely captured by the game in order to play it. Pastime seems 
to synchronize permanence and simultaneity and encloses them within 
what the German pedagogue Hans Scheuerl (1979, 69) def ines as presence 
and inner endlessness. The experience of being suspended in time and 
lost within the game, yet not necessarily in the magic circle, has also been 
theorized from the perspectives of f low (Csikszentmihalyi 1990/2008) and 
incorporation (Salen and Zimmerman 2004; Calleja 2011).
Following the above logic, we may come to the conclusion that play itself 
makes no sense, but simply exists within its internal logic. Play creates 
sense and meaning and presents this to its players. In contrast to work, it 
does not need any external references to be def ined as such. Play carries 
its goal in itself. It is autotelic.
Unlike play, work is perceived a productive activity, which leads to 
meaningful, often prof it-oriented goals. The Middle Ages had associated 
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work with till and hardship. In the thirteenth century, labor (from Latin 
laborem) designated a task to be performed. By the late fourteenth century, 
it was mostly associated with exertion of the body, possibly originating from 
the notion of ‘tottering under a burden’ (from Latin labere). Not without a 
reason, in the Anglo-Saxon linguistic tradition, the term also designates 
the suffering women experience while ‘in labor.’ Etymologically, labor 
seems to be connected with productivity, effort, and suffering, qualities 
which fundamentally differ from play. The laborious effort is undertaken 
for the value of work lies outside of it and is encapsulated in its produced 
commodities. Work is therefore exotelic.
In the digital age, the differentiation between work and play gradually 
disappears and dissolves into playbor (Lund 2015), and while doing so, it 
encodes the Protestant and capital-oriented logic of a productive human 
existence into play. As much as play enters the allegedly play-free domains 
of life, such as the workspace, seemingly non-ludic practices pervade play-
grounds. And it is precisely at the intersection between those ostensibly 
distinct practices of play and work, or playfulness and seriousness, where new 
spaces and forms come into being; where the lines between the imaginary, 
the symbolic and the real are blurred.
The digital machine itself unites those two seemingly mutually exclusive 
qualities. On the one hand, a computer is a digital calculator based on 
mathematical game theory (Von Neumann 1928), performing work-related 
tasks; on the other hand, it is an entertainment center used in free time. From 
its early years the computer has found itself entangled at the intersection 
between work and leisure-related playful activities. It served as a computing 
and simulating aid at governmental departments, universities, research 
and cultural institutions. At the same time, that very same assemblage 
of hardware and software was used to program the f irst games. In 1961, a 
group of researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed 
Spacewar! (Russel 1961), a space combat simulation, in order to demonstrate 
the capacities of the computing machines to the public in a compelling way. 
Today, in the developed parts of the world, the most popular digital machines 
(personal computers, smartphones, or tablets) are an indispensable part of 
work and leisure, permeating both spaces.
As Joost Raessens (2010, 6) notices when discussing the ludif ication of 
culture, play is not only characteristic of leisure, but also now turns up in 
domains that were hitherto considered the opposite of play, such as education 
(e.g. educational games), politics (playful forms of campaigning, using gaming 
principles to involve party members in decision making processes) and even 
warfare (interfaces resembling computer games, the use of drones—unmanned 
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remote-controlled devices—introducing war à la PlayStation). This flooding 
of life with game elements leads naturally to the presence of play (the activity 
of play) and playfulness (the attitude of play) in the domains previously 
reserved for or associated with serious endeavors, such as work. However, in 
order to understand these play-centered dynamics we need to realize that 
the process of ludification of culture is not a one-way street. Our everyday life 
and work practices might resemble play. But equally, our playgrounds seem 
to be turning into workspaces. As Alexander Galloway emphasizes, “labor 
itself is now play, just as play becomes more and more laborious” (2012, 29).
This reciprocal effect has also been discussed in Walz and Deterding’s 
work entitled The gameful world (2015), which is devoted to the ludification of 
various domains of life. They hold that not only games and play are moving 
toward the center of our cultural, social, and economic existence, but also 
other realms of life impress their forms onto play (Walz and Deterding 2015, 
7). Games migrate into new, also non-leisure, territories and, while doing so, 
undergo changes. The latter phenomenon, in contrast to the ludif ication of 
culture is referred to as the cultivation of ludus. Following the same logic, 
we have introduced the concept of laborization (Dippel and Fizek 2015) 
as a contrasting term to that of gamif ication (Deterding et al. 2011)2 or 
ludif ication (Raessens 2006, 2010, 2014; Mäyra 2015). It denotes the process 
of the permeation of play with work elements. However, the work-play 
relationship is neither fully embraced by the concepts of gamif ication and 
ludif ication, nor that of laborization.
In order to cover the overlay of the work-play relationship, we are propos-
ing the concept of interference, borrowing a term that originally was used in 
the f ield of physics to denote the superposition of waves. This concept allows 
us to describe the interactions between phenomena, and their transforma-
tive character. The elements, dynamics, and logics of play are moved into 
the workspace, and by doing so they modify it (ludif ication). At the same 
time the opposite process of influencing play with the elements of work is 
taking place (laborization). The proposed work/play interference model (see 
Figure 13.2) delineates the relation between supposedly non-productive 
playful activities and productive work-related behaviors. It illustrates the 
dissolving distinction between the two qualities, and surpasses a strictly 
dualistic mode of thinking. By doing so it has the chance to characterize 
the complexities and impurities of social praxis more accurately.
2 In its purely mechanistic understanding, gamif ication is described as the implementation 
of game design elements into originally non-game contexts with the aim of influencing human 
behavior. 
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Within the model of interference, work and play appear as polar modalities 
of human interaction. On the one hand, they may be described separately 
from each other. On the other hand, they influence each other reciprocally, 
and within the moment of hermeneutical analysis and empirical research 
may be observed in their overlaying condition (Dippel and Fizek 2015). 
When the seriousness of work turns into jolly playfulness, and when the 
playful frivolousness transforms back into serious work, one may observe 
the processes of work-play interference.
Online citizen science ludic laboratories are considered a priori pleasur-
able and leisure-oriented game spaces, they are especially successful in 
enabling “productive activities of connected human minds” (Terranova 
2013, 42). The players make a voluntary decision to contribute to the digital 
economy. They are not motivated by monetary compensation for hours of 
their immaterial work. Like other participants in the digital economy (fan 
f iction writers, ‘modders,’ amateur web designers), they are acting out of 
the desire for cultural production. They are willingly contributing to the 
development of knowledge, being motivated and rewarded at numerous 
levels from the internal elements of the game’s system itself, including 
points, levels, and badges, to their status among the gaming community. 
EteRNA operates according to reinforcement strategies based on leveling up. 
The player folds the ever more complex patterns and is awaiting the results, 
while watching the animated test-tube simulating a chemical process. 
Such animations introduce a dramatic climax that may be resolved in the 
epiphany of a successful protein assemblage, and allow the players to experi-
ence little eureka moments within the game. Those scientif ic discoveries 
reinforced by the numerical system give the player a luring promise of 
completion. The motivation to perform playful citizen science is also enticed 
by external factors, such as the will to contribute to something greater than 
13.2: A diagrammatic visualization of the work and play continuum as a work/play interference 
model created by the authors.
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the game itself. The scientists recognize the citizen community’s efforts, 
and test the protein fold-up results of the best players in their laboratories 
or acknowledge the players in academic papers. This immediate leverage 
of a playful and pleasant activity with socially productive outcome, the 
element of competition in a large collaborative environment, and the feeling 
of belonging to a research community with a common goal, form the basis 
of citizen science games as examples of the work/play interference.
What remains fascinating in this work/play constellation is the relation-
ship between the human, the machine, and the data. The human agents 
contributing to research in the big data collaborative online games for science 
are of two kinds—the scientist and the citizen science player. Their roles 
played out in the human-machine assemblage are distinct and contrasting 
although both of them rely upon ludic simulation. A team of scientists in 
the laboratory analyze the already sieved data in search of signif icant 
pieces. The deluge of data is beforehand classif ied, labeled, and identif ied 
by players, each sitting in front of their own computer, which together with 
thousands of other calculating machines form a networked production 
line. In this sense, citizen science games resemble virtual assembly lines 
where big data is mined in an iterative factory-like system. The machine, 
on the other hand, stores the big data, runs the game, calculates the results 
delivered by thousands of players, communicates between the players and 
the scientif ic team, and networks the whole community. Most importantly, 
it learns from human behavior.
Into the age of interferences and postludification
[W]hat becomes of games when the sharp line dividing their ideal rules from the 
diffuse and insidious laws of daily life is blurred?
– Caillois 1958/2001, 43
Playing is a fundamental human activity (Tomasello 1999, 91). There is no 
culture known to ethnologists, historians, archaeologists, or missionar-
ies that has been devoid of games (Bally 1966, 61; Mäyra 2008, 37). Some 
researchers argue that play itself is a mode of fun and as such a universal 
quality, not only an attribute of humans (Graeber 2014). The proclaimed 
century of play we are currently experiencing is not necessarily a novelty. 
Already in 1751 Daniel Bernoulli, a Swiss mathematician and physicist, 
wrote, “The century that we live in could be subsumed in the history books 
as: Free Spirits’ Journal and the Century of Play” (Bernoulli 1751/1769, 387; 
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quoted in Bauer 2006, 377 and Fuchs 2014, 131).3 Moreover, a few decades 
before Zimmerman wrote the ‘Manifesto for a ludic century’ (2014) and 
the ludif ication of culture entered academic discourse (Raessens 2006, 
2010, 2014), Huizinga and Brian Sutton-Smith were analyzing play as a 
universal cultural element or state-of-mind, permeating other domains of 
our lives—from language, myths, rituals (Huizinga 1938/1992, 13) to thought 
games, television, theater, sexual intimacy, humor, celebrations and festivals, 
or gossip (Sutton-Smith 1997, 5).
The above examples point to a great diversity of play and the extension of 
play through other domains of life. They all, however, belong to the sphere 
of free time and entertainment. What has changed in our digital times is 
not so much the extent to which games permeate our everyday, but more 
importantly the interfering spaces of this permeation. As we have shown 
with the example of citizen science games, play has entered domains that 
previously had little to do with joyousness. In the case of games with purpose, 
play is as much a frivolous as a productive activity.
Also, such free-time activities as fan f iction writing, modifying existing 
software and video games (developing ‘mods’), managing communities, or 
sharing content via social networks, are being monetized and respectively 
‘laborized.’ Those leisure-related, playful and free activities are assigned 
monetary value and become products of the digital economy. After all, 
free labor is not only based upon the idealism of creative abundance and 
community building, but also on the capitalistic understanding of knowledge 
as added value. More importantly, free digital labor is performed voluntarily 
and is perceived as a pleasant activity—“[i]t does not feel, look, or smell like 
labor at all” (Scholz 2013, 2). And this aspect is particularly interesting as it 
further blurs the distinction between playfulness and work.
The complexities of work and play and their mutual interdependen-
cies and superpositions are also the subject of a recent anthropological 
study, describing and analyzing the collaborative work practices among 
video game developers and the signif icance of play in their workspace 
respectively (O’Donnell 2014). Building upon the work of T. L. Taylor (2006, 
72-73), O’Donnell refers to this playful labor or laborious play dimension 
as work/play interplay, and observes the overlaps on numerous levels, 
from the collaborative team work and the playful work conduct to the 
very arrangement of space in companies, where employees can climb, 
3 In its original form: “Das gegenwärtige Jahrhundert konnte man in den Geschichtsbüchern 
nicht besser, als unter dem Titel: Das Freygeister-Journal und Spielsaeculum nennen” (Bernoulli 
1751/1769, 387).
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play volleyball, or lift weights. As idyllic as this vision of labor may seem, 
O’Donnel emphasizes that the new modes of work practice, based on the 
blurred distinction between what is work and what is play, may as well 
dissolve into “destructive work practices“ (2015, 31). For as much as such 
playful work scheme encourages people to think creatively, it also pushes 
them to invest more time into work, giving the video game producers and 
publishers the possibility of extending the developer’s work week even up 
to 80 hours.
Caillois considered this blurring of f ictitious boundaries and the perme-
ability of the magic circle as a contamination and corruption of play. In 
his reasoning, the four elements of play (agon, alea, mimicry, ilinx) when 
devoid of playful convention transform into destructive activities, such as 
violence (the corruption of competition), superstition (the corruption of 
chance), alienation (the corruption of simulation), or alcoholism and drug 
addiction (the corruption of vertigo) (Caillois 1958/2001, 53-54).
The capital-oriented forms of laborized play or ludif ied work and the 
destructive human drives described by Caillois introduce yet another form of 
skepticism with regards to citizen science games. Here, it is the interference 
between human and non-human players that may cause concerns. Currently, 
humans are excelling at solving puzzles and predicting patterns—skills, 
which form the basis of citizen science gameplay. However, the unparalleled 
power of the human brain in pattern recognition may soon be challenged by 
such algorithms as EteRNAbot, which is already on its way to synthesizing 
excellence. The learning digital machine is enticing fears born in the age of 
industrialization. The uncertainties of the past are mirrored in the digital 
age as journalists paint bleak visions of future games, in which humans 
are not competing against one another, not even against the machine, but 
in which we all serve as “intelligence-gathering slaves” in a playful factory 
simulated by a digital brain, playing with human pawns (Koerner 2012). 
We should realize, however, that such fearsome visions are still deeply 
rooted in the model of human-machine co-existence, where the main role 
of people is to supervise the machines, and the main role of the machines 
is to obediently perform upon the human command. In the digital times, 
when the machines and algorithms are ever more present and ref ined, we 
need to constantly re-negotiate and re-think our place in the playful and 
laborious places of everyday.
It is precisely such interferences, interplays, transgressions, crossed 
boundaries, or blurred lines, which paint a large part of the present ludic 
landscape, and lead to the rise of the new modes of play. And these are 
possibly taking us into the age of postludification. The age in which we are 
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not only saturating the everyday with playful forms of expression, but also 
immersing frivolous play in productivity and labor. Or as Sicart also puts 
it, moving play into the realms of eff iciency, seriousness, and technical 
determinism (Sicart 2014, 5). At the outbreak of the postludic era proposed 
here, we need to decide whether we are embracing the transgressing playful 
technologies and phenomena as empowering, engaging, and participatory, 
or observing them with caution, restraint, or even suspicion in Caillois’ 
spirit.
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 Introduction to Part III
René Glas, Sybille Lammes, Michiel de Lange, Joost Raessens, 
and Imar de Vries
In Part III of this volume, the discussions in all the chapters converge on 
forms of political action enabled by playful media technologies. In the chapter 
On participatory politics as a game changer and the politics of participation, 
philosopher of technology Mercedes Bunz notes that we cannot simply take 
the alleged participatory nature of digital media technologies as self-evident. 
She addresses a similar point to Ingrid Hoofd in Part I, namely how discourses 
about participatory media are all too easily co-opted. How radical is this 
gesture really, Bunz asks. She critically unpacks claims about the revolution-
ary impact of digital technology on society and shows how digital media 
both facilitate increased participation and the splintering of the public. The 
idea of playfully ‘hacking politics’ may help to turn political problems into 
challenges that can be solved through public participation, but advocating 
participation can then easily morph into the outsourcing or offloading of 
state responsibilities onto citizens. Bunz notes how as a corollary many 
participatory projects have become non-monetary-centered organizations.
With her contribution, Bunz opens up the debate on the potential scope 
of ‘true’ political change that playful media can instigate. The chapters that 
follow take the play perspective to provide new insights into the relationships 
between digital technology and political action. Critical geographer Sam 
Hind’s contribution, Playing with politics: Memory, orientation, and tactility, 
investigates political agency by highlighting the jovial and carnivalesque 
qualities of anti-austerity demonstrations in London in 2011. During the 
March for the Alternative, which attracted over 250,000 protesters, people 
carried a giant Trojan Horse with them that variously served as a dynamic 
landmark used in identifying and directing the group of protesters, as a satiri-
cal comment, and as a seemingly frivolous ‘incident.’ In Hind’s analysis, such 
ludic political interventions constitute a playful, material, and performative 
relationship between digital technology and embodied political action. Hind 
analyzes three ways in which social media are instrumental in making this 
work: they enable the production and preservation of memories of protests, 
they enable the orientation and the navigation of protesters, and they provide 
a tactile combination of body and action during events. Even though the 
Trojan Horse was burned afterwards, its political memory lives on thanks 
to the various social media that captured and commented on its existence.
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In Meaningful inefficiencies: Resisting the logic of technological efficiency 
in the design of civic systems, civic media scholars Eric Gordon and Stephen 
Walter pick up Bunz’s notion of digital participation technology as pre-
formatting citizen engagement by highlighting the rhetoric of eff iciency 
that is present in many civic media platforms. Participatory media profess 
to make interacting with the government more ‘user-friendly’ or ‘customer-
friendly,’ but in opposition to this narrative Gordon and Walter argue that 
the true productive power of public engagement lies in creating participatory 
technologies that do not aim at smooth and seamless usability as their 
main objective. Building upon the distinction made by Hannah Arendt 
between labor, work, and action, Gordon and Walter propose that the notion 
of ‘meaningful ineff iciency’ offers an escape from the co-optation of civic 
participation as productive labor and work. Meaningful ineff iciency as 
found in play, they argue, allows for truly participatory civic action as it 
opens up a way of “expanding technological civic systems to accommodate 
more than just the ‘good user’ of systems, but also the marginalized, the 
emergent, and the playful.”
Continuing this focus on the range of possibilities and limitations that 
participatory technology can offer to playfully operating citizens, media 
theorist Douglas Rushkoff begins his chapter Permanent revolution: Occupy-
ing democracy by historically contextualizing and critically discussing the 
2008 Obama presidential campaign as a landmark event that is often referred 
to as having redefined citizens’ political engagement for the better, thanks 
to the widespread use of social media. Given that the Obama administration 
seemed to still largely act as a ‘read-only government’ and today’s net culture 
seems to reward participation with hits, likes, and binary answers instead 
of knowledge or insight, Rushkoff disputes the idea that digital media 
inevitably promote participatory communication. Still, he identif ies certain 
characteristics of digital media —feedback, deconstruction of narrative, 
prototyping, and programmer/player—that do help to rethink expectations 
of agency, participation, and change in the digital environment that we live 
in, perhaps as catalyzers for creating meaningful ineff iciencies. Studying 
the Occupy Movement as a prime example embodying these characteristics, 
Rushkoff claims that it reflects “values and insights of twenty-f irst-century 
science and technology” and that it stands for a form of political engagement 
that is much more inclusive and iterative—and therefore playful—than 
was possible in previous media environments.
In his chapter about playful urban planning, The playful city: Citizens 
making the smart city, media scholar Michiel de Lange argues that play 
and games can help foster smart citizenship. In recent years, many cities 
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have embarked on what is termed smart city policies, deploying ICTs to 
optimize a variety of urban processes. Many authors have noted that these 
smart city policies often leave little room for civic action and agency. De 
Lange proposes the notion of the ‘playful city’ as an alternative vision for 
leveraging the smartness of people in creating more livable and lively cities. 
Play, he argues, should not be positioned as offering potential solutions to 
urban problems. Instead, as an alternative narrative about city-making, 
play allows the future of smart cities to be made political again instead of 
technocratic and tech-driven.
While Rushkoff and De Lange see ways to approach existing systems of 
governance as ‘hackable’ and therefore as enabling playful counter-narratives 
or co-creative narratives to gain ground using digital technologies, the 
contribution Dissent at a distance by The Janissary Collective (composed 
of digital media and journalism scholars Mark Deuze and Lindsay Ems) 
argues that while protest movements and civic groups may indeed benefit 
from ‘mediatization,’ their playful character is less the result of a conscious 
strategy than it is the outcome of the performativity of means-over-ends 
focused engagement, which manifests itself in the ‘slacktivism’ inherent 
in participating online only, and the gaming of the telecommunication 
system. In this, The Janissary Collective is also skeptical about generalizing 
the transformative role of new media tools, and proposes to regard today’s 
political and social movements as thriving on the unruly and affective 
ecologies of media that mostly emphasize the ‘feeling’ of belonging to a 
community instead of actually being part of one. Participation in these 
movements, according to the Collective, is an expression of a playful way 
of being and therefore a mode of being human.
This playful mode of being human in a mediatized world, f inally, is 
explored further by media scholar Alex Gekker, who aims to extend the 
vocabulary of the f ield of digital game studies—and casual game studies in 
particular—to the realm of political studies. In Playing with power: Casual 
politicking as a new frame for political analysis, Gekker’s argument picks up 
on the Janissary Collective’s notion of mediatization and notes that this is a 
meta-process in which the molding forces of games congregate and operate 
within political spheres, which in turn makes politics today less about fully 
f ledged participation than about playful and casual types of engagement. 
Echoing Bunz’s take on the outsourcing of governmental decision-making 
to citizens via digital technologies, Gekker’s notion of casual politicking sees 
citizens being enticed to participate in politics because it is regarded as a 
game, one that does not ask too much of the player and is easily discarded 
when a certain goal is reached. By analyzing the ‘gameful designs’ of the 
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Obama 2008 and Trump 2016 presidential campaigns, Gekker attempts to lay 
bare the possibilities of casual politicking to overcome a range of common 
dichotomies: between passive and active citizenship, between sender and 
receiver, and between citizenship as a duty and citizenship as a vocation.
14. On participatory politics as a 




In this chapter, the revolutionary impact of digital technology on society 
is unpacked and critically assessed. Bunz asks how digital media can 
facilitate the increased participation of citizens, but can at the same 
time be used as a means for diffusion that is far less radical in its politi-
cal outcomes. The idea of playfully ‘hacking politics’ may help to turn 
political problems into challenges that can be resolved through public 
participation, but advocating participation can just as easily change into 
the contracting out of state responsibilities onto citizens. As is argued in 
this chapter, citizens’ participation does not necessarily allow for radical 
transformation and often does not offer enough tension and discussion 
to kickstart societal changes.
Keywords: Citizens’ participation, hacking, politics, digital media, political 
gestures
“Forms of organization are inseparable from technical gestures”: this 
proposition by Bruno Latour (1999, 210) was written right at the time when 
the internet was about to become a mass medium. As digitalization spread, 
a new technical gesture was on the rise (Bunz 2014, 55-59). The aim of my 
contribution is to follow Latour’s proposition and explore it with regards 
to a specif ic type of organization: the f ield of politics. For this, I plan to 
take a general look at the effects of the technical gesture of digitalization 
commonly identif ied as “decentralization” or “fragmentation” (Castells 
1996; Galloway 2004, 46; Hayles 2009, 68; Lovink 2012; Bruns et al. 2015). 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
doi: 10.5117/9789462984523/ch14
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Being at times discussed as promising models of anti-capitalism (Srnicek 
and Williams 2015; Scholz and Schneider 2017), I will specif ically describe 
new forms of participatory politics to analyze how they have influenced a 
shift in the concept of the political. After some introductory remarks about 
the relation of organization and technology, my contribution will look at 
three examples that put new forms of participatory organization into play 
and will explain why this can be conceived as the gamif ication of politics 
(e.g. Deterding et al. 2011, Fuchs et al 2014) or casual-politicking (Gekker, see 
Chapter 20 in this volume). It will also describe the consequences on citizens 
that come with the shift from representational politics to participatory 
politics. Finally, it will turn to a discussion of the political ‘game’ itself, in 
order to ask, how radical is this gesture, how political is this new form of 
organization? Is it a game changer, or is it just the same old story, now in 
just a new, fancy light of participation?
Organization and technology
Organization has an odd and indirect relation to technology. As the Ameri-
can philosopher of technology Langdon Winner noted, there is a “technical 
constitution of society” (1986, 47). This is an interesting remark, as Winner 
did not write “technical dependence.” Obviously, the means of our social 
organization cannot be directly deduced from technology or vice versa. 
However, Winner holds that they are fundamentally linked. In the era 
of industrialization, the link of technology and the political was widely 
debated via the means of production. In the era of digitalization on the other 
hand, we are about to shift our focus away from production and instead 
stress the matter of organization (Srnicek and Williams 2015; Virno 2006, 
36; Baecker 2011). The Dutch philosopher of technology Peter-Paul Verbeek 
(2011) for example has explicitly shown how design always imposes a certain 
organization and with it a morality of things.
On an abstract level, the link between organization and technology reads 
as follows: everything that is organized has a pattern and a structure. To 
form a structure and hold on to a certain pattern, it requires communica-
tion, and communication is based on a technical element. A crowd or an 
individual is never simply there. Connections and distances are constantly 
communicated, negotiated, acknowledged, or denied: this is the work of a 
society, a work done with the help of a symbol, a paper form, or a poster, 
a meeting room, a telephone, a membership card, a digital platform, or a 
specif ic thing (Marres 2012). With the help of those communication tools, 
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we form as multitudes (Virno 2004, 84), create assemblages (DeLanda 2006), 
or coordinate ourselves on platforms (Srnicek 2017).
If we apply this perspective to citizens, we can see the state as an “ap-
paratus” (Althusser 1970) that produces a loose group, connected by the 
symbol of a passport. In Western societies, passports grant citizens certain 
responsibilities and rights, including, among others, the right that they may 
register to vote. This form of participatory power—the vote—has been the 
most important political act of the citizen; it represents his or her ability 
to control politics since in representative democracies we vote someone in 
and out of an off ice. However, if we compare the length of time it takes a 
citizen to cast a vote with the length of time a government is in power, the 
unbalance of this political division of labor becomes apparent: after the 
brief active moment of voting, we f ind that voters (i.e. ‘us’) are generally 
passive, while the politicians (‘them’) make the decisions. To overcome 
this division, participatory politics—getting the citizen to take a more 
active part via public campaigning or in local initiatives—has been a recur-
ring theme. Especially in the 1960s this turned into a strong participatory 
impulse, which was also expressed in art and culture (Debord 1967; Bishop 
2006). Thus, we can say that in our most recent past, participation has been 
discussed as an emancipatory act. Not any more. Now that new forms of 
participation have evolved with digitalization, the positive rhetoric seems 
to have changed: Srnicek has denounced certain forms of participation as 
‘platform capitalism’ (2017). Before him Schäfer (2009) already pointed out 
the misuse of participation as a replacement for market research. Since new 
digital forms of participatory politics continue to emerge in great scale, it is 
important to try to understand this more precisely: how does the increase 
in participatory politics and its transformation from an exception to a new 
norm affect the set-up of the political? Let us look at some examples from 
the recent history of digitalization.
Forms of participation
In 2009, the platform RaceOnline2012.org was created by Martha Lane 
Fox, co-founder of Lastminute.com. Its aim was to tackle the digital divide 
and bring millions of people, who had never been online, in touch with the 
internet. Bearing the gamification of politics in its name, the website made 
use of an interface that acquired details from people willing to help regarding 
on which weekday and time they or their seminar room or their computer 
would generally be available each week; or if they felt more comfortable 
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with teaching a group or an individual person, making available a work 
place, a work tool, or working time. As we can see here, the interface was 
programmed to connect humans and “nonhumans” (Latour 1999, 174) as 
directly and detailed as possible.
Data.gov.uk is another example of early participatory politics. The UK 
government project, which started in 2010 and relaunched in 2018, enables 
developers to freely access non-personal data the state acquired for off icial 
purposes, from traff ic sector data to crime statistics to the governments 
central accounting system. Initiated by the founder of the World Wide Web 
Sir Tim Berners-Lee and the computer professor Nigel Shadbolt, the website 
was launched in January 2010. A few years later, in 2013, some 9,000 data 
sets were available, and more than 2,500 developers had signed up to the 
project. The result of their experimental data use was the creation of many 
applications and websites, among them for example the ‘Care Home Map,’ 
which helps to evaluate the services of Care Homes for elderly relatives or 
friends, or ‘Road Works,’ which informs about planned government traff ic 
works and helps to optimize logistics. With these projects, data.gov.uk 
became committed to the idea of government transparency and proclaimed 
it would open up government. It did this in parts, since most of us cannot 
handle this kind of raw data.
Here, digital participation introduces an interesting dilemma (see also 
Tkacz 2012). It can be summed up as follows: while data sets are of tremen-
dous use to developers, they are of no use to the general public. Being able to 
use data depends on having digital skills, so making it available simultane-
ously triggers a digital divide. Paradoxically, digitalization introduces more 
participation, but it splinters the public—obviously the fragmentation of 
digitalization also affect publicness itself. To correct this, tools exist that 
lower the tech barriers and make app building and programming easier. 
These are ways to tackle this new digital exclusion, as the relapse to an 
equal but passive position is not an attractive alternative.
Finally, there is the interesting example of the Social Innovation Camp, a 
project that was founded in 2008 by, among others, the then global manager 
of Amnesty International Dan McQuillan, a scholar for creative and social 
computing at Goldsmiths University. The Social Innovation Camp brings 
digital solutions to social challenges by following the approach of what is 
known among coders as a ‘hackday’: by applying existing code to a new 
problem, programmers rapidly f ind creative solutions and are able to swiftly 
build a prototype. As digitalization allows new connections and a far more 
detailed administration of our world, this can be applied to real life, or as 
McQuillan puts it, we can “combine rapid prototyping with asset-based 
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community development, using the ability of the Internet to aggregate 
and mash-up solutions to social issues” (2012). One outcome of this new 
approach is GoodGym.org, a project that mashes up participation with 
digital technology; instead of becoming a member at a gym, the service 
pairs runners with isolated and less mobile people in their area. Runners 
then jog to their house, deliver something nice, have a brief chat, and are 
on their way again.
Participation and the citizen
Let us now take a step back from the examples and focus on the political 
ethos these projects bring into play when addressing their issues. Firstly, we 
can notice that these issues do not have a political motive at all, whether 
in the traditional sense of politics as the activity of government, nor in 
the more recent radicalized conception of politics as ‘post-politics.’ This 
movement, represented by philosophers as different as Rancière, Badiou, 
Mouffe, and Žižek, aims for a new radical approach toward politics from 
the standpoint of equality, when f inding politics proper reduced to social 
administration. Instead of compromise and consensus, they stress friction, 
debate, disagreement, and allowing the unheard voice to be accounted for 
(see Rancière 1999, 27ff). Both approaches, however, when compared to the 
‘gamification of politics,’ do not seem to apply. Here, the social and political 
issues tackled have not moved back under the administrative wings of the 
government, but they also do not seem to be an issue in the post-political 
sense. All of them address urgent social problems but there is no friction 
or debate, there is no voice that makes itself heard, or a strong notion of 
inequality.
The problems present themselves as challenges that citizens can face 
and take part in, in case they are interested. Like in the setting of a game, 
political issues appear as simple fragments of a much bigger picture; there 
is also the opportunity with these game-like politics to take part, but there 
is no obligation. Instead of a political idea or ideology, there is a simple 
challenge; instead of tackling common problems in the world as a whole, 
we stick with solving a demarcated f ield or question or problem; instead of 
asking the citizen to believe in a political program, the issues at stake ask 
us to take part in f inding a solution to a particular problem: join the club 
and play with us! Now Wittgenstein (1953) rightly observed that we may 
not be able to clearly def ine what a game is, but there are enough family 
resemblances between this new approach of tackling a social problem and 
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the setting of a game: it is structured, a challenge, circumscribed in time 
and place, and although it is not f ictitious it connects you with a different 
reality from your own. Do not let the elderly feel isolated. Help people 
who have no digital literacy. Open government and make it accessible for 
others. Fight for the survival of your planet. Save Lara Croft. The seamless 
gliding between both spheres makes it apparent that we can indeed claim 
the ‘gamif ication of politics’ when we def ine gamif ication as “the use of 
game design elements in non-game contexts” (Deterding et al. 2011, 10). If 
we explore the effect of this kind of gamif ication further, however, new 
questions arise: what are its consequences for politics? Does the gamification 
of politics not only change politics, but also change the approach of the state 
toward its citizens, and if so in what way?
As I have emphasized above, the social is not an obligation for everyone 
anymore, but a challenge that is optional, in which one can take part as if 
it were a game. Here, the gamification of politics changes the notion of the 
political in a very specific way, and the new notion of the political is triggered 
when the technical constitution of society (Winner 1986, 47) becomes visible. 
Clearly, the technical gesture (Latour 1999, 210) of digitalization is at work: 
fragmentation has dismantled the notion of ‘everyone.’ This leads to an 
urgent political question: What will happen to a state that is subjected to 
the logic of gamif ication when in the past it was a democratic apparatus 
set to ensure the values of justice, freedom, and equality for everyone? Let 
us ponder this question for a moment.
Replacing the war of ‘all against all’ while respecting the plurality of 
its people, the democratic state ideally provides its citizens with equal 
opportunities to live in freedom, so that everyone gets a fair chance to take 
part in society—Jacques Rancière has, among others, discussed equality 
as an essential and complex democratic value “on which any social order 
rests” (Rancière 1999, 16). The actual way that the social order is based on 
equality, however, changes in a digitalized society. Instead of facilitating 
just one equal opportunity for all (i.e. through voting), the state can now 
also offer a range of different possibilities to directly participate in its 
politics. Consequently, instead of ‘a people’ we have a plurality of different 
participants. This means while ‘a people’ can now be more active, they also 
f ind themselves divided into different groups, each one with different skills 
to ‘play politics’ at different levels—an interesting dilemma that needs to 
be discussed.
It becomes apparent that the rise of digital technology confronts the state 
with an interesting problem: to enable digital participation will necessarily 
mean the state is not the same for all. In a society fragmented into citizens 
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with different skills, the idea of equality is without question still important 
but needs to be newly adjusted. While every one of its citizens should be able 
to browse the knowledge of the internet, not everyone necessarily needs to 
know how to code; everyone should, however, get an opportunity to learn 
this important and powerful task. Here, the state needs to struggle with the 
division of its people, for it should not deny its citizens the technical chance 
of taking a more active part in politics. Yet, the attractive option of opening 
government up has another flipside: when is a state enabling its citizens to 
participate politically and when is it simply outsourcing its responsibilities? 
This is a serious problem which this chapter will now turn to in order to 
discuss the potential of participatory politics as a game changer.
Participatory politics as game changer?
If we return for a moment to the beginning of this chapter, where we 
were introduced to Latour’s proposition that “[f]orms of organization are 
inseparable from technical gestures” (1999, 210), we can now finally focus on 
the question of how inseparable these two phenomena are. Can a technical 
gesture initiate new forms of organization? Does it change the organization 
of our societies with regard to being socially truly revolutionary? Regarding 
technology, a revolutionary connotation has often been addressed. For a 
long time, philosophers have been especially fascinated by the deep impact 
technical change has had on society. Besides Marx, it was Walter Benjamin 
who most explicitly linked technology to a social revolution. When in 
Moscow in 1927, he wrote for example that “the revolutionary work of this 
hour is not conflict, not civil war, but canal construction, electrif ication, and 
factory building. The revolutionary nature of true technology is emphasized 
ever more clearly” (Benjamin 1927, 45). Langdon Winner also addresses 
technologies as a basic cause of social change (1986, 31), much like Corlann 
Gee Bush, who points out that technological change stimulates social change 
(1983). Let us now f inally explore the ability of digital technology to change 
societies, as well as the participatory politics, and start with the obvious 
question: Does digital technology really change the way we organize our 
societies, or does it simply automatize it?
Analyzing digital technology, one can notice the potential of far more 
detailed organization than ever before, in which logistics is turned into 
an integral element of production (Thrift 2004, 182). Online interfaces 
automatically manage details and notify issues that, before the existence 
of algorithms, a human person had to ask, such as: When is this room free? 
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When do you have some spare time? What skills do you have? When is a 
computer available? Or, when can this object be used? Again, it becomes 
obvious that digitalization connects and manages the world in far greater 
detail, and this will increasingly become the case with the further growth 
of the Internet of Things (Bunz and Meikle 2018). For instance, by using 
RFID chips not only humans, but also objects are able to answer inquiries 
(Hayles 2009) and this enables millions of new connections. This technical 
innovation takes the Internet of PCs to a next level since it makes objects 
digitally addressable.
The political potential of these new connections, as I have shown 
elsewhere in great detail (Bunz 2014, 109-115; Bunz and Meikle 2018), has 
fascinated media scientists, some even predict the emergence of a new media 
ontology (Kittler 2009). The human geographer Nigel Thrift, for example, 
writes about our new ability of tracking and tracing: “If things are showing 
up differently, we can do different things too, energetically opening up the 
new order of being” (2004, 188). McQuillan discusses this potential further 
as “hacking social reality”: as the digital allows to transform pre-existing 
elements to evoke meanings not originally intended in the raw material, he 
argues that “we can prototype parts of a new society in the shell of the old” 
(2012). As Latour has indicated, the new digital technical gesture does not 
simply apply to automatize tasks, but truly opens up new forms of social 
organization since the change even goes further than what has existed. In 
effect, it interrupts existing mechanisms in their tracks: regarding organiza-
tion digitalization is—again—skipping the intermediaries, or rather one 
intermediary, namely money.
If one analyzes the above-mentioned examples from the Social Innovation 
Camp to RaceOnline2012 more closely, it becomes apparent that they set 
the logic of money aside. Compared to websites of The Red Cross, Amnesty 
International, or Greenpeace, their homepages do (or did) not have a clearly 
visible donate button. Instead they stressed the notion of ‘get involved.’ This 
is symptomatic. Since they focus on connecting things and skills, humans 
and nonhumans directly, money is not at the center of their organization but 
just one means among others to reach their goal. And this is also the case 
with thepublicschool.org, Rynda.org, and many other examples leading to 
the conclusion that a new type of organization indeed has emerged in the 
digital era. Referring to ‘non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) this new 
type can be categorized as ‘non-money centered organizations’ (NMCOs). 
These new possibilities, which have been described and supported by Trebor 
Scholz and Nathan Schneider (2017), introduce a potential for massive change. 
For example, before digitalization and its technical gesture of fragmentation 
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had reached organization, the size of a budget clearly defined the size of an 
organization. Now this has changed. With the rise of NMCOs, the potential of 
playing a different game, one that might escape the logic of money, becomes 
apparent. While the new technical gesture gave rise to this new form of 
organization, it does not however dictate its political interpretation. Here 
the link of technical organization and social revolution, one that escapes 
the ruling logic of money, prof it, and eff iciency, comes to an end. Technol-
ogy and organization are inseparable, but their political interpretation is 
not. Or, to put it differently, the fact that technology enables new forms of 
organization does not mean the direction of change is automatically set 
for a revolution. Participatory politics are pushed further by the technical 
gesture of digitalization so they can be a game changer, but they can also 
be used as a means to outsource social responsibilities from the state to its 
citizens. For example, ‘Do It—Volunteering made easy’ is a website from the 
charity YouthNet supported by the UK Cabinet Office which enables citizens 
to f ind voluntary work in their area. After the public sector job cuts in the 
UK heavily affected social services—the Off ice for Budget Responsibilities 
report showed that by the second quarter of 2011 General Government 
Employment fell by 80,000—there were obviously many opportunities to 
volunteer. This work was often being done by professional social workers who 
had at one time been employed by the state. In April 2018, a search limited 
to a f ive-mile area in East London displayed 1475 volunteer opportunities, 
including helping sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds in their local school or 
college, being the weekend receptionist in a hospital, or joining clean-ups in 
the local area. Here, participatory technology does not innovate, but simply 
helps to replace a retracting state. Participatory technology is simply being 
used to keep on reproducing the same social situations instead of creating 
new ones that may unlock a new becoming.
Conclusion
While exploring Latour’s proposition in the era of digitalization and looking 
into new forms of organization like participatory politics, it became apparent 
that his statement is still relevant: “forms of organization are inseparable 
from technical gestures.” The fact that technology is inseparable from 
organization influences but does not determine politics. In other words, 
digital technology opens up new forms of organization, but the question of 
the political remains. When do we play a new game? And when do we just 
change the rules in order to replay the old game on a new board?
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The focus of this chapter is how playfulness can be a constitutive part of 
political activism. Analyzing the anti-austerity demonstrations in London 
in 2011, Hind looks at the carnivalesque and ludic qualities during the 
March for the Alternative, which attracted over 250,000 protesters. One of 
the highlights of this march was a giant Trojan horse that people carried 
with them. In Hind’s analysis, ludic political interventions such as the 
Trojan horse constitute a playful, material, and performative relationship 
between digital technologies and embodied political actions. Hind draws 
attention to the fact that political events are not solely human-driven, 
but that technologies form an intrinsic part of how they unfold. Through 
a reading of Stiegler, he examines the material and affective dynamics of 
contemporary protest events.
Keywords: Political activism, ludic interventions, the carnivalesque, 
mobility
In this chapter, I want to propose that protest events are not solely human-
driven. Although this might seem a rather modest task to undertake, it is 
a rather bold proposition. Think of the affective nature of all manner of 
demonstrations, rallies, marches, occupations, and even riots. Think also 
of the objectives. Protest events are designed to change human thinking 
and acting. Some are anti-war campaigns to rally fellow citizens. Others 
are full-scale revolutions designed to shift power from autocratic lead-
ers to the people. In essence, they might be witnessed as wholly human 
accomplishments.
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
doi: 10.5117/9789462984523/ch15
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But what is often missing from accounts of these moments is a nuanced 
consideration of the role of technology. Although it is now commonplace 
to suggest that social media has become a conduit for organization of, and 
solidarity with, demonstrations the world over, it is less common to chart 
these technologies in action. Platform-specif ic messages do not  necessarily 
invoke a change in thinking. Nor do they magically cause citizens to as-
semble. While a tweet, a Facebook notif ication, or a Firechat message may 
stimulate action this cannot be presumed in advance of its happening. What 
is of interest in this chapter is how platform-specif ic messages affect the 
playful, material, and performative dimensions of protest events. In order 
to situate this, I will f irst provide a brief introduction to social media and 
protest. Then, I will turn to Bernard Stiegler (1998, 2009) and his work on 
the mnemotechnical and navigational developments in contemporary 
society. In other words, I will examine his work to address the importance of 
memory and orientation. To these I will also add a discussion on the tactile 
nature of protest events to draw out the more recent shifts at the interface 
between technology and protest.
In order to show the specif icity of these dynamics I will make refer-
ence to one particular incident; the parading of a Trojan Horse that took 
place during an anti-austerity demonstration in London, on 26 March 2011. 
Organized by the umbrella organization, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), 
it was known as the March for the Alternative, and attracted over 250,000 
protesters (BBC News 2011)—including myself. Photographic evidence and 
contributions from social media collected both during and after the event 
will serve as the empirical basis for this contribution. The playful, material, 
and performative relation between the Trojan Horse and digital technology 
will become clearer as this chapter proceeds.
Social media and protest: The delusional citizen?
Although some may wager that the exercise of rights now takes place quite at the 
expense of bodies on the street, that Twitter and other virtual technologies have 
led to a disembodiment of the public sphere, I disagree.
– Butler (2011, n.p.)
As Juris (2012) points out, network-based forms of social movement or-
ganization are nothing new. The New Social Movements of the 1970s were 
characterized by less hierarchical arrangements of command that were not 
predicated upon a centralized organizational form (Buechler 1995). Protestors 
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have also been using forms of digital communication to coordinate action 
since the late 1990s. The global justice movement utilized listserve networks 
during this period to communicate with followers across the world. They 
allowed computer users from disparate locations to connect with the cause 
of global justice. But, as Juris (2012, 260) further contends, this was far from 
a revolutionary overhaul in organization, but more simply an incorporation 
of new forms of media into “ongoing practices of core groups of activists,” 
with the aim to “diffuse new dynamics of activism.”
Fast-forward, and the mobilization of activists via Twitter during the 
various Occupy protests (see Constanza-Chock 2012; Pickerill and Krinsky 
2012; Gleason 2013) is but a more recent example of the entanglement of 
such events with new technological capabilities. Again, it is important to 
note that although such advances in access to (and speed, performance, and 
mobility of) such technologies are undoubtedly contributing to a radical shift 
in protest operation, there are still a number of caveats. While it may seem 
that access is open and universal to social media platforms such as Twitter, 
divides do remain. Geography, class, age, race, and gender continue to be 
barriers to online participation (see Zook and Graham 2007; Crutcher and 
Zook 2009; Thatcher 2013), suggesting that the infrastructural, social, and 
political bases for contribution are highly uneven—this despite widespread 
discussion on the ‘democratization’ of data in the ‘Web 2.0’ era (Morozov 
2011; Haklay 2013).
Moreover, the efforts of groups such as Anonymous and Lulzsec (Gallagher 
and Arthur 2011), while synonymous with more natively digital protests 
such as hacks and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, have also 
spawned collective, urban action (Gekker, see Chapter 20 in this volume). 
The widespread use of Guy Fawkes masks made popular in the V for Vendetta 
f ilm (McTeigue 2005) during the Occupy protests was a striking example of 
the visible solidarity between contemporary protesters (see Elden 2011). This 
is what the journalist Jonathan Jones has called a kind of ‘festive citizenship’ 
(Jones 2011); drawing on the public image of an amorphous hacktivist group 
to re-constitute the carnivalesque in a new technological age (see Sicart 
2014, 10-11).
Gerbaudo (2012, 2) explicitly asked: “Is this all just an activist delusion?” 
In other words, can we really draw causal links between social platform 
content and on the ground action? Are the dynamics outlined above really 
constitutive of a new arena of civic engagement? Or do they constitute a 
kind of technological fetishism in which a causal link between message 
and action is presumed a priori? The next three sections will draw out the 
parameters of the debate by drawing on the work of Bernard Stiegler (1998, 
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2009). Social media, it is argued here, are used in three ways to stimulate 
action on the ground: to form a recallable and recoverable depository of 
moments within events; to construct a navigational orientation toward 
moments during events; and to forge a co-constitution of body and action 
in events.
Memory and event
One of the ongoing discussions surrounding new technological devices 
is the effect on the human capacity to remember. Nicholas Carr (2008) 
theorized in his infamous article ‘Is Google making us stupid?’ on how 
Google was helping to shape “the process of thought” by becoming a conduit 
for information-gathering. This, Carr suggests, is leading to a reduction in 
people’s mental capacity to concentrate, to contemplate, and their ability 
to engage in deep learning.
Digital devices like personal computers, mobile phones or tablets, or 
online platforms like Google, Twitter, or Facebook constitute a materializa-
tion of thought, or what Bernard Stiegler (1998) terms ‘tertiary forms of 
memory.’ These “technical objects,” as Stiegler refers to them, sift, collect, 
store, structure, catalogue, and re-present information exterior to the human 
body so that thoughts become “inscribed in the non-living body” of technical 
objects (Stiegler 2009, 4). It is through these objects that we, as humans, 
are comprised especially in spatial terms as Kinsley (2014) and Ash (2010, 
2012) have explored. It is this inscription that becomes a valuable technique 
for those participating in protest events, as the content of such objects far 
outlives their producers.
This has implications for what is known as primary and secondary forms 
of memory. The former constitutes the “original impression” (Stiegler 2009, 
246) of an event or a moment; that initial period of perception in which 
people capture and process everyday occurrences. For instance, at the mo-
ment an activist encounters other fellow protesters during a demonstration. 
The latter forms what we know as human memory; the fragmentation of 
past experiences constituted in the mind afterwards. Say, in the days, weeks, 
months, and years after a particularly memorable protest event. These are 
naturally partial, reconstituted, and re-imagined fragments that together 
with primary perceptual impressions form ‘protensions,’ the projection of 
past thoughts and perceptions into everyday life.
But while primary and secondary memories cease to exist when a life 
form dies, memories supplanted and registered in digital devices and online 
PLAyING WITh PoLITICS: MEMoRy, oRIENTATIoN, AND TAC TILIT y 295
platforms continue on. Stiegler’s (1998) general claim therefore, is that 
technology acts as a third type of human memory, one that, despite laden 
with a degree of human knowledge, is nonetheless exterior to, and independ-
ent of, human memory. It is for this reason that it becomes a powerful tool 
during protest events, providing the ability for others to collect, search, and 
recall particular moments otherwise ‘lost.’ Moreover, critically, that tertiary 
forms of memory come to constitute both primary and secondary forms 
of memory in the f irst instance. In other words, digital devices and online 
platforms precede and therefore wholly shape the types of experiences and 
capacities for thought that Carr (2008) suggested earlier. It is only through 
tertiary forms of memory—technologies that enable us to store and recover 
moments—that our primary and secondary forms can function.
Stiegler (2009, 8) calls this relationship between tertiary memory, in-
dividual, and environment ‘mnemotechnics.’ Put otherwise, all forms of 
media—from printed books to social media platforms—allow for a kind of 
memory to be developed and inscribed. The primary function of this is to 
reduce the cognitive load on the human. If something becomes inscribed 
there is little need to remember it in full—it is safe and secure written, 
drawn, photographed, or copied down in some other way. Such is the power 
of this material independence that it is capable of outliving all other forms of 
memory, and evolving in an altogether unique way. However, these dynamics 
of technical evolution, Simondon (1958/1980) maintains, have been criminally 
misinterpreted, representing a prosthetic, developmental necessity of human 
life. By extension we can understand how digital technology within protest 
events has constituted a prosthesis of action. However, this is not the form 
of technological fetishism questioned previously. For although Stiegler holds 
that technology is a prosthetic, developmental necessity of human life, he 
does not believe that because of this we are married to any specific technology 
per se. We can still propose the former without slipping into the latter, thus 
avoiding the technological determinism highlighted by Gerbaudo (2012).
In the conceptualization of a tertiary memory, Stiegler (2009, 12) grapples 
f irstly with what he calls “the orthographic age.” In constituting the practice 
of writing as the foremost prosthesis of technical memory, Stiegler is able to 
comprehend the role technical objects have in shaping and remembering 
human politics. As he says:
It is philology’s business to establish the authenticity of source materials; 
once they have been established, I no longer doubt having access, as if I 
were there, to Plato’s or Heidegger’s orthographic thoughts, constituted 
in the very possibility of a certain after-the-fact re-constitution. (Ibid., 8)
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We do not question, in everyday matters, the medium of the written word, 
only the veracity of the message written within. For Stiegler, the words of 
Plato and Heidegger do two things. In the f irst instance, they suff ice for 
either two, working as Plato and Heidegger, so that we correlate the words of 
either as they themselves speaking the very same words. This is despite the 
existence of any intonation, rhythm, or accent. Not least to mention either 
authors’ physical or mental state that would have had a bearing on how the 
words were transmitted. Then, in the second instance, they work beyond 
either author, lasting far longer than either could have imagined or indeed 
realized. The writings of both Plato and Heidegger thus serve as lingering 
artefacts of human thought and endure as objects of a technical memory.
One particular moment during the March for the Alternative demonstra-
tion exemplif ies Stiegler’s argument. Consider the photographic evidence 
of a cumbersome, wood and cloth Trojan Horse crafted and paraded by 
protesters along the off icial march route (see Figure 15.1). Its progression 
was marked by Twitter users as messages were sent and photos uploaded of 
its whereabouts along the march route. What was particularly interesting 
was the way in which the Trojan Horse was variously constituted through 
different, mediated accounts. The protest application Sukey (2011)1 was the 
f irst to note its presence, tweeting an image from a feeder point in Ken-
nington Park, south of the route (Sukeyio 2011a) along with the message “Fake 
Stallions Unite.” As it made its way into central London, the Metropolitan 
Police’s communication team (CO11) urged protesters to “continue on the 
march past the Trojan Horse effigy in [sic] Downing Street” (MetPoliceEvents 
2011) in order to avoid the demonstration slowing down. But as protesters 
began to congregate around the unwieldy object, Sukey responded to the 
Metropolitan Police by satirically suggesting that David Cameron, the UK 
Prime Minister at that time, could not come out to bring it inside with such 
a large number of protesters gathered around (Sukeyio 2011b). Meanwhile, 
in a factual tone, the organizers of the event, the TUC, simply alluded to 
an “incident at Downing St.”2
The nature of each communication, as a result, went some way in shaping 
both the general perception of, and re-action to, the event. If users were to 
solely take the CO11’s account of the Trojan Horse seriously, they might be 
urged to continue past a jovial expression of public outrage against public 
1 Sukey is a “multi-platform, news, communications and logistical support system” (Sukey 
2011) for protesters.
2 The tweet in full: “March is held up due to incident at Downing St. #26march.” Retrieved 
from personal records collected during the event. The account has since been deleted.
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sector cuts. If users were entertained by Sukey’s take on the incident, they 
might well have made their own satirical remarks on David Cameron’s 
predicament and joined in the chorus of disapproval. Further still, if fellow 
Twitter users had taken to the TUC’s social media account for updates 
about the protest, they might well have mistaken the disruption for an 
unspecif ied, insignif icant, and momentary event. But as Rieder (2012) 
suggests, some tweets receive more coverage due to their conversational 
spin on events. The TUC’s account is a coded reading intended to avoid 
conflict. The CO11 message, however, has an expressive tactical meaning. It 
is an instruction to move. A command to continue along the pre-designated 
route at a pre-defined speed. The Sukey account is different again; appealing 
to the jovial, carnivalesque nature of the protest event. Even though each 
message has a “refractive capacity” (Rieder 2012, n.p.) to spin, twist, or frame 
the story, only the Sukey account succeeds in mobilizing it fully. While it 
is possible to trace back the logistical narrative of the event through the 
TUC and CO11 accounts, it is a bare, functional story—one devoid of the 
transgressive nature of protest events and their ability to challenge or at 
least ‘temporarily relieve’ (Lane Bruner 2005) oppressive political power. 
Neither the CO11, nor TUC accounts were set up to facilitate such action 
and, as such, refrained from providing any kind of spin, other than a rote 
account of the incident.
If we understand Stiegler correctly, and we are to follow his thesis on 
mnemotechnics, then we are to say that the Trojan Horse that was paraded 
around London was a kind of tertiary memory inscribed with the thoughts 
15.1: The Trojan horse at the March for the Alternative, London, uk (Twitter user @smithsam).
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and actions of the people who devised and constructed it. Even within the 
same media platform—in this case, Twitter—this constructive process has 
the potential to be markedly different depending on the account of such 
events. In this way, the Trojan Horse was materially coded, stored, and 
re-constituted courtesy of the digital medium, this despite its ceremonial 
burning at the busy road junction hours later. Although the object ceased 
to exist, it lived on through the platform—remembered and recoverable 
far beyond the spatio-temporal constraints of the event itself. It is only 
through these mnemotechnical inscriptions that the event itself is now 
actually composed; through and prior to all other forms.
Orientation and event
In the f irst instance, this refractive capacity concerns a temporal quality: 
the ability to witness, remember, and spin events. Now I want to move 
on to the Trojan Horse’s navigational character. In other words, I want to 
consider how those who constructed the Trojan Horse—and I include here 
the Twitter users and photographers just as much as the joiners and painters 
of the horse—became key protagonists in constituting the Trojan Horse as 
a geospatial event itself.
The employment of spatial metaphors throughout the history of the web 
has helped in conceptualizing its networked infrastructure to unfamiliar 
users. Discussions on ‘cyberspace’ were the f irst to use such terminology 
during the late 1990s, when it was believed that the cyber-era would over-
throw the tyranny of materiality, open up new freedoms and allow for the 
“unfettered circulation of abstract free-floating information” (Stevenson 
2013, 45). As Nunes (2006, 8) suggested, “[t]he ‘space’ of cyberspace […] 
remained f irmly within scare quotes”—in cybernetic terms it was meant to 
be boundless and without physical constraint. But at a time when computers 
were heavy, immobile, and accessible only in specif ic places (i.e. internet 
cafes, libraries, etc.), spatial metaphors had to be mobilized to describe the 
nature of connections and ‘virtual’ actions. Desktop computers, chained 
to the desks of users, would paradoxically act as portals to a boundary-less 
world. As Graham (2013, 179) suggests, “common prepositions associated 
with internet use (e.g to go to a website, or to get on the Internet) imply 
a certain spatiality” despite claims in the cyber-era to the contrary. This 
cyberspace, however ethereal, abstract, and boundless, nevertheless strongly 
held to spatial metaphors in order to aid users in conceptualizing the types 
of actions required to engage with such technology.
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However, the interactive nature of the social media era shattered this 
f ixed, singular notion of abstract digital space. Material and digital worlds 
have forever been inextricably linked (Graham, Zook, and Boulton 2012). 
Place and space are thoroughly constituted through a relation with the 
digital. Interactions commonly cross, loop back into, and affect the mate-
rial world. They augment and, in some cases, completely constitute the 
make-up of everyday experience. Kitchin and Dodge (2011) have been the 
most persistent in making this academic argument of the intermingling 
of code and space, employing Gilbert Simondon’s notion of ‘transduction’ 
in order to argue for the (spatially) transformative nature of modern 
technologies (see also MacKenzie 2002; Dodge and Kitchin 2005). Stiegler, 
also a reader of Simondon, again provides an adequate framework for this 
understanding.
In Technics and time, 2 Stiegler (2009, 65) talks of a “genesis of disorienta-
tion.” In the f irst instance, technologies involve a delegation of authority 
from the who to the what; a delegation that has progressively distanced 
humans from their own knowledge. As Leroi-Gourhan (1975, 65 quoted in 
Stiegler 2009, 78) remarks, this delegation is split into f ive stages; “of oral 
transmission, of written transmission with tablets or indices, with simple 
f iling systems, with mechano-graphics, and with electronic seriation.” 
With each advance, Leroi-Gourhan contends, an even greater collective 
memory is constructed, contributing to the “progressive exteriorization 
of individual memory” (1975, 65). In this ensuing process, the only logical 
way for humans to then begin to orientate themselves—bearing in mind 
Stiegler’s (1998) earlier claim that humans are always-already constituted 
through technical objects—is to attempt to articulate the demands of 
technical evolution. This involves an orientation at two levels.
First, it is an orientation between ethnic knowledges—those constructed 
by particular cultures at specif ic times—and technical objects. This is 
orientation qua memory, covered in the previous section. Second, though, 
it is a spatiotemporal orientation of rhythmicity. This is an orientation that 
calls forth the relationship between program (technical object) and speed. 
Consider, for example, the way in which social media platforms and 24-hour 
news channels have re-constituted news-making by drawing out and speed-
ing up the news cycle. Central to this argument is the relationship between 
technical object and space. We can call this orientation a navigational 
dynamic in order to make this claim more explicit.
As Stiegler has detailed, the evolution of technology (oral, written, f iling, 
mechano-graphics, and electronic seriation) has led to a colonization of the 
speed of change. Rhythms of the natural world (stars, seasons, days, bodily 
300 SAM hIND 
functions, heartbeats) are supplemented with rhythms of a human world 
bound to a technical world in speech, writing, and now coding. Spatial 
rhythms of a technically-arranged human world might include airport 
security checks (Kitchin and Dodge 2009), or quotidian driving experi-
ences (Thrift 2004; Sheller 2007; Hind and Gekker 2014). Humans, thus, 
are orientated toward an industrial space and time that introduces the 
notion of ‘real-time’ that forces the human to match the speed of technical 
evolution, moving as part of a generalized socio-technical system. To put it 
another way, they are coerced into keeping up with technological evolution.
For the purposes of this chapter, then, the spatial dynamics of contem-
porary events are co-constituted by the real-time nature of social media 
platforms. As Leroi-Gourhan suggests:
[t]he individual functions like a cell, an element of the collective program, 
in a network of signals that not only control his gestures and the process 
of his effective thought, but which also control his right to absence, that 
is, to his rest or leisure time […] Space then exists only as a function of 
the requirement of time. Socialized time implies a humanized space, 
integrally symbolic, such that day and night take place in cities at f ixed 
hours […] and in which the relations between individuals and their place 
of activity are instantaneous. (1975, 131 as quoted in Stiegler 2009, 89-90)
To return to our story, the construction of the Trojan Horse consisted of 
multiple tools. Not only the tools for its mechanical construction; the wood 
and cloth material, the hammers and nails that secure it together, or the 
paint and brushes that help carry its message, but also the tools of an ‘evental’ 
construction (Shaw 2012), or what Stiegler (2009, 115) calls “event-ization.” 
These included the messages sent by Sukey, the TUC, and CO11. Each message 
either directly or obliquely referred to the same Trojan Horse (an ‘eff igy’ or 
‘incident’). A horse thus made by combining wood, cloth, hammers, nails, 
paint, brushes, and people, but also a horse made by the organizational 
accounts of Sukey, the TUC, and CO11. This was a horse constructed by 
a medium and co-opted by a vast array of actors, ostensibly human and 
technological. A medium restricted in its possible message by an inherent 
structure (‘no more than 140 characters please!’), online protocol (Galloway 
2004), and real-time architecture. In other words, it is through this selec-
tive process of deciding “what happens” (Stiegler 2009, 115) and thus what 
matters, that the event itself is actually constructed. As Stiegler writes, “[t]
he preservation of memory, of the memorable […] is always already also its 
elaboration: it is never a question of a simple story of ‘what happened’” (Ibid.).
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Despite these restrictions, the messages helped to literally orientate 
protesters to the existence of the Trojan Horse, and did so through the 
programmatic tendencies of the tool. Furthermore, the Trojan Horse was 
constituted in space and time by the digital platform, allowing not only 
debate and discussion, but also physical action to take place. Real-time 
updates facilitated the navigation of protesters to the Trojan Horse’s position. 
Transforming the space in which to rally around, whether positioned outside 
the home of David Cameron, or in Oxford Circus. Either as a political object 
for directing anger at anti-austerity measures or as a (literally) burning, 
symbolic reminder of the inequalities of capitalism. In other words, the 
program helped to structure the Trojan Horse, the urban space, and the 
event for which it was constructed.
Tactility and event
[U]nder conditions when those with cameras or Internet capacities are 
imprisoned or tortured or deported, then the use of the technology effectively 
implicates the body. Not only must someone’s hand tap and send, but someone’s 
body is on the line if that tapping and sending gets traced.
– Butler (2011, n.p.)
To understand how the spatio-temporal mechanics of a digitally mediated 
protest event are utilized, we must consider the tactility of such action. 
This is where we must make a break from Stiegler and instead turn to the 
work of those most interested in the haptic nature of technology, as well 
as those furthering a more phenomenological approach to bodily move-
ment. If, as Frith contends, it is through the interface of the mobile phone 
that “the individual is able to exert control over signif iers and construct a 
semi-narrative out of the fractured city streets” (2012, 140), then what does 
this mean for a type of protest predicated on solidarity, togetherness, and 
symbolic holism? Moreover, from a bodily perceptive, how are our senses 
being retuned to adapt to these kind of hybrid, interfacial instances?
In a world dominated by ‘occularcentrism,’ as Jay (1994) famously noted, 
conceptions of touch have been largely neglected. There are numerous types 
of touch, however, and we are only concerned with one here, at least for the 
purposes of this chapter. If we are to make a rather academic distinction 
between ‘close’ and ‘deep’ touch then we might say that one ‘touches’ us, 
quite literally as in body to body, but we might also say that one ‘touches 
us’ emotionally and metaphorically. ‘Tactility’ is the former; a cutaneous 
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sensing of body to body. A form of sensing that relates primarily to the skin 
“as a sense organ” (Paterson 2007, ix). One particular appendage is most 
closely connected to the notion of touch, namely the hands. Like the eyes 
that work as the primary visual organ, so the hands work as contact points 
for the human body engaging with the world through touching and feeling.3
How can tactility help people to orientate themselves? A hypothetical 
problem posed by philosopher William Molyneux to John Locke in 1690 asked 
whether an individual born blind and taught to distinguish between two 
differently shaped objects by touch could do the same by sight alone should 
they be able to see. The empirical psychologist Marius von Senden (1960) 
believed that the visual senses had a monopoly on spatial representation, 
arguing therefore that the blind had no spatial faculties at all since this 
was solely a preserve of the visual sense. This was to do with Von Senden’s 
insistence that perception was not, what is now called, ‘inter-modal.’ In other 
words, the different senses (touch, vision, etc.) would interact with each 
other through a transcendental perceptual system. Fellow psychologists 
Gibson (1950), Piaget (1955), and Jones (1975), however, systematically refuted 
the claim that without sight people lack any spatial cognition whatsoever. 
They understood perception to be an inter-modal process constituting a 
“mutually supportive system of the senses” (Paterson 2007, 40). Touch can 
help mould spatial form, knowledge and experience as much as the visual, 
and this data can inform, and can be informed by, any of the other senses.
In a traditional sense, orientation concerns our ability to reference 
waypoints or landmarks like a hill walker might do. In Stieglerian (2009) 
terms, orientation refers to the openings and affordances we grant to our 
interaction with technology and the world-at-large. The former is a kind of 
orientation focused on a distanced vision, a view of far-away reference points 
that can help to ground the individual, situate their body and place their 
actions. The latter is employed by Stiegler (2009) to make a more general point 
about the transformative nature of referencing one particular technological 
assemblage instead of another. For instance, say, in purposing dominant 
social media platforms (Twitter, etc.) for a particular need, rather than 
using outdated machines that fail to carry out the required task as quickly 
or eff iciently as possible (semaphore lines, Morse code, telephones, etc.).
3 Of course, the feet are also another appendage associated with notions of touch, especially 
in regard to walking. As I primarily wanted to explore the connections between prehensility 
and technology, and related f ieldwork involved the operation of a mobile phone device, I felt 
I should narrow my focus to include only the hands. Although I do not detail the many ways 
in which walking is an embodied and haptic experience in this chapter, Ingold (2004), Solnit 
(2006), and Ingold and Vergunst (2008) provide useful introductions.
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Touch, however, is a ‘near-view’ orientation, an ‘egocentric’ (Kitchin, 
Blades, and Golledge 1997, 233) spatiality that places the subject at the center 
of the map. This ‘performative cartography’ (Verhoeff 2012, 13) is opposed 
to the distancing nature of the visual. In a sense, new digital technological 
apparatuses allow us to manipulate content like never before. The ability to 
pore over, stretch, zoom, and pan across objects is in stark contrast to the 
way in which modern inventions of the panorama, the arcade, the world 
exhibition, and the plate-glass shop window facilitated the “visual spectacle 
alone” (Pickles 2000, 9). Tactile interaction is thus, arguably, the primary 
orientation of contemporary digital society; marking a rather radical shift 
from phantasmagorical fetishes of the modern era. It is this ‘double-tap’ 
philosophy (Hind and Lammes 2015) that drives our interaction with the 
world and its phenomena.
What does this say about the spatiality of protest as wired through a multi-
touch mobile device? The mobile smartphone market is now dominated by 
devices with large, slate-sized screens. Handsets made by Apple, Huawei, 
and Samsung give preference to ‘multi-touch gestures’ over the ubiquitous 
keypad. We are witnessing a technological transition that is re-constituting 
the human body in an entirely new way. In a passage that now can be applied 
to the mobile phone, although originally in reference to high-value desktops 
and industrial machines, Paterson notes:
Whereas the keyboard is a passive mechanical channel between the com-
puter and user, haptics enables a more active exploration and allows the 
user not just to see three-dimensional shapes represented on the screen, but 
also to feel them and interact with them. (2007, 128, emphasis in original)
This corresponds to Paterson’s later analysis of the ‘proximal tactile interac-
tion’ (Ibid., 129) of new haptic technologies. Multi-touch phones allow the 
user to bridge the distance between visual data and the self, and instead 
interact with it via cutaneous sensing. This is, arguably, how protesters have 
sought to comprehend the rather overwhelming size, symbolism, and aims 
of collective action in the digital age.
A stream of near-live updates from a Twitter account straight to a mobile 
device gives the protester an ability to calibrate their place in the greater 
narrative and the wider spatio-temporal extent of the event. Take Sukey, 
the protest application mentioned previously, which when deployed during 
demonstrations displayed a digital map replete with the location of essential 
services for protesters (f irst aid tents, legal advisors, toilet facilities, Wi-
Fi) as well as the shifting points of conflict during a march (police lines, 
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mounted off icers, riot vans, a containment), thus allowing users to make 
navigational decisions (see Figure 15.2). The multi-touch gestures involved 
in navigating such devices thus enable the protester to be present and 
‘of the moment.’ The egocentric orientation of touch is intertwined with 
the growing individualization, processual and ‘event-centered’ framing 
of mapping, all central to the use of mobile devices during protest events 
(see Brown and Laurier 2005; Kitchin and Dodge 2007; Perkins 2009). With 
this combination users are central pivots for navigational duties. Tactile 
interaction allows events to be brought back to the body itself.
Conclusion: What tools for which citizens?
Let us return to the pertinent question concerning technological determin-
ism posed by Gerbaudo (2012) earlier: “Is this all just an activist delusion?” 
The answer, following the analysis in this chapter, should be a qualif ied no. 
But, as above, we must continue to steer clear of a technological fetishism 
that proposes that all and everyone is under the universal spell of techno-
logical evolution. The question that remains from this analysis—and one 
that should replace Gerbaudo’s above—is: what tools are appropriate for 
which citizens? In other words, having hopefully exemplif ied how digital 
technology plays a critical role in augmenting protest events, the question 
of whether their involvement is but a ‘delusion’ should be answered. Instead, 
we need to evaluate the extent to which particular technologies can and 
do generate political power for activists around the world.
In this chapter, I have proposed, through a reading of Stiegler (1998, 
2009) and those working at the interface of phenomenological thought 
and technology, that there are three notable dynamics that come to 
15.2: The Sukey application homepage (left), map view (center) and incident submission form (right) 
as it was in 2011. Twitter updates are displayed in the box above each screen (author screenshots).
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constitute contemporary shifts in protest action. Changes are occurring 
in our ability to remember, which although not new, is now happening 
in near real-time. Material devices are providing an instantly referable 
archive of events that outstrip human capacities. Changes are also being 
witnessed in our ability to orientate toward real-world incidents. These 
affordances allow us to be attentive to happenings outside our immediate 
sensory f ield. But it is only through a shift to a ‘double-tap’ philosophy 
(Hind and Lammes 2015) that allows this to become a reality. The haptic 
capabilities of the digital device allow us to interact with, manipulate, 
and re-constitute our worlds. The modernist distancing of the visual 
is no longer applicable. As the quotes from Judith Butler have iterated 
throughout this chapter, we must consider how such advancements have 
created a new co-constructive, hybrid space where citizens are being 
forced to re-learn their position in the world in order to make their own 
voices heard.
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16. Meaningful inefficiencies : Resisting 
the logic of technological efficiency in 
the design of civic systems
Eric Gordon and Stephen Walter
Abstract
The promise of smart cities is that Big Data and the Internet of Things 
will transform them into eff icient, productive machines. But the smart 
city is a rather rational proposition where technological eff iciency is the 
primary indicator of success. This chapter advocates a counterpoint to 
this emphasis on eff iciency. Borrowing from game design, where players 
are provided with goals, and confronted with unnecessary obstacles 
that make their striving for that goal meaningful, the chapter suggest 
that ’meaningful ineff iciencies’ are necessary for making cities smart. 
When there is room for play in the systems with which we interact, there 
is opportunity for people to form relationships, build trust, care for one 
another, and make shared meaning, all of which comprise the foundation 
for resilient communities.
Keywords: Smart city, meaningful ineff iciency, civic media, dataf ication, 
civic work
We are making government more user-friendly.
– San Francisco’s Mayor Ed Lee (Innovate SF 2013)
In the early 2000s, the City of Baltimore became the f irst large American city 
to organize all its major services under a single digital system and to utilize 
the collection and reporting of big data to increase eff iciency in all aspects 
of government (O’Connell 2001). This program, called CitiStat, winner of the 
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Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
doi: 10.5117/9789462984523/ch16
MEANINGfuL INEffICIENCIES 311
2004 Innovations in American Government Award, originally made use of 
existing, yet closed, data streams collected by sixteen agencies across the 
city. However, CitiStat would make two paradigm-shifting enhancements 
to the system. The f irst was the opening of a new, citizen-sourced data 
stream, a 311 citizen-reporting hotline—similar to 911 but for non-emergency 
calls—that linked directly to city service management; the second was in 
opening up the data to the public and using it as a ‘civic communication 
tool.’ This helped usher in a new age of e-reporting that soon spread to 
related data programs in New York, Chicago, and elsewhere. Now, as both 
data producers and data consumers, citizens ostensibly became partners to 
the government in making the basic functioning of the city more eff icient 
(Ackerman 2004). This model of co-governance was met with much praise 
by tech-industry leaders. The IBM Center for the Business of Government 
sponsored a report praising the City of Baltimore for becoming “increasingly 
customer-friendly” as a result of its data-driven programs and for “the higher 
level of agency performance in delivering critical goods and services to 
citizens in the metropolitan area” (Henderson 2003, 6).
In the decade that followed, social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, 
publishing platforms from Patch to Tumblr, and mobile web-connected smart 
devices all worked to set new standards for how people communicate with 
each other. In April 2015, partly facilitated by these connective technologies, 
multiple videos captured by onlookers went viral showing an unarmed black 
man named Freddie Gray as he was dragged screaming into a police van 
by Baltimore police off icers. Freddie Gray would later die due to injuries 
he sustained during his arrest.
Inspired by the videos captured by smartphones and amplif ied on social 
media, these same technologies were then utilized to coordinate widespread 
protests against police brutality across Baltimore, which would ostensibly 
‘shut the city down.’ Certain city services were canceled, and a curfew was 
imposed. These events, and the often disquieting and extraordinary images, 
stories, and commentaries produced and shared from them, pushed the 
national conversation and media coverage about police brutality, mass 
incarceration, and urban inequality, to the center of attention. In a marked 
shift from other episodes of police brutality in the United States (e.g. in Fer-
guson, MO, and New York City), the state’s attorney for the City of Baltimore, 
Marilyn Mosby, conducted a news conference where she both publicly ruled 
the death a homicide, charging the six off icers involved, and, in unity with 
the protestors, openly acknowledged the “structural and systemic” racial 
issues present in policing, and the need for them to be broadly changed 
(Democracy Now! 2015). Although the decision was a result of many disparate 
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current and historical factors, connective technologies played a part in the 
telling and reflection of the story. Without the capturing of video, without the 
amplif ication on social media, and without the tech-coordinated protests, 
this may have become another buried case of police brutality. Instead, it 
became a highly visual moment of reflection on the inequality inherent in 
Baltimore’s systems of governance.
CitiStat in the early 2000s and the protests in 2015 represent two starkly 
different cases of the use of technologies to ‘eff iciently’ enhance or intervene 
in civic systems. With CitiStat, the notion of eff iciency is born out of the 
technical and industrial sectors, def ined by cost-effectiveness, speed, and 
market distribution. These eff iciencies were intentionally designed into the 
system by a central design team. With the protests, eff iciency is tied to what 
John Dewey (2011) has called ‘civic eff iciency,’ or the ability to get things 
done with others, even if disruptive, messy, and unpredictable. In this case, 
existing technology was appropriated for an unexpected context, and civic 
eff iciency emerged through its unique use by disparate actors. These two 
cases bring up important questions as to what eff iciency means, for whom 
systems are eff icient, and how eff iciencies are designed into a civic technol-
ogy. When the application of technology to civic life is celebrated purely for 
its expediency, transactionality, and instrumentality, then other uses and 
users are potentially sidelined. Civic technology is running on two parallel 
tracks—technological eff iciency and civic eff iciency—where an emerging 
technology sector is forming around streamlining government operations, 
and worldwide social movements are forming around unexpected uses 
of existing technology. While the latter track often produces dramatic 
images and stories that draw media attention and public conversation, the 
former track is becoming increasingly prof itable and, we argue, danger-
ously overtaking the narrative of civic technology design and shifting the 
intentional mobilization of eff iciency by designers, implementers, and 
funders to focus more on helping users of a technological system rather 
than citizens of a democracy.
The philosopher Hannah Arendt, writing in the 1950s in response to 
postwar industrialism in Europe and the United States, provides important 
insight into the logic of human systems, specif ically the way tools and 
functions conceive of and mobilize their human users. Arendt (1998) argues 
that all human activity falls within three categories: labor, work, and action. 
Labor is a fundamental activity that maintains human life, an activity that 
caters to biological needs of production and consumption (the actual human 
effort that is mobilized toward work); work is an activity that contributes to 
the world that humans occupy (everything from building tools to thinking 
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ideas); f inally, action is the birth of a new political current in the world, a 
social means for change with no neatly predictable or prescribed ends.
The problem with many contemporary systems built purely with a focus 
on labor or work is that they too often view humans as interchangeable 
units, and imposed civic behavior replaces civic action. Arendt criticizes the 
rationalizing systems under which modern humans live for their tendency 
to elicit “from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing 
innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members, 
to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achieve-
ment” (1998, 41). Technology critic Evgeny Morozov echoes this in 2013 in 
the context of digital technology: “recasting all complex social situations 
either as neatly defined problems with definite, computable solutions or as 
transparent and self-evident processes that can be easily optimized—if only 
the right algorithm is in place!” is likely not even to achieve its predicted 
purpose, for the ‘solutions’ are often more tied to techno-utopian values 
than the realities of a messy, real world democracy (Morozov 2013, 5).
It is perhaps an irony then that modern web technologies might be the 
most effective medium ever to exist to facilitate action as Arendt defines it. 
Open, interconnected, mobile, complex, chaotic: the web not only provides 
potential for action through its ability to connect disparate people and 
to propagate ideas at a level never before realized, but it is also perfectly 
f itted to integrate into the contours of a democratic system—one complex 
pluralistic system intertwined with another. The job of civic systems can 
be to promote and curate this action while at the same time establishing 
stable “islands of predictability” through institutions, laws, and promises 
(1998, 244). When we invoke ‘civic systems,’ we mean any designed series 
of social interactions aimed at facilitating collective governance or action, 
be it a constituted system of national government aimed at sustaining 
integral institutions, a grassroots collective aimed at radically altering how 
voices are counted in a deliberative process, or an online forum dedicated 
to establishing and maintaining the rules and etiquette of a website. It is 
imperative that the designers of civic systems leverage web-based technology 
not for imposing behaviors, but for facilitating action.
In this chapter, we analyze the narrative of technological eff iciency in the 
civic space. Contributing to what Elizabeth Losh calls the “Virtualpolitik,” 
the narrative of technological eff iciency has become part of everyday gov-
ernance, impacting decisions made by the “managers of the nation state” 
(2009, 12). We seek to recognize where the narrative is challenged through 
alternative actions and designs. We introduce what we call meaningful 
inefficiencies as an emerging design paradigm for civic technology, which 
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accommodates the possibility of messiness, disruption, and playing with 
rules and boundaries. Borrowing from the f ields of game design and game 
studies, meaningful ineff iciencies is a way of thinking about civic systems 
that are open to the affordances of play—what Roger Caillois refers to as an 
“occasion of pure waste” (1958/2001, 5)—where users have the option to play 
within and with rules, not simply to play out prescribed tasks (Sutton-Smith 
1997; Sicart 2014). While we argue for the value of play in the design and 
implementation of civic systems, we do not want to suggest that there is 
something inevitable in the playful (or ludic) paradigm (Raessens 2006, 
2014; Walz 2010; Zimmerman 2015). Instead, we seek to understand play 
not as a paradigmatic shift, but as a characteristic of systems that has been 
overlooked in the current discourse surrounding technology and govern-
ance. Ultimately, in this chapter we present a call to action to understand 
civic technologies not simply in terms of what they do, but what people do 
with them. Designing for meaningful ineff iciencies is a way of expanding 
technological civic systems to accommodate more than just the ‘good user’ 
of systems, but also the marginalized, the emergent, and the playful.
User-friendliness
While civic technology, or civic tech, in its current form is a new phenom-
enon, the insertion of technological eff iciency into civic life is hardly new. 
Consider the design of cities. Twentieth-century urbanism has ushered 
in an understanding of cities as complex and rational systems (Mumford 
2010) wherein the networks of building and roads could be conceptualized 
as a structure or language with which humans could interact (Alexander 
et al. 1977). But the end logic of the modernist city, the master-planned 
Brasilia or Robert Moses’s rationalized sanitation of New York City, is what 
by today’s standards would be called a dumb city, as they were systems 
designed and f ixed in place with the premise of full automation without 
responsiveness to their human occupants. These mid-century modernist 
utopias were human systems designed for the abstracted and generic human 
user (Gordon 2010). More recently, discourses of the smart city, or the smarter 
city, have dominated contemporary city planning efforts around a simple 
premise—data generated through users of systems can inform the design 
and iteration of such systems (IBM 2012; Townsend 2013). In a big data 
environment, where mobile devices and sensors can capture movements, 
purchases and, social interactions, and where data from property, crime, and 
taxes are available and usable in aggregate, the promise of data-driven design 
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is motivating change in urban systems and their governance (Caragliu, Del 
Bo, and Nijkamp 2009; Ratti and Townsend 2011). The individual is no longer 
the primary subject of governance; instead, governments have sought to 
become responsive to the aggregate data traces they leave behind (de Souza 
e Silva and Gordon 2013; Whitson 2015). Data sourced in aggregate, and the 
users that enable eff icient data access, are the subjects directly addressed 
by government and organizations all within the celebrated framework of the 
‘user-friendly city.’ This rhetoric was apparent in Baltimore’s early CitiStat 
program, but questions about which customer was being served, and to 
whom the government was being friendly, arose with dramatic poignancy 
during the 2015 protests. The only people that get counted in aggregate, it 
would seem, are those who are good users of the systems provided.
Inequality and access have been insufficiently addressed in the context of 
‘smart’ governance and city building, largely because it has been so heavily 
influenced by private sector-sponsored infrastructure projects, includ-
ing IBM’s Smarter Cities initiative, or contemporary master-planned city 
environments such as New Songdo City in South Korea. While the modernist 
representations of urbanism are apparent in these projects—skyscrapers, 
plazas, and highways—a central part of the infrastructure is the data 
scraped from citizens as they occupy these representations. Residents are 
conceived as users of systems, and most importantly, creators and users of 
data. Governing this smarter city, therefore, requires access, production, 
and analysis of data, and the conceptualization of the citizen as a producer 
of data within the confines of systems.
The city as system, much like any designed technical system, is designed 
for the user who uses the system well, or one who enters into the system in 
good faith to accomplish prescribed tasks. Users of technological systems 
often accommodate those systems in order to use them well (Lanier 2010) and 
the underlying code of systems becomes a kind of hidden legal framework 
that shapes social actions (Lessig 2006). For example, users learn how to 
navigate automated telephone lines in order to speak to a human being or 
learn how to use Facebook to reach their friends. Technological systems are 
always guiding and ‘reskilling’ their users as much as they are facilitating 
pre-mediated social actions (Latour 1988). Thus, technology that focuses 
only on designing more eff iciency into civic life runs the risk of altering, 
without deliberation or oversight, the very constitution of what a citizen is 
and what they can or cannot do.
So when city government is framed as a user-friendly technological 
system, the characteristics of the ‘good user’ become the legible stand-
in for the citizen. The concept of the ‘good user’ is based on normative 
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structures of citizenship that situate the user solely within abstracted 
procedures, such as attending a meeting or voting or registering a complaint 
about a pothole. The users, conceived within the systems they use well, are 
necessarily articulated outside of any other modes of social integration 
such as place or cultural lineage that might otherwise compose political 
and civic identities (Habermas 2001), and determine patterns of inclusion 
or exclusion (Fraser 1990). Mechanisms of crafting citizenship such as 
formal or informal education (Callan 1997; Guttman 1999) and civic voice 
and activism (Manin 1997; Habermas 2001; Bennett 2008) are potentially 
sidelined in the minds of system architects to accommodate those already 
producing the appropriate data or those data-producing practices that 
can best accommodate new technological systems. The ‘good user’ is the 
rational, self-interested customer who demands eff icient services toward 
prescribed ends. Similar to the concept of ‘political consumerism,’ or the 
buying or boycotting of products for political purposes (Stolle, Hooghe, 
and Micheletti 2005), the production or use of aggregate data is a form of 
consumerism that has direct impact on one’s sense of engagement (or lack 
of same) in civic life (de Zúñiga, Copeland, and Bimber 2013).
Hackability
One of the f irst major instances with a city actively publicizing its ability to 
leverage private sector innovations occurred with CompStat in New York City. 
Originally developed for the NYPD in 1994, CompStat aimed to modernize 
the department through a “continuous improvement of performance” by 
employing “a variety of corporate strategies” to make its organizational 
structure more eff icient (O’Connell 2001). At the core of CompStat is the 
requirement of routine data-based meetings where f ield commanders were 
mandated both to report and react to data generated from their precincts. 
This data resulted from a requirement that all precincts record a number 
of crime statistics on a neighborhood basis. The reaction to the data would 
trigger a street-by-street response, with the goal of rewarding commanders 
not by the number of arrests their staff made, but according to a drop in 
specif ic crime statistics.
Winner of the 1996 Innovations in American Government Award from 
the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, CompStat represents one 
of the f irst major city systems to fully embrace an emerging focus on the 
private sector: the collection and leveraging of big data. Soon, this data-
driven approach to service management was adopted by other New York 
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City departments—ParkStat for the Department of Parks and Recreation, 
TrafficStat for the traff ic division, JobStat for the Human Resources Admin-
istration, and HealthStat for health insurance enrollment—and by other 
cities throughout the United States. It was Baltimore that fused all these 
various departments together in CitiStat.
E-government, Government 2.0, and open government are all terms 
used to describe the ‘digital revolution’ in government function and opera-
tion which have been influenced in no small way by CitiStat (Misuraca 
2009; Ressler 2009; Poje 2011). Chun et al. (2010) identify several stages of 
e-government, ranging from the basic digitization of government records, to 
simple web-based transactions with available data, to more complex transac-
tions such as paying taxes and fines. These early stages of e-government were 
focused solely on the eff iciency of transactions at the municipal level, as we 
saw with the f irst 311 services. The current stage, they argue, is focused on 
interaction. It is about the quality of citizen interaction with government and 
the opportunities for collaborative decision-making through social media 
and open data. These three stages make clear the logical slippage between 
the digitization of records and citizen engagement. For e-government 
practitioners, these very different activities are placed under the umbrella 
of government eff iciency and speak directly to the rhetorical promise of 
networked, web-based technologies for everyday governance.
This declarative position is in part fueled by the Obama administration’s 
2009 open government initiative, which established three principles for 
governing in the digital age: transparency, participation, and collabora-
tion. According to the document, governments should make more data 
available to the public; they should make it easy to access basic services 
and information; and they should foster possibilities for interdepartmental 
and interagency collaboration. The initiative was directed to the federal 
government, but it has served as a justif ication for municipal government 
to devote resources to ‘opening up.’ As these principles of open government 
translate to the local level, they have maintained their focus on internal 
eff iciency and appropriation of private sector rhetoric, but have also been 
ref ined to focus on direct service provision and citizen participation.
‘Opening up’ and empowering citizens has dominated the discourse of 
civic technology. But just as the civic tech community has celebrated these 
possibilities, they have also situated that openness within a language of 
control, specif ically, in the discourse of technology, through the metaphor 
of hacking. According to Shannon Spanhake, San Francisco’s Deputy In-
novation Off icer, “[c]ities are like living machines, and policy making in 
government is like writing the code that governs how a city operates. This 
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city is the most complex machine I have ever had the opportunity to hack 
and it is what inspired my shift from the private sector to the public sector. 
#helloworld” (Innovate SF 2013). Big data production and consumption has 
enabled the opening up of channels of communication, but at the same 
time, it has enabled designers of civic systems to control and hack the 
system. As a result of this conceptual framing, the citizen as a user of a 
hackable system, is disciplined through procedures of what philosopher 
Michel Foucault (1991) describes as governmentality, whereby under the 
promise of collaboration governments redouble their hold on power by 
dispersing it to the governed. In the actual operation of governments, this 
does not represent “a diminishment or a reduction of state sovereignty and 
planning capacities but a displacement from formal to informal techniques 
of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government 
(e.g. NGOs), that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and 
a new relation between state and civil society actors” (Lemke 2002, 11). 
In this sense, government power can be maintained far more eff iciently 
and pervasively not through external force, but by tacitly managing the 
possible forms of self-government and f ields of action available to citizens 
(Söderström, Paasche, and Klauser, 2014). Hackability, according to the 
discourse of the smarter city, is often employed as a means of exerting 
control, as opposed to challenging it. It invokes an internal to government 
strategy that becomes a way of managing social difference, including race, 
class, and gender, by streamlining the good user into normative, technical 
activities.
Civic labor and civic work
The designers and proponents of civic technology too often articulate 
participation and openness within the framework of eff iciency and control. 
This approach to governance is premised on defining a very specif ic user, 
one that is compelled to operate as an individual, presumably for personal 
benefit, but in the service of a system. Hannah Arendt’s conceptions of labor 
and work provide useful frameworks for understanding this design paradigm.
When civic technologies are designed for labor, users are conceived as 
components of an eff icient system, as laborers in achieving prescribed 
ends (i.e. 311 non-emergency systems). Systems designed to cultivate civic 
labor tend to be transactional, focusing on the curation of good habits and 
slipping into the background of everyday routine. Citizen mobile reporting 
apps and APIs such as Boston 311, NYC 311, or Chicago Works outsource 
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the identif ication of problems directly to laborers. According to Arendt, 
to labor is “meant to be enslaved by necessity, and this enslavement was 
inherent in the conditions of human life” (1998, 83-84). Labor is the basic 
contribution to the maintenance of survival. No longer needing to attend 
extensively to biological survival, modern labor in post-industrial nations 
can be equated to the continual repetitive processes with which the status 
quo of any system is maintained. Not only does outsourcing labor to citizens 
increase eff iciency and decrease costs for government if done correctly, 
but it also def ines citizenship in transactional terms and as something 
done purely ‘in service’ to the basic continuation of the status quo and its 
existing power structures.
Systems designed with civic work in mind tend to consider the outcomes 
of labor and the use of those outcomes in the world. For example, public 
planning processes are typically framed as a collective effort toward design-
ing a particular policy document through input and analysis. Contrary to 
simply using citizens as laborers for increasing the eff iciency of civic life, 
civic designers deploy interventions that help to fabricate solutions and make 
citizens better users of existing civic systems. Whether traditional public 
information campaigns, education programs, mandatory requirements for 
participation, or web-enabled education and discussion apps, civic work 
aims to construct an artif ice of eff icient citizenship required by all in order 
to optimize the way civic systems are used. As opposed to using citizens to 
generate big data, here data is used to optimize citizens through systems 
of education or activity. For example, the attempt at crowd-sourcing a new 
constitution in Iceland after the protests in 2008-2009 is a good illustration 
of civic tech directed toward a specif ic work product. While the effort was 
ultimately rejected by Iceland’s parliament in 2012, the process of using 
networked technology to steer collective labor toward specific ends is clearly 
represented in this example. However, the value of such efforts needs to be 
questioned given that the ratif ication of the new constitution, which was 
supported by 67 percent of voters, ended up being rejected because of only 
a few disenchanted MPs. Despite the ‘opening up’ through consolidating 
work efforts, the system remained hackable by its architects, essentially 
under the control of those already in power. Iceland, perhaps because of 
its highly connected (95 percent broadband use) and highly homogenous 
population, has continued to explore and support similar civic tech efforts 
such as Better Reykjavik, which is a mobile input system that has sourced 
since its start in 2010 over 1700 policy recommendations (with over 400 
of them formally considered by the government). The example of Iceland 
demonstrates both the extraordinary affordances of streamlining civic 
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work and the risk of it simply reifying existing power structures through 
governmentality.
Increasingly, practitioners in and out of government are looking to be-
havioral science for insights and for approaches to encouraging civic labor 
and work. In the UK, for example, the Behavioral Insights Team (sometimes 
called the ‘Nudge Unit’) was established in 2010 through the Prime Minister’s 
Office to apply behavioral science to policy enforcement and service delivery. 
In the United States, the Obama administration established a similar off ice 
in 2014 called the Social and Behavioral Science Team (SBST). The notion 
of ‘nudging’ people as an approach to social policy was popularized by 
economist Richard Thaler and former Administrator of the White House 
Off ice of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Cass Sunstein. Nudging 
seeks to alter “people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or signif icantly changing their economic incentives” so that 
“consistent and unwavering people, in the private or public sector, can move 
groups and practices in their preferred direction” (Thaler and Sunstein 
2009, 58). With the subtle coercion of citizens to govern their behaviors 
more eff iciently through the internalization of mechanisms of control (as 
in governmentality), the citizen again takes on the qualities of a good user: 
predictably acting within a pre-defined system and pushed to act primarily 
in their own self-interest.
Many of these efforts have produced clear outcomes. For example, the 
benchmark program for the new SBST, in partnership with the United 
States Department of Education, sought to increase rates of federal loan 
repayment among those who had fallen behind. The team experimented with 
email communication to understand what form of address and frequency 
of email had the most impact on loan repayment. The results of the pilot 
demonstrated that sending emails to borrowers in delinquency for 90-180 
days resulted in a statistically significant increase in repayment applications, 
with 6000 additional completed applications in the f irst month. These sorts 
of results hold signif icant promise for making government more eff icient 
insofar as they seek to understand and iterate on the measurable behaviors 
of citizens. But they also reinscribe the notion of a citizen as a user of a 
system, as a consumer of services, while engaging in labor and work. In 
so doing, they bracket out the nuance, the unmeasurable, and the actions 
through which citizens construct meaning and form identities. By making 
civic systems more user-friendly, they ultimately make users friendlier to 
civic systems.
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Civic action and meaningful inefficiencies
Democracy does not always appear to be eff icient. As the events in Balti-
more demonstrate, anger and feelings of exclusion can lead to disruption 
of otherwise streamlined systems. But those same feelings, bolstered by 
social media and connective technologies, create what John Dewey (2011) 
calls ‘civic eff iciency,’ or working with others to achieve public ends. “If 
democracy has a moral and ideal meaning,” Dewey notes, “it is that a social 
return be demanded from all and that the opportunity for development 
of distinctive capacities be afforded all […] the adoption of the narrower 
meaning of eff iciency deprives it of its essential justif ication” (Ibid., 117). 
Dewey here is distinguishing ‘technological eff iciency’ from the kind of 
‘civic eff iciency’ that makes social experiences valuable and educative. Both 
technological eff iciency and civic eff iciency are present in any democratic 
context, even as civic technologies push to produce and reproduce the 
former. The activities associated with Dewey’s version of civic eff iciency 
are born of Arendt’s third category: action.
Democracy needs to allow for unpredictable, chaotic, novel civic action 
to occur, in which even “the smallest act in the most limited circumstance” 
and even “one deed, and sometimes one word, suff ices to change every 
constellation” (Arendt 1998, 190). Action, as Arendt def ines it, is the birth 
of a new political current, as small as a word or as large as a declaration, 
that reverberates through a human collective and interacts with everything 
and everyone, often imperceptibly. Allowing the freedom and providing a 
medium through which these waves can flow, enables the chaotic emergence 
of new ideas, new experiences, and new actions that a single individual, a 
group, or a data model could never achieve. The consequences are “boundless, 
because action, though it may proceed from nowhere, so to speak, acts into 
a medium where every reaction becomes a chain reaction and where every 
process is the cause of new processes” and that “no matter what its specif ic 
content, always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent 
tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries” (Ibid.). 
An action can be set into motion by a single person, but it reverberates and 
grows in the social world where it takes on a character that transcends its 
initial design or intention through pluralistic, collective force. A system 
that permits action in Arendt’s sense allows for collective contributions to 
a process or a cause to become more than the sum of its parts. From people 
in the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston commandeering the 311 system 
to focus the city’s attention on blighted properties, to a simple hashtag, 
#blacklivesmatter, created by a few activists after the acquittal of George 
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Zimmerman in the wrongful death trial of African American teenager 
Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida—each action is a meaningful inefficiency 
with clear outcomes. One forced a city government to act on long ignored 
blighted properties and the other mobilized a global campaign to highlight 
racial injustices. While vastly different in scale, each is disrupting norms 
and challenging eff iciencies in systems of governance.
In order to counteract technological eff iciency as the dominant design 
value of civic systems, we suggest a concerted effort to design meaningful 
ineff iciencies into human systems. Meaningful ineff iciencies represent the 
design of systems for civic action, not behaviors. They can be civic tools, 
systems, or events, etc., that temporarily halt normal civic processes and 
create a delineated time or place in which play, disorder, messiness, and 
the ability to experiment and fail are safely utilized in productive—though 
not necessarily practical—ways. The results of these types of play can be 
increased civic learning, reflection, empathy, and increased awareness of 
civic systems and their effects—which citizens can then leverage in creating 
new forms of action in the normal processes of civic life.
A meaningful ineff iciency, like Dewey’s civic eff iciency, ultimately 
aims to increase “neither more nor less than capacity to share in a give 
and take of experience. It covers all that makes one’s own experience more 
worthwhile to others, and all that enables one to participate more richly 
in the worthwhile experiences of others” (Dewey 2011, 116). In the near 
dominance of technological eff iciency in the design of civic systems today, 
meaningful ineff iciency is necessarily an oppositional term, bringing to 
light the collapsing of the “range and accuracy [of a citizen’s] perception of 
meanings” into machine-readable, hackable, and simplistic features (Ibid., 
119).
We are not suggesting the design or cultivation of ineff iciencies out of 
context. The fundamental requisite for a civic ineff iciency to be ‘meaning-
ful’ is that it is productively in tension with a new or existing eff iciency. It 
would not necessarily be meaningful to create more ineff iciencies where 
ineff iciencies run rampant, such as in a situation where basic civic and 
social services do not exist. An ineff iciency only becomes meaningful 
once it either provides a respite from eff iciency, where citizens can share 
in a give and take of experience and increase their range and perception of 
meanings with each other, or when it provides a new view of the eff iciency, 
where citizens are able to more fully understand how they are being shaped 
by the system—or how they might in turn be able to shape it. By doing 
so, this prompt allows for systems to make the uncertainties of variables 
fertile; the unexpectedness of outcomes revelatory; the opportunities for 
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waste and the failure of resources and efforts constructive; the stakeholder 
complexities of interests and goals nourishing; and the deliberate misuses 
of the system constructive. Common to all meaningful ineff iciencies, as 
we shall see below, is an element of play, or playfulness.
Play
Play is, in a sense, the mechanism of action in meaningful ineff iciencies. 
Play can be def ined as an activity in which the means are more valuable 
than the ends—that is, it is autotelic, it is done f irst and foremost for its own 
sake. Cultural historian Johan Huizinga writes: “in play there is something 
‘at play’ which transcends the immediate needs of life and imparts mean-
ing to the action. All play means something” (1950, 1). Thus, regardless of 
outcome—which certainly can be important—play itself is its own point. 
Players voluntarily enter into a system ostensibly in pursuit of some goal, 
but participation is not wholly dependent on the outcome of achieving that 
goal. For example, in a good game, players elect to play and the reward for 
playing is play itself. If one were to start a game of chess and beat their 
opponent in less than two minutes, the game would likely be unsatisfying 
for both the loser and the winner, because while the goal of winning provides 
direction, the goal of simply playing is not achieved. The uneven game of 
chess disallows the experience of play. The good user of chess is the one who 
beats her opponent in less than two minutes. The good player, however, is 
one that generates meaning from actions taken within the ineff iciencies 
in the system—the circuitous paths one often takes to achieve victory in 
the face of unnecessary obstacles (Suits 2005).
While play is “an action accomplishing itself outside and above the 
necessities and seriousness of everyday life,” at the same time it can, and 
often is, employed as a “helping-out of the action” of everyday life, beyond 
traditional play contexts (Huizinga 1950, 26, 15). Miguel Sicart suggests the 
term playfulness to apply to play in a “context that is not created or intended 
for play” (2014, 27). Fundamental to this act is the “appropriation of what 
should not be play.” It is this act of appropriation, of bringing to bear on a 
serious situation in life, play—a mode of experience so fundamental to 
how we make meaning in the world as we grow, but so stamped out of adult 
life—that “we bring freedom to a context.” Play is “personal, and playfulness 
is used to imbue the functional world with personal experience,” while at 
the same time “revealing the seams of behaviors, technologies, or situations 
that we take for granted” (Ibid., 29).
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When playfulness is recognized and accommodated within civic systems, 
the result is a meaningful ineff iciency, where the good user is propelled 
toward action, not just work and labor. In this sense, the notion of a user 
of a meaningfully ineff icient civic system is not suff icient; when a system 
enables playfulness, either by design or accident, the user acts as a player with 
freedom to explore meaning well beyond the confines of the system in which 
they are operating. As such, the recognition of meaningful ineff iciencies 
suggests the recognition of a playful citizen, not simply a good user.
The playful citizen, as a subject of civic systems, is more able to fully partici-
pate in the give and take of experience that Dewey declares so fundamental 
to democratic and personal growth. Acknowledging the playful citizen means 
recognizing that people actively play with and within systems, which neces-
sitates being adaptable and responsive to unpredictable appropriations. This 
means that one should not, as internet scholar Yochai Benkler puts it, utilize 
“a straightforward, uncomplicated theory of human nature that reduces our 
actions as simple, predictable responses to punishments and incentives and 
helps us explain away confusing and even disturbing behaviorism,” but that 
designers of civic technologies and citizens alike can learn from each other 
in a constant play of inventive meanings (Benkler 2011, 18).
“Vibrancy and eff iciency may not be diametrically opposed,” says Ethan 
Zuckerman, “but the forces are clearly in tension” (2013, 220). This tension 
can be productive; and, while challenging for designers, it is only through 
designing for the play of these and the other forces that facilitate and are 
moved by citizen action that it is possible to think about and build systems 
that “let our humanity f ind a fuller expression; systems that tap into a far 
greater promise and potential of human endeavor than we have generally 
allowed in the past” (Benkler 2011, 26). Instead of using new technological 
innovations to structure behavior so as to impose transactionality, efficiency, 
and predictability operating on that technology’s own terms, it is possible 
to commission the chaos and emergent play of appropriations when new 
technology enters civic life, and to use citizen action to steer systems in 
new, unconventional directions.
Meaningful inefficiencies: An (im)practical example
The concept of disruptive design is nothing new. In the art world, examples 
abound in the twentieth century, from the Dadaists to the Situationists. Or 
more specif ically in the realm of design, Carl DiSalvo’s (2012) concept of 
adversarial design or Dunne and Raby’s (2013) concept of speculative design 
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each point to an interventionist practice in relation to dominant systems. 
What is unique about the concept of meaningful ineff iciencies is its distinct 
focus on play and civic action taking, not only as an interventionist and 
deliberate act of design, but also as a characteristic that is inherent within 
existent systems. Our own experience in designing civic technologies is 
illustrative of the relevance of meaningful ineff iciencies.
Motivated by a lack of community feedback systems in urban planning, 
in 2010 we were funded by the Knight Foundation to build a public dialog 
game. The project, in the end called Community PlanIt (Engagement Lab 
2012), was an online social network meant to bring the public planning 
meeting online, increase the diversity of those who participated, and to 
scaffold the process with learning in order to enhance deliberation (Gordon 
and Baldwin-Philippi 2014). We were interested in making people more 
informed about the planning issues at hand, more capable of understanding 
the nuances and rules of a public planning process, and more congenial 
and empathetic toward other deliberators and decision makers. Following 
this, our goal, ultimately, was to create a new public planning process and 
to concurrently cultivate a good user of it. In other words, if we were to 
successfully introduce a new platform for public engagement, we would 
need to engage the public in using the platform well.
But, as happens in the early days of a design project, our focus lingered 
on all the bad users we seemed to be getting, and how we might be able to 
make them go away. Because of this, many of our early design iterations 
were about stamping out opportunities where bad users could unexpectedly 
appropriate our system and do something that we had not planned on. 
After some pilot tests in the Boston area, we set out to design a system that 
was more eff icient, had more features, and eliminated uncertainty—not 
so much with the content people could put in to the system, but rather the 
way in which people could use the system. The value of the system, we 
suspected, was the layering of the social values of the internet (eff iciency, 
archivability, searchability) onto the practical outcomes of most planning 
processes (conflict avoidance, ephemerality, and confusion).
However, as we deployed the game in two initial implementations (in 
Boston as part of a school policy planning process and in Detroit as part of 
an urban planning process), it was clear that the efficiencies so painstakingly 
built into the system were perhaps the least interesting (and least impactful) 
qualities of the game experience. While the eff iciencies of online participa-
tion were an appealing selling point to funders and partners (each game 
attracted over a thousand players), in fact, the ineff iciencies of gameplay 
created the greatest amount of interest. Ranging from humorously spamming 
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the system with good-natured community event posts (which then created 
another tangent where participants deliberated about the unsaid rules of 
civil internet etiquette), to stepping away from the planning issues and 
talking about the game system itself, the role of youth in civic planning, what 
it meant to digitally engage with stakeholders or to imbue serious issues with 
a sense of fun, etc.—these actions were intentional means of appropriating 
the system to bring some other meaning to it. The best conversations and 
the most interesting insights did not occur from prompts by the designers, 
but rather the prompts or provocations created when users disrupted the 
normal use of the system and did something slightly different with it.
This sort of thing had occurred with virtually all the games or game-like 
systems we had created for civic engagement up to this point (Gordon and 
Manosevitch 2010; Gordon and Schirra 2012). But never was it clearer than 
in this experiment that perhaps our use of games was actually inadvertently 
doing something else that we were not taking into account; perhaps it 
was not the games themselves that offered the biggest value to these civic 
engagement processes, but rather something that emerged because of the 
very use of a game in this particular sociotechnical context. When tasked 
with organizing and f inding a pattern to the most impactful moments for 
participants during the process, we realized it was not when the system 
was working fully, or during the moments when it was working but doing 
nothing more than facilitating simple transactional interactions such as 
liking comments or answering yes or no to a prompt; it also was not when 
a part of the system was simply broken, or was functionally pointless or 
redundant. The most impact, defined as opportunities to increase trust and 
eff icacy, occurred in moments that were meaningfully ineff icient—where 
either an existing ineff iciency itself prompted the user to appropriate it to 
create some new meaning or action within the system, or when users were 
able to bring in some ineff iciency of their own, and use that to temporar-
ily disrupt the system and cause others to reflect upon what it is that is 
happening under their noses—how they have been designed and how 
they might be able to build off, or resist, such a design. If this observation 
was correct, and in fact community engagement matters most when the 
systems through which people engage are intentionally ineff icient (in the 
technological sense), then our challenge became how to design for these 
meaningful ineff iciencies. Indeed, in the years since Community PlanIt 
was f irst deployed, there has been a marked increase in the desire to see 
technologically eff icient systems in processes of public engagement and 
civic life more generally. The use of games or game mechanics to achieve 
these ends was gaining popularity among marketing consultants and policy 
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makers alike (McGonigal 2011; Zichermann and Cunningham 2011), even 
as it developed its very vocal critics in academia (Bogost 2015). But what 
made our project unique, and perhaps not as scalable as other solutions, was 
the inherent ineff iciency in the system that compelled the user to explore 
alternative meanings. It was the experience of play, buried within our own 
gamified design and replete with messiness and ambiguity, that positioned 
us, inadvertently, in a discursive battle emerging within the conflation of 
technological eff iciency and civic life.
Thus, when we set out to design a game to make planning more eff icient, 
we found ourselves pushing up against the very affordances of games. Games 
are built to be ineff icient as the player seeks to overcome unnecessary 
obstacles to reach the goal and to engage in the process of play for itself (Suits 
2005). Civic tech, on the other hand, is steeped in the discourse of eff iciency, 
with a laser focus on the instrumentality of activity. We became very aware of 
the tensions inherent in the system we designed—wanting to cultivate civic 
action through play, and at the same time appeal to funders and partners 
(foundations, municipal governments, and development organizations) to 
appease their sense of value through eff iciency.
Applied games are often characterized as gamif ied systems (Deterd-
ing et al. 2011). In 2011, the term gamif ication saw a signif icant surge in 
popularity, most commonly applied to the use of game mechanics for 
specif ic behavior modif ications, ranging from business to healthcare. 
The early location-based social network, Foursquare, used points and 
badges to motivate digital check-ins, and major corporations began using 
similar social incentives to increase productivity in the workforce. Gami-
f ied systems are widely considered to do three things: 1) they give users 
motivation to do something; 2) they give users the ability to complete the 
action; and 3) they give users a trigger or cue to complete the action (Laja 
2012). Gamif ied systems, by this def inition, are no different than the ideal 
systems conceived through the lens of civic tech. This is what makes our 
early design work with Community PlanIt so contradictory: it was a gamified 
system that promised some level of increased eff iciency, yet was framed 
around the possibilities of play.
We began teasing out these distinctions very slowly. Our initial studies 
of Community PlanIt were focused on its capacity to increase eff iciency in 
what we understood to be a dangerously inefficient system of urban planning 
(Gupta, Bouvier, and Gordon 2012). We sought to measure participation 
rates, reciprocity on the part of government stakeholders, and trust among 
users. It was not until later implementations and years of being steeped in 
discourses of gamif ication, that all the f issures and intentional ellipses 
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that Community PlanIt brought to planning narratives demonstrated their 
value. The messy data of deliberation, the playful competition, and the 
creative storytelling were not simply artifacts of a system, but were central 
to its design.
The tensions that emerged in the implementation of Community PlanIt 
have been central to our evolved understanding of what it takes to recognize 
and design for civic action. Characteristics of play and playfulness were 
emergent within this system. While clearly also designed for labor and 
work, valued for the data produced by users, the system’s incorporated 
elements of play, of encouraging exploration and discovery, were meaningful 
ineff iciencies that came to define it. Or at least came to define our sense of 
what made it valuable. With the promise of the good user so persistent in 
civic tech discourse—a user self-disciplined through data production and 
consumption—the playful citizen became a necessary design prompt for 
us as a means of cultivating better, more humane systems that are scalable, 
meaningful, and allow for novel action to emerge.
Conclusion
The example of Community PlanIt represents our ‘aha moment’ in designing 
technologies that are meaningfully inefficient. We do not present it as a case 
study with particular observable outcomes, but as a study in process, wherein 
our expectations were subverted by the logics we had inadvertently designed 
into the system. Civic life is composed of actions, even if they are masked by 
the efficient presentation of labor and work. And civic technologies, properly 
conceived, should acknowledge and nurture the actions that are expressive 
and potentially transformative. We began this chapter by talking about the 
contrast present in the civic technology landscape of twenty-f irst-century 
Baltimore. On one hand, CitiStat represents a triumph of technological 
eff iciency, where good users are effectively def ined and governed through 
promises of ‘user-friendliness’ and ‘hackability.’ And on the other hand, the 
2015 protests prompted by the unlawful death of Freddie Gray represent 
a triumph of civic eff iciency led by those historically excluded from the 
category of ‘good user.’ The latter def inition of eff iciency is often realized 
in opposition to existent systems of governance, and for that reason, it is, 
in practice, a meaningful ineff iciency. Civic technologies have the capacity 
to cultivate meaningful ineff iciencies within a system that enables playful 
citizens to electively explore, experiment, resist, and reimagine the systems 
that govern their collective actions.
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We advocate for policymakers and civic technologists alike to incorporate 
meaningful ineff iciencies into the design of civic systems in order to allow 
for emergent qualities and experiences beyond those prescribed to the 
good user. Civic systems should accommodate play through embracing: 1) 
uncertainties (of variables); 2) unexpectedness (of outcomes); 3) opportuni-
ties for waste and failure (of resources and efforts); 4) stakeholder complexity 
(of interests and goals); and 5) deliberate non-use or misuse (of the system). 
These qualities of play function as a kind of safety valve for the dominance 
of technological eff iciency in civic design and encourage an evolution of 
democratic practices not absolutely contained by the rational means of 
their distribution.
We do not mean to suggest that technological eff iciency lacks importance 
or that programs like CitiStat cannot contribute productively to civic life. 
The eff icient delivery of basic services such as access to housing, policing, 
and healthcare, is essential. This sort of eff iciency is a fundamental and 
important part of civic life and human activity, and certainly something 
not to be snuffed out. The danger is when technological eff iciency goes 
unchecked, and the rigid systems are designed only for ‘good users’—where 
the slightest unexpected use of the system by a user operating outside of 
the accepted norms is not accommodated or acknowledged. Ultimately, 
we suggest that designers, implementers, and funders of civic technologies 
take into account the existent qualities of labor, work, and action to more 
accurately pinpoint the function(s) of human activity they are meant to 
address. The future of civic technology needs to be critical of its ascending 
values of technological efficiency and not allow a technomentality to obscure 
relevant intervention points, contexts, and communities in need that may 
not play well with the rules of good use that have been articulated by the 
technology of the time. The basic question in civic tech today—how can 
we make civic life more eff icient with technology—must be changed to, 
how can we use technology to make civic life more meaningful.
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The Occupy movement constitutes an upgrade of political activism from 
campaign to prototype. This shift from the traditional narrative, goal-
oriented movement to activism as ‘inf inite game’ is consistent with the 
changing media environment informing this activity. As we move from 
a culture def ined by the book and broadcast media to one expressed 
more through the net and peer-to-peer media, our approaches to politics 
and our expectations for its results change. We are transitioning from a 
spectator democracy, in which citizens project their hopes and dreams 
onto charismatic leaders, to a participatory democracy, in which citizens 
enact change through their real-time interactions. This shift reflects more 
than a change in communications technologies; it marks a change in the 
mode and dimensional level of activism.
Keywords: Occupy movement, political activism, peer-to-peer media, 
participatory democracy, global justice movement, prototyping
Back in the late 1990s, I became interested in the potential of interactive and 
networking technologies to enhance the potential for democratic and civic 
participation. I wrote a short book entitled Open source democracy (Rushkoff 
1998), in which I outlined what I saw as the opportunity for deeper levels of 
public intervention in not just electoral politics, but ongoing civic affairs. 
At the time, most visions of electronically enabled democracy were still 
stuck in what we might call the Ross Perot phase: use the net to let people 
vote or participate in what the third-party presidential candidate called 
“electronic town halls” (Simon 1992). Perot envisioned citizens watching 
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television programs that informed them about the issues, and then voting 
yes or no to proposals through their remote controls.
Meanwhile, Clinton pollster Dick Morris (Martinson 2000) saw in the 
internet a new path to polling accuracy. Instead of calling people and 
asking them questions, internet pollsters could send emails and monitor 
existing discussion groups and comments sections. While feedback from 
users would not directly inf luence policy, at least lawmakers would be 
able to gauge (and presumably change messaging in order to influence) 
public opinion.
My own hope was for a deeper level of participation. Just as the internet 
allowed former television viewers to create something very much like 
programming, the internet could allow former voters to create something 
very much like policy platforms. The law might come to resemble less a set 
of bound volumes than a participatory wiki.
The 2004 Howard Dean campaign was among the f irst to respond to 
this call for a more net-enabled democracy. Dean’s campaign manager, Joe 
Trippi, used the language of open source democracy to energize the f irst 
sustained and successful internet political fundraising campaign. Instead 
of taking large sums from a small group of donors, Dean drew support from 
thousands upon thousands of individuals whose donations averaged just $80. 
Nevertheless, the $50 million Dean raised made him the f irst presidential 
candidate to forgo federal matching funds (Trippi 2004).
Eventually, the Obama campaign followed suit, using Facebook, Twitter, 
Meetup, forums, and a state-of-the-art website to solicit campaign donations, 
organize on-the-ground get-out-the-vote activities, and generate peer-to-peer 
support for his candidacy. He, too, raised enough money to reject federal 
campaign funds, and managed to leverage the internet’s metaphorical value 
as a participatory medium to cast his candidacy as a bottom-up people’s 
revolution.
However, after Obama won, the stirring idea that ‘we are the change 
we have been waiting for’ quickly devolved into politics as usual. While 
Obama the net-enabled campaigner offered many ways for people to get 
involved by donating money or getting others to donate money, Obama 
the net-enabled off ice-holder used the net much less aggressively. The 
administration offered greater transparency than its predecessors, making 
it easier for citizens to f ind pending legislation on the web. But for the most 
part, it was still a read-only government. The net was used to gather the 
troops for the campaign, but not to solicit or enable their participation as 
citizens in an ongoing way. For those who may have risen to the call to “be 
the change” (Sullivan 2008) this was a disappointment.
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But the media attention garnered through YouTube-sponsored debates 
and national net-organized Meetups spurred dozens of pop culture and 
commercial copycats. Internet-style democracy founds its expression 
in everything from American Idol (where viewers use text messaging to 
vote for their favorite singers) to a campaign for Mountain Dew called 
‘Dewmocracy’ where consumers campaign for name and color of the next 
Mountain Dew beverage offering (Rushkoff 2009). This gamification is not 
an entry point for democratic participation, but rather vulgarizes democracy 
as some form of consumer decision. Instead of using the net to increase 
opportunity, engagement, and levels of knowledge, the net seems to be used 
in the opposite fashion: Internet-style democracy encourages impulsiveness, 
impatience, siloing, and closed-minded hostility (Pariser 2011). CNN and 
other news networks now use scientif ic-looking ‘people meters’ to gauge 
instantaneous audience responses to candidates’ speeches and debates. 
A line at the bottom of the screen indicates male and female enthusiasm 
for whatever a candidate is saying in that moment—as if the immediate 
reaction and the considered response were one and the same (Goodman, 
Rushkoff, and Dretzin 2003).
Meanwhile, the amateurization encouraged by the net leads users to 
believe that access means ability (Keane 2007). Just because someone has 
access to a blog does not mean he or she has the ability to write researched, 
considered or even logical posts. Since a Wordpress template can now make 
anyone’s posts appear—at least superf icially—as authoritative as anyone 
else’s, it is up to readers to distinguish between the veracity and sense of 
different voices, including their own.
But in a media environment where sensationalism still trumps sense, the 
reward for participation is not to gain or share knowledge or insight, but to 
be credited with hits. Bloggers get attention for saying outrageous things, 
or linking to those who have. With the tools to publish becoming equated 
with the skill to write, the amateur is rendered incapable of distinguishing 
his own off-the-cuff output from the considered, researched, or reported 
product of trained professionals. This in turn leads to a misplaced disgust 
for professional journalism—a sense that those who earn column space in 
The New York Times or airtime on the BBC do not offer anything of greater 
intrinsic value than people posting in the comments sections or unvetted 
Tumblr blogs. I have more than once been questioned by college students 
wanting to know why I should be paid for doing “exactly the same thing” 
that they are doing for free.
Of course, the notion that no one should be paid for journalism misses 
the fact that corporations and governments will continue to pay billions 
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to public relations f irms and advertising agencies to obfuscate the truth. 
If society invests nothing in professional journalism, there will be no one 
left with the time, resources, and ability to deconstruct the f ictions, pursue 
leads, evaluate sources, and conf irm facts (Rushkoff 2010). Instead, we 
get an internet-inspired ontological relativism where everyone’s opinions 
matter as much as everyone else’s facts. Again, without some discipline 
and direction—some conscious sense of the structural biases of digital 
media—the promise of some kind of constructive, open source democracy 
moves ever further away.
In my own experience, I was scheduled to deliver a talk at an American 
college and received an email from a young woman who wanted to know 
whether or not I was a “leftist.” It seems she had been retained by an organiza-
tion headed by right-wing activist David Horowitz to protest the hiring of 
leftist speakers and professors at American colleges (Horowitz 2006). The 
young woman had spent a bit of time on my website reading articles, but had 
been as of yet unable to ascertain if I was, indeed, a leftist. “Could you just 
tell me if you are a leftist, so I know whether to protest your appearance?”
I responded that it would be diff icult for me to answer. I had read much 
of Marx and understood the extraction of value from the worker, but I 
was not convinced that large-scale labor unions were the best vehicle for 
correcting the wrongs of corporate capitalism. She replied, asking if I could 
give her a simple “yes or no answer.” I told her “yes and no.” She declined 
my invitation to appear with me to discuss all this on stage during my 
appearance. This young woman was ready to protest based on my binary 
response, but unprepared to have an extended conversation—even through 
email—where she could become educated or even just hone and advance 
her own argument. She wanted something as easy as the like button on 
Facebook.
By amplifying the more gamified, amateur, and impulse-driven qualities 
of the net, e-democracy has not only missed the mark as an opportunity for 
a more participatory electorate and civic body, but also exacerbated some 
of the least productive elements of spectator democracy so many believed 
would be obsolesced by the internet (McLuhan 1992). However, while the 
net may have failed democracy as a tool or platform, it may have succeeded 
on a more subtle yet ultimately deeper level as a media environment. That 
is, while the keyboards and websites and blogs and streaming video and 
social networks actually comprising the internet may not be directly 
impacting the ways in which citizens engage in civics, digital technology 
as a cultural landscape is beginning to have a profound effect on the way 
people conceive of themselves in relationship to one another and institutions. 
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Most signif icantly, as I’ll attempt to show in the case of the Occupy Wall 
Street movement, the net suggests new metaphors and demonstrates new 
principles that inform a novel amalgam of activist practices.
In short, the ‘playful citizen’ now being discussed in many forums and 
collections like the one in which this chapter appears, is most interest-
ing—and ultimately promising—as a style of inquiry into the ways that 
the emergence of the net and accompanying changes in the social-scientif ic 
paradigm have altered our expectations of agency, participation, and change.
Digital environment
The digital environment, like any other media environment, is embedded 
with certain values that inform the culture within it. The textual envi-
ronment encouraged new ways of thinking about accountability (written 
contracts), human interaction (written law) and even religion (the written 
Covenant with God—the Torah) (Logan 1987; Ong 2002). The printing press 
likewise changed the way people related to business (central banking), 
government (the Enlightenment), and the authority of the Church (personal 
Bibles and the Protestant reformation) (McLuhan 1962).
To parse the impact of the digital environment is a bit more diff icult 
since we are currently living within its effects. I identify four of the most 
pronounced conceptual shifts accompanying digitality in order to demon-
strate the ways the Occupy movement has utilized them as central operating 
principles for its new approach to activism and democratic participation.
Feedback. The f irst is the notion of feedback. Traditionally, what we think 
of as feedback is simply the latent results of particular causes. Farmers plant 
in one season, and get feedback months later in the yield of crop. Plant 
seed too close together, and the crop compete for resources. This data is 
then incorporated into the next year’s planting. Likewise, businesses send 
a product to market and then wait for sales reports to determine if the 
design and marketing were appropriate or could be improved upon. Each 
new iteration of planting or product design was based on the feedback from 
the one before.
In the dawn of the digital era, Cyberneticist Norbert Weiner (1965) saw 
in feedback a way of developing robots that could instantaneously ‘feel’ and 
respond to changing conditions in the real world. Just as a thermostat senses 
the temperature in order to turn a heater on or off, and an elevator ‘feels’ 
for indicators at each floor instead of attempting to measure the distance 
between one floor and another, robots could be taught to rely to no greater 
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extent on their programming than to the things around them. Each piece 
of feedback could be iterated into the next action.
With the help of systems theorists aided by computers (Miller and Page 
2007), much more complex systems could be analyzed in terms of feedback 
and iteration. The screech one hears when placing a microphone too close 
to an amplif ied speaker—what we call feedback—is really just the cyclical 
loop of uncontrolled feedback, iterating back to the microphone and again 
to the speaker. It is analogous to any of the many chaotic systems from the 
weather to the stock market that evade the analysis of our normal faculties.
Computers give us a way to see such systems in terms of their feedback and 
iteration. Fractals—the paisley graphics churned out by computers—are re-
ally just visualizations of the feedback and iteration of non-linear equations. 
Their power is in their ability to render previously incomprehensible systems 
in graphics that make sense to the human viewer. As a result, we become 
increasingly ready to understand feedback as an ongoing phenomenon 
rather than some occasional event.
In politics, for example, feedback used to occur primarily in four-year 
cycles. The populace would vote for a president, that president would go 
about his job, and then four years later he would get feedback in the form 
of being granted another term or kicked out of off ice. Pollsters arose to 
obtain feedback at tighter intervals, so that a politician could adjust policy 
(or even just his communication about policy) during his term. Digital 
technology—from live Twitter feeds to real time people meter results—now 
allows for instantaneous feedback. In a digital environment, feedback and 
iteration fold into one another.
Deconstruction of narrative. Likewise, in a digital environment, narratives 
no longer work quite like they used to. Thanks to the remote control, the DVR, 
the joystick, and the mouse, traditional stories are deconstructed, channel 
surfed, and fast-forwarded (Rushkoff 1995). The effects of the Aristolean arc 
and the hero’s journey alike depended on a captive audience. With escape 
as close as the push of a button, audiences of all kinds become intolerant 
of the anxiety associated with the rising tension of a story.
In the deconstructed, cut-and-paste mash-up of digital media, the mes-
sianic, ends-justify-the-means values of traditional journeys no longer f ind 
an environment consonant with their value systems. This is the realm of 
ongoing fantasy role-playing, not tragically terminal heroes. The digital 
environment is not a place for extended struggles, charismatic leaders 
followed by masses, or winner-takes-all campaigns. The structure of digital 
entertainment and problem-solving is less like agonistic play with victors and 
vanquished than it is like James Carse’s “inf inite game” (Carse 1997)—one 
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played for the sake of play. The object of the game is to keep the game going 
as long as possible.
Prototyping. This sensibility extends to the third characteristic of the 
digital media environment, its emphasis on prototyping over product. 
The shareware culture of the internet led to what are known as ‘public 
betas’—the release of unf inished software to the public for testing and 
improvement. As Media Lab director Joichi Ito has explained (Ito 2011), there 
is no point testing a product in-house when there is a willing population of 
users out there ready to bang on one’s programs. Besides, there is no time 
(see feedback and iteration above) to f inish a product before seeing how 
people are going to react to it. Better to incorporate feedback into one’s 
software in an ongoing fashion.
Programmer or player. Fourth and f inally, the digital environment blurs 
the boundary between users and programmers. In a computing environment 
(unless a program is intentionally and artif icially encrypted and protected) 
one’s level of participation is only limited by one’s willingness to learn more 
and dig deeper. One can play music through iTunes, or become a DJ whose 
selections are listened to by others. He can go deeper and use Garage Band to 
make new music, or another program to create new instruments for Garage 
Band. Or he can learn to program a new kind of music sequencer altogether.
Or, as I (Rushkoff 2012) and Julian Kücklick (2004) have explored sepa-
rately, one’s level of participation in any system can now be understood 
through the lens of a programmer or player. One can play a computer game 
out of the box; one can learn the ‘cheat’ codes to play the game on a new 
level; one can learn to ‘mod’ his own level of the game; or one can become 
a programmer and develop his own game. In a digital society, people 
participate on all these levels, and their limitations are either voluntary 
or visibly imposed.
Occupy movement
The Occupy movement bears all four of these characteristics of the digital 
media environment—and its success may have less to do with any im-
mediate goals being met or elections being won than the extent to which 
these values are internalized by politics at large. As an Editor-at-Large 
for Adbusters magazine in the 1990s and later author of the book Life inc 
(Rushkoff 2009), which deconstructed the corporation and sought new 
bottom-up solutions to capitalism, I was at least tangentially involved in 
laying some of the groundwork for this movement’s ethos and methodology. 
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When the Occupation was f irst announced, I decided to remain a distant 
supporter—so as not to either take credit for what was going on, or to unduly 
influence a movement of young people who I believed deserved to do this 
for themselves. In short, I fully believed the Occupiers would be capable 
of planning and interacting in ways beyond my own ability or foresight.
The f irst time I visited Zuccotti Park, during the f irst week of the Oc-
cupation, I had originally intended to speak and offer support. But on my 
arrival, I saw not just one but several cultural heroes of the 1960s through 
the 1990s, all preaching to the assembled activists, or singing songs with 
guitars, or giving interviews to the press. From my perspective, these folk 
f igures meant well—but were ultimately usurping the moment from their 
ideological successors. So instead, I spent that day and several more simply 
observing the proceedings, asking questions, participating in teach-ins, and 
keeping my identity to myself.
My participation was entirely ‘real world.’ I did not check any of the social 
networks or Facebook pages for news, as I seemed to be learning enough 
on the ground. In fact, it did not even occur to me to use Facebook to learn 
what I could in real life. While this may imply a certain elitism, in that 
only those with the means to get to Zuccotti Park could experience what it 
was, the notion that this entire demonstration was enabled by social media 
implies that participants came entirely from one side of the digital divide. 
Yet, the fact that both real world and virtual means of participation remained 
available throughout at least this phase of Occupy suggests that neither is 
true. Social media competency was not a prerequisite for participation. This 
is not to say Occupy was divorced from social media at all. The activities I 
saw on site, however, mirrored the kinds of insights and behaviors garnered 
from what I believe were the participants’ experiences—both direct and 
indirect—of the digital media environment.
For instance, Occupiers have an altogether new relationship to feedback 
than traditional political movements. Although they occasionally march 
and shout, the majority of activity is not directed at or to anyone. Rather, it 
is lateral. Occupiers are more focused on one another than the stockbrokers 
who may curse their encampment from the periphery. The Occupation is 
a form of self-education. Rather than looking for signs that their message 
has been ‘heard’ by a politician or incorporated into some party’s platform, 
they seek instead to develop coherence together.
The result is less like the feedback and iteration of an election cycle, 
where the constituency feeds back to the elected off icial, and more like the 
feedback and iteration of a fractal or dynamic system. As such, it remains 
unrecognizable as a form of politics to those still entirely within the printing 
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press or broadcast modality, yet absolutely activist to participants within 
a digital environment.
Likewise, the Occupy movement is non-narrative, perhaps even to a fault 
given the practicalities of our still largely broadcast-centric media culture. 
The main critique by mainstream media of the Occupy movement is its 
seeming inability to articulate clear goals or demands. This is at least part of 
why mainstream television news reporters appeared so determined to cast 
Occupy Wall Street as the random, silly blather of an ungrateful and lazy 
generation of weirdos. As if defending against the coming obsolescence of 
their own truncated news formats, television journalists reported that the 
movement’s inability to articulate its agenda in ten seconds or less meant 
there was no agenda at all. CNN business anchor Erin Burnett covered 
the goings on at Zuccotti Park in a segment called Seriously?! (Burnett 
2011) “What are they protesting?” she asked, “nobody seems to know.” Like 
Tonight Show comedian host Jay Leno’s testing random mall patrons on 
American History, her main objective was to prove that the protesters did 
not know that the United States government had been reimbursed for the 
bank bailouts. More predictably, a Fox News reporter appeared flummoxed 
when the occupier he interviewed refused to explain how he wants the 
protests to “end.” Attempting to transcend the standard political narrative, 
the protester explains: “As far as seeing it end, I wouldn’t like to see it end. 
I would like to see the conversation continue” (Christopher 2011).
In this sense, whether or not its economic agenda is grounded in reality, 
Occupy Wall Street does constitute the f irst truly post-narrative political 
movement. Unlike the civil rights protests, labor marches, or even the 
Obama campaign, it does not take its cue from a charismatic leader, it does 
not express itself with bumper-sticker-length goals, nor does it understand 
itself as having a particular endpoint. The lack of specific goals makes it hard 
to maintain focus. The movement may be attempting to embrace too wide 
an array of complaints, demands, and goals: the collapsing environment, 
labor standards, housing policy, government corruption, World Bank lending 
practices, unemployment, increasing wealth disparity, and so on. Different 
people have been affected by different aspects of the same system—and they 
believe they are symptoms of the same core problem. What upsets banking’s 
defenders and traditional Democrats alike is the refusal of this movement 
to state its terms or set its goals in the traditional language of campaigns.
But the Occupiers are simply native to a different media environment than 
its detractors. Unlike a political campaign designed to get some person in 
off ice and then close up shop (as in the election of Obama and subsequent 
youth disillusionment), this is not a movement with a traditional narrative 
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arc. It is not about winning some debate point and then going home. Rather, 
as the product of the decentralized networked-era culture, it is less about 
victory than sustainability. It is not about one-pointedness but inclusion. 
It is not about scoring a victory, but groping toward consensus. It is not like 
a book or television, it is like the internet.
The Occupy movement is also imbued with digital culture’s emphasis 
on prototyping. The encampments are no more a form of symbolic protest 
than they are a workshop for prototyping new methods and reviving old 
methods of political engagement. They are beta tests. Occupy’s ‘General 
Assembly’ methodology, for example, is a highly flexible approach to group 
discussion and consensus building borrowed from the Ancient Greeks. 
Unlike parliamentary rules that promote debate, difference and decision, 
the General Assembly forges consensus by ‘stacking’ ideas and objections 
as they arise, and then making sure they are all eventually heard. The 
whole thing is orchestrated through simple hand gestures. Elements in the 
stack are prioritized, and everyone gets a chance to speak. Even after votes, 
exceptions and objections are incorporated as amendments.
Strangers to the process are justif iably alienated by the General Assembly, 
and a certain facility with its processes is required. Those who do not know 
the hand signals cannot readily participate. But from what I observed, 
newcomers quickly came to understand the General Assembly’s rules, either 
through observation and osmosis, or the ready instruction by peers. In fact, 
the last place I had seen ‘newbies’ so quickly and deliberately oriented by 
more experienced participants was on the early internet.
And like many online processes, such as the ‘collaborative f iltering’ done 
to bring popular results to the top of a web page, the General Assembly 
seems like an evolutionary leap forward in consensus-building. Dispensing 
with preconceived narratives about generating policy demands or settling 
the score between Right vs. Left, this process eschews debate (or what 
Enlightenment philosophers called ‘dialectic’) for consensus. It is a blatant 
rejection of the binary, winner-takes-all, political operating system of the 
thirteenth century.
The approach of the Occupiers is more like a university than a political 
movement. Both online and off line spaces consist largely of ‘teach ins’ 
about the issues they are concerned about. Young people teach one another 
or invite guests to lecture them about subjects such as how the economy 
works, the disconnection of investment banking from the economy of 
goods and services, possible responses to mass foreclosure, the history 
of centralized interest-bearing currency, and even best practices for civil 
disobedience.
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It is unwieldy and unpredictable, but oddly consistent with the values of 
a post-narrative landscape. The Occupy ethos replaces the zero-sum, closed-
ended game of f inancial competition with a more sustainable, open-ended 
game of abundance and mutual aid. In the traditional political narrative, 
this sounds like communism—but to the Occupiers, it is a realization of 
the peer-to-peer sensibility of the social net. It is not a game that someone 
wins, but rather a form of play that—like a massive multiplayer online 
game—is successful the more people get to play, and the longer the game 
is kept going.
Finally, the Occupiers embody the player or hacker’s approach to the 
political process. Each member of the movement is as capable and likely 
as any other to write or edit the operating system through which all of 
this activity takes place. Whether joining a general assembly, leading a 
working group, taking a role in developing or sustaining the infrastructure, 
or organizing an entirely new encampment, each member is free to author 
his or her own contribution to the total effort.
Conclusion
In the internet age, occupation could become less a form of conditional, 
temporary, discrete political activism than a new normative behavior. 
The culture of the net dissolves the boundaries between consumer and 
producer, programmer and user and instead promotes more of a peer-to-peer 
relationship between all members of the network. In a similar fashion, 
Occupy eschews hierarchies and defined roles in favor of modeling a new 
normative behavior for its participants. The occupation of Zuccotti or any 
other encampment is just the most pronounced version of the occupation 
of reality itself.
As Occupiers become conscious of the consonance of their approach 
with the greater emerging digital landscape, the loss of Zuccotti and 
other encampments becomes less signif icant. As McLuhan might argue, 
the protest encampment is merely the ‘f igure’—the particular content at 
one moment in time. The occupation concerns the ‘ground’—the greater 
environment in which this activity is taking place. The individual players 
and their temporary roles mean less than the changes to the playing f ield 
itself, our understanding of the extra-political means through which 
the socio-economic landscape can be revised, and the trivial value of 
recognition from either the political parties or the mainstream corporate 
media.
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The Occupy movement is indeed revolutionary, but not in the sense of 
victory, overthrow, and replacement of authority. That cycle seeks simply 
to entrench a new regime (f igure) within the same environment (ground). 
The Occupiers appear to be groping instead for something more sustain-
ably iterative than the steady state of a single solution. The only sort of 
permanence in the occupation is the ongoing process of revolution, itself.
This is a politics consonant with the values and insights of twenty-f irst-
century science and technology. Unlike the innovations of the industrial 
age, which fostered production, accumulation, central authority, and empire, 
those of the digital era are biased toward replication and self-modif ication. 
Robotics, genomics, nano-machines and digital programming do not render 
completed technologies but self-replicating, iterative systems. We program 
them now, but they continue themselves, learning from experience, iterating 
new versions, and carrying on the intentions of their original creators in 
novel ways.
So while the majority of public encampments and protests appear to have 
died down, new forms and mutations of the Occupiers’ presence emerge 
every day. It is as if the movement is on an entirely different calendar, operat-
ing in a parallel dimension. Given the tremendous differences between 
the digital media environment and what went before it, this may not be 
an inaccurate perception. The original occupation may be ‘over’ as far as it 
is off icially recognized by extant media and political authority. But as an 
emergent narrative, digital prototype, cultural norm, and style of play, it 
has only just been born.
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This chapter about playful urban planning argues that play and games can 
help foster smart citizenship. In recent years, many cities have embarked 
on what is termed smart-city policies, deploying ICT to optimize a variety 
of urban processes. Various authors have noted that these smart-city 
policies often leave little room for civic action and agency. This contribu-
tion proposes the notion of the ‘playful city’ as an alternative vision for 
leveraging the smartness of people in creating more livable and lively cities. 
Play, it is argued, should not be positioned as offering solutions to urban 
problems. Instead, play offers alternative narratives about the potential 
futures of city-making, and reinserts the ‘political’ into smart city-making.
Keywords: Smart city, playful city, city-making, smartness, civic 
engagement
How can play and games entice urban stakeholders to become involved 
in making their city? In the nineteenth century, urban design became a 
professionalized discipline in reaction to the new machine era, the explosive 
growth of cities, and an impoverished class of new citizens lacking adequate 
housing (Hall 1988). With the current wave of ‘smart technologies’ pervading 
the urban realm, we observe how, once again, the shifting technological 
conditions of urban life affect the ways cities are made and the role of 
citizens in such processes. Today, municipalities all over the world seize 
the omnipresence of digital technologies as an opportunity to make their 
city ‘smart.’ In the wake of creative city policies popularized in the late 
1990s (Landry and Bianchini 1995; Florida 2004, 2012; Landry 2008), smart 
city agendas aim to improve services and livability through ICTs and 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
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supporting infrastructures. Large technology companies, including IBM, 
CISCO, Siemens, Microsoft, Philips, General Electric, among others, are 
forming coalitions with municipalities and knowledge institutions in ‘triple 
helix’ smart city consortia. Among the problems that smart city policies 
seek to address are mobility, clean energy, water and food production and 
distribution, health, living standards, and public participation (Hollands 
2008).
Smart city visions and discourses have received much criticism (e.g. 
Hemment and Townsend 2013; De Lange and De Waal 2013; Söderström, 
Paasche, and Klauser 2014; Vanolo 2014; Calzada and Cobo 2015; Hollands 
2015). These criticisms can be broken down in three major strands. The f irst 
strand of criticism focuses on the ill-def ined notion of ‘smartness.’ What 
does ‘smart’ actually mean? Who is supposed to be smart? How can digital 
technologies be used for a pedagogy of smart urban life? The second strand 
targets the technocratic solutionism of these visions and the lack of agency 
ascribed to ‘smart citizens.’ All too often, technology-centric smart city 
visions assume that there are easy technological f ixes for complex urban 
problems. They fail to leverage citizen creativity and smartness in more 
participatory ways of city-making. The third strand critically questions 
underlying simplistic views of what cities are or should be. What makes a 
city? Do we want city life and the urban experience to be about control, 
eff iciency and predictability, or do we also value serendipity, friction, and 
playfulness?
To address these shortcomings, a variety of alternative notions have been 
coined. Many of them stress inclusivity and citizen agency. Quite a few of 
these build on the notion of playfulness to seek people-centric alternatives to 
the tech-driven smart city. Terms coined include the ‘playable city’ (Nijholt 
2016), the ‘ludic city’ (Feirreis 2007; Stevens 2007), the ‘gameful city’ (Alfrink 
2015), and the ‘playful city’ (De Lange 2014, 2015; Sicart 2016). At stake in these 
notions is the question of how games and play can help foster a smarter civic 
engagement. In this chapter, I further develop the idea of the ‘playful city’ 
as an alternative imaginary for utilitarian smart city agendas. This chapter 
investigates how playful media technologies can help to engage citizens in 
playing with and testing future city scenarios, and how as a result this can 
make cities and citizens smarter. I claim that the playful city is a productive 
concept to help conceptualize truly smart cities. This claim rests on three 
interconnected arguments, each addressing one of the above-mentioned 
criticisms. As I have argued elsewhere (De Lange 2013, 2014, 2015), play and 
games can be used f irst to leverage citizen creativity (smartness). Second, 
games and play can help to organize engagement, create collectives and 
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strengthen people’s agency (citizen participation). Third, games and play 
can be used to experiment with possible urban futures that are much more 
solidly rooted in a fertile substratum of theorizing urban culture instead 
of technology-driven eff iciency (cityness). The notion of the playful city 
addresses civic agency in relation to professional disciplines. It aims to 
develop a perspective on playful citizens and playful urban planners.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, I juxtapose 
two approaches to citizen engagement in urban planning. This section 
serves to articulate the central concerns of my argument that deal with new 
technologies, civic participation, smartness, and cityness. Furthermore, 
it traces how playfulness slowly entered its way into city-making with 
the advent of creative city policies. Next, I take a look at some historical 
strands of conceptualizing city life in terms of play, in order to construct a 
more solid conceptualization of the ‘playful city.’ The section exposes f ive 
different playful city themes, each harboring a different kind of playful civic 
smartness. The section also zooms in on the notion of play. The chapter then 
turns to a concrete case study of Rezone the Game, a game about vacant 
urban spaces in which I have been involved as a researcher, in order to f ind 
out how play can engage citizens in co-creating their urban environment. 
In the conclusion, I suggest that the concept of play serves to account for 
shifts in city-making and urban design practices. It is proposed that the 
tripartite ontology of play as material object, rule-based algorithm, and 
situated action offers a fruitful perspective on the changing roles of various 
stakeholders in shaping the future of the media city.
What is at stake in this contribution is how people can become engaged 
in their urban environment and with urban issues through ‘playful me-
dia technologies’ (see Frissen et al. 2015). The early days of digital media 
technologies bred in many commentators a gigantic optimism about their 
creative and democratizing potential to involve non-professionals in areas of 
professional expertise. For example, speaking about the field of design Mieke 
Gerritzen and Geert Lovink programmatically declared that “everyone is a 
designer in the age of social media” (Gerritzen and Lovink 2010). Similarly, 
Chris Anderson in his book Makers: The new industrial revolution claimed 
that “we are all designers now” (Anderson 2012, 53). We can and should 
doubt whether this is truly the case. As is argued in several chapters in this 
volume, there are many problems with the assumption that new media fuel 
more egalitarian and participatory societies, the end of expert knowledge, 
and a blossoming of high quality user generated content. There is little 
doubt, however, that digital media technologies profoundly shape new 
practices of city-making. ‘Civic media’ or ‘civic technology’ are terms that 
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have recently gained considerable traction to designate the potential of 
media technologies to foster civic engagement (Gordon and Mihailidis 2016).1 
The challenges of dealing with digital media technologies and citizen-driven 
city-making in the f ield of urban planning have become more urgent in 
the light of accelerating urbanization, a worldwide f inancial crisis that hit 
the sector particularly hard, and the rise of a DIY (do-it-yourself) maker 
culture. Like many other disciplines, urban design is faced with a tilting 
balance between professionals and amateurs, a decline in legitimacy of 
expert knowledge, and the rise of networked collective or ‘connective’ action 
(Varnelis 2008; Bennett and Segerberg 2012). This contribution argues that 
playful technologies and the ludif ication of (urban) culture (Raessens 2006, 
2014) provide momentum and opportunity to productively address such 
questions of citizen engagement in city-making.
Planning cities
Citizen participation is by no means a new phenomenon in urban plan-
ning. In the 1970s, architects and planners already experimented with 
engaging communities in ‘placemaking’ and collective ownership through 
participatory design techniques (e.g. Landry 2008, 208). Only one century 
before, the inverse had happened in western societies, when a major profes-
sionalization took place in how cities were made (Hall 1988). In reaction to 
the industrialization of the city and the squalid living circumstances of a 
pauperized class of new urbanites, urban planning became a professional 
and academic discipline. Ever since, urban planning has been concerned 
with realizing visions of a better future. Dreams of a better tomorrow were 
frequently driven by fears and anxieties about city life today (Andraos 
et al. 2009). Urban design produced spaces that prescribed how people 
should behave. It was assumed, for instance, that the creation of healthier, 
greener, cleaner, and more aesthetically pleasing urban environments 
would lead to more societal stability (Huxley 2006, 774). Thus, planning 
became an instrument for superimposing order and control. The design of 
these ‘governable spaces’ would discipline and rationalize the minds and 
bodies of people, instill higher moral standards in them, and mold them into 
good citizens (Huxley 2006; Watson 2009). Central to the late Peter Hall’s 
magnum opus Cities of tomorrow: An intellectual history of urban planning 
1 Also see, for instance, reports by the Knight Foundation (2013) or various programs by 
UK-based Future Cities Catapult (2018).
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and design in the twentieth century (Hall 1988) is this continual struggle 
between planners who want to impose a top-down totalitarian planning 
logic onto the populace in the belief that a better society is never designed 
by committee, and those who take an on the ground perspective of people’s 
everyday needs and desires, and wish to empower them. Best exemplifying 
these extremes in city-making is the often-recounted antagonism between 
New York City’s modernist municipal planner Robert Moses and urban 
activist Jane Jacobs. Moses built bridges that were deliberately too low for 
public transportation, thus preventing racial minorities and low-income 
groups without private cars to get to Long Island Jones Beach (Winner 1980). 
Jacobs, on the other hand, made passionate pleas for messiness and diversity 
(Jacobs 1961/1992). As an activist, she took it to the streets and defended 
Greenwich Village against Moses’ demolition plans to make space for a 
highway. In the humanities, a similar opposition is expressed in Michel de 
Certeau’s well-known juxtaposition of a birds-eye city view from high above, 
and a city walker perspective at street-level (de Certeau 1984). We briefly 
look at how the Situationist art movement addressed this tension later on.
An apparent break from old ideals of urban planning as instruments 
for superimposing social order took place in the second half of the 1990s 
with the rise of the ‘creative city’ paradigm. Building explicitly upon the 
legacy of Jane Jacobs, creative city proponents valued city life for being 
pleasantly chaotic, unpredictable, emergent, and self-organizing. Chaos is 
not to be curbed but cherished. In fact, in moderate doses it is a necessary 
precondition for creativity to blossom, via serendipitous encounters and 
exchanges. In the new paradigm, socio-economic prosperity of cities goes 
hand-in-hand with fostering their playful qualities. Cities with many playful 
‘third spaces’ provide nurture beds for creativity and, ultimately, monetary 
revenue. Neither private domestic spaces nor utilitarian work spaces for 
rationalized productivity, these playful civic spaces were hotbeds for new 
ideas to blossom and come to fruition (Oldenburg 1989; Rifkin 2000; Thrift 
2008). Creative city discourses f it very well with the rise of the information 
economy and the rhetoric of disruptive innovation.
Several points in the discussion above are relevant for this chapter. The 
f irst point is about ‘smartness’ in civic participation. The recurrent tension 
between city-making for the people and city-making by the people reflects 
opposing views of citizenship and participation. One involves a liberal 
view that highlights ‘passive’ individual rights (“the right to have rights”), 
while the other entails a republican communitarian view that emphasizes 
‘active’ collective participation and civic duty (Somers 2008, 5, 14). Today’s 
technology-driven smart cities seem to recombine these two types into a 
354 MIChIEL DE LANGE 
new type of participatory liberal citizenship, while at the same time stripping 
away their respective empowering potential and political agency. In many 
smart city visions, the good citizen is no longer a collectively organized 
and vocal political agent, or somebody protected by individual rights, but 
primarily a mute collector of data. Civic participation equals producing 
economic value. Although this is often touted to exemplify a new branch 
of participatory and entrepreneurial urban citizenship predicated upon a 
collectivized ‘sharing economy’ (Davidson and Infranca 2016), in terms of 
political agency it is very limited. No longer communal duty or individual 
rights, citizenship becomes individualized duty. You shall be a productive 
citizen. How then, can the notion of the playful city contribute to an active 
kind of ‘smart’ civic participation in which people can help shape the future 
of their cities?
The second point is about media technology and civic participation. When 
we think about smart cities, and indeed more generally about media and 
citizenship, we need to pay attention to the ‘politics’ of technologies and 
artifacts (Winner 1980). Technologies and their material and institutional 
arrangements may serve both as enabling devices and as instruments of 
control. Smart city technologies do not bring equal civic participation for 
everyone. They can empower some while posing insurmountable thresholds 
for others, in terms of accessibility or literacy. Like Moses’ NYC bridges 
half a century ago, the institutional arrangements that come with smart 
cities might lead to social sorting and a splintering of urban public life (see 
Graham and Marvin 2001). So, one may ask how can we think of a more 
inclusive kind of civic participation through the notion of the playful city?
The third point is about what is called ‘cityness,’ or what constitutes city 
life (for example, Brenner and Schmid 2015). The brief discussion above 
sensitizes us to the fact that every well-meant vision about better urban 
futures is infused with ideological assumptions about city life and the role of 
citizens. This rhetoric of change conceals a deep core of what should remain 
stable. In the case of the industrial city, urban planning professed to bring 
positive change to the housing conditions of the masses and endow people 
with individual citizen rights to adequate living circumstances and—in 
many European cities—institutionalized welfare. The implication, however, 
was that the working class through a variety of new institutions were f ixated 
and made controllable for the sake of the societal status quo. City life in the 
machine age was to be neat and orderly, and everything and everyone had 
to behave like a cog in it. Likewise, the smart city’s emphasis on controlling 
and optimizing flows and environments through data means it perpetuates 
existing systems. It is, in a sense, a return to the modernist conception of 
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the city as a controllable machine, or to be more precise, a smart cybernetic 
system controlled through feedback loops and self-learning capacities. The 
case of the smart city control center in Rio de Janeiro illustrates this drive 
toward centralized real-time control. The Rio Operations Centre was built by 
IBM and allows the municipality to gather data from 30 different agencies, 
display them on screens in a room-size ‘urban dashboard,’ and remotely 
manage processes like natural disasters or big public events (Townsend 
2013, 65; Mattern 2015). The critical question then is what remains f ixated 
through the rhetoric of smart urban change? To what extent do attempts at 
optimizing existing systems allow us to step outside of the box and conceive 
of radically new alternative visions for the future of cities? As I will argue 
in more detail below, I propose that the playful city imaginary is not only 
a productive notion to conceive of a more participatory smart citizenship, 
but also acts as a meta-reflective notion that opens up the space to critically 
question its own foundations.
Playful cities in a historical context2
In order to better understand how playful technologies can help engage 
people in participatory city-making, let us trace several historical themes 
in understanding the city as playful. Indeed, play and games have been 
part and parcel of city life (Stevens 2007). I identify f ive major playful city 
themes: the city as a center of entertainment; the city as everyday theater; the 
city as civic learning space; the city as a subversive playground; and urban 
simulation. First, from Roman bread and games (panem et circenses) to the 
present ‘experience economy’ (Pine and Gilmore 1999), cities have long been 
conceived as centers of entertainment and fun experiences. According to 
this view, the city is a locus for genuine playful behavior and activities, and 
for enjoying games or other forms of entertainment in designated settings. 
Second, with the rise of the modern metropolis, people’s interactions in newly 
conceived public spaces came to be understood in theatrical metaphors. 
Theorists like Georg Simmel, Erving Goffman, and Lyn Lofland argued 
that urbanites in public situations engage in role-playing and information 
games using various props as a way to deal with life among strangers in 
highly segmented roles and situations (Goffman 1959; Lofland 1973; Simmel 
1997). In this view, city life itself is conducive to everyday role-playing. Third, 
a historical strand of ‘ludic architecture’ connects play and games to the 
2 This section is based in part on de Lange (2009, 2015).
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physical design of cities. In the Netherlands after the second World War, 
Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck dotted the ruined cityscapes with outdoor 
play spaces as a way to counter top-down functionalist planning policies 
and to open up room for people’s own creativity (Oudenampsen 2013). 
Play served the pedagogical goal of teaching new generations to deal with 
conflict and tensions without resorting to destructive violence. Besides, 
what better way to make traumatized people smile again than watching 
children playing? According to this view, play spawns learning and Bildung 
ideals of civilization. Accompanying the restoration of the physical urbs, play 
mends the social bonds of civitas. A related fourth historical strand takes 
play as downright subversive. The artistic movement of The Situationists 
International criticized mass consumer society and sought to reclaim the 
right to the city through subversive counter-play and everyday spatial 
tactics, like dérive and detournement (drift and diversion) (Debord 1955, 1958, 
2005; de Certeau 1984). A friend of Van Eijck, Constant Nieuwenhuys’s New 
Babylon was an attempt to imagine a non-conformist city of play in which 
ever-changing environments would foster citizen creativity and engagement 
(Nieuwenhuys 1974; De Mul 2009). More recently, several studies in the 
same tradition focus on subcultural or countercultural urban practices like 
skateboarding or parkours (Borden 2001; Mould 2009). In this view, play is an 
everyday tactic to counter dominant structures by reclaiming agency and 
‘the right to the city’ (Lefebvre 1996; Mitchell 2003). Fifth, while not strictly 
playful, terms from the world of informatics like networks, simulation, 
feedback, algorithms, and virtuality have come to profoundly influence 
architectural theory and practice as new ways to imagine, represent and 
design cities with digital tools (see Wigley 2001; Picon 2008). Cybernetics 
and systems theory have been very influential in understanding the city 
as emergent rule-based systems, which can be simulated and ‘played’ 
through creative recombinations and generative, algorithmic, responsive, 
or parametric design (see Berry 1964; Beesley and Khan 2009; Tan 2014).
What we can take from this, f irst, is a more nuanced and plural under-
standing of the notion of ‘smart.’ In the views above there is fairly clear 
conception of ‘smartness’ at play, each different from the other. Smartness 
in everyday role-playing means being clever, persuasive and having self-
confidence. In the case of Van Eyck’s urban playgrounds smartness is didactic 
and self-empowering. The smart playful tactics of the Situationists evoke 
shrewdness and unorthodox associative thinking. And the smartness in 
urban simulations is of an almost demiurgic ambition as it attempts to 
confer sentience or intelligence to systems to aid in problem-solving and 
learning. As for the ‘entertainment city,’ it may be a bit more diff icult to 
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discern smartness among those seeking a temporary carnivalesque inverse 
of normalcy (indeed it is easy to dismiss this as childish, stupefying, or opium 
for the masses). Yet, many of these urban play activities simultaneously aid 
in developing problem solving skills and fostering communal and situated 
experiences (not to mention that it takes creativity and originality to produce 
or curate such engaging experiences). There is a whole genre of mobile urban 
games with labels like pervasive/ubiquitous/location-based mobile/hybrid 
reality/alternate reality/urban games that frame the city as a playing board 
and escape the confines of the screen to be played in hybrid space (Chang 
and Goodman 2006; Montola, Stenros, and Waern 2009; de Souza e Silva 
and Hjorth 2009; de Souza e Silva and Sutko 2008, 2009). Hence, the ‘playful 
city’ complements the majority of smart city visions that equate ‘smart’ 
with automation and eff iciency. It also vastly broadens our perspective of 
what ‘smart citizenship’ in relation to urban life could be.
A second point, made by many already, is that the modern separation of 
play and everyday life is not the default but the exception (see Ehrmann, 
Lewis, and Lewis 1968). Clearly, Van Eijck, Constant, Débord, and others, felt 
the need to go against the dominant mode of thinking with their integrated 
views. Recently, play and everyday life are (again) being understood as 
inextricably intertwined (Raessens 2006, 2014). This is largely driven by 
the pervasive presence of digital technologies in the urban realm, by the 
creative city agenda, and by the current search for smart city alternatives. 
It is imperative therefore that we consider playfulness not as some exotic 
idealistic notion far removed from the nitty-gritty of city-making, but as an 
inherent part of it. In fact, urban designers are turning to play to develop 
more diversif ied and resilient modes of urban planning (see Venhuizen 
2011; Holleman, de Kort, and Lindemann 2012; Tan 2014).
A third point is that we must pay closer attention to the myriad of 
understandings of play and games. Conceptual clarity is needed to push 
the playful city as a productive idea to explore participatory smart city-
making. Although there is inf initely more to say about play and games, for 
sake of brevity, I shall stick to the well-known conceptualization of French 
sociologist and philosopher Roger Caillois. Caillois identif ied four types of 
play: competition (agôn), chance (alea), make belief (mimicry), and sensory 
delusion (ilinx) (Caillois 1958/2001). He further differentiated between two 
opposing poles in play attitudes: spontaneous and intrinsically motivated 
free play (paidia) versus rule-based and goal-oriented gaming (ludus). 
While other play theorists have better situated play in everyday reality (for 
instance Ehrmann, Lewis, and Lewis 1968; Sutton-Smith 1997), Caillois offers 
a powerful scheme to analyze how since the rise of the modern city, play 
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in various guises has been a central element in imagining urban culture.3 
More importantly for our purposes here, however, is that this scheme allows 
us to analyze and theorize playful city-making with more rigor.
Caillois’ distinction between paidia and ludus, I argue, coincides with two 
stances toward the citizen engagement in the smart city. This helps us to 
better articulate the differences between the smart city and the playful city 
when it comes to citizen engagement. Citizen engagement in the majority 
of technology-driven smart city agendas tends toward the ludus pole: it 
is contractual and rule-governed, goal-oriented, and favors rationalized 
eff iciency.4 The playful city serves to emphasize the paidia pole: free spon-
taneous play, not so much instrumental and goal-oriented but autotelic, that 
is, the joy of the activity in itself constitutes the major reason for engaging. 
Furthermore, smart city initiatives tend to use technologies (including 
games) in a very ludus-like way. Tech is understood as goal-oriented: it 
aims at solving problems and thus ending the engagement. I want to make 
a plea here for playful smart city interventions that instead lean toward the 
paidia pole: aimed at continuing engagement and self-motivated action. 
As we will see below, such playful interventions do not necessarily use 
games with the aim of solving a problem, but to ask questions about the 
underlying mechanisms and to create the conditions for people to come up 
with smart ideas.5 Additionally, Caillois’ fourfold game typology allows us to 
establish that smart city interventions are mostly of the competitive agôn 
type. Complex urban problems like sustainability, crime, or congestion are 
agonistically framed as ‘challenges’ that can be solved via data and apps. 
As a city-branding strategy, smart cities are continually competing with 
each other in a host of global rankings. According to this view, smartness 
3 Agôn underlies the ‘ecological’ views of the Chicago School that took urban life as a competi-
tion for scarce resources, and the post-industrial city engaged in competition with other cities 
vying for the attention of the creative industries. Alea connects to common views of urban 
life as serendipitous and is present in terms used to describe high or late modernity as a ‘risk 
society’ (Beck 1992) or in terms of radical uncertainty. Mimicry informs the view of urban life 
as constant theatrical role-playing. And ilinx can be recognized for example in the f laneur who 
loses himself in the crowd, Walter Benjamin’s shock experiences brought about by visual media, 
Simmel’s metropolitan blasé attitude caused by ‘intensif ication of nervous stimulation,’ and 
the Situationist legacy of psycho-geography.
4 One only needs to take a look at some of the corporate videos made by IBM Industries 
(2013) to understand that the rhetoric about citizen engagement is skin deep and only serves 
the functional needs of the municipality and corporate stakeholders.
5 See for instance Games for Cities (2018), a database that contains a mix of goal-oriented 
games and more playful interventions, several of them developed in the context of smart city 
policies.
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is of a competitive nature: it means ‘outsmarting’ the system, other people, 
or other cities. Competitive problem-solving is in my view a very narrow 
understanding of ‘smart.’ By contrast, I argue for playful city interventions 
that involve a broad range of game types, including alea, mimicry, and ilinx, 
to nurture and leverage different kinds of civic smartness. That could mean 
embracing and anticipating aleatory radical uncertainty, engaging in creative 
and cooperative make-belief, or seeking pleasurable experiences and deeply 
valuable “occasions of pure waste” (Caillois 1958/2001, 5) or “meaningful 
ineff iciencies,” as Gordon and Walter write in Chapter 16 of this volume.
Rezone the Game: Playing against vacancy
Armed with these directions and insights, I want to move from these theo-
retical and historical explorations of the playful city to a more concrete case, 
in order to see how participatory smart citizenship may work in practice. 
Rezone the Game is a project to help address the complex urban issue of 
vacancy.6 Two cultural organizations from Den Bosch in the Netherlands, 
the Bosch Architecture Initiative and art organization Wave of Tomorrow, 
collaborated with a game design school to create Rezone the Game (www.
rezone.eu), challenging players to ‘f ight blight.’ In the game, players work 
together to keep the city safe from deterioration by salvaging real estate from 
decline. There are four player roles: the proprietor (owner of the real estate), 
mayor (representing the municipality), engineer (urban designer), and citizen 
(neighbors). Rezone the Game is composed of a physical board game with 
a number of 3D printed iconic buildings that represent the neighborhood, 
an augmented reality layer of real-time information about these buildings 
projected on a screen, and a computer algorithm programmed to let buildings 
descend into vacancy like a wildf ire. A camera above registers the players’ 
moves by scanning QR codes on pawns. The game engine continually adapts 
to changes. To beat the system players must strategically collaborate instead 
of pursuing self-interests. The game was tested during a series of events 
including The Playful Arts Festival (2013) and Rezone Playful Interventions 
(2014), with the mayor of Den Bosch participating in playing. The large Dutch 
construction company Heijmans became interested. Their involvement 
initiated a new collaboration and lead to a follow-up game concept. Part of 
the motivation for the development of Rezone the Game was that it is hard 
to address complex questions like vacancy through conventional means. 
6 I have been involved in this project as a paid advisor and researcher.
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Traditional parties involved in urban development are not inclined to invest 
in initiatives with uncertain outcomes and often wait for others to take the 
f irst step. It was believed that in a game stakeholders would feel freer to 
experiment without immediate (f inancial) consequences.
Again, this informs the three elements of smartness, civic participation, 
and cityness mentioned at the start of this chapter. First, in this case play-
ful smartness is fostered on multiple levels. Players have to manage their 
different stakeholder roles, they must forge coalitions with other players 
and quickly negotiate, they must unpack the underlying mechanisms of 
vacancy, and think of ways to address this issue. Rezone the Game involves 
all of Caillois’ play types: competition, role-playing, chance, and even diz-
zyingly speedy interactions with the computer system. The competitive 
element exists not between players but between players and the system. 
Playing together forges trust and connections between players. Real world 
stakeholders can meet each other in a playful atmosphere instead of at 
the negotiation table. The game is fun and acts as a catalyst for ensuing 
discussions and reflections among players (a crucial part of the play sessions), 
and even potential follow-ups. It is a deliberately simplif ied and artif icial 
safe setting where real emotions and desires emerge. It invites people to 
temporarily stand in their adversaries’ shoes. This could lead to better 
understanding of each other’s standpoints through embodied experience 
and affects, instead of mere argumentation and deliberation. No longer 
passive as users of the city, players temporarily become smart planners.
Second, Rezone the Game helps to foster citizen engagement around the 
issue of vacancy. The game was used to invite real world stakeholders to the 
table. This happened during special play sessions and events such as The 
Playful Arts Festival (2013) and the Rezone Playful Interventions event (2014). 
Stakeholders met in a joyous atmosphere instead of tense town hall meetings 
or around the negotiation table. Playing together allowed relationships to 
form based on trust. Importantly, Rezone the Game is not a ‘solutionist’ 
attempt to solve a complex urban problem via technology. Playing the game 
helps people to become incentivized and take ownership for an otherwise 
abstract issue like vacancy. Playing makes the issue tangible via personal 
lived experiences and provides possible horizons for further action. The 
game mechanics and dynamics are deliberately aimed at stimulating social 
interactions and experimentation through collective action. Hence, we can 
conclude that this playful intervention strengthens a new hybrid liberal/
communal type of citizenship: people’s individual rights to the city are 
extended to include a collective right to the smart city.
ThE PLAyfuL CIT y: CITIzENS MAkING ThE SMART CIT y 361
Third, Rezone the Game represents a particular take on the notion of 
cityness. A superf icial reading might suggest that it is a game that helps 
to solve the issue of vacancy. The underlying notion of cityness in such 
a view, would be one of a playable system with citizens as productive 
problem-solvers. According to this view, a complex urban problem can 
have an optimal solution, which leads the city into a state of equilibrium. By 
contrast, I understand the game to actually have a deeper narrative, which 
tells that urban issues like vacancy are far too complex to model, let alone 
solve, by simple technological means.7 Previously, I suggested that the special 
quality of playful city interventions like Rezone the Game is that they act on 
a meta-level. Gregory Bateson famously theorized that play always consists 
of a level of meta-communication. When monkeys in the zoo engage in 
play-f ighting, they exchange signals that communicate that what they are 
doing is not f ighting. In his words, we face “two peculiarities of play: (a) that 
the messages or signals exchanged in play are in a certain sense untrue or 
not meant; and (b) that that which is denoted by these signals is nonexistent” 
(Bateson 1972/1987, 141). In my view, this is precisely the strength of playful 
city interventions like Rezone the Game: it questions its own solutionist 
promise by overtly signaling to not actually do what it purports to do (solving 
vacancy). Instead, the game impels players to stake claims about what kind 
of city they actually want, to negotiate the underlying issue, and to agree on 
how to address it collectively. This involves a view of the city as a commons, 
a space of perpetual tension and conflict and at the same time a space that 
allows for negotiation and collaboration (Foster and Iaione 2016, 288).
As I have argued above, understanding city life in terms of play and 
games has a long tradition. Arguably, this connection has become even more 
important today. For an increasing number of people playing games is part 
of their cultural repertoire. They have grown up playing video games and 
are ‘ludo-literate’ (see Part I of this volume). Moreover, as outlined in the 
Introduction and in earlier work, we live in a playful media culture (Frissen 
et al. 2015). We are continuously surrounded by a plethora of technologies 
that offer spaces for playful experimentation, and shape our understanding 
of the world as playful. Playing means acquiring knowledge about the world 
and the capacity to act in it, in what can be called ‘ludo-epistemology’ (see 
Part II of this volume). Therefore, it no longer seems strange to have various 
organizations turn to games to address serious issues.
7 See also the notion of ‘procedural rhetoric,’ which designates how arguments can be created 
and unpacked using computer models, thus making claims about how things work (Bogost 2007, 
1-64; 2011, 13-14). 
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Reflection and discussion
This chapter dealt with the question of how play and games can help foster a 
smarter civic engagement. The current challenge of making our cities smart 
impels us to ask not just what is technically feasible or economically viable, 
but what is also socially desirable. Do we want smart tech programmed by 
companies to make decisions for us? Or do we want to include the ‘smart-
ness’ of actual people? Do we want eff icient cities, or also generate other 
values like sustainability, democratic legitimacy, playfulness, and a sense 
of ownership? Do we consider technologies as just utilitarian solutions, 
or far more broadly as part of our everyday culture and experiences? The 
notion of the playful city, I argue, helps to do this by conceptualizing ‘smart 
cities’ in terms of smartness, civic participation, and cityness. The play-
ful city opens up a people-centric and plural perspective on ‘smartness,’ 
instead of just a technologically driven one. If we want citizens to be smart 
alongside cities, we need to better understand how people already possess 
the capacity to act smart in a multitude of ways and how we can leverage 
this to make better and more interesting cities. The playful city also helps 
to think about citizen participation. Play and games themselves are not 
solutions for urban problems. They do however change the ways we address 
complex urban issues through more inclusive, participatory (and also more 
‘messy’) approaches. Play also provides a far richer outlook on cityness. Play 
highlights the importance of creativity, curiosity, and culture in city life.
Play redef ines roles and relations between professionals and citizens in 
processes of making cities. It has become clear that the making of cities no 
longer is the exclusive domain of architects and planners. Rather, it is one 
of the domains shaping, and being shaped by, playful citizenship. Game-
makers, media artists, app developers, and a variety of other urban dwellers 
are becoming the designers of today’s cities (De Lange 2015). Cities are facing 
ever more complex issues. This requires smart strategies to tap into the pool 
of citizen smartness and leverage civic participation. Games and play seem 
great ways to do so. However, this requires policy makers and planners to 
relinquish control, accept uncertain and ambiguous outcomes, and to allow 
the possibility of failure. Games are ontologically multifaceted: they are 
composed of a set of constitutive rules, a material setting, and actualized 
through the embodied activities of the players. This is comparable to what 
urban designers recognize as program, design and use, but with a twist. 
Game designers create rules and can influence the setting yet the game is 
only actualized in play. People playing are not merely end users. They are 
active participants. They frequently play with the (rules of) the game (see 
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Chapter 11 by Glas and Lammes in this volume), discuss the issues raised in 
the game through the use of strong concepts (Schouten et al. 2016), or even 
question the very foundations of the game as we have seen above. According 
to Dutch cultural historian Johan Huizinga, author of the seminal Homo 
ludens, play is not just part of culture, but it is central to its origin (Huizinga 
1955). Play generates culture because it provides room for innovation. Play 
offers a safe space for experiment and collaborations in which failing does 
not immediately have grave consequences. Huizinga’s observation that 
culture (which he used in the narrow sense of ‘civilization’) emerges from 
play, suggests that playful interventions like the one discussed in this 
chapter may contribute to a new urban planning culture and participatory 
urban culture (Van Westrenen 2011; De Lange, Van Boxmeer, and Peters 
2014). In addition to governments, corporations and (design) professionals, 
playful citizens are key in creating smart urban futures. If we are serious 
about making our cities smarter, we need to understand them as playful.
As already mentioned, the playful city also allows us to consider more 
critical issues. A f irst consideration involves the f ine balance between 
persuasion and manipulation. Rezone the Game persuades people to ad-
dress the issue of urban vacancy through collaboration, but it could easily 
become manipulative if outcomes are used by one party for their own 
prof it. A closely related second consideration involves the exploitation of 
people’s free efforts in what is known as ‘playbor,’ a portmanteau of play 
and labor (Kücklich 2005; Rheingold 2012, 134-135; Walz and Deterding 
2015). Several authors argue that play in late capitalism has been absorbed 
by work itself through the conflation of labor and leisure time, and the 
concomitant self-disciplining ethics of the creative class (e.g. Rifkin 2000; 
Scholz 2013; Fortunati 2015). Play risks becoming absorbed in goal-oriented 
utilitarian practices, and neoliberal and self-disciplining discourses of 
labor as play. While this has not received much attention here, this should 
be born in mind when studying and designing the playful city. Quasi-
participation is a third consideration. Who can play, who may actually 
decide? What will happen to the outcomes of games like Rezone the Game? 
What suggestions are being made? To what extent should we consider 
games like these a kind of ‘tokenism’ if nothing really profound happens 
with them (Arnstein 1969)? A fourth critical question about ‘civic media’ 
is how a technology-driven participatory citizenship might reshuff le or 
even bypass legitimate democratic institutions (see Foster and Iaione 2016, 
339). How desirable is it if civic tech only serves the interests of groups of 
people capable enough of making productive use of these technologies 
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(for a discussion of public values in the ‘platform society,’ see Van Dijck, 
Poell, and De Waal 2018)?
For future research, I suggest that the playful cities agenda should be 
pushed along the following lines: 1) Research: What urban issues lend 
themselves to being addressed by play and games, and what are the key 
considerations? 2) Design: What type(s) of games, and which mechanics-
dynamics-aesthetics, can be employed for particular complex urban issues? 
3) Validation: How can we assess and validate the role of play and games in 
urban culture? 4) Governance: How can we up the scale and appropriately 
institutionalize the use of games for complex urban issues (i.e. stakeholder 
coalitions, toolkit, best practices)?
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19. Dissent at a distance
The Janissary Collective (Mark Deuze and Lindsay Ems)
Abstract
The contribution by The Janissary Collective argues that while protest 
movements and civic groups may indeed benef it from ‘mediatization,’ 
their playful character is less the result of a conscious strategy than the 
outcome of the performativity of means-over-ends focused engagement. 
This manifests itself in the ‘slacktivism’ inherent in participating online 
only. The Janissary Collective takes a skeptical stance towards generalizing 
the transformative role of new media tools, and proposes to regard today’s 
political and social movements as thriving on the unruly and affective 
ecologies of media that mostly emphasize the feeling of belonging to a 
community instead of actually being part of one. Participation in these 
movements is an expression of a playful way of being and therefore a 
mode of being human.
Keywords: Political protests, social movements, public dissent, mediatiza-
tion, affect
Asked for advice on what it takes to become president when speaking with 
a group of fourteen- and f ifteen-year-old students on 8 September 2009, 
United States President Barack Obama answered:
I want everybody here to be careful about what you post on Facebook, 
because in the YouTube age, whatever you do, it will be pulled up again 
later somewhere in your life. And when you’re young, you make mistakes 
and you do some stupid stuff. (Stewart 2009)
Such advice seems to make sense—as employers reportedly check social 
network sites to research job candidates. Countries including Germany and 
Spain have attempted to curtail such practices, seeking to make it illegal for 
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prospective employers to check up on applicants’ private postings—clearly 
assuming that since we live through networks of mass self-communication 
sometimes we may need to be protected from ourselves (O’Hear 2010). 
Although such efforts may be noble, there is perhaps something to be said 
for not opting out, for enthusiastically embracing the recording, storing, 
and sharing potential of present-day media. Ironically, this insight was 
also shared by former President Obama; when one considers his statement 
(on 28 January 2011) in response to the mass demonstrations across Egypt, 
referring directly to the Egyptian government’s attempts to shut down 
the country’s internet and mobile communication services at the time, in 
which he said:
I also call upon the Egyptian government to reverse the actions that 
they’ve taken to interfere with access to the internet, to cell phone service 
and to social networks that do so much to connect people in the 21st 
century. (BBC News 2011)
This call cannot be seen as separate from the global surveillance conducted 
by United States government agencies and other nations through the services 
and networks that support but can also potentially subvert social order. 
Considering the amplifying and accelerating role that mobile phones (outfit-
ted with digital cameras) and online social networks have played, and 
continue to play in ongoing processes of social change. Such movements 
include, but are not limited to, events in Ukraine in 2004, Moldova and 
Iran in 2009, Tunisia in 2010, Egypt in 2011, in Syria since 2012, around the 
world under the banner ‘Planet Occupy’ (Schneider 2012), since 2013 in the 
US under the Black Lives Matter movement, and the #TimesUp and #MeToo 
movements which were jump-started in 2017. As a result of the widespread 
visibility of these high-tech social movements, it seems as if the future 
belongs to those clearly not shying away from telling everyone about their 
life and passions (Hermida 2014).
There seems to be a direct link between specif ic kinds of contemporary 
global protests, our current media ecology, and the role of individualized 
(yet connected) citizens in everyday life. To some extent, this link is bench-
marked by a claim to citizen’s power through both physical and virtual 
action. Escaping neat categorization, much of today’s activism exists in 
a networked, ‘foamy’ format that lives in and mirrors the infrastructure 
of the internet. Yet, this mimicry is not just with a series of servers, wires, 
nodes, and access points—it is also articulated with values and practices 
that shape technologies, just as much as these values and practices are 
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shaped by such technologies. Referring to the Occupy movement, Steve 
Anderson, director of the non-profit organization OpenMedia, wrote in a 
column for the Canadian weblog Rabble (on 1 November 2011): “[the Occupy 
movement] feels like an ongoing space infused with web values and practices. 
Their structure of participation mirrors that of the online encyclopedia 
Wikipedia […]. Will it last? I have no idea, but I think these social practices 
are addictive and contagious” (Anderson 2011). One could argue that the 
viral and networked nature of social protest as well as the commodification 
of social networks (through digital marketing) reduces people to a faceless 
multitude (or data clusters representing specif ic consumer markets)—an 
aimless horde waiting to be divided and conquered by targeted advertising. 
In effect, we become zombies. Sarah Juliet Lauro (excerpting her work 
for the io9 weblog on 13 January 2012) linked the Occupy movement to a 
zombie-like quality of contemporary society. She suggests that the collective 
disruption of public spaces takes its cues from zombies—more specif ically, 
zombie walks occurring more or less regularly around the world: “These 
events seem to me to incarnate the youth culture’s lament for its lack of real 
social power, and perhaps signal a willingness to change this” (Lauro 2012).
In a talk given at a symposium on zombies at Winchester University (on 
28 October 2011), British Romanticist Gary Farnell endorsed the zombie as 
“the off icial monster of the moment,” suggesting that the zombie signif ies 
“an image of the truth of the current conjunctural crisis of global capital-
ism” (Farnell 2011). Relating zombies to a link between worldwide protests 
and the role of (social) media, scholars like Lauro and Farnell feel that 
zombies put a face on a widespread sense of crisis. Yet, it is not the face of 
the individual human being concerned about privacy or personhood, but 
rather the face of people being neither human nor machine. Once we are 
reduced to a multitude in Paolo Virno’s sense, we are capable of engaging in 
a different way with being in the world that is essentially pluriform. Instead 
of being reduced to a singular mass of people, the era of Big Data, omnoptic 
surveillance and post-humanism reproduces us as a multitude, “a plurality 
which persists as such in the public scene” (Virno 2004, 21). Approaching the 
increasing interdependency between technology and life-world from a more 
positive point of view, Don Ihde reaches a similar conclusion in suggesting 
that the mediating technologies of the information age make possible an 
“essential pluricultural pattern” (1990, 156) in people’s understanding of 
themselves and each other. According to Ihde, our global pluriculture gets 
established through the various ways in which media expose us to ideas, 
beliefs, cultures, rituals, up to and including culinary and architectural 
traditions different from our own. In media we cannot help but see and 
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experience the lives of others (and they can see us, either through surveil-
lance or our ongoing oversharing of it). Perhaps it is counterintuitive to 
suggest that the pluriculture of the multitude constitutes a zombie society, 
assuming that zombies are all the same (and therefore one). The point, 
however, is not that zombies are identical: it is just that their differences 
do not make a difference.
The protesters around the world do share certain characteristics that could 
remind one of zombies: f irst, they tend to be based on social movements 
without leaders, lacking clear hierarchical structures, and generally having 
no clear goals. Social movements such as the Arab Spring, the Indignados 
in Spain, the globally dispersed Occupy movement, and the Black Lives 
Matter and #MeToo movements have playful properties in that they have 
all share certain performative elements (concerts, costumes, cosplay, clever 
signage celebrations), that get creatively promoted, expressed, and shared 
in media (especially via social media such as YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, 
and Facebook). In this context, we understand a social movement to be 
playful when participation is self-directed and when the activities involved 
tend to be meaningful unto themselves rather than evaluated toward some 
specif ic end and can therefore considered to be autotelic (Csikszentmihalyi 
1990). They are also considered playful when such activities at least to some 
extent are somewhat non-serious and somewhat performative (particularly 
regarding the omnipresent personal media documenting and sharing the 
activities). Second, these and other contemporary spontaneous movements 
involve people from all walks of life: from East to West, North to South, 
black and white, men and women, old and young—again negating distinct 
classif ications—at least temporarily as these protest tend to erupt as rapidly 
as they dissipate. Finally, not only does the social arrangement of these 
protests rely heavily on the use of media (which in turn enable the active 
involvement of people not necessarily present)—they seem similarly infec-
tious and as viral as media can be. We argue that what makes our being in 
the world in media more resonant with zombie life is its embodiment of the 
man-machine hybrid, rather than, as suggested by Parikka (2010), analogous 
with insect or bacterial life which similarly contains no structures, clear 
leaders and goals (swarms), expresses equality in diversity (the beehive), 
and is contagious (like a virus). The zombie forces us to question the false 
dichotomy—the endless remix—of the living and the dead.
Like our current media ecology, the nature of zombified social movements 
today has a distinctly remixed and remixable character, both in terms of 
media praxis—mashing up video and audio, culture jamming, online sharing 
and forwarding, up to and including hacking—and insofar as the people 
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involved, forming a blend of often disparate backgrounds, life phases, and 
ideals. Following Miguel Sicart (2014), one could argue that participation 
in these movements—whether online or off line, either on the ground 
or through telepresence—is an expression of a playful way of being and 
therefore a mode of being human.
It is our goal in this contribution to suggest that the organization, 
technologies, and outcomes particular to contemporary forms of social 
movements and global protests differ in signif icant ways from those in the 
past, while stipulating there always has been a co-creative link between 
public protest, media use, and socio-political context. In other words: while 
our time is different, it is not necessarily new.
New social movements
It seems that hardly a day goes by without news coverage of some type of 
activist social movement being staged throughout the world. While the 
notion that we live in a ‘movement society’ (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) is not 
new, the pace and frequency of these group actions seems to have intensified. 
Not surprisingly, there has been a surge of research and popular debate on 
the connections between newer networked media, citizen engagement, and 
movement dynamics. Popular and academic interest in what makes these 
movements tick is fueled by their often dramatic and playful character—
including zombie walks, cosplay, and gaming telecommunication systems 
by organizing protests via social media—challenging the status quo. These 
and other forms of public (and publicized) dissent can serve society as an 
equivalent form of our news media when they refuse to perform the tasks 
we expect of them: we seem to become aware most only once there is a 
breakdown. Social movements that propel forms of dissent in the public’s eye, 
in effect, bring forth society, make it visible and open it up to intervention. 
As Snow and Soule put it, “understanding our own society, as well as the 
larger social world in which it is embedded, requires some knowledge and 
understanding of social movements and the activities with which they are 
associated” (Snow and Soule 2009, 5-6).
The newer networked media presence—the tweets from the streets, the 
dramatic YouTube videos, the Facebook groups—in many of these move-
ments is unmistakable. Generally, mediated communication is important 
for its role in several key features of movements, such as social networking, 
collective identity formation and maintenance, sharing of ideas, and playful 
protest. The communicative power of newer media would seem to add 
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particular affordances for movement participants. Protests and dissent in 
many forms can be coordinated and communicated globally, quickly, and 
more easily with newer networked media (Cottle and Lester 2011). Yet, we 
must caution against generalizing the transformative role of new media 
tools in social movements (Bennett 2003). Traditional media continue to 
play a critical role in defining, framing, and narrating dissent. There exists a 
reciprocal relationship between legacy media, mobile and networked media, 
and social movements, where each has a shaping role on the cognitions, 
attitudes and behaviors of the others. This ecological view of mediated 
dissent posits that ‘old’ and ‘new’ media work in concert as movements 
emerge, climax, and fade in particular cultural contexts:
Social networking and other forms of Internet-based communication may 
provide new means to participate, new styles of protest and new ways to 
mobilize support, but they cannot fully relocate the mediated politics of 
dissent away from mass media news platforms. All political actors are now 
present in both the ‘old’ media and what Manuel Castells calls ‘networks 
of mass self-communication,’ and all undoubtedly will continue seeking 
to f ind bridges between the two. (Cottle and Lester 2011, 291)
The world of social movements and dissent seems to be changing with 
those bridges. That is because recent social movements “both draw upon 
and also challenge the socio-technical properties of the new media” (Loader 
2008, 1921).
The formative features of social movements can be conceptualized in 
terms of f ive key elements. Movements tend to be collective efforts to chal-
lenge or defend some existing cultural, political, or economic authority. They 
are somewhat organized, in the sense that they usually include informal 
networks with shared beliefs and some solidarity. Movements tend to be 
sustained over time, although activities and participation may ebb and flow. 
Most social movement research emphasizes non-institutional means of 
mobilization and protest. It is further important to emphasize the fluidity of 
contemporary social movements in terms of membership, tactics, structure, 
and aims (Della Porta and Diani 1999; Snow and Soule 2009).
Mediatization (Hjarvard 2013) supports the features of social movements, 
in terms of both mobilization and media coverage. In the context of our lives 
as lived in media (Deuze 2012), it can be said of social movements that if they 
do not make it into media, then they do not really exist. When movement 
participants engage with newer media as part of their strategies and tactics, 
could this media use instantiate different social movement dynamics? 
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Recently, various social movements have emerged with characteristics that 
are out of sync with dominant social movement theory. These characteristics 
include: no clear hierarchy with often multiple (and varying) crowd-sourced 
leaders; no clearly defined demands or goals; no clear nation-based ideologi-
cal framing; no coherent collective identities based on national politics; 
diversity and heterogeneity within an already fluid group; and, last but not 
least, a heightened role for emotions and identity dynamics. Moreover, all of 
these characteristics f ind expression in the kind of media such movements 
tend to use: generally mobile, networked, remixed personal media (next to, 
and at times instead of, mass media).
Walgrave’s (1998, 2001) trenchant analysis of the Belgian White Move-
ment may have set the stage for discussions about movements that start 
off as emotional movements only to become more instrumental and 
conventional later on, a pattern that seems prevalent today. Emotions 
have long been important for understanding social movements, but emo-
tions have not been the target of much research on social movements, 
perhaps because of the diff iculties with obtaining measurements and 
conducting analyses. Emotions are not only tough to operationalize, 
they are challenging for movement participants to talk about as well. 
Fortunati (2009) wonders whether this oversight in the social sciences 
has made the way in which people, media, and society are analyzed seem 
to be without a heart. She advocates for an increase in the investigation 
of (electronic) emotion.
At the beginning of the twenty-f irst century, there is a surge in research 
into affect theory since emotions are increasingly being considered as an 
important purpose of social movements, even as a key reason for their exist-
ence or maintenance (Polletta and Amenta 2001). People often participate 
in movements in order to meet affective and emotional needs that cannot 
easily be fulf illed elsewhere. Social networks, important catalysts or even 
requirements for collective action, are themselves built on affective bonds 
(Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2001). In other words, people join a network 
because it makes them feel good. These affective ties hold the network 
together, paving the way for group action (Ibid.). Feelings for a group can 
make participation itself pleasurable and meaningful, even if separate 
from the movement’s aims. It is through emotions, then, that people can 
potentially discover their capacity for collective action.
Emotions may be the main reason people participate in movements in 
the f irst place, which in turn makes the kinds of dissent recently witnessed 
around the world—whether it is the Arab Spring, UK riots, street protests 
in Brazil, or the Tea Party Movement—harder to classify along earlier lines. 
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The link between contemporary media, new social movements, glocalized 
forms of dissent, and emotional immersion as a catalyst is further explored 
by Jodi Dean. In her article ‘Affective networks’ she maintains that people’s 
use of social media, like Twitter and Facebook, constitutes an affective 
network, eliciting feelings of community. Dean writes:
Affect […] is what accrues from reflexive communication, from com-
munication for its own sake, from the endless circular movement of 
commenting, adding notes and links, bringing in new friends and fol-
lowers, layering and interconnecting myriad communications platforms 
and devices […] Every little tweet or comment, every forwarded image 
or petition, accrues a tiny affective nugget, a little surplus enjoyment, 
a smidgen of attention that attaches to it, making it stand out from the 
larger f low before it blends back in. (2010, 21)
According to Dean, these affective attachments to media are not enough to 
produce actual communities, but the feeling of community matters since 
they enable mediated relationships that can take a variety of evolving, 
interconnected forms.
Could these new mediated emotions catalyze collective actions? Pa-
pacharissi and Oliveira (2011) argue for the importance of understanding 
affect in media use during contemporary social movements. Using centering 
resonance analysis and discourse analysis, the authors analyzed storytelling 
forms on Twitter for a period of time during the Arab Spring. Based on 
their f indings, they characterize Twitter feeds during the Arab Spring as 
affective news streams, since they “blend opinion, fact, and emotion into 
expressions uttered in anticipation of events that have not yet been reported 
in mainstream media” (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2011, 24). Such affective 
news streams sustain and nurture affective involvement, connection, cohe-
sion, and awareness. This is especially relevant, the authors suggest, in 
authoritarian regimes where speech is heavily controlled. In such oppressive 
contexts, these affective statements in social media can become political 
statements and a challenge to authorities (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2011).
The idea that aggrieved groups, brought together by shared, mediated 
emotions yet lacking substantive plans for social change might occupy the 
streets, infuriates some observers. In an opinion for the New York Times, 
columnist David Brooks (2012) responded to the viral YouTube video, ‘Why 
I Hate Religion But Love Jesus.’ Brooks used the performance art video 
as a window to explore the state of youth activism, protest forms, and 
social change. He argues that ill-informed, media-saturated youth lack the 
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historical knowledge, contextual understanding, and well-laid, directed 
plans to carry out social change. He opines: “If you go out there armed only 
with your own observations and sentiments, you will surely f ind yourself 
on very weak ground.” Yet, armed with just those mediated sentiments, 
people around the world seem to be discovering a momentum for collec-
tive action. They are strangers who meet to become a fluid ‘we’ in media. 
Powered by these affective ties, social movement dynamics, including 
knowledge building and sharing, can and do emerge. Perhaps some are just 
not comfortable with this order or, rather, disorder. The unruly nature of 
these affective ecologies bypasses the scripts, standards, and protocols of 
news industries, political parties, and social institutions. Their post-gender 
qualities (dynamically combining feminine elements of inclusivity and 
exchange with more masculine characteristics of confrontation and ag-
gression) also escape carefully established ways of sense-making processes. 
Perhaps the newer forms of dissent, in conjunction with charged emotions 
and social media, are indeed as irreducible as zombies are.
It may be too reductive to label the recent collective actions throughout 
the Middle East, Northern Africa, Latin America and the United States as 
media-fueled emotional movements. There is no mistaking the triggering, 
expressing, and sharing of emotion that newer media, and social media in 
particular, have allowed in these contexts. This circulation of affect (Dean 2010) 
in media, intense and alluring as it is for people, is ripe for cultural analysis. And 
perhaps we need some unreason to really make sense of the cases before us.
Contemporary media and dissent
Scholars in a number of disciplines investigating the relationships between 
new social movements, dissent, and newer networked media tend to pitch 
their intellectual tents in one of two camps. Some argue that media have 
had a significant impact on social movements’ successes or failures (Castells 
2007; Shirky 2008; Allagui and Keubler 2011; Elseewi 2011; Howard, Agarwal, 
and Hussain 2011; Segerberg and Bennett 2011; Wall and El Zaheed 2011). 
Other observers emphasize the social forces responsible for the uprisings 
and downplay the importance of communication tools (Agre 2002, 2003; 
Christiansen 2011; Etling, Faris, and Palfrey 2010; Hofheinz 2011; Newsom, 
Lengel, and Cassara 2011). Still others argue that both of these two perspec-
tives are essential to understanding recent phenomena, somehow suggesting 
one should move back and forth between the tents in both of the camps (Hara 
and Huang 2010; Aouragh and Alexander 2011; Shklovski and Kotamraju 
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2011). Interestingly, all authors (even those who call for a more holistic 
approach) view these two entities as separate in their discussions of social 
media and social change. This has implications for what kinds of questions 
investigators ask and what types of f indings they achieve. By sidestepping 
this distinction and, by instead seeing media as both technological and 
emotional infrastructures that reveal the motivations and actions of the 
people and institutions using them, researchers can begin to observe and 
analyze the circulating intensities that instantiate current social movements.
By observing and analyzing the use of social media tools in recent social 
movements in this way, it becomes clear that social media are extremely 
versatile tools put to use in multiple ways by different groups of protesters 
and governments; there is not only one single use or result of Twitter-use in 
protest events. Social forces and technical forces are intertwined. Technical 
forces are social forces that have been f ixed through a decision-making 
process for a certain time period into a non-biological infrastructure. They 
are decisions with lasting impact. Social forces are constantly changing with 
fluctuations in the local ecosystem. This is a new advantage for observers 
and analysts of human behavior. When a tool can be used in multiple ways 
to achieve a wide variety of different outcomes, one can look at the way 
the tool is used and the resulting outcome to identify the user’s intentions 
and ambitions. Social media tools today help make protester’s actions, 
motivations and expressions more visible on a global scale which can be 
benefitial in a way that was not possible before.
For example, news media in the United States became transfixed by the 
protests that broke out after the 2009 Iranian elections. They broadcasted 
updates continuously despite the limited access Western journalists had 
to events on the street. Because of this limited access, news outlets became 
very dependent on the information generated by Iranians. The BBC’s Persian-
language television channel reported receiving about f ive videos a minute 
from amateurs, even though the channel was blocked within Iran and 
4,000 emails and hundreds of phone calls a day (Landler and Stelter 2009). 
Along with this information, news outlets turned to Twitter for information 
including images and video along with eyewitness accounts of events on the 
streets. On 16 June CNN’s Wolf Blitzer and Abbi Tatton used conversations on 
Twitter to help them construct a view of what was unfolding on the ground 
in Iran (Tatton 2009). In a similar case, a BBC web article also embedded 
user generated video footage of a man wounded after the Revolutionary 
Guard fired shots on the streets of Tehran (BBC News 2011). Perhaps the most 
frequently circulated story from the Iranian protests plays out in a video of 
an Iranian woman named Neda Agha-Soltan, dying after being shot while 
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walking with her singing instructor on the street. A bystander caught her 
death on video and posted it to the internet. This video became the source 
of much inspiration for Moussavi supporters in Iran and around the world 
(Fathi 2009). The video link was distributed frequently through Twitter.
Moreover, the United States government asked the CEO of Twitter to 
leave its service up in Iran during the 2009 protests when it was scheduled 
to be taken down for regular service maintenance (Landler and Stelter 
2009). This was an explicit diplomatic move on the part of the United 
States government who was acting out politically against its enemy, the 
incumbent Ahmadinejad regime, by securing the communication tools of 
the anti-government protesters on the streets in Iran.
On the other hand, the United States government went so far as to arrest 
Elliot Madison, a protester who was tweeting the location of police blockades 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania during the 2009 G-20 Summit protests just a few 
months later (Goodman 2009). In the G-20 Summit protests, the use of Twitter 
by protesters was altogether different. In Iran, Twitter was used primarily to 
get information out to Western journalistic outlets, as evidenced by the small 
number of Twitter users in Iran at the time and the large number of tweets in 
English instead of Farsi. At the 2009 G-20, Twitter was used by protesters to 
avoid the police in the streets. Elliot Madison was one of these protesters. When 
he was arrested, he was in a hotel room that was raided by a brigade of armed 
police officers. His charges were for hindering apprehension or prosecution, 
criminal use of a communication facility, and possession of instruments of 
a crime. Eventually all of these charges were dropped (DMLP 2010). It was 
intended he be used as an example of what protesters should not do.
These apparently contradictory moves show that the Obama administra-
tion’s actual goals were not to secure the freedom of speech of Iranian 
citizens, as it was claimed (Landler and Stelter 2009), nor to stop violence in 
the streets of Pittsburgh (Singel 2009). Instead, the United States government 
was trying to gain some leverage over its international adversaries and 
suppress dissent at home. The governments’ actions can also be considered 
to be attempts to extend this control over communication channels and 
information flows across media.
An additional affordance made possible by the new socio-technical 
arrangements of today, is that people who are not geographically located 
where the protests are taking place can still participate in the protest events. 
In effect, these online protest participants are providing resources in the 
currency of emotional support, interest and sympathy. These are invaluable 
resources that help motivate the physical participants to keep f ighting even 
when it seems that they might not achieve their goals. In this way, new 
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communication tools and the socio-technical arrangements in which they 
are embedded provide ways for people to participate in protest events from 
a distance—their non-presence becomes a signif icant (and sustaining) ele-
ment of the social movement. Online participants help those on the ground 
circumvent f irewalls. They re-tweet, forward and share information from 
protesters on the ground with their social networks. They learn about police 
brutality and express sympathy on personal forums such as Facebook and 
Twitter newsfeeds. All of these actions contribute to the multi-faceted form 
of today’s social movements. Two essential components, however, can be 
identified. One is geographic and offline, the other is online and virtual. One 
cannot exist without the other. Mediated participation fuels motivation and 
determines the functional potential of the geographically located protests. 
That the online component is essential to today’s movements is understood 
by the autocratic regimes outlined above. In efforts to suppress and dissolve 
the movements, there was an attempt to curtail communications via the 
internet and/or SMS by taking down infrastructure and/or content.
These ever-changing circulating intensities are now visible and recorded 
for observers of human behavior in new ways. The channels of information 
f low—the infrastructure and how messages travel—shed light on how 
human power struggles play out. Today, we can see the utilization of social 
structures more visibly, which can have implications for future outcomes 
of protest events and social power struggles between governments and 
dissenters in the connected world.
Conclusion and discussion
Although turning to media in moments of social upheaval and unrest is 
not a new phenomenon, the traits of today’s media technologies and the 
social arrangements that have emerged in conjunction with our media 
provide new channels through which to witness, participate in and take 
responsibility for today’s social movements. Social movements both shape 
and reflect qualities of the media that are used to motivate and sustain 
them. Just as our media can be seen as neither dead nor alive—as neither 
the internet, nor our cell phones or what we do with them determines 
our lives, yet at the same time our lives have become quite unimaginable 
without them—contemporary forms of mass protest for social change 
feel like zombie movements. There are—or seem to be—no leaders, no 
hierarchies, few or no particular individuals running the show, even though 
there def initely seems to be a show taking place. This mediatized aspect 
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of public (and, to some extent, private) life is paramount, tending to make 
forms of social protest more about the disruption of social order in and 
of itself rather than the achievement of some clear goal beyond it. Sherry 
Turkle (2011) is among those warning that our emotional life is becoming 
increasingly performative and controlled by the influence of technology. 
Media may act as amplif iers and accelerators of affect in the context of 
new social movements, and in the process also act to amplify the playful 
aspects of participation, such as the at times non-seriousness of joining in, 
the ‘slacktivism’ inherent in participating online only, and the gaming of 
the telecommunication system.
The protesters, as a relatively amorphous and generally temporary col-
lective, seem pretty good at tearing things down—yet tend to be less than 
effective at building anything anew. Instead of capitalism’s central tenet of 
creative destruction, we observe a purposeless passion at work—signaled 
as a crucial quality of the multitude by Virno (2004), engaged as we are 
in production time without producing anything (analogous with Marx’s 
concept of activity-without-end-product). Similarly, the performativity 
of means-over-ends focused engagement can be seen as a playful act of 
citizenship. Raw emotions drive these new movements, locally spurred on 
by viral forms of engagement from anywhere on the planet. The good, bad 
and the ugly become visible in power negotiations like never before—we 
can see each other (trying to) live. Next to mass media reporting hastily 
(and somewhat grudgingly) on outbreaks all over the world, a new system 
of communicative practices emerges, based on peer-to-peer connectivity 
and a phatic digital culture (Miller 2008) consisting of small communi-
cative gestures that are distinctly social and produce communal forms, 
but are generally not intended to transmit substantial information. Most 
importantly for scholars, new socio-technical configurations represent new 
lenses with which to observe human activity, forcing us to question age-old 
assumptions about (possibly false) dichotomies between engagement and 
apathy, participation and witnessing, production and consumption—and 
indeed between affect and effect in processes of (mediated) social change. 
The zombie, both as an analogy and a metaphor, is a helpful conceptual tool 
to question such categories. In media, there is a new visibility of everyone’s 
actions (Thompson 2005), both among the powerful and the powerless. This 
emerging struggle to publish and publicize our lives makes socio-technical 
configurations the new artifacts that reflect our current social state at this 
point in time, providing a new object for media studies.
It is impossible to generalize about the transformative role of new media 
in dissent around the world. What we can analyze and discuss, though, 
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are f issures in power and why particular groups of people in particular 
contexts seem to discover and widen those cracks. As we have discussed, 
this is ultimately not just a story about social life but about media life (Deuze 
2012), about mediated outbursts of anger, fear, hope, play, courage, sacrif ice, 
and creativity.
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20. Playing with power : Casual politicking 
as a new frame for political analysis
Alex Gekker
Abstract
The chapter examines the entanglement of play and politics through 
digital media. By analyzing the Obama 2008 and Trump 2016 presidential 
campaigns, it proposes a new term for examining political engagement, 
namely ‘casual politicking.’ Building on mediatization theories, the chapter 
takes the affordances of causal video games as a template to analyze the 
actions performed by citizens, politicians, and organizations attempting 
to alter behaviors. The resulting characteristics of the political process 
are presented through four key aspects: the role of ICT platforms with 
intuitive interfaces, the prevalence of issue-centered rather than ideologi-
cal action, a perpetual political engagement undeterred by failure, and 
socially focused networks orientated towards fun. When applied to the 
two campaigns, surprising similarities can be seen, despite the different 
messages and personalities of the candidates.
Keywords: Casual politicking, casual games, mediatization, elections, 
Obama, Trump
This chapter deals with the tricky duality of politics and play for the con-
temporary citizen. Arguably, politics is and always has been playful. In his 
famous treatise on playfulness, Johan Huizinga sees the playful (agonistic) 
origins of law in the courts of the Greek and Roman lawyer-politicians. In 
a later chapter, he analyzes the playfulness of war and peace in medieval 
society and mourns the loss of such playfulness in contemporary times 
(Huizinga 1970). Brian Sutton-Smith (2005) calls this type of interaction 
‘play as power,’ hailing from ancient sporting events and contests. Similarly, 
mediatization scholar Stephen Coleman (2006, 2011) tracks the changes 
Glas, R., S. Lammes, M. de Lange, J. Raessens, and I. de Vries, eds. 2019. The Playful Citizen. Civic
Engagement in a Mediatized Culture. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
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in the voting and participation habits of young people with the advent of 
televised voting for Big Brother-style reality shows. However—as I will 
argue below—political play has changed considerably since it merged 
with the digital affordances of new media platforms, resulting in autotelic 
political play that is centered on issues and platforms rather than concrete 
ideologies. To illustrate this, I highlight two turning points in world politics: 
the campaign that led to the election of Barack Obama as President of the 
United States in 2008, and the campaign that elected his successor, Donald 
Trump. Provocatively, I claim that these campaigns were identical in their 
underlying principles, despite the differences in the ideology and personality 
of their respective candidates.
In doing so, I aim to offer a view of playful political processes through 
the contemporary lens of digital media by bridging the gap between two 
disciplines that have rarely met, namely game and play studies on the one 
hand and political communication on the other. In an introductory chapter 
to the influential anthology Political communication in postmodern democ-
racy: Challenging the primacy of politics, the editors warn that “as readers, 
listeners and viewers learn to recognize the manufactured nature of news, 
cynicism and disillusionment with politics grows and with it a dramatic 
erosion of trust and political engagement” (Brants and Voltmer 2011a, 6). 
The word ‘users’ is absent from this warning, yet users are perhaps the most 
common conceptualization of the masses to date and, in fact, as pointed 
out by visualization guru Edward Tufte, “[t]here are only two industries 
that call their customers ‘users’: illegal drugs and software” (Whitlatch 
2015, n.p.). Unlike in narcotics industries, however, political-socio-technical 
processes are in a constant state of flux and renegotiation between various 
parties, users and producers alike. ‘Usage’ does not imply unidirectionality, 
as research has shown that in complex technological processes designers 
and users ‘co-conf igure’ each other continuously (Woolgar 1990; Bruns 
2007). Therefore, I argue that to understand the remaking of what it means 
to be engaged in contemporary mediated politics, we must look at users 
and even more so at players.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The f irst section introduces 
my main theoretical framework. Utilizing the hybrid human/nonhuman 
perspective of the Actor-Network Theory (ANT), I conceive mediatized 
political engagement as shaped through playful performative practices and 
enabled by casual devices. Unlike the sporting metaphors or grand battles 
associated with political play, I suggest that casual games should be used 
as our primary analogy. The second section outlines my concept of casual 
politicking, and its properties of reliance on ICT platforms, issue networks, 
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perpetual engagement, and social media sites. Throughout this chapter, I 
will discuss the 2008 Obama app and Trump’s ‘Great Meme War’ in 2016 
as two poignant historical case studies exemplifying casual politicking 
mechanisms. Ultimately, I offer a view of the ludif ication of politics in 
which action is contingent on the perceived enjoyment of—and affordance 
to—users.
Games as mediatization of politics
This section will show that a type of video game referred to as ‘casual games’ 
can be used as a productive prism for understanding certain types of political 
engagement. In the f irst subsection, I briefly problematize classic theories of 
political communication in relation to current modes of media consumption, 
and suggest mediatization theory as a solution. Mediatization presupposes 
the existence of certain ‘molding forces’ whereby media technologies and 
institutions mold previously non-mediated spheres of life. In the second 
subsection, I argue that casual games are a type of medium that can and 
should be examined in relation to political mediatization.
Mediatization
Video games are an example of networked media, becoming widespread 
through the convergence of platforms and technologies (Jenkins 2006a; 
Jenkins 2006b; Moore 2011; Sicart 2014; Walz and Deterding 2015). The 
f ield of game studies that has emerged around them is multifaceted and 
conflicted, hailing from computer science, cultural studies, play studies, and 
Human-Computer-Interface (HCI) studies. In this chapter, video games are 
postulated as an established communication medium, rendering it possible 
to examine the potential of games and game studies as a prism for political 
research. This follows the notion of political agents as tactical producers 
and consumers of media, as has been conceptualized in recent scholarship 
(Fuchs et al. 2014; Tufekci 2017).
Agenda setting and framing are two fundamental theories for political 
communication in general, and for my notion of casual politicking in particu-
lar. Ever since McCombs and Shaw (1972) published their ground-breaking 
research on what they dubbed the agenda-setting effect, researchers have 
studied the media’s ability to set agendas for the public and political estab-
lishment by putting certain topics in the spotlight while downplaying others. 
Or, as McCombs and Shaw quote Cohen in the opening pages of their work: 
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“[T]he press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what 
to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think 
about” (Cohen 1963, 13, emphasis in original). While the f indings regarding 
the agenda-setting effect vary in terms of the strength, directedness, and 
homogeneity of effects, it is generally agreed that media are responsible 
for highlighting a set of topics that influence public opinion (Scheufele 
and Tewksbury 2007). Increased public concern subsequently influences 
the attention given to those issues by public off icials, who consequently 
try to attract the media’s attention with topics f itting their own interests, 
and so on, ad inf initum.
The second theory, framing, was developed through the application 
of psychologist Erving Goffman’s (1974) frame analysis theory. Goffman 
suggests that our daily experience is organized through a series of ‘frames,’ 
or referential models with which we approach each situation. We use dif-
ferent ‘keys’ to refer to different frames, depending on our heuristics and 
predispositions. Such frames might include, for example, ‘play’ or ‘rehearsal’ 
as opposed to ‘serious situation.’ In other words, a person is able to make a 
distinction between their understanding of an argument in the frame of a 
theater play and an argument in the frame of observing an incident in the 
street. Framing as media theory (Entman 1991, 1993; Iyengar 1994) builds 
upon this and suggests that the media repackages certain aspects of stories 
for their audiences in a way that influences the broader context within which 
the stories are understood. These aspects may include words, photographs, 
or interviews emphasizing certain things, but also elements such as the color 
chosen for the graphics or the visual arrangement of material on the page or 
the screen. Word choices, the placement of photographs, or even the colors 
used on a page or during the newscast invoke certain referential frames 
for an audience. One famous example of frame analysis was conducted 
by communication researcher Robert Entman (1991), who examined two 
similar aerial tragedies, the shooting down of a Korean civilian airplane 
by the Soviets and the shooting down of an Iranian civilian airplane by 
United States troops. He shows how the American press framed one case 
as a tragic mistake (using words such as “tragedy” and “plane passengers”) 
and the other as a deliberate crime (“attack,” “victims,” and portraying the 
plane in crosshairs).
Agenda-setting and framing theories are considered the cornerstones of 
modern political communications, yet they represent a research paradigm 
no longer suff icient for understanding modern mediated communication. 
As economic and technological networks converge to offer a personalized 
(political) experience (Jenkins 2006b; Couldry and Hepp 2016; Chadwick 
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2017), the networked society supplements mass communication with mass 
self-communication (Castells 2007). Such structures are dominated by a flat 
network of internet peer-to-peer communication, rooted in social media 
sites, email, online games, and micro-blogging rather than by the hierarchies 
of traditional media—though still reliant on them for broader appeal. While 
traditional media institutions still set the agenda and frame it, everyday 
users today have much greater ability to do the same, by ‘poaching’ and 
‘repackaging’ meanings provided by mainstream sources (Jenkins 2006a, 
2012; Schäfer 2011). This greatly undermines the power of such traditional 
media institutions to set and frame agendas, as can be seen through the 
massive bottom-up activist campaigns of #BLM and #MeToo that originated 
on Twitter. Facebook, for example, has emerged as a dominating force on the 
web, inducing a signif icant change in how information is exchanged and 
evaluated (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013; Helmond 2015). And while scholars 
and activists have long warned about the ramifications of an algorithmically 
curated public sphere, it took several years and Facebook’s own admission of 
unwilling compliance with Russian interference in United States elections 
to cement awareness of this change in the public’s mind.
There seems to be an increased enveloping of different social spheres 
within mediated communications. This, in turn, affects how those spheres 
behave and what sort of discourse arises, a process that is referred to as 
mediatization. While ‘convergence,’ a concept used to describe the media 
changes mentioned above, brings to mind a technical term and a process 
of one-sided integration, ‘mediatization’ on the contrary implies elasticity 
and reciprocity: the web affects political discourse as much as corporate 
mergers affect televised content distribution methods. In it, we f ind traces 
of globalization anthropologist Arjun Appadurai’s (1996, 2001, 2013) views 
of the world’s composition as constantly shifting and changing scapes 
(ethnoscapes, technoscapes, f inancescapes, mediascapes, and ideascapes), 
multiple geographies that are leaking through each other—thus creating 
a global blur of cultures and images. Building on the notion of imagined 
communities (Anderson 1983), Appadurai raises the importance of imaginary 
spaces as global social practices that tend to weaken the nation states and 
lead to the creation of deterritorialized communities of immigrants and 
‘wannabe nations.’ Such modern practices, I argue in response, have an inher-
ent resistance to the classic agenda-setting and framing effects of the media 
because they are dispersed, multi-modal, and constantly reconfiguring.
Prominent communication researchers Bennett and Iyengar (2008) sug-
gest that the changes in audience fragmentation, media authority, and news 
consumption are leading to a change in the way audiences form opinions 
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and interact with political processes. According to them, communication 
research continues to be “adrift theoretically, seldom looking back to see 
where foundational modern theory needs to be adapted and, in some cases, 
overthrown, in order to keep pace with the orientations of late modern 
audiences, and new modes of content production and information delivery” 
(Bennett and Iyengar 2008, 713). They argue for a return of a ‘minimal effects’ 
era in research, concentrated on the diminishing power of institutions to 
dictate agendas, alongside the growing signif icance of choice in media 
consumption and the ability to surround yourself with reinforcing political 
attitudes in an ‘echo-chamber’ or distance yourself from political discourse 
and conduct altogether. They lament the f ixation on “f indings-driven 
controversies in political communication” (Ibid., 709) and instead propose 
focusing on developing a theoretical framework “that may reconcile the 
paradox between the growing centrality of media in governance processes 
and its shrinking credibility and attention focus in the lives of citizens, 
particularly given the waning of mass media influence in the lives of most 
citizens” (Ibid., 714). This highlights the problem of traditional communica-
tion research, with its imposition of unidirectional effects-driven f indings, 
when applied to modern modes of political mediation.
Such entanglements of political and media institutions have come to 
be known as part of the research direction referred to as mediatization 
research. According to sociologist and mathematician Friedrich Krotz 
(2007), mediatization is a metaprocess that occurs in parallel to and with 
other metaprocesses (globalization, migration) and informs knowledge 
construction, identities, social relations, and organizational structures. It 
takes into account longitudinal shifts in communicative processes medi-
ated by various forms of technological mass media and new media. While 
diverse and not free from internal debates, the mediatization perspective 
recognizes that there is an ongoing entanglement of media infrastructures 
and institutions with other, previously separate social spheres. The resulting 
change is that certain f ields that could previously be separated into their 
own analytical domains, for example politics, religion, or family life, are 
becoming increasingly modif ied by the way they are mediated (Hjarvard 
2008, 2013; Lundby 2009; Brants and Voltmer 2011b; Hepp 2012, 2013; Couldry 
and Hepp 2016). Some have argued that this perspective faces the peril of 
descending into the pitfall of media-centric technological determinism, 
particularly focused on new technologies (Deacon and Stanyer 2014). The 
proponents of the approach retort that, while disagreeing on the extent 
of mediatization in terms of historic continuity and the role of certain 
platforms, the goal is to focus scholarly attention on distinguishing
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[b]etween being ‘media-centric’ and ‘media-centered.’ Being ‘media-
centric’ is a one-sided approach to understanding the interplay between 
media, communications, culture, and society, whereas being ‘media-
centered’ involves a holistic understanding of the various intersecting 
social forces at work at the same time as we allow ourselves to have a 
particular perspective and emphasis on the role of the media in these 
processes. (Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2015, 316)
Andreas Hepp clarif ies in an earlier work that mediatization is not “a ques-
tion of a ‘causal effect’ of a certain media (technology). Media as such only 
become concrete in communicative action; however, they offer a certain 
‘potentiality of action’ in such a f iguration, which can be called the ‘molding 
forces’ of the media, and have to be analyzed in a contextualized way” (2012, 
17). He utilizes concepts from Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Latour 1987; 
Latour 2005b; Law 1992) to strengthen this theoretical framework, since its 
scope aims for the exploration of social processes involving the conjunction 
of humans and technology. ANT argues that in order to understand modern 
society, a researcher must follow the ‘work-nets’ of human and non-human 
actors—or rather, actants (Latour 2005b)—in producing cultural-material 
artefacts, referred to as chains of associations. We can thus facilitate mean-
ings by tracing and relating the different actors to one another, wherein 
agency is distributed among them. Such a theory of mediatization presents 
technological endeavors as “coagulated actions” (Hepp 2012, 16) of human and 
non-human actants. Hepp argues that mediatization should be viewed as a 
metaprocess where media are not transparent instances of communications 
but institutionalized sociocultural processes, consisting of the coagulated 
actions of press institutions, governmental actors, the technologies that 
allow them, and relevant idiosyncratic uses of them in each case by the 
users (viewers, participants). This conceptualization of mediatization is 
built not on a specif ic media logic, or even logics, but on “the moulding 
force of the media” (Ibid., 17). This mediatization framework infused with 
ANT is what allows me to contextually analyze the respective campaigns of 
Obama and Trump in the section below on casual politicking. It presupposes 
that socio-technical changes in modes of communication are fueled by a 
combination of (1) developing technological practices and (2) the institutional 
changes of political and media organizations in response to these practices. 
Moreover, it draws attention to the necessary shift in what it means to ‘do 
politics’ when examined through the prism of such shifts.
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Games
Here, we return to the appropriation of games and the f ield of game studies 
for cultural enquiry. By tracing specif ic manifestations of the mediatization 
metaprocess, I show how the molding forces of digital play congregate and 
operate within political spheres. One can no longer talk of unidirectional 
effects on the public, as in the case of agenda setting and framing, but on 
how the media penetrates, infuses, and resonates along with various other 
social practices. Thus, as mediatization implies, the continued growing 
entanglement of additional spheres of life with specif ic media logics leads 
to the hybridization of communicative and cultural practices. I follow Joost 
Raessens’s (2006, 2014) suggestion that games and other digital technologies 
facilitate playful goals and identities, leading to the “ludif ication of culture.” 
This idea was summarized by the prominent game developer and theoreti-
cian Eric Zimmerman in an interview for Jesper Juul’s book on casual games 
(2010). In the interview, Zimmerman notes:
[a]s digital technologies and networks of information, the Internet, comput-
ers, mobile technologies, more and more pervade our lives, [and] the ways 
in which we socialize and flirt and communicate and learn and work and 
do our taxes and engage with our government and manage our finances, 
and many, many other important aspects of our lives, the more I think our 
culture becomes primed for play and particularly, games as the dominant 
form of leisure. Because games are the form of culture that is most intrinsi-
cally related to those things, to systems, technology, information, and 
mediated communication, […] play becomes a more dominant paradigm 
for culture rather than the moving image. (Juul 2010, 215)
Here Zimmerman evokes the idea of playfulness as a major component 
of various human activities, underlying modes of being beyond leisure, 
later reinforced in his Manifesto for a ludic century (Zimmerman 2015). 
Moreover, he draws a conceptual link between the abstract idea of play 
and the notion of play as embedded in computerized systems, making 
computation itself playful, in what Sebastian Deterding def ines as the 
‘rhetoric of systems’ (Deterding 2015), which is explored further below. It 
is built on the argument of play as a prerequisite for culture, drawing from 
Homo ludens (published originally in 1938) in which the Dutch historian 
and anthropologist Johan Huizinga (1970) suggested the then-revolutionary 
notion that play is present in most areas of human activity. It is the basis for 
law, politics, religion, commerce, war, and most other human endeavors. To 
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support this argument, he pointed to the ‘play-element’ of ancient Greek 
and Indian mythology, riddle-games in ancient civilizations, medieval 
tournaments, and carnivals, as well as the beatif ication process of Chris-
tian saints. The French sociologist, critic, and philosopher Roger Caillois 
(1958/2001) later criticized and ref ined Huizinga’s overtly broad definition 
of play. Caillois made a distinction between ludic activities centered on 
competition, such as sports or gambling, and activities of free play, such as 
theater, music, or carnivals. He introduced the idea of play as a voluntary 
activity and tied the act of playing to make-believe—which was lacking in 
Huizinga’s original def inition.
Following on from these two pioneers, the debate on the role of play in 
various human activities has been extended to include biologists, sociolo-
gists, psychologists, historians, mathematicians, and designers. In particular, 
play has been examined by game designers, a profession emerging with 
the growth of leisure time in post-industrial societies and the culture built 
around tabletop games and later on computer games. Designers took a 
specif ic, practical interest in the notion of play, trying to understand how 
play is present in games and what sorts of rules and guidelines games should 
follow in order for them to be an enjoyable, playful activity. As digital (and 
to some extent, tabletop) games have become distinct cultural artefacts, 
academics have started to pay interest as well. In 2003, the Digital Games 
Research Association (DiGRA) was established and its f irst conference 
was held, further demarcating games from play. The f ield of game studies 
(Aarseth 2001; Raessens 2016) builds on play research by combining classic 
notions of play with modern insights taken from the f ields of HCI and 
interactive design as well as cultural analysis rooted in f ilm and television 
studies.
Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman (2004) note that as digital technologies, 
computers, and video games develop, a familiar definition is sneaking into 
the f ield: that of games as systems coined by writer and game designer Chris 
Crawford (1982). Building on Crawford, Salen and Zimmerman suggest 
that a game is “a system in which players engage in an artif icial conflict, 
defined by rules, that results in a quantif iable outcome” (2004, 80). Another 
elaboration of Crawford’s definition was proposed by Juul (2003, 35): “A game 
is a rule-based formal system with a variable and quantif iable outcome, 
where different outcomes are assigned different values, the player exerts 
effort in order to influence the outcome, the player feels attached to the 
outcome, and the consequences of the activity are optional and negotiable.”
What I f ind interesting about these supplemental definitions is that they 
could just as easily apply to modern political processes, especially when 
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these processes take place in a mediatized environment. The fact that so 
much of our contemporary political jargon rests on metaphors of a contest, 
a race or a game is not a trivial thing, since metaphors—as Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980, 1999) remind us—are more than just words; they represent 
our experience in the world, which is shaped and framed by the signs we use. 
Elections are a simple example. The players and the rules are there, while 
the results are certainly quantif iable: e.g. election win percentages and the 
number of seats in parliament. Regarding the artif iciality of the conflict, 
this is mostly a question of worldview. However, even as we turn away from 
this very obvious example (after all, election campaigns have long become 
synonymous with ‘games’ or ‘races’), the elusive association remains. The 
‘system’ in the definition contributes a great deal to this. ‘System’ (together 
with ‘network’ or ‘algorithm’) is the organizational metaphor of the network 
society (Castells 2001, 2007; Galloway 2004; Van Dijk 2005). This idea lies 
in the specif ic understanding of play as systematic (Deterding 2015) and it 
reminds us of computers, communication infrastructures, logical patterns, 
and mathematical topographies—all those things that were not neces-
sarily associated with politics but now are. Perpetual campaigns, media 
monitoring, polling, and calculated political advertising are all part of 
news management strategies undertaken by contemporary establishments 
(Brown 2011), as fully revealed in the Cambridge Analytica scandal and its 
reliance on psychometric data collected from Facebook users for political 
campaigning (Graham-Harrison and Cadwalladr 2018). Journalistic practices 
are becoming similarly systematic, quantif iable, and algorithmized via web 
metrics, ratings, subscription f igures, and opinion polls (Christin 2018). As 
noted above, digital games do seem to be the cultural form most closely 
associated with our digitalized-networked age by modern play theorists. 
To understand the role of the digital game within mediatized society, let 
us trace its characteristics.
Unlike other media, the technological affordance of games allows multiple 
participants to engage with content repeatedly under similar conditions, 
individually or through collaborative effort. In this context, a single play-
through has diminished signif icance compared with the broader game 
capital and meta-game practices such as socializing or asking other players 
for help (Steinkuehler 2004; Consalvo 2007; Shaw 2010; Corliss 2011). As Simon, 
Boudreau, and Silverman (2009) have shown with their exploration of players 
of the game Everquest (Sony Online Entertainment 1999), performance is 
never calculated simply as a momentary score of kill points, but is instead a 
confluence of game mechanics, personal track record in relation to others, 
online social experience, and offline understanding of the play context, 
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over a period of time. This accumulation of social capital via engagement 
with playful systems is what draws me to examine video games through 
the prism of mediatization theory. I claim that as the political becomes 
increasingly mediatized, games become an expanding, different type of 
media, reaff irming within themselves characteristics associated with the 
network society as a whole. The continuous ludification of culture (Raessens 
2006, 2014; Jahn-Sudmann and Stockmann 2008; Pargman and Jakobsson 
2008; Roig et al. 2009; McGonigal 2011; Fuchs et al. 2014; Walz and Deterd-
ing 2015) is exhibited in the trickling spread of digital games beyond the 
boundaries of the home and arcade parlor and into broader cultural forms. 
From a separated, dedicated activity associated with a certain gender and 
class (Cassell and Jenkins 2000; Flanagan 2009), games have grown into a 
mainstream media consumption practice, to the point that “games have 
become so successful in ‘colonizing’ the sphere of everyday activities that 
playing them becomes transformed into a mundane act, comparable to 
watching television (to kill time) or cooking (to f ill one’s belly)” (Pargman 
and Jakobsson 2008, 234).1
In parallel, games and game elements are frequently being incorporated 
as design methodologies in computerized f ields as distinct as advertising, 
education, and corporate training, resulting in the paradigm of ‘gamif ica-
tion’—the inclusion of game elements in non-game systems (Deterding, 
Dixon et al. 2011; Deterding, Sicart et al. 2011; Fuchs 2012; Fuchs et al. 2014). 
This aspect of games as a widespread cultural phenomenon is thoroughly 
explored by Jesper Juul’s (2010) foray into the phenomenon of ‘casual games,’ 
the immediate precursor to the adoption of gamif ication. He combines 
ethnographic studies of players, interviews with developers, and comparative 
analyses of the game industry, and stresses that the abundance of such games 
has made the format accessible and accepted over multiple platforms and 
devices. Today, Juul notes, “[t]o play video games has become the norm; to 
not play video games has become the exception” (Juul 2010, 8). Digital games, 
from the workplace time-killers Solitaire and Minesweeper to smartphone 
staples like Angry Birds (Rovio 2009) and Candy Crush Saga (King 2012) to 
the top-selling (‘Triple-A’) blockbuster Grand Theft Auto and Call of Duty 
series, can thus be seen across various audiences, across age groups, gender, 
and income brackets. They are at the forefront of the new digital economy’s 
1 Arguably, Pargman and Jakobsson refer to ethnographic studies of hardcore gamers here, 
but as discussed next, those def initions are becoming blurred: ‘casual’ players occasionally 
spend growing amounts of time on games, while ‘hardcore’ players switch to ‘casual’ games 
due to lack of time.
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business model, extracting value from the experience of media in new (and 
often troubling) ways, from micro-transactions to behavioral tracking 
(Philips 2016).
The casual game is an important paradigm shift in video gaming culture, 
which highlights producers’ attempts to address wider audiences on the one 
hand and audiences’ growing familiarity with digital game interfaces on 
the other. Juul notes that from a market perspective, the modern ‘hardcore’ 
game industry (which is aimed at dedicated players who can devote time 
and effort to complex game learning curves) has reached saturation. Still, 
the inclusion of simple digital games in a variety of products (from watches 
to movie players) has made basic games into a common pastime of millions. 
Since many hardcore games are diff icult to get into for casual players while 
casual games seem to be accessible to all, several game developers have 
attempted to ‘casual-ize’ some of the features of games, leading to simplif ied 
controls for hardcore games or the inclusion of mini-games as part of the 
main game. Intuitive controls on consoles like the Nintendo Wii/3DS and 
AR/VR applications with three-dimensional body tracking, music games 
from the Guitar Hero or Rock Band series, the rise of intuitive touch screen 
controls and the overall dominance of smartphones as personal media 
devices, as well as the waxing and waning popularity of Facebook and the 
social games played through it, are all developments that have made digital 
gaming more accessible and acceptable for most people.
To conclude this section, I view the proliferation of digital games as an 
indication of the ludic attributes of our culture, previously identif ied in 
play studies. As (casual) games become the lingua franca of the digitally 
engaged, certain modes of behavior associated with playing games are 
becoming dominant. Mediatization theory suggests that politics is affected 
by the molding forces of the media, and while the theory initially pinpointed 
television as the medium ‘to blame,’ later replacing it with the web and 
associated ICTs, I suggest that games, and especially casual games, are the 
direction in which mediatization theorists should be looking now. Game 
studies and political communication have rarely been combined until 
now, and I hope to provide additional food for thought by creating a new 
conceptual framework for studying topics of engagement, participation, 
and information transmission that traces the different forms of ludic politi-
cal communication. I suggest this form is present in both top-bottom and 
bottom-up relations between the public, media, and governing off icials, 
and I call it ‘casual politicking’.
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Casual politicking
According to Juul (2010), the term ‘casual game’ developed over the 
last two decades to denote a type of entertainment software aimed at 
popular audiences rather than video game hobbyists. The genealogy of 
the casual game can be drawn from parlor card games such as Solitaire 
and family board games like Monopoly, alongside such early staples of 
video gaming as Myst (Cyan 1993), which was more concerned with the 
aesthetic experience than with complex game mechanics. The term is 
often contrasted to that of ‘hardcore’ games and their players, who are 
interested in developing complex gaming skills and willing to commit to a 
major time investment. However, Juul points out that the introduction of 
new distribution platforms has created a new economy of play time, one 
where simple games can be played repeatedly in short bursts, but taking 
up many hours over the day. Instead of focusing on time investment, Juul 
provides a breakdown of the design elements most strongly associated 
with casual games.
This section is dedicated to a two-stage argument about the applicability 
of Juul’s design elements to the study of contemporary politics. In the previ-
ous section, I argued that digital games are an expression of the ludif ication 
of culture in digital media. Moreover, I showed that mediatization theory 
suggests how certain ‘molding forces’ in the media shape entangled social 
spheres, and I presented casual games as a possible venue for such an 
analysis. Here, I wish to operationalize this analytical framework by f irst 
synthesizing the characteristics of casual games according to Juul, and 
then providing certain parallels with processes of political communication. 
I compare the Obama 2008 election app to Trump’s ‘Great Meme War’ 
strategy as a comparative case study to be analyzed within this framework. 
Here it must be stressed again that I do not claim any unidirectional or 
bidirectional effects between casual games and the political shifts I describe. 
Rather, the two reflect a similar trend in the information consumption and 
distribution practices of ICT-reliant audiences in the developed world. To 
begin with, I briefly introduce the two case studies and their signif icance 
before extrapolating the principles of casual politicking by synthesizing 
Juul’s characteristics into four distinct categories.
The off icial Barack Obama 2008 mobile application for the iOS and 
Android mobile operating systems is an example of casual politicking 
true to its time (Ritchey 2008). Mobile communications, text messages, 
and applications were instrumental in the success of Barack Obama’s 2008 
campaign (Kiyohara 2009; Pick 2010) and the app was a major part of this 
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effort. The app was released after a collaborative effort by ten volunteer 
coders, who had decided to donate their time and skills in order to sup-
port their presidential candidate (Sagolla 2008; Pick 2010). The develop-
ers acknowledged the innovativeness of their own emergent method of 
contributing to the campaign and stated that the same emergent principles 
helped build the features they implemented in the app, saying that “[t]he 
app was designed as a means to donate your time in discreet segments—we 
call it ‘micro-volunteering’” (Sagolla 2008). The application includes seven 
main functions (see Figure 20.1) and a “Donate” button, which played an 
important part in Obama’s unique campaign funding method of obtaining 
a multitude of small donations.
Ironically, the very same principles that went into the design of the Obama 
app and its surrounding campaign can be identified in the making of Donald 
Trump’s ‘Great Meme War’ (Nagle 2017; Lovink and Tuters 2018)—the word 
‘meme’ here refers to the practice of creating and spreading (visual) content 
online (Shifman 2014), while the word ‘war’ evokes the character and tone of 
Trump’s presidential campaign. This semi-facetious term, which references 
bloody conflicts of old yet is f illed with purposefully self-deprecating humor, 
was favored by online supporters of Trump, claiming to have “actually elected 
a meme as a president” (Ohlheiser 2016, n.p.) While Trump’s campaign also 
featured the option to donate money in a similar fashion to the Obama 
app, the main conceptual innovation of Trump’s campaign was utilizing 
micro-volunteering for cultural meaning-making (see Figure 20.2), and 
cross-pollinating various political right-wing groups (loosely identif ied as 
the ‘Alt-Right’) by Trump’s chief strategist Steve Bannon. The latter presided 
over the popularization of the Alt-Right identity in his previous position 
as the editor of Breitbart News, and maintained ties to this community 
throughout the campaign until his later departure from Trump’s White 
House team (Neiwert 2017).
20.1: obama ’08 app home screen.
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Understanding these two pivotal moments in political participation 
requires us to take a brief detour to the world of casual games, and their 
unique properties for capturing and holding the user’s attention (see Table 1, 
left column). First and foremost is the concept of ‘juiciness,’ relating to these 
games’ design patterns. Juiciness is embodied in the visceral interfaces 
that prioritize immediate visual and aural gratif ication, intuitive control, 
simplif ication of tasks, and a clear def inition of goals. Usability is a major 
component in juicy design.2 Games in general have outstanding interaction 
design methodologies, communicating their objectives via tutorials and 
gameplay rather than through external training. Unlike other kinds of 
software, casual games are developed for quick and easy play, aimed at 
a non-technical audience, in a context where complex instructions are 
impractical. A juicy interface values simple controls with immediate 
feedback, often in non-diegetic form as in text that appears on the screen 
congratulating players on successful actions. A second characteristic is 
interruptibility, which means designing the game in such a manner that a 
play session requires little effort. Casual games are designed to be played in 
short bursts. Be it a social network game that runs server-side through the 
2 Although Juul separates juiciness from usability, the former is reliant on the latter, as a 
usable and intuitive interface will determine whether the juicy elements become apparent. 
For my discussion, it is suff icient to include both terms under one category.
20.2: one of the images from the titular page on the ‘Great Meme War’ Encyclopediadramatica website, 
depicting Pepe the frog (an unofficial mascot of online Trump supporters) saluting the ‘fallen’.
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website interface and requires no save/load functions, or a console game 
that breaks play into small segments (levels, missions, mini-games), such 
games allow users to adjust the playing time to suit their schedule rather 
than vice versa.3 Thirdly, casual games exhibit a forgiving attitude toward 
mistakes. This is not to say the games are not hard, but they are designed in 
such a way as to avoid making players have to repeat large portions of game 
play if they make a mistake. Finally, all casual games exhibit a tendency 
to involve social connections as part of the game design, either by making 
the game multi-player or by promoting features such as leader boards and 
providing bonuses for inviting friends and family (Juul 2010).
Similar principles can be applied to tracing casual politicking. To date, 
many critics of online modes of political engagement depict them as 
shallow and non-consequential. Terms like ‘slacktivism’ or ‘clicktivism’ 
(Morozov 2014) highlight the low threshold of computer-mediated political 
engagement, both on the side of the political establishment and on that of 
ordinary citizens. To engage with the political only online, in other words, 
is not serious politics. Instead, I offer the term ‘casual politicking’ as a 
more nuanced alternative to the pessimistic view of contemporary politi-
cal participation online. With this term, I wish to evoke—in conjunction 
with the aforementioned characteristics of casual games—an unplanned, 
emergent, and self-organizing mode of conduct, rather than a binary, rigid 
structure of serious versus non-serious politics. It relies on four key aspects, 
which we can equate with the four casual gaming operating principles 
discussed earlier (see Table 1, right column).
First, such modes are facilitated by ICT platforms that exhibit interface 
and affordance equivalents to the juiciness elements of casual game design. 
Second, casual politicking relies on issue-centered rather than ideology-
centered conduct, which, when coupled with ICT platforms, generates an 
interruptible political mode for various actors. Users follow and connect with 
those issues that are relevant to them, contributing in each case according to 
their time and resources. Third, users exhibit perpetual political engagement, 
resonating with the low price of failure characteristic of casual games. In 
other words, there is a fluid and continuous engagement with issues on the 
side of politicians and citizens alike that allows for a quick recuperation 
in case of failure, while avoiding major disappointments and a sense of 
3 ‘Casual players’ can still spend long hours on games. Juul’s survey indicates that fourteen per 
cent of casual players dedicate more than 40 hours a week to playing games. Similarly, almost 
one third of baby-boomer gamers in the United States spend 20 hours playing a week (Pearce 
2008). The game simply allows for shorter individual play sessions. 
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setbacks. Lastly, just like in casual gaming, sociability is the driving force 
of casual politicking. This is reflected by involving networks of like-minded 
people in the political process, heavily relying on the social capital aspect 
of actions rather than on the perceived outcome.
Table 1: Comparison between involvement principles underlying casual gaming and 
those underlying casual politicking
Casual gaming Casual politicking
Juiciness: Rich visceral interfaces for 
immediate gratification
Intuitive interfaces: Accessible, reliable, and 
highly visualized interface for immediate 
information and engagement, with a high 
level of affordance
Interruptibility: Intended to be played 
in short bursts, minimal save/load 
compatibility
Issue-centered: Engagement for the shorter 
political/media attention span through 
clictivism and meme wars
forgiving attitude toward mistakes: A game 
may be hard, but failure does not result in a 
massive setback
Low price of failure: Perpetual processes 
minimize each engagement’s cost and 
reduce the entry barriers
Socially driven: Existing ties are important 
parts of the play experience
Socially driven: Existing ties and networks 
are important parts of the participatory 
experience, which underscores fun rather 
than ideology
Accessible interfaces in ICT
ICT networks with high-affordance accessible interfaces facilitate direct and 
visceral experiences that require little in the way of technical or political 
education. More and more political content migrates to platforms where 
ideologies are simplif ied in infographics and participation is achieved by 
signing an e-petition or sharing a link on your social media site profile, such 
as the embedding of Facebook’s ‘Like’ buttons on an external website that lets 
users ‘like’ a certain topic or personality and then receive communication 
about it in their feed (Helmond 2015).
Moreover, this ubiquitous access to information is provided by constantly 
simplifying and homogenizing access to digital data. This is done through a 
better understanding of computer-mediated usability (Nielsen and Pernice 
2008) as well as through the growing distribution of mobile wireless devices, 
which become embedded in the urban experience, manifesting a renewed 
connection between the city, its inhabitants, and the information they 
produce/consume (Mitchell 2003; Nunes 2006; de Souza e Silva 2006; de Souza 
e Silva and Hjorth 2009). For the f irst time in history, mobile communication 
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means that both the information carrier and the information itself are 
mobile—creating the possibility for the individual to be on the move while 
transmitting and receiving large quantities of data (Poster 2004). Casual 
politicking requires fast and simple access to data, and the ability to com-
municate while being on the move, often involving swarming (dispersed, 
self-organizing) modes of operation. Such traits are achieved through the 
imagined technological affordances (Gibson 1977; Norman 1988, 2002; Nagy 
and Neff 2015) of the interface, where agency results from the conjunction 
of a sentient (human) actor pursuing a goal and the perceived qualities 
of objects in the immediate vicinity that allow the actor to perform an 
action. Digital interfaces are often built with affordance design principles in 
mind, to hint, guide, and drive users. Contemporary interfaces thus create 
affordances for fast two-way communication, location-based action, viral 
news consumption, and the like.
The Obama app exemplif ies this well. The f irst option on the app’s main 
screen—Call Friends—links the app to the user’s phone book, sorting their 
contact list according to U.S. states (with an emphasis on contested ones), 
and prompts the user to call contacts and discuss the upcoming vote. This 
most innovative feature allows users to track their call efforts, post notes in 
relation to each friend, and eventually compare their statistics to nationwide 
lead callers. In effect, this function alters a friendly discussion about politics, 
turning it into a quantif iable measure and, more importantly, comparable 
set of statistics. While its developers may not have thought of it at the time, 
this function was probably one of the f irst attempts at gamif ication in 
national politics. The second menu choice—Get Involved—gives contact 
details for the nearest campaign headquarters using geolocation. They 
both rely on the unique technological affordances of the smartphone as 
a mediator of sociality and space. The smoothness and immediacy of the 
afforded function contributes to the speed of action.
This all occurs in an atmosphere of ‘post-broadcast democracy’ (Prior 
2007), where citizens have an increasingly selective interface with news 
media. Those who are interested in political information tend to be more 
partisan, and devote their time to searching and consuming politically 
oriented news material. Others have the opportunity to avoid the consump-
tion of political news altogether, occupying themselves with entertainment 
content (which increasingly also includes video games). This leads to a 
widening gap between involved and uninvolved citizens, as knowledge is a 
prerequisite for public participation (Bennett and Iyengar 2008), with fatigue 
from the constant need to participate creating the need to f ind alternative 
means of self-expression (Schölzel 2017). To state the obvious, neither of 
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the campaigns discussed in this chapter would have been possible without 
the ICT infrastructure available today. But such foundations include not 
only the oft-praised speed and horizontality, but also the embedded socio-
technical affordances of such websites as 4Chan, Reddit and YouTube that 
were instrumental in the formation and subsequent distribution of various 
forms of memetic content. And while an attempt to understand Trump’s 
‘Great Meme War’ as only technological reeks of ‘solutionism’ (Morozov 
2014), ignoring this component is also foolhardy.
To sum up, ICT platforms let casual politicking practitioners create 
interfaces for quick information provision and mobilization, which often 
require no—or minimal—previous knowledge or training. This opens up 
the opportunity for multiple actors to engage in interruptible, issue-centered 
political conduct.
Interruptible issue-networks
Just as game designers tend to create gradual experiences that allow 
players to choose their level of involvement, casual politicking is about 
selective levels of participation according to the individual’s abilities, 
desires, and availability. The prime promise of this type of engagement is 
that of choice—for the individual, the politician, and the media. Actors in 
mediatized environments are constantly exposed to a multitude of topics, 
interpretations, focuses, analyses, framings, and counter-framings.
The marketplace of ideas has become more than just a metaphor. In a 
multitude of global distractions, the active citizen has an abundance of 
choice and can select from a wide spectrum of economic, human rights, 
and environmental issues, from Black Lives Matter to #MeToo. But this also 
means that public interest quickly diminishes and moves onto the next hot 
‘issue of the day.’ Consequently, many organizations focus on certain issues, 
rather than on an ideological bundle, ‘selling’ certain ideas or beliefs, while 
constantly framing and reframing those issues in order to take advantage of 
momentary alliances, public opinion shifts, a beneficial media landscape, 
and the like. This notion follows from the work of Richard Rogers and Noortje 
Marres, who developed and implemented a digital humanities tool named 
Issue crawler that follows web URLs based on certain keywords, tracking 
the amalgamation of issues between different websites (Marres and Rogers 
2000; Rogers 2002, 2013; Marres 2006, 2017). What emerges from their research 
is a reflection of how politics works in the networked age: unsurprisingly, 
via networks. Rogers and Marres name them ‘issue networks’ after the 
term coined by political scientist Hugh Helco in the late 1970s. While Helco 
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and others used this term to refer to the cynical practice by civil society 
organizations of combining forces on certain issues for purely populist goals, 
Marres argues that issue networks are in fact an aff irmative framework, 
which we can use to examine activism and decision-making mechanisms.
Such networks, with their recognizable hashtags and domain names, also 
help concretize the debate (Burgess and Matamoros-Fernández 2016). Latour 
(2005a) famously criticized political scientists for being too preoccupied 
for too long with how to conceptualize the representational procedures 
in debating issues, rather than the issues (things) themselves. He argues 
that political contestations around topics like global warming or the war 
in Iraq have rendered the classic agreements on the rules and boundaries 
of debate null and void and that there is a need to “bring into the centre of 
the debate the proof of what it is to be debated” (Ibid., 8). Issue networks do 
just that, by allowing publics to form around a token, while still debating 
the exact boundaries of the issue in question (Bruns et al. 2016). Obama’s 
app presented a quick ‘cheat-sheet’ of election issues, broken down by 
categories such as Foreign Affairs or Energy-Environment. Inside each 
category, a list of stances and quotes was presented, to give an idea of the 
candidates’ approaches but also to make use of during discussions with 
others. By the time Trump’s supporters rallied for their candidate, the 
issues were generated bottom-up, rather than dictated from above. An 
infamous example of an issue can be seen in ‘Pizzagate,’ where the 4Chan 
community cultivated a conspiracy theory claiming that Hillary Clinton, 
Trump’s rival for presidency, supported a hidden child-abuse ring (Bach, 
Jokubauskaite, and Tuters 2018). While the full details of this endeavor 
are beyond the scope of this chapter, suff ice it to say that it ended up 
with an assault-rif le-wielding Trump supporter entering a pizza parlor in 
Washington D.C., aiming to put a stop to the abuse, an incident that was 
picked up and discussed in mainstream media sources. Clinton’s team had 
to respond to those events, becoming implicated in them and shifting the 
discourse onto ‘Pizzagate’ itself, rather than the broader political issues of 
the campaign.
Overall, the disjointed nature of issue networks, coupled with the af-
fordances provided by modern ICT, allow the various casual politicking 
practitioners to engage with selected issues and provide their followers 
(but subsequently, also opponents) with rapid means of interfering with 
the agendas of both decision-makers and the media.
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Perpetual processes
In the aftermath following Foucault’s dissection of the premodern and 
modern societies of punishment and discipline respectively, Gilles Deleuze 
noted that the postmodern is the society of control (Deleuze 1992). The 
defining moment of the move from enforced discipline to embedded control 
is the perpetualness:
[I]n the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school 
to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies 
of control one is never f inished with anything—the corporation, the 
educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting 
in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation. 
(Ibid., 5)
Game researcher David Nieborg identif ies mainstream Triple-A games as 
an “unfinished commodity” (2011, 36), arguing that by utilizing “branched 
serialization” (Ibid., 38), publishers turn the single game into a perpetual 
release cycle, generating constant additions to the original game content in 
the form of smaller and cheaper paid-for download packs or more content-
f illed and expensive expansions.
Casual games show even stronger ‘unf inished’ characteristics, as the 
casual game revenue model resembles a service rather than a product. 
First, they are developed on the basis of existing and well-known genres 
and mechanisms (Juul 2010) to appeal to the broadest base possible. In 
addition, the game is often ‘freemium,’ meaning that it is free to play, but 
allows for additional (usually small) payments to unlock layers of the 
game previously inaccessible or to speed up the game progress (Evans 
2015). The design of such games often presupposes the introduction of 
additional goods, and thus the game is intentionally left incomplete, with 
more features added as the life cycle of the game continues (Hamari 2011). 
Much of the freemium content consists of ‘vanity items’ that have no real 
gameplay value, and many vanity items are seasonal, such as Christmas 
decorations or clothing for the player’s avatars or virtual domains (Fields 
and Cotton 2011), tied to the player’s real-world time. Casual game companies 
often compete with one another by copying successful game elements, 
and because distribution is mostly online and development cycles much 
shorter, audiences occasionally move en masse to a more successful clone 
of an older game, forcing the latter’s designer to embark on a new, fast-
paced development and marketing campaign. Games as an industry are a 
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very f itting illustration of the Deleuzian never-f inishing condition that is 
prevalent in societies of control.
The same perpetualness exists similarly in the realm of politics, and using 
the epistemic prism of casual games helps us to conceptualize it. With the 
growth of mass self-communication and the loss of legitimacy, politicians 
have adopted further methods of perpetual and horizontal campaigning 
(Manin 1997; De Beus 2011). Instead of issuing focused messaging to the public 
during election time, mediatized politics constantly strives to present a vivid 
spectacle4 to the ever-hungry press and the judgment of their constituents. 
My claim here is that understanding the ways casual games capitalize on 
their players’ desire for short-cycle repetitive patterns of use can help us 
shed light on such political developments. In an increasingly information-
saturated world, games and politicians may face similar challenges: to stand 
out among the crowd and draw attention (Terranova 2012). Both Obama’s 
app and Trump’s campaign have done so, to varying degrees of success. To 
do this, both of these actants seek to rally users through ‘social’ methods 
of engagement.
Sociable and collaborative
The last def ining characteristic of casual politicking is the tendency to 
orchestrate political action as social and collaborative. What I mean by this 
is that modern politics is reliant on ‘social’ elements as they are understood 
today in the popular digital discourse, as a design principle or technology 
powering many of our mediatized environments—from news to entertain-
ment to education. Social elements, which are often tied to the ‘Web 2.0’ 
concept (O’Reilly 2005), include reliance on sharing and crowd-sourced 
elements, distributed and decentralized models, platforms rather than 
services, and the like.5 Social capital is a major driving force behind casual 
games, especially those with the free-to-play model. They use a player’s 
computerized social connections to facilitate cooperation or completion, 
prompting an exchange of virtual crops or tracking a friend’s progress on 
a leader board. Similarly, the social component of causal politicking is 
reliant on playful and subversive massive engagement with political content 
4 Manin uses the metaphor of the theater to describe postmodern politics: politicians perform, 
citizens watch, journalists review. 
5 For a broader discussion of the term and the associated practices, see Kylie Jarret’s (2008) 
critical paper on Web 2.0 terminology.
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and stands in direct relation to the collapse of traditional representative 
parliamentary democracy and the rise of issue networks.
Communication outlets are increasingly consciously aligning themselves 
with certain political and/or economical actors’ ideologies (Brown 2011). In 
this environment, framing information becomes a game of sorts. Individuals 
and groups are approaching the glocal (Meyrowitz 2005) and translocal 
(Hepp 2013) media spaces as puzzles: what is the given information, what is 
hidden, what is the bias of each source, how can we deconstruct, recombine, 
and supplement the news provided in order to make sense of the world? This 
approach is inherently social and ludic, and many online news communities 
in fact act as if they are current affairs ‘fans’: inquisitive, critical, fanatical, 
and collaborative (Gray, Sandvoss, and Harrington 2017). The gamification 
of various political spheres is built on such a perception of fan (and fun) 
engagement with the political process, for example in the practice of ‘fake’ 
social media accounts that are now widely used to parody public f igures 
(Wilson 2011).
In the case of the Obama app, it allowed those who used it to organ-
ize themselves (independently or through Obama’s local headquarters) 
to participate in the broadening of the network. The people using the 
app do this of their own volition, contributing themselves as additional 
nodes to Obama’s network and obtaining in return the perceived benef its 
of connectedness. Some features, such as the leader-board caller func-
tions, appeal directly to the users’ sense of competition, whether among 
themselves or in the greater context of the presidential race: talk to your 
friends, as the winning conditions of this race can be quantif iable, and 
each call matters.6
Eight years later, the same principles fueled the ‘Great Meme War.’ The 
practice of ‘shitposting’—creating random and deliberately annoying 
memes—was about playful socialization. Many of the participants in the 
‘war’ did it, primarily, to have fun as part of a bigger community, jokingly 
seeing themselves as rebels and outcasts in the light of classic science f ic-
tion and fantasy tropes (Banis 2018). Just like the touch-screen game or 
app, innocuously taking up more and more of people’s time without them 
realizing (Gekker 2016), the meme war grew and became serious business. 
6 It is interesting to note the progress of this leaderboard approach toward the 2012 presidential 
elections when supporters were given the option of creating their own customizable fundraising 
page, which further increased the campaign personalization and potentially fostered an internal 
competition in terms of design, operation, and success metrics of each page. It remains to be 
seen whether such a distributed approach will be effective in the long run.
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Some Trump online supporters admit they regretted their actions after 
the election results were announced. It is conceivable to imagine them 
perceiving their participation through the prism of the screen, concentrated 
more on the immediate results—make a successful meme to antagonize 
the ‘normies’ (non-supporters)—than on the f inal outcome.
Conclusion: Toward the ludification of politics
At the annual Game Developers Conference in 2010, game designer Jesse 
Schell gave a talk in which he outlined his vision of the continued process 
of the ludif ication (and especially gamification) of society (G4TV 2010). It is 
not so farfetched, he argued, that the future will feature gameful elements 
everywhere: in our taxes, health insurance, cars, social interaction, and so on 
(e.g. Zimmerman 2015). He calls it the ‘gamepocalypse,’ a term that registers 
the concern he has for this state of affairs, although both he and some of his 
supporters noted the positive opportunities of this situation. This future is, 
however, uncertain, with others pointing out the backlash of people against 
the gameful systems, and the hyped nature of the gamification f ield, which 
may subdue the enthusiasm for implementing such design mechanisms in 
additional societal systems.
While gamepocalypse may be a contested vision, I wish to complicate 
the discussion yet further with the proposition of gamocracy as a form 
of political organization. It will not necessarily happen in the way Schell 
envisioned it, with leader boards for the best performing politicians, graphic 
interfaces through which parliament members could battle opposing fac-
tions, or ‘political experience points’ with which you could ‘level up’ for 
voting or participating in referenda (although those are some interesting 
experiments). It will, however, prioritize the aforementioned modes of 
engagement so characteristic of games and their audiences: playfulness, 
immediacy, and casual burst-like activity. This will result in the need for 
a new research framework from cultural studies and the humanities to 
supplement traditional tools of communication. Such a framework will 
focus on the citizen not only as a sender or receiver of information, but 
as a subject embedded in a ludic culture whose motives in the political 
realm may rely on the notions of fun and play no less than on ideological 
rational choice.
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